

This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the information in books and make it universally accessible.

GoogleTM books

<http://books.google.com>





32101 076387131

5001
436


Library of



Princeton University.

THE
HARVARD
THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME IV



ISSUED QUARTERLY BY
THE FACULTY OF DIVINITY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

HARVARD
LIBRARY
PUBLISHED BY

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
PUBLISHED BY HARVARD UNIVERSITY

1911

The *Harvard Theological Review* has been partially endowed by a bequest of the late Miss Mildred Everett, "for the establishment and maintenance of an undenominational theological review, to be edited under the direction of the Faculty of the Divinity School of Harvard University. . . . I make this provision in order to carry out a plan suggested by my late father, the Rev. Charles Carroll Everett." During the continuance of *The New World*, Dr. Everett was on its editorial board, and many of his essays, now collected in the volume entitled *Essays, Theological and Literary*, appeared first in its pages. Sharing his belief in the value of such a theological review, and in devotion to his honored memory, the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School, of which he was a member from 1869, and its Dean from 1878 until his death in 1900, has accepted the trust, and will strive to make the *Review* a worthy memorial of his comprehensive thought and catholic spirit.

The *Review* is edited by a committee of the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School consisting of Professors G. F. Moore, W. W. Fenn, and J. H. Ropes.

YTESIVMU
YRABU
J.M. NOTION

CONTENTS FOR JANUARY, 1911

THE OLD THEOLOGY AND THE NEW	<i>William Adams Brown</i>	1
THE SHEPHERD OF HERMAS AND CHRISTIAN LIFE IN ROME IN THE SECOND CENTURY	<i>Kirsopp Lake</i>	25
THE SOCIAL SETTLEMENT AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, <i>Gaylord S. White</i>		47
IS FAITH A FORM OF FEELING?	<i>Andrew C. Armstrong</i>	71
THE SYNOPTIC MIND	<i>George R. Dodson</i>	80
SOME PROBLEMS IN THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION	<i>Irving King</i>	104
THE MORAL ARGUMENT OF THEISM	<i>George A. Barrow</i>	119
HEBREW OSTRACA FROM SAMARIA	<i>David G. Lyon</i>	136

CONTENTS FOR APRIL, 1911

ITALIAN MODERNISM, SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS .	<i>William Frederic Badè</i>	147
UNIVERSITY SETTLEMENTS IN GREAT BRITAIN	<i>Percy Ashley</i>	175
JESUS AS LORD	<i>Benjamin Wisner Bacon</i>	204
BEYOND MORAL IDEALISM	<i>George Plimpton Adams</i>	229
THE TYPES OF AUTHORITY IN CHRISTIAN BELIEF, <i>Clarence A. Beckwith</i>		241
REVERENCE AS THE HEART OF CHRISTIANITY	<i>Charles A. Allen</i>	253

CONTENTS FOR JULY, 1911

SCHOPENHAUER'S CONTACT WITH THEOLOGY, <i>William Mackintire Satter</i>		271
RATIONAL MYSTICISM AND NEW TESTAMENT CHRISTIANITY <i>Henry W. Clark</i>		311
THE COVENANTERS OF DAMASCUS; A HITHERTO UNKNOWN JEWISH SECT	<i>George Foot Moore</i>	330
GOD IN ALL AND OVER ALL	<i>Warren Seymour Archibald</i>	378
THE PASTOR AND TEACHER IN NEW ENGLAND	<i>Vergil V. Phelps</i>	388

CONTENTS FOR OCTOBER, 1911

EMERSON FROM AN INDIAN POINT OF VIEW .	<i>Herambachandra Maitra</i>	403
THE ETHICS OF JESUS AND THE MODERN MIND	<i>Daniel Evans</i>	418
THE CRITICAL PROBLEM OF THEOLOGY TODAY: THE PROBLEM OF METHOD	<i>Herbert Alden Youtz</i>	439
CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION	<i>W. W. Fenn</i>	460
THE IDEA OF A MODERN ORTHODOXY	<i>Douglas C. Macintosh</i>	477
THE NATURE OF PRAYER	<i>Mary Whiton Calkins</i>	489

INDEX OF AUTHORS

ADAMS, GEORGE P. . . .	Beyond Moral Idealism	229
ALLEN, CHARLES A. . . .	Reverence as the Heart of Christianity	253
ARCHIBALD, WARREN S. . .	God in All and over All	378
ARMSTRONG, ANDREW C. . .	Is Faith a Form of Feeling ?	71
ASHLEY, PRECY	University Settlements in Great Britain	175
BACON, BENJAMIN W. . . .	Jesus as Lord	204
BADÉ, WILLIAM F.	Italian Modernism, Social and Religious	147
BARROW, GEORGE A. . . .	The Moral Argument of Theism	119
BECKWITH, CLARENCE A. . .	The Types of Authority in Christian Belief	241
BROWN, WILLIAM A. . . .	The Old Theology and the New	1
CALKINS, MARY W.	The Nature of Prayer	489
CLARK, HENRY W.	Rational Mysticism and New Testament Christianity	311
DODSON, GEORGE R.	The Synoptic Mind	80
EVANS, DANIEL	The Ethics of Jesus and the Modern Mind	418
FENN, W. W.	Concerning Natural Religion	460
KING, IRVING	Some Problems in the Science of Religion	104
LAKE, KIRSOPP	The Shepherd of Hermas and Christian Life in Rome in the Second Century	25
LYON, DAVID G.	Hebrew Ostraca from Samaria	136
MACINTOSH, DOUGLAS C. . .	The Idea of a Modern Orthodoxy	477
MAITRA, H.	Emerson from an Indian Point of View	403
MOORE, GEORGE F.	The Covenanters of Damascus: A Hitherto Unknown Jew- ish Sect	330
PHELPS, VERGIL V.	The Pastor and Teacher in New England	388
SALTER, W. M.	Schopenhauer's Contact with Theology	271
WHITE, GAYLORD S.	The Social Settlement after Twenty-five Years	47
YOUTE, HERBERT A.	The Critical Problem of Theology Today: The Problem of Method	439

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME IV.

JANUARY, 1911.

NUMBER 1.

THE OLD THEOLOGY AND THE NEW

WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

By the old theology we mean the type of theology which, whatever its date, ignores the modern scientific movement and is unaffected in method by the results of that movement. By the new theology, conversely, we mean the type of theology whose method is determined by the modern scientific movement and which is hospitable to its results. The purpose of this article is to ask what is the relation of the two, what they have in common, wherein they differ, and what ought to be the attitude of the representatives of the one to the other.

By the modern scientific movement is meant the movement of thought whose chief marks on the outward side are the acceptance of development as the law of the physical universe, and on the inward side the recognition of the contribution of mind to the content of knowledge. It is a movement to which it is not easy to set exact chronological limits. While Darwin and Kant are the names that we commonly associate with its beginnings on the outward and the inward side respectively, it goes back in principle much further. When Copernicus substituted for the prevailing geo-centric astronomy his new helio-centric system, he was using principles of which our modern view of the world is only the fuller and completer expression.

The old theology, I say, is the theology whose method antedates this modern scientific movement and is unaffected by its results. All turns here on the term "method." The new theology is not a matter of date, but of principles. In all the different churches are men modern in the details of their theology, taking over

now this and now that result from current criticism and investigation, but in principle old theologians, because their method remains unaffected by the fundamental change in the principles of thinking which we call the modern scientific spirit.

There is, then, no lack of representatives whom we might take as illustrations of our subject. They might be drawn from the various schools of thought, Calvinistic, Arminian, Lutheran, Anglican, for in all these historic types the same fundamental difference of point of view may be illustrated. But for our present purpose we will take that particular theological system which is the most virile, clear-cut, and independent of them all, and which has, moreover, the advantage of being the school from which many of us can trace our own theological inheritance. I mean historic Calvinism. Whatever else may be questionable, we shall all agree that Calvinism is a typical representative of the old theology.

I

The first thing that strikes us as we approach the Calvinistic system is the fundamental dualism in its view of the world. The universe is divided into two parts, nature and the supernatural. The former is the world of law, in which everything takes place uniformly, that is to say, in which, when any event happens, you can predict with certainty that it will be followed by such and such other events. The latter is the world of grace, or, in other words, of miracle, that is to say, of those unpredictable divine activities which break in upon the uniformity of nature out of a clear sky, and have no known antecedents to which they can be referred. Nature can be known by human reason, but to the realm of grace we have access only through revelation. Man, as we know him today, is a member of the former realm. He is a child of nature, and his knowledge is limited to the orderly sequences of law. What God may intend in the higher realm we cannot tell, save as the Almighty graciously makes his purposes known through revelation.

This limitation of knowledge, to be sure, was not native to man. Man was created righteous, and in his original state was fully acquainted with God's purposes on his behalf; but this vantage-

ground of knowledge he lost through sin, and as a result the race as a whole is not only unable to do anything that is good, but is ignorant of the only remedy that could deliver it from its state of helplessness. If man is to be saved, God must intervene. He must impart to his sinful creatures the knowledge which they are unable to obtain for themselves; and in fact such gracious interventions have taken place from time to time in human history. God revealed himself to Adam in the garden, he revealed himself to Abraham, to Isaac and Jacob, to Moses and the prophets, and, finally, most clearly to mankind in Jesus Christ.

We can see now the great significance which the Bible has for the old theology. The Bible is the repository of divine revelation. In it the gracious God has gathered up the special communications which from time to time he has been pleased to vouchsafe to men, and they are here preserved in permanent form for the enlightenment and guidance of future generations. The Bible, therefore, is the one certain means by which man can find a remedy for the misery in which his sin has involved him. It is his only infallible rule of faith and practice.

But the Bible alone is not enough. Many men read the Bible who are not saved, and the reason is that they do not read it understandingly. For this there must be a special communication of God, a direct revelation to the heart of each man through the divine spirit. The supernatural activity of God without is matched by a similar activity within. Through the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* God assures the believer of the divine authority of his word, and in regeneration creates within him a divine life which makes it possible for him to avail himself of the gracious provision revealed therein.

This deep-cut division in the world and in human life goes back finally to God himself. The principle of law and the principle of grace are alike rooted in his nature. As holy, God is under law, bound by the necessity of his own inexorable justice to punish all sin; as gracious, he is able to show mercy or withhold it as he pleases, owning no sovereignty but that of his own inscrutable and self-determining will.

From this fundamental antithesis all the other articles of the Calvinistic system necessarily follow. It determines the con-

ception of punishment. Punishment is the price which divine justice exacts for sin. It determines the conception of salvation. Salvation is remission of penalty on the basis of a substitutionary atonement. It determines the doctrine of the person of Christ. Christ is both God and man, two natures in one person; man that he may make atonement, God that he may be able to make it. It determines the doctrine of the trinity. God is three persons in one substance, for if there be no such distinction in his being, it will be impossible for him in his capacity as Son, the representative of mercy, to make the atonement exacted by himself in his capacity of Father, the representative of justice. Finally, it determines the conception of the church. The church is the organization divinely intrusted with the means of grace, the one institution among men through which the divine revelation in the Bible and the sacraments is preserved and handed down from generation to generation.

We are not interested here in the details of the system. Our concern is rather with its consequences. First among these we may mention the definite standard which Calvinism gave its adherents. The writer was once walking through New York City with Dr. Wilfred Grenfell, the well-known missionary to Labrador. It was towards midnight, and we had been discussing some of the perplexing problems which the complex life of the city presents. Grenfell had been silent for some time. At last he said abruptly: "I wish I were back in Labrador. It is so much easier to know what is right in Labrador than it is in New York." No old-time Calvinist would have felt the impulse to express Grenfell's wish. To him right was right everywhere and always, in Labrador and in New York, and he knew what was right at any time or in any place, for it had been divinely revealed once for all in the Bible. His duty was simply to hear and obey.

A second consequence was the clear line drawn between the religious and the secular. The church and the world, God and Satan, confronted each other like two hostile camps, and it was the duty of every believer to come out of the one and ally himself with the other. The result was a lessening of interest in many things that other ages have valued, art, letters, the institu-

tions of civil government, culture and civilization in the broadest sense. All these were valueless in themselves except as they could be made instruments to promote the service of God and the welfare of his church.

A third consequence was the reinforcement of power which came with the consciousness of immediate dependence upon God. Duty was rooted in faith, and at every reading of the decalogue the thunders of Sinai still made themselves heard. To man the task required might seem hard, but with God all things were possible, and the man who put his trust in him might be sure that in the end he would prevail.

Such, then, is the old theology, in contrast to which the new theology must be judged. We have taken Calvinism for our example, but we might equally well have taken Arminianism, or Anglicanism. Arminianism gives the human will more place in its dealings with God. The will is an arm which man himself has the power to reach across the gulf separating him from God to clasp the hand outstretched from the other side. In Anglicanism the sacraments are given a larger place than in the more radical Protestant systems. God meets man not only or chiefly through the Bible, but in the sacraments, those mystic rites consecrated by immemorial usage, through which the guilt of sin is washed away in baptism, and the corrupt and mortal nature renewed by feeding on the body and blood of Christ. But these are differences of detail. The fundamental lines remain the same. In each case we face the same antithesis between law and grace, nature and the supernatural, the human and the divine. There is no place for toleration or compromise. We deal in absolute antitheses, realities that have remained unchanged from the beginning. The conceptions of development, of growth, of adaptation, of progress, are unknown.

What, then, shall we say of this old theology which we have thus briefly passed in review? What is its meaning as a phenomenon in human history, and what its value for human life? To answer these questions intelligently we must first ask and answer certain others. First, where did this theology come from? Secondly, what gave it its power over the men who held it? And thirdly, why is it no longer satisfying to us today?

And, first, where did the old theology come from? The answer to this is very simple. It was the outcome of the Protestant Reformation, that great protest against Catholicism which took place in the first quarter of the sixteenth century; and it bears the marks of its origin. Three different strands enter into it, which we must distinguish if we are rightly to understand it.

In the first place, there is the Christian element, which was preserved in Catholicism and inherited by Protestantism from it. The importance attributed to the Old Testament as a source of revelation, the central place given to Jesus as the founder of Christianity, the Saviour of men, and the Lord of his church, the conception of God as a God of grace, providing a way of forgiveness for the penitent sinner, the high ethical standard required of man as servant of his brother, the conception of the church as the community of the redeemed, bound together by common faith and consecrated to a common service, all these are elements which belong to primitive Christianity and which have passed over into the old theology through Catholicism.

In the second place, there are certain elements which Protestantism shared with Catholicism. Such are the dualistic view of the world, the conception of freedom as arbitrary choice, and sovereignty as the power to do as you please; the doctrines of total depravity and of original sin, as they were formulated by Augustine in the fifth century; the conceptions of verbal inspiration, and of imputation as a legal transfer of merit from one individual to another, on the basis of mathematical equivalence; the conception of regeneration as a magical change taking place in the subconsciousness, apart from any necessary connection with the faith which is its normal accompaniment and evidence in experience; the function assigned to the visible church as the guardian of the means of grace and the administrator of the divine discipline,—all these are inheritances of Protestantism from Catholicism, and all of them have passed over in one form or another into the old theology.

They are inheritances, I say, of Protestantism from Catholicism, but to say this is only to push the question one step further back. Whence did Catholicism derive them? How was it that it added to the primitive and simple Christianity of the New Testament this elaborate superstructure?

To answer this question in detail would carry us too far, but, in general, it may be said that these new elements represent the reaction of contemporary thought upon Christianity. They are the consequences for religion which followed from the view of the world which was built up little by little by the labor of the great thinkers whom we call the schoolmen. Many of the materials of their majestic structure are found centuries earlier. Greek philosophy contributed a part, Jewish legalism contributed a part, Eastern mysticism contributed a part, logical minds untrained in the methods of experimental science, working over generation after generation the problems that have always presented themselves to the mind, contributed their part. The result, I repeat, was a great system of thought which constituted the world-view of the Middle Ages. Catholicism took over this view of the world, used it in the formulation of its theology, and passed it on to Protestantism in its turn.

To us today there is so much in this old world-view that seems artificial and unreal that it is hard to realize what an advance it was upon the thinking that preceded it. In a world full of mystery and unreason, where the supremacy of law was only imperfectly recognized, where man felt himself surrounded on every hand by spirits, good and evil, who might at any moment break in upon his security by some malicious, or, at all events, some unpredictable act, it was a great gain to build a wall of division between nature and the supernatural which should at least set bounds to their activities. It was a great thing to know that there was a sphere in which law reigned and in which effect inevitably followed cause, even if there remained outside of it a territory impenetrable by reason, from which occasional messengers, celestial or infernal, might invade the common world. Here, at least, was a foundation for science, a territory in which the great achievements of human reason might find a home.

We must remember, then, when we estimate what we have called the Catholic elements in the old theology, that not religion but philosophy is responsible for them. They are, I repeat, the reaction of mediaeval thought upon the Christian religion, and our quarrel with them is not the quarrel of philosophy with religion, but of philosophy with philosophy.

Finally, there are the Protestant elements, the elements, that is to say, which represent the reaction of Protestantism against Catholicism, and its own distinctive contribution to the religious life of man. Among these may be noted the recognition of the direct responsibility of the individual to God, with its corollary in the right of private judgment, the insistence upon the Bible as the sole authority for faith and practice, over against the Catholic insistence upon tradition; the practical character given to doctrine as truth bearing directly upon personal experience, and therefore of the highest importance for every individual to understand, the wider extension of the sphere of religion through the doctrine of the universal priesthood of all believers, and, finally, the insistence upon the same strictness of ethical standard for the layman as was required of the minister.

I have called these elements Protestant because they have found their fullest and clearest expression in historic Protestantism. Yet it is only just to Catholicism to remind ourselves that they have their parallels in the Catholic church. Catholicism too has always had its protestants, its men of immediate religious insight and of high ethical standard, who have dared to criticise the abuses of existing religion, and have pointed the way to a freer and more spiritual faith. The mystics who from age to age have made their appearance in the Catholic church have been such protestants. Francis of Assisi in the thirteenth century was such a protestant, Jansen in the seventeenth was another, Pascal and his friends of Port Royal were others. Had it not been for the work of such men in the past, not only would the position of the Modernists today be untenable, but their very existence would be inexplicable. Modernism is the fruitage within Catholicism of the same principles of freedom and individuality which in our own day have given birth in Protestantism to the new theology.

Such, in general, are the elements that have gone into the making of the old theology in its Protestant form, and which in their action and reaction explain the changes through which it has passed in the course of its history of four hundred years. These changes are due to the fact that the old theology is not wholly old, but at its core, in its doctrine of private judgment and individual responsibility, bears a germ of the new, which, when

furnished with the proper environment, is certain to spring up and bear fruit in surprising and far-reaching modifications. If it were not for the presence of this living germ at the heart of the old theology, enabling it again and again to push out fresh roots through the restraining folds of its inheritance of tradition and to renew its vigor at the pure springs from which Christianity first drew its life, our problem would be far simpler than it is today.

Our second question has to do with the causes which give the old theology its hold upon its adherents. Here too the answer is simple. The explanation of its power is found, where all theology worthy of the name finds its power, in the living experience from which it springs and of which it is in large part an expression. We misunderstand Calvinism when we think of it primarily as a system of doctrine. It was indeed a system, and faced the great questions with which philosophy has to do, but its interest in these was secondary. Primarily it seemed to the men who held it a transcript of experience which they could daily verify in their own souls. Doctrines such as election, preterition, regeneration, justification, effectual calling, perseverance, assurance, which to many in our day have lost their meaning and become empty words, were to them names for realities which had their verification every day in their own lives and in the lives of their friends.

In the fifth chapter of the Westminster Confession of Faith we find this paragraph under the general head of the doctrine of Providence:—

As for those wicked and ungodly men whom God as a righteous judge for former sins doth blind and harden, from them he not only withholdeth his grace whereby they might have been enlightened in their understanding and wrought upon in their hearts, but sometimes also withdraweth the gifts which they had, and exposeth them to such objects as their corruption makes occasion of sin, and withal gives them over to their own lusts, the temptations of the world, and the power of Satan, whereby it comes to pass that they harden themselves even under those means which God useth for the softening of others.

These sentences express one of the most rigid and repellent of the doctrines of Calvinism, the doctrine of reprobation. But

when we look at them not as theoretical statements, but as a leaf taken out of the book of human life, how true they are! How often we see just such experiences in the lives of the people we know, things that ought to be means of growth proving as a matter of fact causes of corruption and of weakness, the money that one man makes his servant becoming the master of another, knowledge resulting in pride rather than in efficiency, love leading to self-indulgence rather than to unselfishness, even the unfaltering trust, which is the best gift that one human being can give to another, made the occasion for carelessness and indifference.

Or take an illustration from the tenth chapter, another of the hard chapters of the Confession. It is the definition of effectual calling.

All those whom God has predestinated unto life, and those only, he is pleased in his appointed and accepted time effectually to call by his word and spirit out of that state of sin and death in which they are by nature, to grace and salvation by Jesus Christ, enlightening their minds spiritually and savingly to understand the things of God, taking away their heart of stone and giving unto them a heart of flesh, renewing their wills and by his almighty power determining them to that which is good, and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ, yet so as they come most freely, being made willing by his grace.

Reading this paragraph as a statement of theological doctrine we are repelled by its arbitrariness, but when we look at it as a description of Christian experience we find that it brings before us in living language the essential elements of the process which actually takes place in the soul of a man when he enters upon the religious life,—the enlightenment of the mind, the loosing of the pent emotions, the new purpose impressed upon the will, the sense of an external constraint laid upon one, yet in such form that the consent, when it comes, is most free. All this can be verified in countless lives.

But theology deals not with present experience only, but also with unseen realities. It formulates those great convictions which give support to faith when the shocks of life come and human strength alone seems too weak to withstand their strain. Here, again, the old theology reveals its strength. It brings man face to face with the eternal God and plants his feet upon a rock that

cannot be shaken. This sense of immutable security meets us again and again in lives that have been fed upon the old theology. Its artificiality, its legalism, its separation of things that seem to us to belong together, its pedantic weighing of merit against guilt, —all this disappears when the plan of salvation is contemplated as the purpose of the unchanging God for the redemption of man, his child.

Among Cromwell's letters, contained in Carlyle's classic edition, there is one directed to his son-in-law, General Fleetwood, then Lord Deputy of Ireland. It is dated at Whitehall, June 22, 1655, two years after the dismissal of the famous Rump Parliament. After treating of various matters of business, the writer, then ruler of one of the most powerful nations in the world, and bearing upon his shoulders burdens of responsibility that would have crushed any but the strongest man, concludes as follows:

Dear Charles, my dear love to thee; and to my dear Biddy [his daughter] who is a joy to my heart, for what I hear of the Lord in her. Bid her be cheerful, and rejoice in the Lord once and again: if she knows the Covenant, she cannot but do so. For that transaction is without her; sure and steadfast, between the Father and the Mediator in His blood: therefore, leaning upon the Son, or looking to Him, thirsting after Him, and embracing Him, we are His seed;—and the Covenant is sure to all the Seed. The Compact is for the Seed; God is bound in faithfulness to Christ, and in Him to us: the Covenant is without us; a Transaction between God and Christ. Look up to it. God engageth in it to pardon us; to write His Law in our heart; to plant His fear so that we shall never depart from Him. We, under all our sins and infirmities, can daily offer a perfect Christ; and thus we have peace and safety, and apprehension of love, from a Father in Covenant,—who cannot deny Himself. And truly in this is all my salvation; and this helps me to bear my great burdens.

The literature of Puritanism is full of such examples. Our hymn-books witness on every page to the strength and peace which faith in the God of the old theology brought into the lives of those who put their trust in him.

When I survey the wondrous cross
On which the Prince of glory died,
My richest gain I count but loss,
And pour contempt on all my pride.

It is not strange that men who held such a faith should have done a great work in the world. Calvin in Geneva, Cromwell and Milton in England, John Robinson in Leyden, the Pilgrim Fathers at Plymouth Rock, all these are examples of what we might call the pragmatic value of the old theology.

II

But, if the old theology contains so much that is true and life-giving, why is it no longer satisfactory today? Why do we need a new theology? Has our experience changed? Has our need altered? Or is the cause to be found elsewhere in some new factor that has entered into our environment, but which was not present in the minds that formed the old theology?

We shall be helped to an intelligent answer if we begin by considering how this new theology came to be, and here again we must begin with a definition. What do we mean by the new theology? We mean, as has been said above, the theology whose method is determined by the results of the modern scientific movement, both on the objective side in the acceptance of development as the law of the physical universe, and on the subjective side by the recognition of the contribution which the mind itself makes to the content of its own knowledge. It is a theology which has come into existence as a result of the intellectual revolution through which thought has passed during the last century, and it expresses the reaction of that revolution within the realm of religion. It is not confined to any one country, nor restricted to any branch of the Christian church. It has sprung up independently in different places. In Germany its great name is Schleiermacher, in England, Coleridge. In the Catholic church it appears in Modernism, a movement whose wide ramifications and increasing influence are causing us ever new surprise. Wherever the modern view of the world has become a constituent part of human thinking, there, sooner or later, the new theology has made its appearance.

Let us look at this theology a little more carefully in order to see what it involves. And here, at the outset, we are met with a difficulty. The new theology has no formal creed, in which its

beliefs are embodied. It has no official representative who can speak with authority for the convictions of his fellow-theologians. It is a spirit and a method rather than a body of definite opinions, and any statement of its tendencies must be individual and provisional.

This lack of official standard has often been made a reproach against the new theology on the part of those trained in the old. It seems to them to be not so much a theology as a group of theologies, each inconsistent with the other. And indeed there is not a little in the attitude of the representatives of the new theology to give plausibility to this reproach. It is natural that men who are engaged in the details of investigation should feel more keenly the things which separate them than the premises in which they agree. When one hears in Germany the polemics of the Ritschlians against the Hegelians, or in England or this country the attacks of the pragmatists upon the absolutists; when one sees the Abbé Loisy pointing out how inadequate is the conception of Christianity set forth by Harnack in his *What is Christianity?* and how superior is the type of Catholicism provided by his own book, *The Gospel and the Church*, one is tempted to believe that here are fundamental differences, and to feel that the representatives of the old theology are right when they say that the new theology has no definite standards and no common agreements.

But one needs only to draw aside for a little and look at things in a longer perspective in order to see how misleading such a judgment is. Judged from the point of view which here alone interests us, the questions at issue between the various representatives of the new theology are only differences of detail. Like the differences between Arminianism and Calvinism of an earlier day they are compatible with the recognition of common principles. Indeed, the battle between the pragmatists and the absolutists is only the perpetuation on the new field of the modern world of the old battle which the Arminians and the Calvinists waged with their different weapons two hundred and fifty years ago. I do not say that these differences are unimportant. On the contrary, I believe them to be highly important, but as compared with the issues which we are now considering they are secondary and may be overlooked. As there are principles,

common to all the schools of the old theology, which constitute it a distinct intellectual and religious type, so there are principles common to all schools of the new.

The first and most striking characteristic of the new theology is its view of the world as a unity. The contrast between nature and the supernatural, which was fundamental for the old theology, has disappeared. To us moderns life is all of a piece. The universe is one undivided whole. The same law which holds the planets in their orbits governs the mote which dances in the sunlight outside the window; and the law without is matched by a corresponding law within. The mind has its uniform processes, too, in which cause follows effect in irrevocable sequence.

When we study this law more in detail we find that it is a law of development. Growth is characteristic of all living things, and even the great masses of matter that we call inorganic have been formed little by little through combinations of simpler elements. And it is so with the law of the mind. Thought grows, character develops, and through the reaction of will and feeling and thought upon a changing environment personality is ever becoming. To understand, therefore, the real nature of anything, we have to consider not what it is today, but to what it is tending, the immanent law of its development, the purpose by which character is dominated, the goal which society seeks to fulfil. Reality is teleological. We know what a thing is when we know whither it is going.

The consequence for theology of this change of the point of view is obvious. The premises of the old theology are gone. Nature and the supernatural are not two different kinds of reality, but two different aspects of one and the same reality. Nature expresses the law in the process, the supernatural the end to which it tends. Nature has to do with cause, the supernatural with meaning and value. Man himself partakes of the nature of both realms. He is at once a product of causes and a creator of values. He is limited indeed in power, but, so far as they go, his faculties are trustworthy, and the only way in which he can hope to attain knowledge of any kind is to trust the light that is in him. There are not two kinds of knowledge, the natural knowledge that comes from reason and the super-

natural knowledge that comes through revelation, but there are two aspects of knowledge, the knowledge of the causes which produce effects and the knowledge of the purpose which the effects are designed to serve. Revelation concerns itself with the latter aspect of knowledge. It is God's disclosure to the spirit of man of the meaning of the processes whose causes his reason discovers.

Applying these principles to the Bible, we see that it can no longer be isolated from other books, as was the habit in the old theology. Considered as literature, the Bible is a book like other books. We can trace its origin, follow its history, analyze and explain the processes by which its different elements were brought into the form in which we have them. The uniqueness of the Bible consists in its content, the ideals that it presents, the inspiration which it furnishes, the direct contact into which it introduces us with God and with the spirits of the great men of the past who have lived in daily communion with him.

What is true of God's revelation without, in nature and in the Bible, is true also of his activity in the spirit of man. Here too the abrupt contrasts of the old theology have disappeared from the new. Sin is not a foreign intruder making its appearance in the universe suddenly at a moment of time, and bringing about an abrupt transformation in human nature as a whole. Sin is the inevitable result of certain tendencies inwrought into the structure of human nature. It is the survival of the animal in man, his failure to rise to the higher capacities within him. So, salvation is not an act wrought once for all in some transcendent realm. It is a process going on through the ages, and rooted as truly as sin itself in the nature of man. Atonement is not the great exception, it is the universal law of all true living. Calvary is a principle as well as an event. As Horace Bushnell, one of the greatest of the new theologians, has put it, "A cross has been among the perfections of God from all eternity." So, under other names, justification and sanctification are experiences found outside of Christianity. The church is not composed of exiles from the world, it is the first-fruits of the society that is to be. Jesus is not God and man, he is God in man, the first-born among many brethren, but the type to which all mankind is ultimately destined to conform.

These changes in the interpretation of the divine activity involve a corresponding change in the view of the divine character and of God's relation to the universe. The dualism in the Calvinistic conception of God disappears. God is not thought of as separate from the universe, but rather as its immanent law. He is not a transcendent being living in a distant heaven whence from time to time he intervenes in the affairs of earth. He is an ever-present spirit guiding all that happens to a wise and holy end. We meet him in nature. We meet him in history. We meet him in the Bible. We meet him in the lives of great men, and supremely in Jesus, the ideal man, through whom he has given us the clearest revelation of his character and purpose.

And wherever we meet him he is always the same. He is not sometimes just and sometimes loving, but loving in his justice and righteous in his love. He has but one purpose, which animates him in all that he does, and that is to make individuals like Jesus, and to unite them through brotherly service in the ideal society. In a sense far higher than the old, the new theology makes earnest with the christlikeness of God.

Such, in brief, are some of the fundamental conceptions which meet us in the new theology. We are not interested to follow out the details. They differ in the case of individual theologians. What concerns us here are the practical consequences which follow from these principles for human thought and life.

It is evident that these consequences must differ in important respects from those which we have already considered in connection with the old theology. For one thing, the kind of authority presented is different. The old theology, as we saw, provided a clear-cut and invariable standard, valid everywhere, always, and for everybody. The new theology knows no such standard. It deals with principles rather than laws, and when conditions change, the application of principles has to be modified to suit the changing environment. Right and wrong are determined for us not so much by a standard established in the past as by a purpose affecting the future. As Christians it is our ultimate aim to establish the kingdom of God on earth, but what particular kind of conduct that purpose may involve under any particular set of circumstances can only be determined by a study of the

factors of the problem as they arise. What Dr. Grenfell could do in Labrador he cannot do in New York, and to the new theology that is as it should be.

It follows, in the second place, that the clear-cut line between the religious and the secular, which was so prominent a feature of the old ethics, has been wiped out in the new. There is no particular realm of human experience which one can isolate from the rest and say that it is more divine than others. All life belongs to God, and it is our business as his children to see that his purpose is accomplished in every sphere of human endeavor.

With this broadening of the sphere of religion goes, in the third place, a corresponding modification in the conception of God's relation to man. The consciousness of the immediate presence of God, which was so characteristic a feature of the older piety, is not so prominent in the new. It is not that the belief in the divine presence is lacking, but it is spread over so wide a territory that it is not as palpable to the emotions. It is easier to realize that God is speaking in the thunders of Sinai than to feel his presence in the air we breathe or in the gentle constraints of social custom. We may be no less sure of God's ultimate purposes, but we are more hesitant when it comes to interpreting his utterances in detail.

It is not strange, in view of these changes, that one trained in the old theology should feel a certain inarticulateness in the new. Its breadth seems to him vagueness, its flexibility absence of backbone. The extension of a religious meaning to phases of activity and spheres of experience formerly dismissed as secular seems scant compensation for the breaking-down of customs which have owed their strength and permanence to the religious sanction in a narrower sense. What is to become, we are asked, of Sunday-observance, church-going, family worship, the habit of Bible-reading and of daily prayer, if no firmer basis can be provided for their support than the generalities of the new theology? And we ourselves, when we consider the easy-going religion which is all about us, often share this feeling, and wish now and again that we could recover the unquestioning faith of an earlier age, even at the price of some of its intolerance and narrowness.

And yet, in spite of the manifest practical advantages of the old

theology, we know well enough that it would be impossible for us to go back to the world of Calvin and Edwards, even if we would, and that we would not if we could. Again we ask, Why is this true? Is our change of attitude due to an alteration in our experience, or to the presence of some new factor in our environment? We can now see that both these causes have been at work.

The latter cause is the more immediately apparent. Our primary reason for accepting the new theology is intellectual. We hold it because it explains the facts of life as a whole better than the old. It fits in with the habits of thought which we follow in other phases of our rational activity. When we turn to our Bible, we do not have to abandon the methods which we use when we study Shakspere or Homer. I once asked a friend, a professor of physical science, how he could oppose the application of critical principles to the study of the Bible. "In my brain," he said, "I keep two compartments, with a wall between them. On one side is my science and on the other my religion. If the wall should break down and the science should overflow, that would be the end of my religion." The new theology frees us from any such danger. It unifies our thinking, and that is in itself a great good.

It is worth while to linger upon this point, for it is of far-reaching importance. Intellectual influences did not play so prominent a part in the creation of the old theology as they have done in the case of the new. Neither Luther, nor for that matter Calvin, was a philosopher. Their interests were primarily moral and religious. We have seen that what we have called the Catholic element in the old theology, or in other words its underlying philosophy, was an inheritance from the past. It was taken over substantially unchanged from contemporary thought. It was a vessel found ready to hand, into which the new wine of moral and spiritual enthusiasm, which we call the Reformation, was poured. Whether it was the best possible receptacle is neither here nor there. It was the receptacle that was at hand and of which it was necessary to make use.

In the case of the new theology, the case is just the reverse. Here the motive at work was primarily intellectual. We have

a new view of the world growing up independently of the existing religion and reacting upon it. A new vessel has been formed, and the old wine is being poured into it. The vessel is strong and capacious, and can easily hold what it has received. Indeed, it is a question whether there is not room for a great deal more than it yet contains.

This explains the charge of indifferentism so frequently brought against the advocates of the new theology. They are called critical, destructive, sceptical, pullers-down rather than builders-up, and it must be confessed that there is truth in the charge. How can it be otherwise? The new theology is the outgrowth of a rational movement, and thought is necessarily critical, destructive, sceptical. The old view of the world which served for a thousand years has broken down, and countless builders are at work on the framework of the new philosophy which is to house our enlarged universe. But religion is not primarily interested in problems of thought. The interest of religion is practical, vital, personal. There must be new wine to fill the new vessel, if we are to have a religion for the modern world that will equal the old in power and vitality. The wine of religion is feeling. If the choice lies between an irrational religion that gives emotional satisfaction and a rational religion which does not, most people will choose the former without a moment's hesitation, as they have done again and again in the past.

But such a choice is not necessary in the present case. While intellectual influences have been prominent in the creation of the new theology, they have not been the only ones at work. Man is a unit, and no great change in thought takes place without producing corresponding changes in emotion and conduct. This is signally true in the case of the new theology. It makes its appeal to the heart and to the will, as well as to the mind. If it owes its origin to curiosity, it finds its verification in experience.

It makes its appeal to the heart. The God of the old Calvinism was a tower of strength to those who put their trust in him, but he was a consuming fire for those who felt themselves outcast from his grace, and the world of the old theology was a world that was full of outcasts. The records of the old insane

asylums have a pitiful story to tell. If one were elect and could know it, all was well, but outside lay the great mass of the unregenerate, for whom there was no hope; and none could tell but in this mass might be included a wife or a husband, a father or a brother, a son or a daughter.

In his famous sermon, "The End of the wicked contemplated by the Righteous: or the torments of the wicked in Hell no occasion of grief to the saints in Heaven," Jonathan Edwards, pleading with the impenitent in his congregation to turn from their sins, uses these words:

You that have godly parents, who in this world have tenderly loved you, who were wont to look upon your welfare as their own, and were wont to be grieved for you when anything calamitous befell you in this world, and especially were greatly concerned for the good of your souls, industriously sought, and earnestly prayed for your salvation, how will you bear to see them . . . now without any love to you, approving the sentence of condemnation, when Christ shall with indignation bid you depart, wretched, cursed creatures, into eternal burnings? How will you bear to see and hear them praising the Judge for his justice exercised in pronouncing this sentence, and hearing it with holy joy in their countenances, and shouting forth the praises and hallelujahs of God and Christ on that account? . . . You that have godly husbands or wives or brethren or sisters, with whom you have been wont to dwell under the same roof, and to eat at the same table, consider how it will be with you when you shall come to part with them; when they shall be taken and you left. . . . However you may wail and lament when you see them parted from you . . . you will see in them no signs of sorrow that you are not taken with them.

If we are to realize what the new theology means for the emotions, we must try to put ourselves back for a moment into the world in which Jonathan Edwards's sermons could be preached and could be heard. The old theology gave us a God who was powerful but arbitrary. The new theology gives us a God who is everywhere and always consistent, a God who can be trusted not for me only, or for my children, or for my church, or for my nation, but to do that which is right and loving and wise for every child of man.

This is a distinct contribution to practical religion. It frees the heart from fear, and gives confidence and security. A God

who is like Jesus everywhere and always is a God in whom we may safely put our trust, and such is the God of the new theology.

But we do not fully measure the experimental value of the new theology until we consider the practical consequences which follow from this faith. To believe in a God of universal love enlarges and reinforces the motive to social service. Our dream is of a redeemed society, a city of God on earth, which shall involve the christianization of all the relations of life and the unity of all mankind in brotherhood, justice, and peace. This is an end that reclaims for divine use and meaning many sides of life for which the old theology could find scant value, and makes the old truth of the universal priesthood glow with a new and diviner meaning.

It is at this point that the practical appeal of the new theology is strongest. The characteristic note of our age is the new social spirit which is stirring all about us. The new theology provides the theoretical basis which is necessary to bring this spirit to self-consciousness. It rationalizes the instinctive faith in a better social order which animates so many of the men and women who are leading in the forward movement in church and state. In the Father who cares for men here as well as hereafter, and whose most acceptable worship is brotherly love, it gives us a God who can command the social conscience as well as satisfy the individual need.

For these three reasons, then, we find the new theology more satisfying than the old. It gives us a securer basis for our thought. It gives us a worthier object for our worship. It gives us an enlarged scope for our service. It is not something of which we need to be ashamed or for which we should apologize; but we may preach it with confidence, sure that when it is understood it will find response in the hearts and minds of men.

III

We have considered the old theology. We have considered the new. It remains, finally, to consider the relation between the old and the new. What ought to be the attitude which we, who

call ourselves representatives of the new theology, take toward the persons and the institutions which represent the old?

If the conclusions which we have thus far reached are correct, two positions which are often taken on this subject are excluded. The first is the position of those who maintain that there is an absolute antithesis between the old and the new theology, so that the only self-respecting position for the new theologian to take toward the old is that of Cato toward Carthage; the second is that which contends that the two are in substance identical, and that the apparent difference is a matter of phraseology and can be corrected by a change of words.

It is not true, in the first place, that there is an absolute antithesis between the old theology and the new. On the contrary, they have many things in common. Common to both are the fundamental elements of the religious experience, the sense of dependence and of reverence, the consciousness of sin, the longing for salvation, the joy of the soul in contact with God. Common to both are many truths and experiences which are specifically Christian. The conception of God as loving as well as just and powerful, the acceptance of Jesus as the supreme revelation of God, the substitution of an ethical and social for an individualistic and selfish conception of religion, the kingdom of God as the goal of effort and the unifying principle for thought. Common, finally, to both is faith that God is in essence rational, and the effort to give to the content of his revelation a form capable of rational understanding and defence. Here are great reaches of common territory, too broad to be overlooked, too valuable to be lightly abandoned.

Yet, though there is so much in common, there is a real difference between the two. There is, first of all, the fundamental difference in method, which we have already described, a difference which carries with it in either case a consistent view of the world and leads to corresponding differences in practice. The old theology retains in its thought of God an element of arbitrariness and of mystery, and this sense of the unknown hampers it in its practical activities. There is a realm of effort and of aspiration, congenial to the Christian spirit, from which it feels itself debarred. There is a great gulf fixed between world and

church, secular and religious, and that gulf must remain for all time. The new theology recognizes the separation, but refuses to regard it as permanent. The gulf is here to be bridged, sin to be replaced by righteousness, ignorance by knowledge, selfishness by love, the kingdoms of the world by the kingdom of the Lord and of his Christ. This difference is a real difference, and the new theology would not be true to itself if it did not make it apparent.

The true attitude of the new theology to the old, then, would seem to be that of a criticism which is rooted in sympathy. A part of its effort should be to give a more adequate intellectual expression to the body of convictions which the two hold in common because they grow out of similar religious experiences; a part should be to draw the consequences of the deeper religious and ethical insight for which the new view of the world makes room, and so to open the way to a better and more satisfying experience.

You will note that in both cases the stress falls upon experience. Theology, like philosophy, cannot create, it can only interpret; and the material with which it deals is religion. It is one of the unfortunate effects of the period through which we have been passing that this fact has so often been forgotten. Criticism has been exalted from a means to an end, and the great convictions by which the soul of man lives have been treated simply as curious historical phenomena, the unravelling of whose rise and fall constitutes a fascinating problem for the mind. This unsympathetic attitude is, I believe, one of the chief reasons for the wide-spread suspicion of the new theology, but it is a phase which is sure to pass. Indeed, I believe that it is rapidly passing. As the new view of the world becomes more familiar, and the results of criticism more assured, men will gradually come to see more clearly how impotent is thought apart from faith. They will value theology, whether new or old, in the measure in which it deepens, enriches, and purifies experience.

It is through our common experience, then, that we have to seek our approach to an understanding with those who hold the old theology. We have to show that the region which the new knowledge opens for thought to explore is at the same time,

as is always the case with human discovery, an invitation to new experiences. But we have also to show, and this is no less important, that with the intellectual resources which the new knowledge puts at our disposal we can give to the old convictions a surer and more satisfying expression than they have ever received before. If the new theology can do this, it will last; if not, it will have to give place to a newer.

*THE SHEPHERD OF HERMAS AND CHRISTIAN LIFE
IN ROME IN THE SECOND CENTURY*

KIRSOPP LAKE

UNIVERSITY OF LEYDEN

It was once remarked with much truth that the non-fulfilment of the expectation of the Parousia was the principal factor in the development of early Christianity. This is all the more important, because it was not the custom of the first Christians to speak of the "second" coming—that is a modern point of view—but of the "coming" of the Messiah. To them the Son of Man, Jesus, had come, and the resurrection proved that he was now the Messiah in heaven, but, as Professor Burkitt has recently pointed out, "Son of Man" does not mean "Messiah" in the full sense, but is rather the description given of the predestined and pre-existent Messiah, before he actually came as Messiah in function. The Parousia of the triumphant Messiah whom they expected was as much future for Christians as it was for Jews, and on this point the main difference between the two was that the former believed that they knew who the Messiah was.

Yet, though the coming of the Messiah was future, it was imminent, and hourly expected, and this expectation was the background of all the thought of the early Christians, which enabled them to accept such a method of life and series of doctrines as were only permanently possible if society underwent a radical change. As a matter of fact society did not undergo a radical change, and thus the main problem for the second generation of Christians was to accommodate to a society which after all showed no signs of passing away, beliefs and doctrines which had been based on the expectation of its transitoriness. In the end, therefore, it was the Christian doctrine and practice which underwent the change, and society which remained. Instead of entering a new world the Christians found themselves busy with the task of improving the old one. That is one aspect of the

picture. The other is that in this task Christianity owes most of its success to the expectation which it had once cherished. The Messianic kingdom, its laws and its teaching, ceased to be an expectation, but survived as an ideal. Gradually, in practice if not in theory, men gave up looking for the coming of the kingdom in which sin, suffering, poverty, and death would be miraculously abolished; but nevertheless they had enjoyed the vision of the time when these things would happen, and pressed forward to make the world in which they were living—and would continue to live—correspond somewhat more closely to the city which they had seen.

It would of course be absurd to suggest that the second or third generation of Christians would have expressed themselves quite in this fashion: no generation is ever fully conscious of the changes of thought which later historians find important. But the readjustment of thought went quietly on for nearly two centuries, and the struggle to which it gave rise between practice and theory is really the most important thing in the history of this period. Such a process of readjustment is, however, so complex that it is impossible to follow it clearly except by taking special examples from the history of a single community, and by noticing how in the first half of the second century changes were introduced by reason of this gradual alteration in the point of view, and the consequent conflict between theory and practice.

For this purpose the church at Rome is the best one to study, and for the first half of the second century practically the only source of information is one book, the Shepherd of Hermas. This curious book is in form an apocalypse, divided into Visions, Mandates, and Similitudes. It was written about 140 A.D. by Hermas, brother of Pope Pius I, but it is probable that it contains various pieces, all written by Hermas, varying in date between 110 and 130. It is an apocalypse, but a practical apocalypse, and although the writer chose to express himself in this, as it were, old-fashioned and conservative form, it is plain enough that he was really a progressive thinker, and deliberately chose this form of expression because he knew that human nature will often listen to a reformer who wishes to change either appearance or

substance, but not to one who attacks both simultaneously. That is why progress is never direct, but spiral: one generation alters the substance, but leaves the appearance; the next sees the inconsistency, and changes the appearance as well. It takes two generations to complete the process, and that is reform; if the attempt be made to do both at once, it becomes revolution.

Hermas was a reformer: he was busy introducing changes in thought and practice, to recommend which he used an old and popular form of statement, and in the present article it is proposed to trace the way in which these changes affected, in the first place, the doctrine of baptism, and in the second place the position of prophets in the Christian community.

I

Whatever may have been the position of baptism in Palestine, it always held the central position in Christian doctrine and practice in the Graeco-Roman world. Christians regarded themselves as men who had accepted the Messiah, and had in some sense entered into his kingdom before his coming in power; they were "proleptic" members of the kingdom. The condition of their entry into it was acceptance of the Messiah, but the actual method of entry was baptism. In Christian baptism the convert was said to be born again to eternal life, to become a new creature, to be set free from evil spirits, and to be cleansed from sin. The importance of this doctrine for the propagation of Christianity in the second century can scarcely be overestimated. Baptism was the great "mystery" of Christianity, just as, for instance, the "taurobolium" was the great "mystery" of Mithraism. The oriental religions were all mystery-religions, or, as we now should say, sacramental: that is to say, they offered to their votaries participation in eternal life. The differences between them in this respect were formal rather than essential, as can be illustrated from the fact that the phrase "born again into eternity" (*in aeternum renatus*) is applied in an inscription to worshippers of Mithra as well as to Christians. Thus the Christian teachers had the great advantage, from a missionary point

of view, that they were teaching not only in a language, but also in a form of thought, which was understood by their public.

It cannot be accidental that all the forms of religion which became popular at this time in Rome were sacramental, and the explanation is probably to be sought in psychology. In the language of William James, there were in the beginning of the second century a number of "sick souls," who found a remedy in a combination of faith and outward acts to which a specifically healing character was given, and it is worth noting that, whether we accept the sacramental theories of the second century or not, the actual psychiatric efficiency of the sacraments themselves is undoubted. The theory was that baptism admitted to the Messianic kingdom, and incidentally, because all evil was excluded from that kingdom, gave release from sin. The fact was that the sick soul who believed was healed,—whether it would equally well have been healed if it had believed in something else is a question which is exceedingly important in itself but not important for the pure historian.

That Hermas fully accepted this central position of baptism is clear from *Vis.* iii. In this he describes a great tower, built over a spring of water, and explains that the meaning is, "your life was saved, and shall be saved, by water," and adds that the tower (the church) is founded on "the word (*ῥῆμα*) of the almighty and glorious Name." The reference to water and to the "Name" in baptism calls for no further comment. Or again in *Sim.* ix, 16 he says:

For before man bears the name of the Son of God he is dead, but when he receives the seal, he puts off mortality and receives life. The seal, then, is the water. They go down, then, into the water dead and come up alive.

The doctrine of baptismal regeneration, taking place *ex opere operato*, could scarcely be more clearly expressed.

Such teaching was probably typical of all the mystery-religions, and it is plain that in the use of such modes of thought the danger of an absolutely unethical development was considerable. Theoretically, indeed, there is no room in such a view for a moral or ethical element. The baptized Christian was *ipso facto* a mem-

ber of the Messianic kingdom, had obtained eternal life, and was free from sin. In practice, however, it soon became clear that on the one point which could be observed—freedom from sin—the Christian was by no means safe. Theory and practice were in collision, and the problem as to what should be done became serious. As always happens, attempts were made—not wholly unsuccessful—to make the theory answer the facts, and at the same time to raise the practice to the level of the theory.

The theory had the necessary corollary that sin after baptism was unforgivable (cf. Heb. 6 4-6): practice had shown that if this were so, baptism was likely to be valuable only to men at the point of death. Sinlessness was to be a characteristic of the members of the Messianic kingdom, and it had therefore been supposed that it could and would be a characteristic of Christians; but experience proved that this was not the case. The theory obviously failed to satisfy the facts, and the result was, if we may read between the lines of *Vis.* iii, that it was becoming more and more frequently the practice to postpone baptism in order to avoid its responsibilities. In this vision Hermas sees the preparations for building the tower (the church) beside or over the water. The imagery is clearly drawn from the hills which surround the Campagna, where stone is quarried from a precipice and allowed to fall by a kind of chute.¹ This is, however, an inaccurate method of guiding the blocks, and many go far away from the place intended for them. So Hermas sees many stones which cannot be brought to the water, and therefore cannot be used for building the tower. These, he explains, are "they that have heard and are minded to be baptized in the name of the Lord. Then, when they bethink them of the purity of the truth, they repent, and go again after their evil desires." That is to say, they are intended to represent those who postpone baptism too long, and are prevented by death. For them Hermas gives no hope of entry into the church, though he does not absolutely condemn them to final reprobation. "They may

¹ I saw exactly the sort of scene (except that there was no tower) between Grotta Ferrata and Frascati, when the electric tramway was being laid. The stones slid down the cliff to their destination, but, just as Hermas describes, many of them failed to reach it.

repent, but they cannot fit into this tower. But they shall fit into another much lesser place, and this after they have been tormented and have fulfilled the days of their sins." It is not quite clear what Hermas means by this: I am inclined to believe that he refers to a repentance after death, and to something closely resembling purgatory.

In any case it is plain that the suggestion that baptism should be postponed was well known in Rome when Hermas wrote, and that he rejected it. Moreover history tells us that his view was ultimately accepted, and that ecclesiastical practice went to the other extreme by instituting infant baptism, of which there is no trace till the second half of the second century.

Nevertheless the refusal to accept a postponed baptism as satisfactory did not help to solve the original problem. The theory or doctrine still remained that the baptized person ought to be sinless, and practice still proved that he was usually nothing of the kind. Hermas recognized the latter fact, but did not wish to abandon the theory entirely. In *Mand.* iv, 3, therefore, he presents the problem to the angel who is instructing him: "I have heard, sir, from certain teachers² that there is no other repentance than that one, when we went down into the water and received remission of our former sins"; and the angel replies that this is indeed the case. Thus the theory was not abandoned. But it was altered, for the angel goes on to explain that in the future there will be one further opportunity of repentance, and a great part of the book after this is given up to the explanations of the working of penitence, which is so realistically handled that it is clear that the first steps have been taken on the road which led to the institution of Penance.

Similarly, an effort was made to improve the practice so as to correspond more exactly with the theory. Clearly, the danger was that men should argue to themselves, "We are saved through baptism, we have been made sinless, and no act of ours can affect

² When one remembers that the Epistle to the Hebrews was well known in Rome before the time of Hermas (cf. the long quotations in 1 Clement), it is difficult not to think that this is a reference to Heb. 6 4 ff. It will be noted that Hermas does not deny the truth of what Hebrews says; he only claims to supersede it on one point by a more recent revelation.

this happy result." There were indeed heretics who actually argued in this way, and thus no doubt gave color to the accusation of immorality which was so often brought against the Christians; and the natural answer to, and reaction against, their contention was to insist on the necessity for a higher ethical character in the Christian life.

Probably we can find an earlier trace of this tendency in 1 Peter. Whether that epistle was really written by St. Peter or not is a most difficult question. Personally, I am inclined to think that there is a shade of superior probability for the traditional view that it was written by St. Peter from Rome in the time of Nero. If so, it falls too early for our period, and it is a proof that the problem existed in Rome from the beginning. But there is also something to be said for a later date, which places the epistle in the beginning of the second century. In any case, it almost certainly came from Rome. Now, in speaking of baptism, the writer says that Noah and his family were "saved through water, which also in the antitype doth now save you, even baptism, not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the interrogation of a good conscience towards God." The phrase translated "interrogation of a good conscience" is *ἐπερώτημα τῆς καλῆς συνειδήσεως*, and probably refers to some sort of moral vow made by the baptized person. Perhaps it is not rash to see in the *Didache* the best illustration of the probable nature of this vow. In it, as will be remembered, the ethical or moral treatise which we call the *Two Ways*, is used as a manual of instruction for catechumens.

In any case, if we read between the lines, it is easy to see that the writer of 1 Peter is afraid of a non-moral view of baptism. Still plainer is it in *Hermas*. In the ninth Similitude he sees twelve maidens gathered round the tower which represented the church, and is told:

These are holy spirits, and a man can in no wise be found in the kingdom of God unless they clothe him with their raiment. For if thou receive the Name only, but receive not the raiment from them, thou shalt profit nothing, forasmuch as these maidens are powers of the Son of God. If thou bear the Name, but bear not his power, in vain shalt thou bear his name. The stones, said he,

which thou sawest cast away, these bore the Name, but put not on the clothing of the maidens. What, said I, is their clothing? Their very names, said he, are their clothing. Whosoever beareth the name of the Son of God ought to bear their names also, for the Son himself beareth the names of these maidens. And their names are Faith, Continence, Strength, Patience, Simplicity, Innocence, Purity, Joy, Truth, Prudence, Concord, Love.

The meaning is obvious; not only baptism, but a moral life is required: and Hermas is clearly protesting against the view that in baptism, by a purely magical use of the name and of water, the Christian obtains eternal life or membership in the Messianic kingdom, and is trying to impress his hearers or readers with the necessity for moral virtue as well as for the sacramental efficacy of baptism.

It would be interesting if we knew whether the other sacramental religions, such as Mithraism, went through the same development. In the absence of evidence, certainty is of course impossible, but I think the probability is that the course of events in the other mystery-religions was somewhat different, and that for a reason which is important because it points to one of the most serious differences between Christianity and the other oriental religions. Christianity made from the beginning a special appeal to the failures of society, to the "submerged tenth," the poor and the wretched. In this respect it differed sharply from the other sacramental religions which offered their privileges only to respectable and desirable persons. This distinction was clearly noted by Celsus,³ who, in a manner which finds a curious echo in some modern forms of thought, heaped scorn on the Christians for admitting to their church all the undesirable elements which other religions excluded.

The result was, first, that the necessity for emphasizing the moral standard among the initiate was from the start far more urgent among Christians than among the votaries of the other mysteries, which appealed to the ninety and nine righteous

³ Cf. Origen's quotation from Celsus in *Contra Celsum* iii, 59: *οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας τελετὰς καλοῦντες προκηρύττουσι τάδε· ὅστις χεῖρας καθαρὸς καὶ φωνὴν συνετὸς . . . καὶ ὅτῃ ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδὲν συνοῖδε κακόν, καὶ ὅτῃ εὖ καὶ δικαίως βεβαίωται . . . ἐπακούσωμεν δὲ τίνας ποτὲ οὗτοι καλοῦσιν· ὅστις, φασίν, ἀμαρτωλὸς, ὅστις ἀσύνητος, ὅστις νήπιος, καὶ ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ὅστις κακοδαίμων, τοῦτον ἡ βασιλεῖα τοῦ θεοῦ δέχεται.*

rather than to the one sinner who repenteth (and has a tendency to backsliding), and, secondly, that, so far as the need was felt in the other mystery-religions, they were inclined to meet the claims of morality by raising their standard of admission, and warning off all who in any way fell below it, while Christianity, which could not adopt this method, was forced to try to insist on a high standard after admission. It had started with the theory that its sacrament not only admitted to eternal life, but removed sin, and though experience had shown that this view was untenable, and that Christians were after all sinful, it could at least try to make them as little sinful as possible, and so render the gulf between theory and practice somewhat less terribly evident.

Moreover, this fact probably stands in an intimate relation to the problem why Christianity, which welcomed all the socially and morally inefficient elements in the Roman Empire, survived more successfully than the cognate mystery-religions which appealed only to the efficient.⁴ The main reason, I think, is to be found in the fact that morality, or ethics, is not the same thing as religion, and cannot be regarded as a perfect measure of it. Christianity, Mithraism, the religion of Isis, and the other mystery-systems were quite definitely religious, not ethical, systems. They made their appeal to the religious, not merely to the moral and respectable, and by their success or failure in attracting them they stood or fell. Religion is, as it were, one of the senses of the soul, morality is another, and both are distinct from logic. You will often find religious people who are neither innately moral nor logical, and naturally moral persons who have no sense of religion. Not only so, but there is even the same principle of compensation visible in the spiritual senses as in the physical. We all know that a blind man develops an abnormal sense of touch which to some extent compensates for his lack of vision. Probably it is the same with our spiritual senses: the man who has naturally no sense of morality, as such, often has an extraordinarily high degree of religious feeling, which helps to compensate for his defect; and, on the other hand, those who have no sense

⁴ It might probably be added that Mithraism, which was in the end the most serious rival of Christianity, approached most nearly to its practice in this respect.

of religion have frequently an extraordinarily high moral standard. The point is of considerable importance in practical work, and, as practical psychology comes to be better appreciated, will no doubt be consciously used as a principle of social work.

Let me guard, however, against overstatement or misunderstanding. I hope it is clear that I do not mean that religion can ever really be satisfactorily expressed in immoral conduct. What I wish to say is that morality is not a measure of religious experience, and that in any case conduct is not religion itself, but only a translation of it. Perhaps it may be put in this way. Let us say that religion is the conversation of man with his heavenly Father; it is then quite clear that morality is something different, because it is not conversation, but action. The conversation of father and child may lead to the child's doing what the father wishes—or it may not. But if it does not, that is no proof that the conversation has not taken place; nor if a deaf child, who cannot hear his father's voice, does what his father wished, is he any the less deaf. My impression is that there are many in the human family who are deaf, so that they never hear the Father's voice, yet do his will; and many others who hear his voice quite well, and have frequent conversation with him, but are quite unsuccessful in translating into action what they have heard in this way.

To come back to history: the importance of this point of view is that it explains why Christianity succeeded and Mithraism failed. Christianity did not in the beginning make the mistake of confounding morality with religion, but accepted all those who felt the religious impulse, in spite of the fact that morally and socially they often belonged to the ranks of the inefficient and undesirable. From this point of view the importance of Hermas is that he gives us a glimpse of the church at Rome wrestling with the problem of making this class of converts understand that, though religion be not morality, its truest manifestation in life is nevertheless to be found in morality.

The increased attention which was thus directed to what may be called the practical study of ethics had at least two important effects. Previously the Christians had regarded themselves as those who were destined to be the members of the Messianic

kingdom, just as Jesus was destined to be the king, and it had been assumed that they possessed the qualities which would distinguish alike the king and the members of his kingdom, especially sinlessness, or, to express it in positive terms, righteousness. Experience forced them to admit that this was not always true, and Hermas formulated the view that the permanent retention of membership in the Messianic kingdom depended not only on the miraculous sacramental virtue of baptism, or on the power of the name of the Messiah, or even on the faith which accepted Jesus as Messiah, but also on the possession of various personal ethical virtues. This was bound to lead to a distinction on the one hand between sin and sin, and on the other between virtue and virtue. The distinction between sin and sin is made in 1 John, where a difference is drawn between sin unto death and sin not unto death; and thereby was taken the first step on the road leading to the later ecclesiastical doctrine of deadly and venial sin, and the elaborate casuistry of the Middle Ages. Hermas himself, however, did not pursue this line of thought; to him sin was sin, and his doctrine of penitence is the only concession which he makes from the teaching that sin after baptism is fatal. But on the other side—with regard to a distinction between virtue and virtue—he makes an important development, and formulates a teaching which in essentials does not differ much from that of supererogatory virtue. That is to say, he admits that there is a degree of virtue above that which is necessary for salvation; and that it will have a suitable reward in the future. This is clearly stated in his treatment of fasting (*Sim.* v, 3), in which he says:

Keep the commandments of the Lord, and thou shalt be in favor with God, and shalt be inscribed in the number of them that keep his commandments. And if thou do any good thing beyond God's commandment, thou shalt win for thyself more exceeding glory and shalt be more honorable with God than thou wouldst have been.

The "good thing beyond the commandment" is

To eat nothing but bread and water, and when thou hast told the sum of that day's expenses to which thou wouldst have been put for the meats consumed in it, thou shalt give it to a widow or orphan or one in need.

It is instructive to compare this with the story of the young man in Mark 10 17-31 who asked what he should do to inherit eternal life, and with the recension in Matthew. In Mark he is told that keeping the commandments is insufficient; in Matthew, that it is insufficient *if he wishes to be "perfect."* There is a radical distinction in thought between the two things, and Hermas and Matthew seem to represent the same kind of divergence from primitive thought, though I see no reason—rather the reverse—for thinking that there is any literary connection between them. They both point to the time when Christians began to distinguish between membership in the Messianic kingdom or salvation, or eternal life, or whatever other name they may have given to it, and high or low position within the kingdom, and to speak of those who were "perfect" in distinction from those who, while unquestionably members of the kingdom, did not reach to the highest position.

It is plain that we are here at the beginning of that development which led to mediaeval casuistry with its nicely graded apportioning of an appropriate label for every possible human act, varying from deadly sin to supererogatory virtue; nor is it, I think, less plain that this development was due to the gradual change of attitude towards life involved in the passing away of the expectation of the coming of the Messianic kingdom and the corresponding rise of the Catholic church. Primitive Christianity meant the change of life from bad to good. It thought in absolutes. The Catholic church meant the transformation of life from worse to better; it thought in relatives. The change was enormous; it is the most important thing in early church history, and obviously was necessary to make Christianity the practical power for good which it became. Yet, however paradoxical it may be, it is profoundly true that the success was possible just because the change was never complete. However much the church was occupied with making men better, instead of making them good, it never wholly forgot the splendor of its first vision of a sinless world, and centuries later, when the memory of its early hopes had grown dim, and the church was degenerating into a society whose motives were dubious and practices lamentable, the power of the Reformation lay largely in the

fact that its leaders recognized the ideal of Christianity to be the formation of a new creature rather than the improvement of an old one.

II

Just as the gradual movement of the centre of the Christian life from the expectation of the Messianic kingdom to the practical needs of the Catholic church influenced the development of doctrine, as was shown in the instance of baptism, so it produced an even more remarkable change on the side of organization. It is plain that a community which is momentarily expecting a complete and catastrophic change in the character of society is unlikely to possess more than the necessary minimum of organization; it is not less plain that as soon as this expectation passes into the background the need of organization will be increasingly felt, and those who have some official place in the organization will gain an importance hitherto denied to them. This is what happened in the early church, especially in Rome, and the importance of *Hermas* is that it gives us, if not exactly an account of the change, at least a picture of the state of things which previously obtained, showing us the points which necessitated this organic development.

This question brings us into some disputed matters, and I think that the study of history shows that the truth has not been the monopoly of either party in the dispute. If we ask who were the most important people in the Christian church in the first generation, the answer undoubtedly is, the Apostles and Prophets. If we go on farther, and ask who was the most important person in the church at Rome at the end of the second century, the answer unquestionably is that it was the Bishop. But the difficulty comes when we inquire how this change took place; for that is precisely the problem to which no undoubted or unquestionable answer can be given. The importance, therefore, of *Hermas* is that, with some help from cognate documents, he throws enough light on the question to enable us to reach a solution which possesses a very high degree of probability.

It would not be unfair to say that on the main question students have been divided into two parties. One party has argued that

the bishops of the end of the second century represent the apostles of the first, and has based its contention on certain references which go to show that in the first century the apostles appointed bishops (or presbyters—probably the two words applied to the same office⁵) in various communities. Against this view another party has emphasized the distinction in function between the early bishops and the apostles, has disputed the reasoning of the opponents, and in the heat of argument has very foolishly thrown unnecessary doubt on facts vouched for by excellent evidence. The facts seem to be opposed to the extremists of either school. It is clear, on the evidence of the New Testament and all succeeding literature that in all important communities there were from the beginning local officials, appointed in the first place probably by the apostles, and that they were sometimes called bishops, sometimes presbyters. Thus the apostolic appointment of some presbyters is probable: but, on the other hand, it is not less clear that the functions of an apostle were quite different from those of a presbyter or bishop, and that functionally the apostle is akin to the prophet, not to the presbyter.

The discovery of the *Didache* in 1883 is really the starting-point of progress in the solution of this problem. It corrected once for all our ideas as to the meaning of the word "apostle," and as to the importance of the Christian prophets. We are apt to regard "apostle" as meaning one of the twelve disciples, and even when we outgrow this untenable view (untenable because the word is applied in the New Testament to several outside the number of the Twelve) we remain under the influence of a false, or at least unnecessary, interpretation of 1 Cor. 9 1. Here St. Paul, arguing that he is at least the equal of the other apostles, says, "Am I not free, am I not an apostle, have I not seen Jesus our Lord?" and this has been explained to mean that an apostle must have seen Jesus. There is nothing in the context to justify this view. "Have I not seen Jesus?" is more probably additional to "Am I not an apostle?" than explanatory of it, for the question was not whether Paul was an apostle, but whether he

⁵ Some years ago one would have made this statement with much confidence. But J. Réville's book *Les origines de l'épiscopat* suggests other possibilities. They do not, however, seriously affect the present question.

was the equal of the original apostles. It is true that the question has usually been taken by commentators as if it were explanatory. But this is merely the after effect of the old view that apostle must mean "one of the Twelve," and that it is historically improbable is clear from the Didache, in which "apostle" is not a title given to a special class of men who had once been in the company of Jesus, but to men inspired by the Spirit who went about spreading the gospel among those who had never heard it, and founding churches wherever they met with success.

These "apostles" were closely connected in character with the prophets. According to the Didache these also travelled about, but their object was the edification of existing churches rather than the foundation of new ones. The difference between apostle and prophet was therefore functional, not essential, for both were men through whom the Holy Spirit spoke, and they revealed truth to the world through his inspiration. But a prophet—and probably not an apostle—might settle in a definite community, and it is quite clear that wherever prophets were, they were the spiritual leaders of the Christians in that place, not because they had a definite office, but because they had a special gift.

The outburst of prophesying was one of the marks of the Christian community, and, as the account of the Day of Pentecost in Acts 2 shows, it was recognized as a definitely eschatological sign that the Messianic kingdom was at hand. The writer of Acts explains the phenomena of Pentecost as the fulfilment of the words of Joel, "It shall come to pass in the last days I will pour out my Spirit on all flesh, and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, and your old men shall dream dreams, and your young men shall see visions, and on my servants and on my handmaids in those days will I pour out my Spirit, and they shall all prophesy." That "in the last days" is not in the original, but in Luke's correct explanation of the context, is worth noticing because it shows that to him the eschatological significance of Pentecost was the principal thing. It is also noteworthy that the last phrase, "and they shall prophesy," is not in the original. If it be a true canon of exegesis, as I believe, that divergence in quotations from the original often indicates the point

which the quoter regards as important, then clearly Luke regarded prophecy as one of the signs of the coming of the kingdom. The position of prophets in the early church is thus seen to be the natural consequence of the eschatological Messianic expectation, and, as this expectation began to be falsified by time, the position of the prophets lost at least part of its basis.

Thus at the beginning of the second century prophets were the most important people in the settled order of the community, but the eschatological reason for their importance was gradually weakening. This, however, would not have been sufficient to destroy their position (for the eschatological expectation was not the only reason for honoring them) had not a new and serious problem arisen. This was provided by the "false prophets" and is dealt with by Hermas in the eleventh Mandate. In this Hermas says:

He (the shepherd) showed me men seated on a bench and another man seated in a chair; and he said to me, "Seest thou them that sit on the bench? These are faithful, but he who sits on the chair is a false prophet who destroys the sense of the servants of God,—of the doubleminded, that is, but not of the faithful. The doubleminded, then, come to him as a soothsayer, and ask him what haply shall befall them; and the prophet, having in himself no power of the divine Spirit, answers them according to their demand and according to their unholy desires, and fills their souls as they wish."

That is to say, he recognizes that there were in the church not only the true prophets, but also false prophets, and that this gave rise to the double problem,—how is it that there are false prophets, and how can they be distinguished so that the true may be accepted and the false rejected?

To the first of these questions Hermas never gave the answer that the false prophet was an impostor; such an idea would have been completely opposed to the whole trend of thought in those days. He did not hesitate to proclaim the inspiration of the false prophets to be as certain as that of the true prophets. All prophets are inspired; only some have the wrong sort of inspiration. The false prophet prophesies "because the devil fills his spirit."

This view is characteristic of early Christianity, and is very

important for any right appreciation of the growth of doctrine. The Christian of the second century explained all psychological phenomena, including religion, in the terms of obsession. The world, so one may express the theory, is full of all sorts of spirits or angels: some of them are good, some are evil, the good proceed from God, the evil from the devil, and all, whether good or evil, have the power, under favorable circumstances, of taking possession of men and inspiring for good or for evil. This belief was derived by Christianity from Judaism, and Judaism probably obtained it from Persian sources; it is therefore one of the points in common between Christianity and Mithraism, and this fact is rather important, not only because it explains some of the great resemblances between Christianity and Mithraism, but because it brought Christianity into the main stream of thought in the Roman Empire. When a Christian spoke of obsession by an evil spirit or inspiration by a good one, he was not talking in a language other than that which men were accustomed to hear; he was using the same *Weltanschauung* as his hearers. The tendency to explain psychology and physiology in terms of spirits was as common then as is now the attempt to explain them in terms of microbes.

Nor must it be thought that "spirit" was used in the modern sense of an influence or an essential characteristic. The Christians of the second century, like most of their contemporaries, thought of spirits as real beings. The difference between those days and ours may be illustrated by saying that when we speak of a "spirit of holiness" we are scarcely conscious that we are personifying an abstract quality,—all the emphasis is on the "holiness"; but when a second-century writer used the same phrase, the emphasis was all the other way,—on the "spirit," not on the "holiness," and he was so conscious that he was speaking of a definitely existing being with an individuality as great as his own, that the idea of the abstract quality was quite secondary. To us such phrases are the personifications of abstractions, to them they were the qualities belonging to persons.

This theory of the universe, that it is full of spirits whose working explains the phenomena of natural and spiritual life, was applied widely. Disease was explained as an attack from

an evil spirit, so also was sin, and so was magic, soothsaying, and false prophecy. In the same way the Christian was a man who had been taken possession of by a good spirit, and a true prophet was a man possessed by a divine spirit of prophecy which had a message to deliver. Thus not only prophecy, but all religious or psychological phenomena, true and false, were explained as various workings of different spirits. As an illustration may be taken the interesting passage in which Hermas explains the reason why bad temper leads to sin (*Mand.* v, 1):

Be long-suffering and prudent, said he, and thou shalt have dominion over all wicked works, and shalt do all righteousness. For if thou be long-suffering, the Holy Spirit which dwells in thee shall be clear, and not darkened over by another evil spirit. . . . But if any ill temper approach, immediately the Holy Spirit, which is delicate, is straitened by not having clear space, and seeks to depart from the place, . . . for that both the spirits then should dwell together is unprofitable and evil for the man in whom they dwell.

The answer, then, of Hermas to the first question, What is the nature of a false prophet? was simple: he is a man whom an evil spirit inspired to prophesy, and for his generation this answer was satisfactory and decisive.

The second question was far more difficult, and of greater importance for the church life of the time. How is it possible to tell the difference between the true and the false prophet, or, in the language of 1 John, to "try the spirits"? Hermas gives his answer in the eleventh Mandate. He suggests that we can tell the difference between a true and false prophet by noting their conduct (*Mand.* xi, 9-14).

From his life prove the man that has the divine Spirit. First, he that has the divine Spirit which is from above, is meek and peaceable and lowly, and refrains himself from wickedness and vain desire of this world, and makes himself poorer than all men, and answers nothing to any when insulted, and does not speak solitarily, nor does the Holy Spirit speak when a man would speak, but when God wills that he should speak, then he speaks. Whenever, therefore, the man who has the divine Spirit comes into a meeting of righteous men who have faith in the divine Spirit, and the congregation of those men make their prayer unto God, then the

angel of the prophetic spirit which obsesses him fills the man, and the man, being filled with the Holy Spirit, speaks to the congregation as the Lord will. . . .

Hear now about the spirit that is earthly and void, and hath no power, but is foolish. First, the man who thinks that he has the spirit exalts himself and wishes to have the preëminence, and straightway he is heady and shameless and full of talk and conversant among many luxuries and other deceits, and he receives pay for his prophecy, and if he receive not he prophesies not. Can, then, a divine spirit receive pay and prophesy? That a prophet of God should do so is impossible, but the spirit of such prophets is earthly. And then he never at all approaches an assembly of righteous men, but flees from them. And he joins himself to the doubleminded and empty, and prophesies to them in corners and deceives them by speaking in all things emptily according to their lusts. . . . When however he comes to a full assembly of righteous men who have the divine Spirit, and intercession is made by them, that man is emptied and the earthly spirit flees away from fear of him, and he is struck dumb and utterly crushed, not being able to speak a word.

The policy here suggested was not a new one. We find it first in Matt. 7 15-20.

Beware of false prophets, which come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves. Ye shall know them by their fruits. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles? Even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit. A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down, and cast into the fire. Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them.

Whether this passage was really spoken by Christ, or represents rather the special exegesis of some saying of his which the church gave at a later time, is impossible to say. The principle, "by their fruits ye shall know them," was no doubt in the section of the source (Q) on which the Sermon on the Mount is based, for it is found both in Matthew and Luke: the question is whether the reference to false prophets was in Q but omitted by Luke, or is simply a redactorial comment by Matthew. For myself I think it more probable that Matthew inserted than that Luke omitted it. But this is not important for the present point:

the text of Matthew, as it stands, is almost certainly earlier than *Hermas*, and represents the same policy of a "conduct test" applied to prophets in order to distinguish the true from the false.

The same policy can also be found in the *Didache* (xi, 3 f.):

Now concerning the apostles and prophets, according to the decree of the gospel so do ye. Let every apostle that cometh to you be received as the Lord; but he shall not stay save for one day; but if there be necessity, the next day also; but if he stay, then he is a false prophet.

That is the rule for apostles; they are missionaries, and a missionary has no business to wish to stay too long away from his work, which is among the unconverted, not among those who are already Christians.

And every prophet speaking in a "spirit" ye shall not try nor judge, for every sin shall be forgiven, but this sin shall not be forgiven.* But not every one that speaketh in a spirit is a prophet, but only if he have the ways of the Lord; from their ways then shall the false prophet and the true prophet be known. And no prophet appointing a table [probably this means ordering an Agape to be held] in a spirit will eat thereof, unless he be a false prophet.

It is interesting to notice that the Johannine epistles represent a different point of view. They wish to apply to prophets a dogmatic test.

Beloved (says the writer of 1 John 4 1-2) believe not every spirit but try the spirits whether they are of God; because many false prophets are gone out into the world. Hereby know ye the spirit of God; every spirit that confesseth Jesus as Christ come in the flesh is of God, and every spirit that confesseth not Jesus is not of God. . . . Hereby know we the spirit of truth and the spirit of error.

Contrast this with *Hermas* and with the *Didache*, and I think we must admit that we have to do with two independent attempts in the different localities to deal with the question of the false

*Note here the earliest and undoubtedly correct interpretation of the "sin against the Holy Spirit," namely, to reject the message of an inspired prophet, because he is the mouthpiece of the Spirit.

prophets. Hermas is an undoubted proof that the question was very important in Rome in the first half of the second century, and that then the conduct test rather than the dogmatic test was applied.⁷

The difficulty of the policy supported by Hermas was practical. Who was to apply it? Who was to judge between prophet and prophet? Ignatius had already given the answer: it was to be the bishop. It is uncertain whether the writings of Ignatius were known in Rome in the first half of the second century, but it is surely obvious that the solution he suggests was certain to be made. Perhaps it is worth while recalling the evidence which exists as to the bishops or presbyters in Rome at this time. Hermas helps us here but little. He refers to the bishops, but only in passing, and the source of our knowledge is Clement, who wrote in the last years of the first century (1 Clem. 42 4, 44 1-3). He states that the apostles appointed the

First-fruits, when they had proved them by the Spirit, to be bishops and deacons unto them that should believe, . . . and afterwards they provided a continuance, that if these should fall asleep, other approved men should succeed to their ministrations. Those, therefore, who were appointed by them, or afterwards by other men of repute with the consent of the whole community, . . . we do not think it just to cast out from their ministration.

If we take this passage in connection with the various references in the New Testament to bishops or presbyters (and Clement, like St. Paul, used the words as synonymous), here is sufficient proof that there was in every community an organization of administrative officers, called either bishops or presbyters. They were not apostles, and they were not prophets—from these they differed both functionally and essentially—but they were the administrative heads of the community, and as such would naturally be the mouthpiece of opinion, and have the last word of judgment in matters of fact, such as the behavior of some stranger who claimed to be a prophet, was suspected of

⁷ Hermas may indeed even be used as an argument to show that the Johannine literature was not introduced in Rome until after the time of Hermas. It is not impossible that Justin Martyr brought it with him,—but this question deserves separate treatment.

being a false prophet, and had to be tested by the rules laid down in the Didache, in *Hermas*, and in *Matthew*.

Moreover, we know, if *Epiphanius* may be trusted, that at all events *Marcion*, when he came to Rome, applied to the presbyters for recognition and failed to obtain it, so that we shall run little risk of error if we say that by the middle of the second century the prophets had so far come under the control of the administrators of the church that the latter had the power of deciding who was and who was not a genuine prophet. Thus the result of this problem of the early church—the question of true and false prophets—was the subjection of prophets to bishops and the beginning of that long chapter of history in which the episcopacy became not only the administrative arm of the church but the tribunal which judged the quality of men's spiritual life and the accuracy of their theological statements.

That this solution had its dangers is obvious from the study of history; but under the circumstances it was absolutely unavoidable, and it belongs to the general process of readjustment which was rendered necessary by the passage of the church from a community living in the momentary expectation of the coming of the Messiah to one in which that expectation was gradually fading into a hope for a more or less distant future, and Christians were settling down to the more actual problems of life. The extreme importance of *Hermas* is that it gives us glimpses of this process of readjustment.

*THE SOCIAL SETTLEMENT AFTER TWENTY-FIVE
YEARS*

GAYLORD S. WHITE

UNION SETTLEMENT, NEW YORK

More than a quarter of a century has elapsed since a letter, written by a passenger on an English railway train as he sat on the bank beside the track waiting for a broken-down engine to be repaired, resulted in the founding of the first Social Settlement. The writer was the Reverend Canon Samuel A. Barnett, then Vicar of St. Jude's Church, Whitechapel, in East London, and the settlement was Toynbee Hall. Mrs. Barnett has recently published an interesting account of the steps that led to the realization of the settlement idea. She describes the lack of knowledge of the poor on the part of earnest, thinking men, when she and her husband took up their work at St. Jude's, and tells of the visits they made to Oxford from time to time to talk to little groups of cultivated, serious young college men to get them to care about the poor and their problems. Some of these men came to Whitechapel for a visit, to see for themselves the conditions of poverty, and occasionally some would take lodgings in East London, when they left the university to begin their life-work. In this way a connection was established between Whitechapel and the university, and discerning spirits were able to see that each side had contributions of value to make to the other.

It was not strange that when Mr. Barnett was asked to give advice to some men at St. John's College, Cambridge, who were desirous of doing something for the poor, and were not quite prepared to start a college mission, he should have suggested that "men might hire a house, where they could come for short or long periods, and, living in an industrial quarter, learn to 'sup sorrow with the poor.'" This suggestion was made in the letter to which I have referred, and "that letter," says Mrs. Barnett, "founded Toynbee Hall." The letter was expanded into a paper read in

November of the same year (1883) at a college meeting at St. John's College, Oxford. The idea was taken up with enthusiasm, and on Christmas Eve, 1884, the first settlers took up their residence in the new building which had been erected adjacent to St. Jude's Church. The story of the naming of the new enterprise, as Mrs. Barnett tells it, is interesting. Arnold Toynbee, a rare spirit, was one of the group of young men at Oxford who had been deeply interested in the welfare of the poor. An intimate friend of the Barnetts, he had been a frequent visitor at St. Jude's vicarage, and for a brief period had lived in lodgings in East London. But his health, never vigorous, soon gave way and he was removed by an untimely death. Mrs. Barnett writes:

The 10th of March was a Sunday, and on the afternoon of that day Balliol chapel was filled with a splendid body of men who had come together from all parts of England in loving memory of Arnold Toynbee, on the anniversary of his death. Dr. Jowett had asked my husband to preach to them and they listened, separating almost silently at the chapel porch, filled, one could almost feel, by the aspiration to copy him in caring much, if not doing much, for those who had fallen by the way or were "ignorant of our glorious gains."

We had often chatted, those of us who were busy planning the new Settlement, as to what to call it. We did not mean the name to be descriptive; it should, we thought, be free from every possible savor of a Mission, and yet it should, in itself, be suggestive of a noble aim. As I sat on that Sunday afternoon in the chapel, one of the few women among the crowd of strong-brained, clean-living men assembled in reverent affection for one man, the thought flashed to me, "Let us call the Settlement Toynbee Hall." To Mr. Bolton King, the honorary secretary of the committee, had come the same idea, and it, finding favor with the committee, was so decided, and our new Settlement received its name before a brick was laid or the plans concluded.

It was two years later that the Neighborhood Guild, which subsequently became the University Settlement, was founded in New York. From these beginnings the movement has spread until in this country alone are now counted some five hundred social settlements. If the name is often loosely used, implying a somewhat vague conception of the essential idea, it has ceased to be an unfamiliar term. Indeed "settlement work" is used by many persons as a generic expression to denote such ac-

tivities as are usually associated with a settlement—the clubs, classes, and social gatherings that are so much in evidence in most settlements.

All this means that the social settlement has gained a certain vogue. It has become a popular method of modern philanthropy. It has reached a well-established place in social amelioration and reform. If the name is claimed by organizations which miss the essence of the thing, this in itself is an evidence of the settlement's popularity.

Time was, in the early days of the settlement, when its friends felt obliged to ask that for a while judgment be suspended. The idea was too new; perhaps by reason of its breadth it appeared too vague. Just because the settlement was designed to touch life at every point, to include within its view the whole range of human interests and needs, it was not easy to give a concrete and specific statement of its aims and purposes, such as would be entirely satisfactory to that somewhat over-rated individual, the practical man. Still, the practical man has his rights. The settlement can no longer ask exemption from criticism on the ground of its experimental character. In this age of "efficiency tests," applied not only in the field of industrial and commercial enterprise but also in that of education and charitable effort, the settlement cannot hope to escape. Nor do its friends desire that it should be exempt from the necessity of rendering an account. They believe that it has fulfilled a useful function in the community, and they are not prepared to agree with those of their critics who, while they admit the value of the work accomplished, maintain that the method has about reached the limit of its possibilities as a factor in social progress. It is a fair question to raise—this question as to the relatively permanent value of the social settlement. When a certain settlement was closed last winter in New York, the impression got abroad that the House was no longer of vital necessity to the neighborhood, owing to the extension of social opportunities by the municipality, a condition which was generally supposed to be attributable to the influence of the settlement. As a matter of fact this view of the case was erroneous, but such a situation is quite conceivably possible. There is an aspect of the settlement in which its very success in

bringing about a variety of needed local reforms, such as the socialization of the public schools, the extension of playgrounds and the like, might be supposed to put it out of business; much as a physician might seem to terminate his usefulness by the success with which he pursued preventive medicine and social hygiene. Hence it is high time to inquire what the settlement has accomplished and what promise for the future the method possesses.

The question is sometimes asked, how far the settlement has fulfilled the hopes of those who took the lead in the early days. It would be interesting to ascertain what the founders of the work had in mind, and to determine how far their expectations have been realized. Thus, for example, Canon Barnett declared long ago that the aim of the residents of Toynbee Hall was "first to form friendships and then through friendship to raise the standard of living and of life." Professor Graham Taylor tells us that the purpose of the founders was "to democratize culture and to humanize city politics." Writing, while the settlement was still young, of "the subjective pressure towards social settlements," Miss Jane Addams distinguished a threefold motive, namely, "the desire to make the entire social organism democratic, to extend democracy beyond its political expression"; then "the impulse to share the race life in order to bring social energy and the accumulation of civilization to those portions of the race that have little; and, finally, a feeling that springs from a certain renaissance of Christianity," especially in its early humanitarian aspects. The object of Hull-House is described as being "to provide a centre of a higher civic and social life; to institute and maintain educational and philanthropic enterprises, and to investigate and improve the conditions in the industrial districts of Chicago." Somewhat differently phrased is this statement from Chicago Commons: "We, who are at Chicago Commons to share the common lot, choose to live, for our own and others' sake, where we seem to be most needed, rather than where the neighborhood is supposed to offer the most of social privilege and prestige. . . . We assume the full obligations and claim all the rights of citizenship in a community with whose interests we identify ourselves, whose conditions we share, and for whose home

happiness, material welfare, political freedom, and social privilege and progress we try to do our part."

It will be noted that all of these statements of purpose are concerned not with definite and concrete details, but rather with certain broad principles of good citizenship and neighborly service. I think it may be said that the early leaders in the movement did not aim at accomplishing this and that definite object, so much as at the expression, in the midst of the life about them of which they had voluntarily made themselves a part, of the spirit of neighborliness. They were thorough-going democrats who sought to make the privileges of the few the opportunities of all. They set about their task in the scientific spirit, seeking to know the facts of the situation with which they were dealing; and they brought to it the desire "to serve by sharing." This has been, perhaps, one of the distinctive contributions which the settlement has made to the work of social reform—this combination of the scientific spirit with the humanitarian. It is probable that those who struck out on this untrodden way would not have ventured to predict whither it would lead them; but the prospects must have been alluring. Unforeseen opportunities and possibilities were constantly unfolding to the view, and now, as one looks back over the years, it is not difficult to see some marks of progress toward the goal of democracy. Just what value to assign to the settlement in the process, just how much to claim for it in reviewing the progress that has already been made, is more difficult, but that it has played an important part no one who is familiar with the movement can doubt.

Before we attempt to indicate what the settlement has accomplished and to estimate the value of the idea, it will be worth while to clear the air of certain misconceptions. It is somewhat surprising to find how general, at this late day, is the confusion of mind regarding the method and the aim of the social settlement. There are, for example, those who confound it with "mission work," as if it were some new form of religious propagandism; others think of it as some fresh departure in organized charity; and still others conceive of it as chiefly concerned with educational effort. Such misunderstanding is, after all, not so much to be wondered at. Just because the settlement sought to touch

life on every side, it laid itself open to misunderstanding on the part of the casual observer. And most people, moreover, are slow to grasp a new idea. They can think of it only in terms of something they already understand and in association with some institution to which the new idea appears in some way related. And those who confounded the social settlement with enterprises of education or undertakings of religion or organized charity were not altogether at fault. For the settlement has been brought of necessity into intimate relations with these and other phases of work.

Settlement workers have always been vitally interested in questions of education, and nearly every settlement has some educational features among its activities, such as a kindergarten or library or classes in manual training and household economics. But in nearly all cases these features will be found to have been introduced either as supplementary to the educational facilities of the public schools, or as experiments whose value must be demonstrated, before Boards of Education can be asked to incorporate them in the public-school system. There may also be instances in which sewing or cooking or carpentry is taught, either as a means of bringing a personal influence to bear upon the characters of the children or of getting in touch with certain elements of the neighborhood.

But the settlement does not exist primarily to do a work of education. Such educational features as settlements may have included in their programmes are, in a sense, accidents of the work. And yet the subject of public education is very close to the heart of every settlement resident. All his experience goes to convince him that the field of education must be broadened and socialized and that whatever of educational opportunity society owes to the individual must be paid for by the people as a whole. Some of the most notable work of the settlements has been accomplished in connection with the public schools, but of this I shall speak later.

If it is a mistake to think of the social settlement as an educational institution, it is still farther from the truth to consider it simply as a fresh departure in charitable work. This is not to say that there are not many cases where the lines of settlement

work and interest run parallel to those of organized charity. If, for example, organized charity is everywhere throwing the emphasis on the importance of preventive work in dealing with the social problem, the settlement is in full agreement, and hopes no less ardently than organized charity to see the day when poverty shall be abolished, and to have some part in bringing that happy day to pass. But the settlement is not dealing primarily or as an essential part of its work with the dependent class. It is simply a neighbor among neighbors. And just as one neighbor lends a helping hand to another neighbor in distress, so the settlement tries to bring the needed help to those of its neighbors whose lines have fallen in grievous places. This may mean giving temporary material relief. It will more likely mean putting the unfortunate individual or family in touch with the appropriate agency of organized charity. No settlement would wish to acquire the reputation of being a centre for the administration of material relief. It is true that the modern charity-organization society includes among its functions many things beside the administration of relief. The field of charity has expanded with the expansion of social vision and the deepening of the sense of social responsibility. And if thus both in interest and in method charity and the social settlement have drawn closer together, the enthusiastic advocate of settlement work might claim, with some show of reason, that the situation was in a considerable degree due to the reaction of the spirit of the settlement upon the work of charity. Doubtless a more temperate statement of the case would be that the settlement is itself one expression of the new social spirit which has profoundly influenced all philanthropic effort.

There is perhaps no more serious blunder concerning the social settlement than that which confounds it with the "mission." For there are those even today who conceive of settlement work as only another name for "mission work"—not, to be sure, the old-time sort of mission work, but none the less an effort through the preaching of a gospel to save individual souls. Now there is a sense in which the settlement idea grew out of the mission idea. I do not mean simply that there is a deep religious motive, whether it be consciously acknowledged or not, underlying the settlement. What I have in mind is the fact that when Canon Barnett first

proposed the establishment of a social settlement he took occasion to point out the shortcomings of the then popular "college missions," centres of religious work in the crowded sections of London, supported by university men, and suggested that university settlements would better express the idea that these missions sought to realize. But those who think of the settlement as a centre of religious propagandism might defend their attitude by citing the fact that not a few settlements are carrying on some sort of definite religious activity. A recent study of "Religious Work in the Settlements of the Borough of Manhattan," New York City, covering twenty-seven houses, showed that eleven were maintaining some form of religious work. Nine of these were Protestant in their connections, one Roman Catholic, and one Hebrew. There are, of course, other organizations directly connected with churches and known as church settlements, but of these the study above referred to took no account. Now it might be maintained that the settlements which are conducting religious work are very far removed from the traditional "mission" both in method and spirit. In most cases this would be true. But in my judgment it is far better for the settlement to leave distinctively religious work to the church and confine itself to the kind of neighborhood work which it is especially fitted to do and which no other organization yet devised is so well adapted to accomplish. Those settlements which on the whole have exerted the widest influence have followed this plan, not because of any inherent hostility to organized religion, but because it seemed the wisest course. And I am convinced that their policy has proved itself thoroughly sound. Any other course must tend to confusion. To mix religious activities with the work of a settlement is to run a serious risk of imperilling some of the settlement's most important interests. And it is difficult to see what can be gained by such a course which could not be better accomplished by a church or mission with a thoroughly socialized ministry. I think I can make clear what I mean by calling attention to two aspects in which the functions of the church or mission and the settlement are differentiated. These points of difference concern, first, the approach to the neighborhood and, secondly, the contacts with the neighborhood.

The mission is established in a given locality for the purpose

of declaring a message—a gospel that is well developed and clearly defined. It has a distinct work of propaganda; and it seeks to persuade men to accept its message and act upon it. It knows at the outset exactly what it proposes to do, for it deals primarily with well-ascertained human needs which it believes to be universal.

In this respect the mission differs radically from the settlement, which does not approach its neighborhood with preconceived notions as to what must be done for the neighborhood's regeneration. It has no definite propaganda, no clear-cut social theory to apply. It conceives its first duty to be to make the acquaintance of its neighbors, to study its field with a view to knowing the conditions under which the men and the women and the children are living and working. Policies, remedies, gospels, must come later and only as a result of this knowledge. And, furthermore, its method of work is not so much through the preaching of any gospel as through the organization of its neighborhood—of all the local forces for good, in some co-operative programme for the common welfare.

The other aspect in which the mission and the settlement differ is found in the character of the neighborhood contacts of the two institutions. This is an important difference to bear in mind. Obvious as it seems, it is often overlooked. If a church or mission be located in a given neighborhood, and the people invited by the most cordial methods to come and adopt the view of truth contained in its doctrinal standards and denominational platform, it requires little experience to forecast the result. One may be sure that the appeal of the mission, however broad and genuine, will be effective only with a certain class of the people of the neighborhood. Those who like the particular sort of thing for which this particular ecclesiastical organization stands will gather to its support, while whole sections of the neighborhood will stand entirely aloof. It will be a case of natural selection. If the mission is supported by Protestant interests, it will be vain to expect to attract Jews and Catholics; if it is a Catholic organization, nothing can be hoped for from the Jews and Protestants; and if the Jews are the promoters, Protestants and Catholics will leave it severely alone. This situation is as deplorable as it is

real. In the crowded sections of our cities and amongst our immigrant populations, serious problems growing out of the very general indifference to religion press for solution. Materialism in many forms presents itself, and the feeble efforts of religious bodies to cope with the tremendous need are pitiable. The situation possesses elements of tragedy. One may discern hopeful signs of a growing tolerance in the representatives of the three great religious bodies of the western world, but, as with neighboring nations between which exists an *entente cordiale*, let one overstep the boundaries of the other, or let any conflict of interests arise, and cordial relations are abruptly terminated. In spite of the broad-minded attitude of many religious leaders of different faiths, and in spite of the greater tolerance of the present day, we have not yet reached the point where all religious men, regardless of creed, can readily co-operate for the material and spiritual good of all. As long as this continues to be the case, no church of any faith can hope to make really broad contacts with a neighborhood whose religious and social interests are varied.

With the settlement, however, the case is quite different. The very first duty of the settlement is to get as far as possible into neighborly relations with every element of the surrounding life. Race, religion, social conditions, and class feeling need present no barriers to friendly intercourse between people who live on the same block or in the same district. And the settlement resident is not satisfied to let such barriers exist between himself and his neighbors. He meets the people among whom he lives not on a professional basis but on the basis of neighborliness—on the broad basis of a common humanity. And I think it may be said that, other things being equal, a settlement is successful just in so far as it comes into effective relations with Jews and Catholics and Protestants, the political leaders, the city officials, the organized workingmen, the socialist group, and all other groups that affect the social life of the neighborhood. This is the ideal the settlement holds before it, and it is an ideal that some settlements have realized to a considerable degree. And there is a distinct value in this, when so many influences in our modern life are making for division into social groups and tending only to accentuate class consciousness. The settlement stands pri-

marily for those influences that unite and that tend to promote social consciousness.

From what has been said regarding the relation of the settlement to other social activities it will, I think, be obvious that the social settlement worker has come to know the life of industrial neighborhoods from a new point of view. Others have labored in the same field. The teacher, the charity worker, the mission worker, the student seeking data for some task of social research,—each may claim to be familiar with the neighborhood, but the knowledge of each will almost inevitably be limited and qualified by his special interest. The settlement worker has in a true sense no special interest. He is interested in everything that has any human bearing upon his neighbors. He has no special end to serve beyond the simple end of getting acquainted, knowing facts about the struggles, the difficulties, the aspirations, of his neighbors, and the conditions under which their work is done and their lives are lived. Just because the settlement worker does not “profess” anything, he escapes the narrowing influence of the professional point of view and is not met by that defensive attitude on the part of his neighbors which the visit of the professional worker calls out. When the minister calls unexpectedly, the chances are that the mother of the family will hastily throw her apron over the can of beer that stands on the table; when the settlement resident calls the chances are that he will be cordially invited to share the contents of the can. This may shock the nerves of the reader, but one comes to feel, on reflection, that there is an immense advantage in this frank and open relationship.

This knowledge of things as they are, of life as it is, among that class of the community upon which the burdens of poverty rest, this first-hand knowledge of conditions through living in close contact with the conditions, is the settlement's peculiar treasure. That such knowledge could be had by living in neighborly relations with people, and that it was worth having, was the settlement's discovery, a simple and obvious thing, as it now seems, and yet a discovery that has modified all social work and supplied a necessary corrective to much scientific social inquiry.

As we come now to discuss certain elements of value in the

settlement method, the influence of this knowledge of conditions through acquaintance with one's neighbors will reveal itself. For example, it fits the settlement to interpret the life of industrial neighborhoods. In a democracy nothing but harm can result from a failure to understand and appreciate the conditions under which different sections of the community live and work, and the ideals and aspirations which govern them. Progress rests upon intelligent public opinion, and this is the result of mutual understanding. How little the people of some social groups know of the life of those of other groups!

Here, for instance, is a vast number of immigrants herded together in a corner of a great city, alien in race, in language, in customs; yonder is a great group of workingmen strongly organized and striving for justice in industrial conditions; here, again, is an active body of earnest men laboring with whole-souled devotion to reorganize society and place it upon a socialistic basis; and besides all these are the multitudes of people of moderate means, and the smaller number of the rich, most of whom fancy, when they give the matter any thought, that so long as they are comfortable the rest of the world must be,—except, of course, the shiftless and criminal who deserve their lot. With our population sharply divided into such groups as these, each with little vital contact with the other, there is abundant opportunity of misunderstanding and prejudice, which unfortunately are all too common. Perhaps still more unfortunate is the dense ignorance of one group concerning the most important interests of the other. Much social injustice is due to lack of knowledge. With persons of intelligence and sympathy, to know is commonly to act. If, for example, women generally knew from frequent and neighborly observation the burden of sweated labor under which multitudes of their sisters suffer that the bargain counters may be heaped high, the work of the Consumers' League would be considerably simplified.

Indeed, hardly anything seems of more importance just now than that a better and more sympathetic understanding of each other's point of view should exist between the widely separated groups of society. If there had been such an understanding on the part of the ministers' association of Bethlehem, Pa., and the

striking steel workers, the ministers would not have put this question to the strikers: "Is it reasonable to expect that by attacking your employer openly and in secret, by trying to destroy his property and his business, you can best persuade him to deal generously and magnanimously with you?" Nor would it have been necessary for the committee appointed by the Commission on the Church and Social Service to use such language concerning this question as the following: "There is evidence that the ministers were sincerely desirous to serve the best interest of the workmen, including the strikers, but the question addressed to them, and quoted above, is proof positive that they were too far aloof from the workingman to understand him and to win his confidence. Nothing could be more exasperating to the workingman than to assume that he desires to persuade his employer 'to deal generously and magnanimously' with him. What he desires and demands is not generosity and magnanimity at the hands of his employer, but simple justice. Not until ministers get close enough to the workingman to gain his point of view can they hope to influence him to any extent." It is safe to assume that none of these Bethlehem ministers had ever enjoyed the privilege of settlement residence. For the settlement resident, if he has eyes to see and ears to hear, gets the point of view of the labor man and would never have committed such a blunder. It is just here that the settlements have rendered an important service. They have not only acquired knowledge of the conditions under which their neighbors live and labor, but they have been a medium through which this knowledge has been spread abroad. The knowledge which the residents of settlements have gained has been based upon concrete instances of injustice and suffering and need on the part of their neighbors and friends. And the knowledge thus gained has been used to mould public opinion and to create a background for intelligent efforts for reform. This function of the settlement as an interpreter of the life of the crowded sections of our cities has received its finest expression in the genius of Jane Addams. It would be hard to overestimate the value of such work as she has done through her writings and addresses. Nothing could be finer than her book, *The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets*, as an interpretation of the

environment of the city youth, and as an appeal for a more intelligent handling of the question of public recreation. It needs, of course, something more than settlement residence to qualify one to render such service, but there are few seasoned settlement residents who have not in some degree done a similar service. They have made valuable contributions to the work of social interpretation through reports and published studies, as members of, or witnesses before, official commissions, and as advocates of social legislation before legislative bodies.

It is perhaps in relation to our immigrant populations that the settlements have been most effective in the exercise of this function of interpretation. Some of our most difficult social questions grow out of the presence of the multitudes of immigrants who crowd into the already congested sections of our cities, through the ranks of unskilled labor, and bring with them habits and customs of primitive rural life which are ill-suited to city dwelling. Their presence complicates the problems of sanitation, of housing, and of industry. And yet there are contributions of value which every immigrant race and nationality is capable of making to the sum total of our composite American character. If, on the one hand, we are to profit by these contributions, some group of people must have the insight to recognize such elements of value and the skill to draw them forth and preserve them. And if, on the other hand, we are to give to the new-comers something more than material goods, something of the best of the spirit of our traditions and institutions, some group of people must make it its business to see that this is done with tact and sympathy and judgment.

To many of our foreign-born neighbors the night-stick of the policeman is the sceptre of authority in America; and the first contact with our civic institutions which makes a lasting impression on him is often effected by a liberal application of that same sceptre, followed by an arraignment in the police-court. The public schools are doing an important work in americanizing the children of the immigrants, but what of the adult? Shall we leave his education in civic and moral ideals to the tender mercies of the politician and the saloon-keeper? These men take a very practical interest in him and have a corresponding influ-

ence over him. Through the joint good offices of these worthy citizens the Italian laborer gets a job—when he is able to pay for the privilege; and the politician obligingly puts him in the way of getting naturalized; indeed, he is always ready to be his friend, if always with the expectation of some suitable *quid pro quo*. I recall the significant inquiry with which a young man was met who was endeavoring to organize a class of Italians for the study of English in a New York settlement. As he went from store to store, where the men congregated in the evening, giving his invitation, he was more than once asked, “Are you from Tammany?” When he disclaimed any connection with that organization, they shrugged their shoulders and turned away. Apparently they could not conceive of any other organization, or group of citizens, taking an interest in their welfare! It was an unintentional rebuke to the settlement, which was not lost upon it. The settlement worker who is thoroughly at home among his Italian neighbors has an unusual chance to serve both his neighborhood and the community at large. Through a dozen natural channels he comes into friendly contact with his neighbors, and with sympathetic understanding helps them to adjust themselves to the new and strange environment; and through his contacts with the larger world outside of the “Little Italy” or the Ghetto the settlement resident has a chance to correct mistaken impressions and to dispel unfounded prejudices concerning the people among whom he dwells.

Another useful purpose that the social settlements have served has been as initiators of movements for social advance and as experiment stations where new proposals for community welfare could be tried out. I know of no other organization which is quite so well fitted, by its very nature, to perform the service of interpretation. And naturally growing out of this is the effort to meet the needs that are discovered.

In this latter particular the field is less peculiarly the settlement's. Other organizations have had a large part in the work of social progress, but the settlement has done its share. Within recent years large foundations have been established for the purpose of initiating and furthering movements for community welfare. Before these great gifts were made, leaders in

charitable and correctional activities were demonstrating the possibilities of preventive work and setting on foot new enterprises of philanthropy. And it is not too much to claim that the social settlement was a potent influence back of much of these more modern efforts. Not that the settlement undertook at the outset to accomplish any definite reform. It set itself to get acquainted with people. And this simple undertaking produced results which could not possibly have been foreseen. That something must happen as a consequence of knowing one's neighbors the early leaders felt assured, but just what that something would prove to be, the most sanguine of them would scarcely have ventured to predict, even though they cherished their dreams of what it might be. One thing that followed was the influence on all enterprises of philanthropy and religion coming from the settlement method of learning to know people's needs by sharing their experiences of life and using this knowledge as the basis of reform and preventive work. Another thing was the necessity which at times the settlements themselves felt of initiating reform and preventive work and of using their facilities for testing the worth of new propositions. A concrete case of individual need comes to the attention of a settlement resident, and in the attempt to meet the need it is seen to be only a symptom of a larger social need. Then follows an effort to meet the larger need, and the settlement is the natural place for the effort to be tried out. It is in this way that settlements have become experiment-stations in social work. Examples may be cited in the field of public health, education, and recreation.

The settlement's intimate relation to the homes of the neighborhood has naturally given it a deep, though by no means exclusive, interest in the problems of child-welfare. Many of the efforts of residents are directed toward securing for the children of the tenements such opportunities for development, physical, mental, and moral, as intelligent parents of ampler means consider essential for their children. Questions of health naturally come in for a large share of attention where so many influences are at work to retard sound development. What, for example, was more natural than for Miss Wald, of the Henry Street (Nurses') Settlement in New York, with her professional training and intimate

knowledge of the homes of her neighborhood, to see how much could be accomplished by having a trained nurse co-operate with the doctor who was assigned to inspect the children in the public schools? The next step was to try out the plan, with the consent of the public authorities, in the neighborhood of the settlement, using the settlement nurses for the experiment. The nurse could give general supervision to the cleanliness of the children, call the attention of the doctor to cases of special need, and follow up in the home or the dispensary any prescribed treatment. After a little experimental work the value of the plan is determined, and we have our staff of school-nurses working under the Board of Health, later merged, as a further development of the idea, into the Division of Child Hygiene of the Department of Health.

Kindergartens and free libraries commonly found a home in the settlements before the community was ready to support them out of public funds. When the public was convinced of their value by practical tests, they were largely transferred to public administration and support.

Much of the process of socialization which the public schools have undergone with such beneficent results has been initiated by the settlements. Experiments in "home and school visiting" were being made in the settlements, in the ordinary course of the day's work, long before any one realized that there was enough value in the scheme to organize it and put a tag on it and develop it into a distinct department of social activity. The first boys' club in a public school in New York was organized by a worker in the University Settlement who had successfully developed the club work of the settlement boys. This may be regarded as the entering wedge in the use of school-buildings as recreation centres.

The whole question of public recreation is one which has always come to the front in settlement experience. The "organization of leisure" is a familiar phrase in descriptions of settlement purpose. Not only do many persons need help in utilizing their spare time in a way to minister health to the body and refreshment to the spirit, but also the opportunity for safe and wholesome recreation must often be created. At present the needs of the community in the matter of recreation are left largely to the

exploitation of those who see in them simply an opportunity of commercial gain. Towards many of these enterprises of private business the attitude of the municipal authorities has almost always been repressive, and rightly so. But the community has offered little to meet in a wholesome way the legitimate public need which the cheap theatre, the uncensored motion-picture show, the dance hall, and the like, are meeting for pecuniary profit and at a frightful cost in human character.

It has remained for the social worker to recognize the immense importance of sane, wholesome recreation as a powerful character-builder and to move for larger municipal provision for this need of the city-dweller. The playground has always been a cherished object with the settlement resident, and scarcely a settlement can be found in a crowded district which will not have converted its little two-by-four back yard into a pathetic apology for a playground. In the early days of the movement for playgrounds the settlement people were among the most ardent advocates and the most active workers. And it is with no small satisfaction that social workers in New York reflect that the present Commissioner of Parks for the Boroughs of Manhattan and Richmond was an old settlement resident and for years has been the foremost promoter of playgrounds in the city. But I have said enough to indicate how the settlements have acted as initiators of movements and served as centres for social experimentation.

Such things as I have mentioned, and others similar to them, have been accomplished, sometimes under the lead of the settlements and more frequently in co-operation with other groups of social workers, because there were persons of intelligence, sympathy, and some leisure living among the people, sharing their experiences, studying the neighborhood needs, and finding out what ought to be done.

Other uses of the settlement might be mentioned. One is tempted to speak of its "get-together" character, to point out the service it has done in bringing together on neutral ground representatives of different social groups, and giving them a chance to meet face to face and to exchange ideas and view difficult problems from each other's point of view. They have helped in this way to promote a true democracy of feeling. The part the settlement

has played in quickening social consciousness may be difficult to estimate, but it has undeniably been large. Today, for instance, we hear much less than a few years ago of the "institutional church." The social mission of the church is, fortunately, coming to be taken as a matter of course. We expect every live church to be conducting, or taking part in, some form of social work. And I believe that the settlement through its influence in stimulating a sense of social responsibility has reacted directly on the churches to produce these results. There is a sense in which the settlement in its earlier days acted as a challenge to the churches. The churches naturally looked somewhat askance at the settlement, which undertook work, with a careful avoidance of all religious features, in quarters regarded by the church as its own preserves. This in itself was enough to arouse suspicion against the movement on the part of the church, but there were further grounds of complaint. It was soon apparent that the settlements were absorbing many of the more thoughtful young people, who had been brought up within the churches. Not a few college men and women, coming to take up the active work of life and finding little sympathy in the church for their intellectual and social convictions, turned with a sense of relief and satisfaction to the opportunity which the settlement offered of practical work in simple, genuine, human ways. This fact did not pass unobserved by the churches, and in addition they could not but recognize that the settlements were achieving results in the very districts in which they were compelled to admit utter failure. The situation stirred the church to action. Methods of so-called "settlement work"—clubs and classes and a variety of social activities—were adopted, and the institutional church was developed. I do not wish to appear to claim that the settlement was the sole influence in quickening a sense of social responsibility in the church. If the settlement had never been, the church could not have failed to feel the touch of the spirit of the age. Its social conversion was inevitable. Still it remains true that the church and the settlement had too many common interests to escape the effect of mutual reaction. Friction was sure to result unless extraordinary care and forbearance were exercised on both sides.

It was hardly to be expected that on either side there should

be a conscious effort to allay distrust and promote a good understanding. The definition of the institutional church given by one of the leaders in that movement is significant. He defined the institutional church as "the social settlement plus religion." I think one may detect here a hint of the influence of the settlement upon the social movement within the church, and also a suggestion of the church's estimate of the social settlement. Evidently, from the point of view of the church the settlement lacked the one thing needful. Happily much of this feeling has passed away. A more sympathetic attitude has taken its place. And yet the feeling still lingers to such an extent in the minds of many persons identified with the church that it may be worth while to add a word concerning the matter. If those who today complain that the settlement lacks "religion" mean thereby that in their judgment it ought to conduct organized religious activities, I have already expressed the reasons why I think their point not well taken. To do that would be to introduce the very element that prevents the broad neighborhood relations so essential to the settlement's success. It places the settlement in the category of a mission. It would be far better to decide at the outset whether to establish a mission or a settlement, and then determine the question of religious work accordingly. And if this complaint means, as it sometimes does, that there is anything in the nature of the settlement that makes it intrinsically hostile, or even unfriendly, to religion, I should have again to take issue with the complainant. Any doubt about the religious character and value of the settlement is based either upon a misapprehension of the settlement or an extremely narrow view of the significance of religion. I believe the present social movement is essentially a religious movement. It springs from human sympathy and expresses its sympathy in intelligent practical form for the welfare of mankind. If the chief object which the truly religious man holds before his mind is the advancement of the kingdom of God through a life of loving service, the social-settlement worker can clasp hands with him. Some settlement people may prefer to use a slightly different terminology in stating their aim,—to call things by different names,—but the things are not altered by the difference in the labels. And if it is further

urged that religion is concerned with the salvation of the individual as well as with bringing men into right relations with their fellow-men, the settlement can help even in this phase of religious work. It does not presume to attempt to convert men in the conventional sense, but if individual salvation is understood to include saving man's body and mind, as well as his spirit, it can make an important contribution to this larger process of redemption. We are at last coming to realize the need of a sound physical basis for a normal moral and spiritual life, and the settlement is a force in the readjustment of the physical and moral life of the individual, as well as of the environment in which he lives. Service is not all of religion, but it is an important element, and the social settlement is a synonym for service.

If there is, as I believe, a better understanding of the settlement on the part of those who represent the church, it is likewise true that settlement workers generally are realizing the need of a closer co-ordination of all the moral and spiritual and social forces of the community. The settlement worker and the socialized church-worker are finding much common standing-ground. Religion is no longer tabooed in settlement circles, if it ever was. And I believe the churches on their part will come to see that in some neighborhoods, at least for the present, a settlement without organized religious work can do a useful work which neither a mission nor even an institutional church can do. Must we not rid ourselves of the idea that "Christian work" is one thing and "humanitarian work" quite another? Does any one doubt that Jesus was fully as religious, and quite as much engaged in "Christian work," when he was ministering to the sick and feeding the hungry, as when he was preaching to the multitude or gently revealing the Samaritan woman to herself? Both functions are of importance. The one must supplement the other. Not all organizations doing useful philanthropic and educational work and liberally supported by church people are required or expected to open their meetings with prayer or conduct revival services; and it is hard to see why the settlement, which is first of all a home, should be viewed with misgiving, because it concludes that its wisest course is to leave to the church all forms of active religious work.

But I believe the settlement will come to see more clearly the value of those spiritual processes and the power of that inspiration which it is the function of the church to generate and set in motion. And thus the church, the synagogue, and the social settlement will more effectually supplement each other's work and bring about a correlation of spiritual and moral forces that will hasten the coming of that day when justice and good will shall rule in all relations between man and man.

It remains now to consider the question of the future of the settlement. There are not wanting those who believe that the settlement will soon have served its generation and ought then to follow the example of the ancient leader of Israel who, as we are told, under similar circumstances fell on sleep. Is this the case? Is there sound reason to believe that the settlement method has accomplished about all that can be expected of it and that its days are numbered? We are reminded that more and more the activities of the settlement are being turned over to the appropriate departments of the city government, and that the settlements themselves desire this and are constantly endeavoring to promote it; we are told that when the process is complete and all activities now carried on by the settlements are municipalized, the settlements may take in their signs, put up their shutters, and close their doors. For the sake of argument we may grant that in time all the familiar activities of the settlement will be carried on by the community, and we may assume that no new ideas will be evolved to require "trying out," although that is a somewhat improbable assumption. But, even so, I think the settlement would still have a place of usefulness. For one thing, it would doubtless be necessary to have a voluntary organization or group of people experienced in social work, to co-operate with the city officials who were charged with its social enterprises. If politics is to be kept out of the administration and the evils of mechanical methods reduced to their lowest terms by means of intelligent, sympathetic, human supervision and leadership, some group of private citizens who care about these things must be in close touch with the situation. Today we have State Charities Aid Associations, Public Education Associations, and the like, exercising a similar function. What group would more

naturally take up this matter as its business than the settlement group? At a recent conference it was stated that the social work of the public schools in one of the larger Western cities had been successful only in those sections in which there were settlements.

Furthermore, is it not worth while to have a group of educated people, with social and civic ideals, living as citizens and neighbors in the industrial quarters of great cities? It does not require an active imagination to conceive of many services such a group could render. In all large cities startling changes are taking place, due to the movements of nationalities and races, changes so rapid that often within a few years a neighborhood will undergo a complete transformation,—the Jews, for example, crowding out the Irish, to be themselves displaced later by the Italians. To be a constant factor in the midst of such kaleidoscopic changes, the one established neighbor, rooted, and grounded in the neighborhood, persistently gathering facts, supplying leadership, and forming a rallying-point for all good citizens, this is a service no other organization could render so effectively as the social settlement.

As to the character of the settlement of the future one hesitates to venture a prediction. I think, however, that one may detect a tendency to revert to the simplicity of the early days of the movement. Much passes today for "settlement work" and the "settlement idea" that is only loosely related to that for which the settlement really stands. It began, as I have pointed out, with a group of people of education and culture making their home in a neglected neighborhood with the idea of being good neighbors and of sharing the common life. From this simple beginning it has developed in most cases to include a large plant, a staff of paid workers, and a great variety of activities. The effect has been to obscure the simplicity of the early idea. The institutional settlement has always been regarded by the friends of the movement as in a measure a necessary evil,—a development which was required by the situation, but permitted with regret. The tendency now seems to be to a more decided reaction against the institutional type, and this tendency gives promise of permanency for the method. The older settlements will doubtless

continue to endeavor to meet the needs that arise in their neighborhoods, as long as the municipality lags behind in its enterprises of social service, even if this necessitates a further development in the way of institutions. But where new settlements are organized, their promoters will do well to consider whether their opportunity does not lie in the direction of the simpler, residential type. Such a settlement could direct its energies chiefly to increasing still further the social usefulness of schools, public libraries, gymnasiums, playgrounds, recreation-houses, and the like, and would take a lively interest in seeing that all such work was efficiently maintained. Its residents would not lack neighborhood work, and, freed from the exacting duties of much club and class work, they would have more time to devote to such important services as those which I have mentioned,—the interpretation of life and the initiation of, and co-operation with, new movements for social welfare,—services which the settlement is peculiarly equipped to perform. This seems to me to answer, as well as it can be answered, the question of permanency; for it is difficult to believe that the time will arrive within the next few generations when social justice will be so firmly and widely established that such efforts will be altogether out of date. When that happy day comes, the settlement, along with many other forms of philanthropic and charitable effort (about which, by the way, one wonders why the question of permanency is never raised), may be cheerfully relegated to the scrap-heap of social endeavor. In the mean time we may safely conclude that the settlement has a contribution of peculiar value to make to the work of setting up that new order of society which those who follow the lead of the Christ believe shall be eventually realized in the kingdom of God.

IS FAITH A FORM OF FEELING?

A. C. ARMSTRONG

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

Like the appeal to faith at large, the tendency to conceive faith as emotion may proceed from various motives. In contrast to an arid intellectualism, or with a view to curing practical corruption, it is urged in furtherance of earnest religious experience. This was the case in the pre-reformation and the Reformation age, and again during the revival in the eighteenth century in England. In eras of doubt the faith of feeling is commended as a substitute for the halting processes of reason, with their dubious or negative conclusions. This motive also was active in the era of renascence and reform, and it has markedly influenced the religious development of later modern times. Such motives, moreover, rest upon a basis of truth. The heart has its rights as well as the head, and its deliverances possess an evidential value. In periods of intellectual change the witness of the heart gains special importance as an aid to faith until the reason can adjust itself to the new conditions. The faith which purifies and the faith which inspires is always the faith which is experienced. These principles need emphasis now less than ever before, for there has never been a period in which they have been so often advocated, and with so great authority, as in the last century and a half. In our own time, in part by voices which have only lately ceased to speak to us, they have been urged with a persuasive eloquence that has carried them throughout the civilized world. Formulated in technical fashion, they have entered into the reflection of the age until they have become one of its most characteristic and most significant philosophies of religion.¹

For practice, however, as well as theory, much depends upon the form of the doctrine. The interpretation of faith solely in

¹ See the writer's *Transitional Eras in Thought*, chap. vi.

terms of feeling contains as many pitfalls as the purely intellectual view of it. Scarcely less dangerous is the view which constantly emphasizes the emotional phase, although it partly recognizes the element of knowledge which is involved in the discernment and in the application of religious truth. From the point of view of logical theory the errors of this emotional interpretation have often been criticised. It has been less commonly noted that it neglects essential laws of the emotional life itself, that the psychology of emotion confirms the logic of belief in its rejection of the sentimental theory. This will appear if we consider in outline the varieties of emotional consciousness. The affective side of consciousness includes phenomena of less and greater complexity and development. Lowest in the scale come the feelings which accompany the exercise of the senses or the simpler impulses and activities. Higher than these, more complex, more developed, more wide-spread in their influence on life, more dependent on individual and social history, on culture, on social as well as physical evolution, are classed the emotions in the stricter meaning of the word. Among the emotions psychology assigns the highest place of all to those which have been termed the sentiments, the intellectual, the aesthetic, the ethical and religious sentiments of the mind. In some of its forms the conception of faith as emotion tends to class religious consciousness with the simpler rather than with the more developed types of feeling. The mystic's yearning for direct communion with his God, still more his aspiration towards union with the Deity or absorption into him, brings perilously near a sensitive analysis of piety. The apologetic demand for an immediate and certain substitute for reason leads many advocates to a virtual adoption of the same erroneous conclusion. For the sensational view is negatived by psychology as fully as it is by logic and by practical experience. In its beginnings the religious feeling no doubt manifested itself in the simpler and less developed forms of the affective life. And it continues to sustain close relations to the sensitive, and even to the organic and physical, phases of human nature. But from the first it contained in germ the elements of true emotion; while evolved at all, it belongs where by common consent it has long been classed, among the distinct-

ively spiritual phenomena. To refer it now to sense means a return toward primitive attitudes, however lofty the motive by which the retrogressive interpretation is inspired.

Religious feeling, therefore, must be counted emotion in the technical sense. But the established psychology of emotion forbids the resolution of faith into feeling only. An emotion consists of three factors, the idea about which the feeling gathers, the element of feeling proper, the bodily phenomena which follow from this affective state, or, as some contend, precede and produce it. Since the promulgation of the celebrated theory of James and Lange there has been much debate concerning the order of these last two factors and their relative importance. Does the emotion proper affect the body, according to the traditional view? Or does the bodily excitement precede and cause, or by its reflex effects on mind constitute, that which we commonly term the emotional condition? Do we tremble because we are afraid, or are we afraid because we tremble? Do we weep on account of grieving, or is grief the reflex of tears? This discussion, however, hardly affects the principle which we are now considering. Professor James applied his theory primarily to the "coarser emotions," those in which the bodily element is most prominent. But from these the sentiments have long been distinguished, among other differences by the absence of this pronounced physical factor. Or, if this distinction in the scope of the theory be not maintained,² the present argument still remains intact. Whether the emotion produces the bodily echo or the physical excitement produces the affective reflex, in either case a cognitive idea forms the groundwork of the total phenomenon. Pathological and unmotivated cases apart,³ we rejoice or grieve over something, we are amused or saddened or incensed or calmed by something, we regret something, we hope for something, we shrink from something, perceived or represented in memory or imagination. More abstractly, we are devoted to truth, we appreciate beauty, we cleave loyally to the good, we fear God and strive to do his will. Man's emotional life is essentially connected with

² See James's unconvincing discussion, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii, pp. 468-470.

³ Cf. James, vol. ii, pp. 468-469.

his cognitive thinking. The phenomena of the one gather about elements which the second supplies. Emotion is not mere feeling; its bodily side apart, it is feeling related to ideas.

These facts make it imperative to take account of the intellectual aspects of religion. The ideas and principles to which faith relates are of moment for faith, even in its emotional phases. The cognitive state around which a religious emotion gathers is a determining factor in the feeling itself. Not, indeed, the sole determining factor. The feeling is essentially a function of the idea, it depends upon it and follows from it. But there are numerous other tendencies which affect the joint result. History, habit, training, culture, even that vague physical and mental complex called temperament, even circumstance and passing conditions, all enter into the possible antecedents of a given emotional state. Individual belief and the collective faith of social groups are alike determined by these and similar causes. But though there are many factors in the genesis of piety, it remains established that the ideas about which pious feeling centres form leading conditions of its appearance and its character. Emotion, moreover, varies with the cognitive content to which it is attached. The element of knowledge is an essential component in the emotional complex; if it be altered, the feeling proper loses its determining basis and is itself liable to change. An apparition, for instance, is shown to be a shadow, and fear gives place to calmness or to amused reflection on the illusion of the immediate past. Good news turns to tidings of disaster, and the once happy throng disperses in sadness or lingers only to give expression to its grief. The shadows fall on distant summits, and delight in the sunset-glow fades into the sterner moods which are also inspired by the view of peak and glacier.

So also with the more personal emotions of which this paper treats. The allegiance of the savage to his chief, the subject's loyalty to his sovereign, the devotion of the citizen to his country and its interests, are examples which may be classed together under patriotic feeling, but it is evident that the several manifestations of the type differ with the stage of political evolution reached, evident also that these variations have to a large degree depended on changes in political ideas. The tribal head, the monarch,

the fatherland, on the one hand, the war-pledge, feudal submission, enlightened patriotism, on the other,—the evolution of ideas and the development of feeling have gone on by parallel stages. The ethical and religious emotions follow the same law. In part the content of duty varies with the view of moral obligation; the moral feelings also experience change, even though duty retain its constraining power. Moral rules may be construed as divine commands, or considered self-evident principles, or conceived as conditions of social welfare. The accompanying moral feelings may in the several cases bear the same names, but in character they inevitably differ. Even if for a time the effects of inheritance and training outweigh the influence of personal reflection, in the event the several tendencies will work out their due results. Of this the history of morals supplies abundant experimental proof.⁴ The case of religion is even clearer than the case of morals. Fear has grown to reverence, propitiation has developed into worship, other-worldliness has been so far replaced by the religion of the present that it is not always easy to maintain our devotion to the Unseen. It would be idle to contend that these alterations of attitude and feeling have gone on independently of intellectual change. Analysis and history combine to show the contrary. It is impossible to construe such phases of the religious consciousness merely in terms of emotion, if one mean by emotion feeling devoid of cognitive attachments. Fear and reverence and worship and devotion,—the terms themselves connote a mingling of cognitive and affective states.

The emotional analysis of faith misconceives these aspects of religious experience. Religious consciousness contains cognitive as well as emotional (and volitional) elements. The affective factors depend upon the cognitive, and vary with them. Hence the resolution of faith into mere feeling overlooks an essential element in the total phenomenon, while the predominantly sentimental interpretation is in part guilty of the same mistake. On the other hand the emotional analysis is not entirely erroneous. It may be relatively justified by historical conditions, as shown

⁴ The evolution of French culture since the beginning of the Revolutionary era may be cited as one of many illustrations which cannot be considered here.

in the beginning of this paper. It rightly distinguishes between primary religious ideas and their reflective interpretation in terms of abstract dogma. In addition it can plead a basis in general mental fact, even though its principal contentions run counter to the results of psychological inquiry. For in the psychology of religious feeling, as everywhere in the emotional life, the laws established are subject to marked limitations. The emotion proper depends upon cognition, and changes with this. But the element of feeling, as we have also noted, is but one among many constituents of the joint affective state. That is to say, we are dealing with an exceedingly complex phenomenon, whose complexity, moreover, is accentuated by other conditions characteristic of emotional states. Emotions are characterized, for instance, by a wide range of divergence, so that even those which are classed together may also greatly differ. We speak of fear, or love, or grief, and these class-designations rest upon fact; but psychologists recognize that such names denote no fixed and self-identical types. There are different fears and loves and griefs—and so with the rest—into whose composition, still to borrow the figure from the physical world, there enters not merely a large, but also a highly mutable, body of constituents. Once more, emotions are unstable, as well as complex and mutable. The many diverse factors out of which they are built up are not compacted into a closely integrated whole. In them the web of consciousness is loosely, rather than compactly, woven. The strands are not so knitted together that to separate them will destroy the fabric. On the contrary, the looseness is equal to the differentiation, and is the ground of a parallel function. The several factors in an emotion not only differ with varying conditions; they are so loosely joined that substitution becomes an easy process, often without notable change in the phenomenon as a whole.

Hence follow several limitations of the general law which are relatively favorable to the emotional theory of faith. Religious feeling depends on knowledge, but not on knowledge alone. The religious emotions centre about ideas and doctrines, but the connection is not so close as the intellectualist, not to say the dogmatist, maintains. Changes of religious sentiment accompany alterations in belief, but the variation of the two factors is not

always direct, or immediate, or equal in extent. The cognitive phase may greatly alter, and yet for the time the phase of feeling undergo but little change. Under certain conditions, when the intellectual variation is in incidentals rather than in essentials, in particular if it concerns the dogmatic formulation rather than the primary content of religious belief, the affective factor may continue permanently the same. Here is evident the foundation for the claims of the sentimental view. Since the dependence of feeling on cognition is not absolute, the way is open to declare the former independent of its mate. As the co-variation may fail to be immediate or complete, it is possible to dwell upon the persistence of pious feeling amid the vicissitudes of doctrinal change. The necessity for religion of a living personal experience reinforces the tendencies born of intellectual need. In times of doubt the doctrine, exaggeration though it be, is often nobly used to confirm belief or to encourage troubled souls in their search for peace.

Certain of our examples of the general law may serve to illustrate its limitations also. The evolution of loyalty has paralleled the evolution of political ideas, but patriotism persists in a remarkable measure. Ethics changes, but the present generation has learned with pleased surprise how strong the sentiment of duty may remain amid the fluctuations of ethical theory. Few phenomena of the second half of the nineteenth century have been less expected than the maintenance, even the deepening, of moral feeling which has gone on, although several of the prevailing forms of thought have included elements which tend to undermine it. In regard to religious faith the matter was finely stated by Auguste Sabatier in his *Philosophie de la religion*. Dealing there with the evolution of dogma, he thus describes a religious assembly:

Here, in one of our temples, is assembled a great company for worship. Among this audience perchance there are poor old women, very ignorant and somewhat superstitious, men of the middle class with a little literary culture, scholars and philosophers who have reflected on Kant and Hegel, even professors of theology penetrated to the marrow by the critical spirit. All bow in spirit and worship; all use the same language learned in childhood; all repeat with heart and lips: *I believe in God, the Father almighty*. I do not know whether there is on earth a more touching spectacle, anything nearer heaven.

All these different souls, who perhaps would be incapable of understanding one another in the realm of mere intellect, really commune with one another; a common religious sentiment penetrates and animates them. The moral unity of which Jesus spoke when he said, "That they may be one as we are one," is for the moment realized on earth. But do you believe that the word God, pronounced by all lips, arouses in all these souls the same image? The poor dame, who remembers still the illustrations in her big Bible, imagines the Father eternal with a long white beard, and eyes shining and burning like coals. Her neighbor would smile at this naïve anthropomorphism. He has the deistic notion, rationally demonstrated to him in his course of philosophy at school. But this notion in turn would seem crude to the Kantian, who knows that every positive idea of God is contradictory, and who, to escape the contradiction, takes refuge in the idea of the Unknowable. For all, however, God subsists, and it is because God is present and living in all, that the word lends itself to so many different acceptations; but, note this point, the word lives only because it serves to express a piety which is felt (*ressentie*) and common. The life of dogma is in piety.⁵

The law of the concomitant variation of idea and feeling is thus limited and not absolute. But it is to be noted that the limiting conditions do not make void the underlying principle. They remain limitations merely, so that when a certain measure of alteration is passed, the phenomena revert to the type which the law demands. If patriotism persists amid political change, it encounters perils unknown before altered conditions, among them strange conceptions of the state, had led on to anti-militarism, internationalism, or even to anarchistic views. There is nothing finer in later modern culture than the union of moral earnestness with negative opinion; nevertheless it is clear that ethical positions have altered with the intellectual development, and further, that several of the moral dangers of the time depend on conclusions which follow from agnostic premises. And Sabatier's argument itself, despite the glowing spirituality by which it is pervaded, suggests an inference contrary to the view which he defends. In an age of religious transition it is indeed well to draw the boundaries of faith as wide as the truth will in any wise permit. The

⁵ Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion d'après la psychologie et l'histoire, pp. 303 f.

spirit of the time requires support beyond that which the precision of intellect would grant. Burdened individual souls should not be held too straitly to theoretical formulas. And the thinker who does not feel the need of relief has himself scarcely experienced, or has happily surmounted, the tendencies of his own time. In the event, however, individuals and ages must conform to the inevitable law. It might almost be said that there is a duty laid upon us so to adapt our feelings to that which we hold to be true. As sincere and reasonable men, ought we to worship an unknowable force as though it were a personal God? Are there not ethical questions involved in our spiritual attitude as well as doctrines and religious interests? But this phase of the matter need not now be pressed. It has often been brought elsewhere to the attention of thinking men. And it is the psychological aspect of the problem which is here especially in point. Whether or not we believe that feeling ought to follow knowing, it is certain that eventually it will follow it. It is in the nature of the psychical conditions that, when the cognitive basis fundamentally varies, the emotional accompaniments will also change. They may not do so at once, or completely, but in the end essential variation is sure. Analytical psychology, moreover, is confirmed by historical psychology. The biographies of religious thinkers often show the alterations of feeling which accompany changes in belief, albeit these may have been reached only after hesitancy and suffering. The history of religion at large—notably in the modern age—is evidence of the same concomitant evolution. Faith, therefore, cannot reasonably be analyzed into feeling alone. For feeling here is in part a function of knowledge. The sentimental theory is almost as one-sided as the intellectualism which it seeks to supplant. If it lays stress on factors in belief which need to be emphasized, over-emphasis involves both theoretical and practical dangers. Religious faith includes elements both of knowing and of feeling. These interact in an organic and living way. Psychology, as well as logical theory, forbids the endeavor to construe it in terms of either one apart, or to minimize either at the expense of its fellow.

.

THE SYNOPTIC MIND: AN IDEAL OF LEADERSHIP

GEORGE R. DODSON

St. Louis

To be able to reflect the mind and sentiment of one's own generation and be the interpreter of its aspirations is a great thing, but to succeed in giving to a noble and enduring ideal of humanity its classic expression, to voice clearly the deepest needs and highest dreams of many centuries, is the supreme performance, which is beyond the power of all but the few geniuses who are large enough to represent our race. Of all the saints, sages, and saviours who have studied the drama of human life, no one has ever surveyed it from a greater height than Plato, nor has any mind surpassed his in comprehensiveness and insight. And his conclusion, his matured conviction, was that humanity's most urgent need is for adequate leadership. The goal of the ideal system of education which is outlined in the Republic was the discovery, selection, and training of what he calls "synoptic-minded men" to be the leaders of the state. The youths to be prepared for this high function were first to be selected from those apparently most promising, and then submitted to a course of physical and mental discipline lasting through the greater part of life. This was a sifting process, and from time to time the failures were dropped. The finer natures continued their elementary studies till the age of twenty, when they were submitted to a new test of their capacity for leadership. Up to that time their manner of study was to be appropriate to youth. Their knowledge, being necessarily a mass of unconnected and unrelated fragments, could not be embraced in a unitary view. But when the synthetic powers ripen, the time arrives to attempt an organization of the mental content, to put together the things that have been, and are being, learned, and comprehensiveness becomes an ideal of the mind.

Plato's statement is as follows: "The sciences which they have learned in their early education without any order will now be

brought together, and they will be able to see the natural relationship of them to one another and to true being." The Greek word for the ideal aimed at is *σύνολος*; that is, these hitherto unrelated subjects will be combined into a synoptic view. The possession of a talent for doing this, of a synoptic mind, is the criterion by which selection is to be made for still higher advancement. Plato has another name for minds of this type; indeed, he generally calls them "dialectical," but he explicitly states that in his usage the two words mean exactly the same thing, and his whole theory of education is based on his conviction that only those minds that possess the capacity for putting things together in a comprehensive view and thus seeing them in their natural relations are fitted for the higher studies which equip men for leadership.

The experience of the ages has confirmed the insight of this famous thinker. That one of the greatest needs of humanity is for a supply of synoptic-minded men to manage its affairs and direct its development is as nearly an unquestioned truth as we are likely to meet with in these critical days. And it is of the most profound and even vital significance for all who are set to be leaders, and not least for the ministers of liberal churches. There are those who look to us for guidance in the conduct of the greatest and highest of human interests. It is not only our privilege, but our business, to be men with a cosmic outlook, and to strive toward a comprehensive and unitary view, even though it must necessarily be tentative and incomplete; and, while no one can reach the height of Plato's ideal for the philosopher and be a "spectator of all time and existence," we can and ought to have some sense of the frame in which our human life is set, to look down the long vistas of evolution, and attain to some inspiring conception of our place in the great process, of the achievements of the past, and of humanity's reasonable hopes for the future.

And how sublime is the vast drama! Science cannot fill out the details, but its outlines of the magnificent scheme are doubtless something like the truth. Standing by the seashore last summer, my imagination vainly tried to picture what I know must have taken place,—the living jelly coming out of the water, organizing itself, multiplying and specializing its cells, acquiring

skeleton, organs of sense and locomotion, nervous system and brain, until distinctively human activities appear and humanity with its advancing intellectual, moral, social, and religious life is an established fact on the earth.

And because the great process is still going on, because in us it has become self-conscious, because humanity is not only being pushed up by cosmic forces as formerly, but is now also deliberately climbing up, striving toward its native ideals and thus co-operating in its own evolution, because it is in need of leaders who can help to clarify its thoughts and bring into distinct consciousness the noble ideals that lie implicitly but obscurely in its heart, the moral and religious teacher has a work to do, a work which he can hope to perform successfully only as he is a man whose habit of mind is comprehensive and synoptic, and whose ideal and constant effort is to see life sanely and see it whole. I venture, then, to offer some thoughts on the present situation, and to suggest an answer to the question, What o'clock is it in the evolution of human life? For, I think it safe to assume, what we are chiefly interested in is not religion only, but the evolution of human life on this planet. It is not possible to detach the religious aspect of life from the rest of it, since religious thought and feeling are the blossoming, the outflowering of the whole process. The higher life must be cultivated, as indeed it must be lived, as one life. And if I emphasize the intellectual phase of this higher life, it is because this emphasis seems at present to be sorely needed. The philosophers and religious writers of today vie with one another in exalting the importance of the voluntaristic aspect of our human existence, and in disparaging the activity of the seeker for truth who loves it for its own sake as well as for its uses, who believes with the noblest minds of all ages that the knowledge of truth is a good in itself, that *θεωρία* is one of the natural goals of human striving. A flood of books, essays and sermons, is coming from the press the avowed purpose of which is to establish the irrational and, in practice, largely immoral principle of the "will to believe," that is, to justify the procedure of those who assume to be true any mystical or irrational doctrine which they may conjecture to be of help in the business of life.

Jesus is said to have looked on the multitudes with compassion, regarding them as sheep without a shepherd. The situation has improved somewhat, but the multitudes need compassion still. Many of its leaders have lost their way, and are seeking in the bogs of pragmatism and other forms of anti-philosophy for humanity's highway. Some have even given up rational ideals, and profess no longer to believe that the universe is an order the truth of which it is possible for us to know. To understand how this disqualifies them for leadership, it is only necessary to remember that all inspiring preaching, every message that has ennobled the lives of men, has been marked by two characteristics, namely, faith in the worth of human nature and in the reality of truth.

In order to make it perfectly clear that the greatest need of our excessively specialized and subdivided modern life is for synoptic-minded men, it is necessary to consider in the large the development of humanity's higher life as it appears from the point of view of the philosophical psychologist. Other classifications may, of course, be made by those who have other interests at heart, but I think it will be recognized that the picture to be presented is no mere fancy of mine, but that what I am saying the facts themselves say to all who can appreciate their significance.

There are, then, three great stages in the evolution of thought, namely:—

1. The primitive confused awareness.
2. The clearing up of this confusion through the making of distinctions.
3. The synoptic view in which the things distinguished are seen together.

The first stage need not detain us long. Everyone who has studied the history of thought knows that distinctions which are familiar to us were not made in ancient times. Thus there was a period when the problem of the relation of mind and body had not arisen because these two aspects of reality were not yet clearly distinguished. Matter and spirit were regarded as different forms of a single substance. "Whatever acts is body," it was said. "Mind is the subtlest form of body, but it is body nevertheless." The soul-atoms were thought to differ from those

of the body only in being very small and smooth and not in fundamental nature. The problem of interaction, therefore, presented no special difficulty. Early theories of exorcism and baptism betray this confusion of conceptions. As Edwin Hatch has shown, it was imagined "that demons might be the direct cause of diseases because the extreme tenuity of their substance enabled them to enter, and to exercise a malignant influence upon, the bodies of men. So water, when exorcised from all the evil influences that might reside in it, actually cleansed the soul. The conception of the process as symbolical came with the growth of later ideas of the relation of matter to spirit. It is, so to speak, a rationalizing explanation of a conception which the world was tending to outgrow."

In the course of time problems are disentangled. Matter came to be thought of as that which has extension and weight, and mind as that which thinks and feels. This was a great advance, and this differentiation is a necessary step in mental progress. But at this stage a new difficulty arose. Men fell into the error of supposing that things which they can distinguish in thought are in fact separate, or even opposed. They made their useful distinctions too absolute, and the evil consequences, for practical life as well as for the understanding, immediately appeared. The differences between the various aspects of human life were exaggerated until they appeared to be antagonisms, and men took it for granted that if they chose the one they must reject the other. And so we have the spectacle of the saints, in both the Christian and non-Christian worlds, identifying themselves with the part of life which they considered noblest, and despising and mistreating and occasionally, from a different application of the same logic, even indulging their bodies. The horrors of asceticism and the bestiality in which it not seldom ends are familiar, and to describe them here would serve no good purpose. What is useful, however, is to see that the logic of asceticism is simple. Since the body is not the soul, and since the two are opposed, let us mortify the deeds of the flesh. Or, in the other case, since the body has nothing to do with the soul, let the swine feast and satisfy its base nature.

History shows that the result of overdoing this useful distinc-

tion between body and mind is always the desert, physical, mental, and moral. Specialization and differentiation are necessary phases of intellectual progress, but not its goal. It is necessary to go on to organization, to keep clear the things that have been shown to be different, and yet to think them together in their natural unity. While it is a great advantage to the physiologist to be able to study bodily processes without troubling himself about the mental life, and to the psychologist to be free to investigate psychic processes pure and simple, it must never be forgotten that the two sets of processes are actually very closely related, that mental and nervous life do in fact go on together, and are both parts of the real, concrete life that we know. The goal of thinking is the comprehensive view of the synthetic mind. No other view is true, and every other view leads to bad results in practical life. And today there are evidences that this is being felt, witness the growing recognition of the fact that there are psychic factors in health and physical factors in morals. We are beginning to see clearly the truths which the old Greeks felt when they treated life as one. In the education of their youth, gymnastic was not merely for the body nor was music exclusively for the soul, but both were for both.

Hegel saw this clearly enough in his day, but the form in which he cast his thought, his rigid scheme, and his defects as a writer make it easier to condemn him off-hand than to appreciate his great, fruitful conceptions, which may easily be stated in a simpler and more intelligible way. His vision was perfectly clear. He saw that the distinctions which we find it useful and necessary to make are not absolute, that life includes tendencies that seem opposite, and that it is thus larger than the logic of acute and consistent, but narrow, minds, and that to see life sanely and do justice to all the phases of its development requires what may be called the dialectic, synoptic, synthetic, or comprehensive mind.

What a pity that Hegel's power of clear exposition was not equal to his insight, and how much we need his message in the United States today, in spite of the progress of the last eighty years! For minds with the requisite scope are still rare. Even our leaders are for the most partisans. As Emerson said, each

sees but one aspect of the total situation, and it generally takes two to make a man. Nor is the case very different with our intellectual *élite*. Their specialization is usually so extreme and exclusive that although they know their subjects, they do not see them in perspective and in their larger relations, the result being that they are all too often poor teachers. How rare it is to find a mind able to take the results of investigation in one department, and unite them with the truths reached by workers in other fields! The ideal is to carry specialization to the utmost and then to organize the truth discovered into a unitary view, that is, not to leave the materials of the house of thought lying around in separate heaps, but to build, to think together again, without blurring them, the things that science has distinguished, but which after all have their place in the organic unity of the living whole.

In Plato's phrase, the opposite of the ideally organized mind, the comprehensive intelligence, is the "crippled soul." This is his name for the imperfect, deformed creature whose scope of vision is so limited that it can embrace but one aspect of our many-sided life. And no doubt the Greek thinker would have accepted Muirhead's definition of philosophy as a "lifelong struggle with one-sided ideas of life." One who meets many highly educated men must often be struck with the felicity of the term "crippled souls." Each man seems to rationalize but a small section of his mind. In some regions he is mature, in others he is about five years old. An eminent naturalist will tell us that he has communicated with the dead, or a fine mind like that of Maeterlinck, able to produce the beautiful essay on "Sincerity", or that on "The Dog", will also profess belief in childish superstitions, such as those set forth in the essays entitled "The Star" and "The Pre-destined."

And here it is well to consider that, if comparatively few have attained to the third stage of intelligence, this is but natural, for the work of distinction-making is by no means ended. Our thought is still too much of a blur, and our problems too complex and in need of disentangling. For instance, one reason for the frequent failure of educational methods is the lingering error that each child has a number of faculties, such as memory and

reason, which, it is supposed, may be developed by discipline. The truth is that these distinctions are crude in the extreme, and that the mind is a name for a vast number of specialized capacities. Strictly speaking, we have, not a memory, but a multitude of memories, good, bad, and indifferent, and we find that men generally reason well about the things which they have studied, but that their judgment is not to be trusted when the subject under consideration is unfamiliar. This discovery dissipates into thin air the notion of formal discipline, and is of the greatest importance for the art of education and for correct judgment of the characters and capacities of men. Many such useful distinctions are doubtless yet to be made, for our natures are far more complex than was formerly supposed. The psychologists are showing that below the threshold of consciousness great numbers of tendencies, memories, fears, and longings live and work, either singly or in associative systems, that they affect our disposition and sometimes our health. We have as yet by no means been able to take stock of all that is in the obscure reservoir of life, and it will be a long time before we can say of any psychologist what the author of the Fourth Gospel said of Jesus, that "he knew what was in man." Just now this truth needs to be emphasized, but ere long, in virtue of our constitutional tendency to excess, we shall probably have to protest against its overstatement, and to recall the fact that the mind, in spite of the abundance of its organized reactions and special capacities, has a certain unity after all.

This tendency to hypostatize distinctions is one of the chief characteristics of popular thinking. There are, for example, many people who are sufficiently developed to appreciate the importance of moral education and who become in consequence its ardent promoters. But they usually proceed on the false assumption that because the instruction given in the public schools and colleges is predominantly intellectual, it is without any moral result, and that it needs to be supplemented by an education that is purely ethical. But of course only those who linger in the second stage of intellectual development can think in this way. Education is one, and, while its aspects may be distinguished, it cannot be actually separated into independent

parts. There is no purely intellectual education, no moral or religious education which is just that and nothing else. The habits of study, order, neatness, punctuality, accuracy, thoroughness, politeness, and co-operation, which are developed in school life because they are its necessary conditions, are all moral. So with all instruction in history and literature that goes beyond the most elementary stages. As the student proceeds, his intellectual interests are awakened, the spirit of the great writers touches his spirit, he catches something of their enthusiasm for noble ideals, his horizon is enlarged, and he is enabled to observe the effects of good and bad actions as illustrated on the stage of the world, and this is only another way of saying that he is being built up in his moral life. To fail to see this truth, and to suppose that the moral is a separate or separable section of life which can be advanced only through the reading of a particular book or through instruction which is "purely moral," is to misunderstand, and so to be incapable of adequately meeting, the real situation.

In this respect, however, the people are not sinners above many who speak from the pulpit and the professor's chair. Much preaching and passionate utterance on social matters is based on a superstitious notion of the nature of right. The moral sense can be truly estimated only when regarded in its natural relation with the other aspects of life. To isolate anything is to distort it, and much teaching and preaching is vitiated by a too sharp sundering of the moral and the rational. The conscience is assumed to be a sort of divine ingredient in a nature otherwise unmoral or else fatally determined to the bad. Those who speak in its name too often seem to feel justified in pronouncing on complex social situations which they give no evidence of having adequately studied. They apparently do not doubt their competence to decide what rates railroads should charge, what wages they should pay their employees, and what is extortionate and what fair in many similar cases, without any considerable experience with the business in question or knowledge of the actual conditions.

Yet it remains true that the right is only the rational viewed in a certain light. It is what is on the whole, and all things con-

sidered, the wisest and best thing to be done, and what this is in complex cases can only be determined by patient and careful study. Only in simple situations is the decision easy. The possession of a monitor like the inward voice of Socrates is not an adequate equipment for an adviser of men in our complicated social and industrial life. What is right is that which does justice to the widest and highest interests involved, and, since these frequently in some measure conflict, the right can only be a conciliation. It is never something abstract to be followed, regardless of its effects on the interests involved; rather is it that which secures for all normal and legitimate human interests their maximum fulfilment. In great matters the "crippled soul" cannot do right because it does not see the total situation, because it sees but a few of the interests that must be cared for; such a one is likely to become a fanatic who may be praised a little for an upright purpose, but who must be much condemned for the social harm he is sure to do.

The Republic clearly states that in the production of the trained intelligences, who can do right because they are large enough to take into consideration the many varied interests of humanity, nature as well as education plays a part. There are some minds with which nothing can be done. After being tested and found wanting, they are quickly dropped, the philosophic natures alone being able to profit by the highest training and ultimately becoming capable of wise leadership. It would be very easy to make fun of this idea; nevertheless, it is true. Nor do we have to look very far for an illustration. In the recent history of this country a great part was played by a man who had the native qualities in question, although he did not have the advantage of an academic education. I refer to Lincoln, our supreme type of the synoptic-minded man. The men about him, with all their earnestness and acuteness, were most of them but "crippled souls," in that they were partisans, representatives of certain special or local interests and blind to all others. Lincoln felt the total situation, and was perhaps the only man in the country who could do right, because he was the only man large enough to see it. With a few more leaders like him, and fewer anti-slavery orators and Southern hot-heads, we should undoubtedly have settled

the questions of slavery and states' rights without a civil war. That is always the case. When men are not large-minded and rational, they must fight. The most eloquent denouncers of wrong are apt to be half-wrong themselves, for in promoting the interests they have at heart they are wounding others just as precious. And men who live in a world that has been evolving for ages, a world in which things get to be wrong because they are out of date, a world in which readjustments of all kinds have constantly to be made, cannot do right, whatever their intentions, until they learn to see together the many various interests involved and to patiently use evolutionary methods in promoting desirable conditions.

A similar situation confronts us today. There are men who are industriously preaching the doctrine of class consciousness, and calling upon all to line up for or against, and, if they are not checked, we may have another illustration of the ravages wrought by a superstitious moral sentiment which assumes that the good is the promotion of a single interest in the world, and not the conciliation and adjustment of all interests. Our hope for a continued peaceful social evolution depends upon the existence of a majority of sensible people, led by men of great sanity and wholeness of view.

The fact that many who are sufficiently educated to get a hearing and have their utterances printed still linger in the second stage of development comes out clearly in the current discussions concerning the relations of the individual and social life. Certain writers who start from the individual give the impression that they have not advanced beyond the position of Rousseau. The absolute individual they talk about is an abstraction, and never was on land or sea. They betray no appreciation of the fact that every civilized man is shaped by the society in which he grows up, that he is nourished on its ideals and saturated with its traditions, and that his whole higher life is social just because it is human. On the other hand, those who are emphasizing the social aspects of education, morality, and religion, not infrequently seem to have forgotten that there is no society apart from the individuals that constitute it, that, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a social conscience, no conscience, that

is, which is not somebody's conscience, and no general happiness that individuals do not feel. They do not think as clearly as the boy of six who was discussing with his little sister the purpose of human life. The latter had retained in her memory some of the pious instruction given by her teachers, and when the question was put, "What are we here for?" said at once, "Why, we are here to take care of other people"; to which her still unsophisticated brother replied, "No, that cannot be; for what then are the other people here for?"

The crippled souls are prolific writers, and it will be a fortunate thing for humanity when they are offset by greater activity on the part of those who realize that the concrete human life that we know is one, that it has both its individual and its collective aspects, that this distinction exists within a living unity, and that to take it absolutely is to push men back into the old way of fighting out their problems instead of thinking them out. He who can see but one thing at a time is but a fraction of a man, and fractional men, the representatives of special interests, are socially inefficient, despite their appearance of force. They often settle conflicting claims on the field of battle, because they know of no other way of getting their claims allowed. But the man who is able to see things together is of the highest value to the state, and is the supreme type of efficiency. His mind is like a deliberative assembly in which all great human interests have representation. Because he is able to make the necessary adjustments and effect the conciliation which life requires, he makes fighting unnecessary. Understanding perfectly that society is a balance of forces, some of which are now too strong and some too weak, he will actively aid the cause that for the time needs assistance, and promote the interest that is being oppressed or overlooked. He will work with a clear head and with steadfast good will in his heart, knowing that he is not an enemy of those whom he must for the time oppose. And if, in spite of his efforts, a crisis comes, and a situation arises in which it is necessary for him to fight, he will do his duty, not as a partisan, nor as the enemy of any man, but as the real friend of all. The spirit in which he will act is that of one of Victor Hugo's heroes, who in order to protect the precious interests of society aimed his

gun at the leader of the mob, the bearer of the red flag of anarchy, and pulled the trigger, not in hate, but with tears of sorrow streaming down his face.

The philosophic nature, the synoptic-minded man (would that we had a simpler, homelier term by which to designate him!) is, therefore, not developed for contemplation only, but for wise social action. Although he will feel the blessedness of the mind's higher life, the joy of seeking and learning truth, he loses nothing of his efficiency because of the clearness and wide sweep of his vision. He is socially valuable because he knows when and where to help. He aids a cause when it is too weak and resists it when it is too aggressive.

To give a concrete illustration, a mind of this type will take a lively issue and an active part in the present controversy over the open and closed shop. Believing in the value of organized labor, he will not hesitate to oppose it in so far as he considers its principles to be wrong. In this case his course seems clear. For, stripped of all confusing associations and set in the clear light, the establishment of the closed shop means that workingmen will have to get a license from some labor organization to live in the United States. So far, the majority of wage-workers in this country have shown by their actions that they prefer to remain outside the unions, and this in spite of the persuasive arguments and coercive methods of many years. To work for the closed shop is to force these men to surrender a hardly-won freedom; it is to say to them, "You must come to terms with a certain private organization. If it permits you to live and work, very well; if not, we will not employ you, buy your goods, or accept your services in any way. Submission or death by starvation is your alternative." Stated thus simply, this seems hard, but that is what the closed shop comes to in the end.

Now the large-minded man who is compelled to oppose what he deems a mistaken, and hopes is but a temporary, policy of a great organization which in other ways is potent for good, can do so with the greatest energy. Of course he will deeply regret to seem an enemy when he is really a friend, yet he has no ill-will, since he knows that many men are still in the stage of development where they cannot understand what is not partisan,

and where they suppose that he who is against them on one point is against them all along the line. And while today he does his utmost against the closed-shop policy of organized labor, he knows that he is not opposing labor's true interest, and is well aware that at no distant date, when other issues are joined, he may find it necessary to fight for this organization. Even now he may find interests in common with it and work for them, even though his efforts are for the time not appreciated.

In a similar way he will not hesitate to oppose his friends, those whom he meets at the church or the club or in business life, if they seek to gain exclusive privileges through legislation. He will do all he can to promote the spirit of fair play that would give everybody a chance, and that jealously opposes every attempt to monopolize the market either for labor or for any of the necessities of life. Indeed, one of the most admirable things about the ideal type we are describing is the quality of his spirit. The comprehensive view goes with, and to some extent produces, a universal sympathy. While the partisan is always and everywhere a hater, the characteristic of the mind that surveys life from a sufficiently elevated point of view is geniality. It sees everything in the world with sympathy, that is, it appreciates the relative justification of the various points of view, and gladly does justice to ideas and institutions and policies that have served their purpose and have passed or are passing away. Such a one has no blind animosities or furious antagonisms. He will see the fanatic and his cause, and all around both. The attitude of the protestant, whose reason for being is the wrong he protests against, he will recognize as occasionally necessary in certain situations, but not as the normal and desirable attitude of the human spirit. And not only will he be tolerant of intolerant fanatics, but he will have deep sympathy with the great world of men and women who largely follow their instincts and traditions and do not always take their reformers seriously. For he sees clearly that this world of average men and women manages to get on, and so maintains the possibility of further development, while our race would long since have ceased to be if it had followed all its passionately earnest reformers. Such a mind is genial, because it is human and humane, and reflects in its large-

ness something of the greatness of the majestic march of life upward through the ages and of the complexity and variety of interests of the inhabitants of the great, round world.

Leadership belongs exclusively to no one group or profession, but there are two classes in which above all others it should naturally be expected,—the professional teachers of philosophy and the ministers of the liberal churches. To take the philosophers first, the present situation in this country would be depressing were it not evidently swiftly changing and were there not hope that a higher and nobler conception of philosophy's true function and ideal service will some time be attained. What is that function? What, indeed, can it be but the unification of knowledge? What service is so needed today as that of assisting young men and women to organize the detached bits of their information into some comprehensive view of the world? Mental progress consists essentially in a constant reorganization of the mental content, and the essential condition of this is a preliminary organization. It matters not so much what the first synthetic view is, provided it is flexible and capable of revision, as knowledge grows from more to more and the constructive powers develop. The philosopher ought to be the broadest man in the university, and his department is ideally the clearing house of the sciences. The students should learn in that department to seek the organic place in the one body of truth of the truths they learn in their separate studies, and to acquire the habit of seeing things together. Only in this way can the mind have a life, and be something other than a lumber-room in which each new acquisition is piled, regardless of its consistency with what is already there. Such philosophic organization and construction is a tremendous stimulus to the intellectual life. No one wants facts so much as he who wants them for the light they shed on some great problem. In this region, as in so many others, the current of interest flows downward, and interest in great questions, such as that of man's place in the cosmos, fertilizes all the sciences, and inspires and sustains research. Such an influence is needed in the university for the teachers' sake. The great teacher is a man who not only knows his subject, but sees it in its larger relations, and is able to make clear its significance for

other studies and other human interests. The young man who studies the cell-structure of a fern, or dissects the brain and nervous system of a fish would be a pitiable object if he saw no further than the poor dismembered fragments before him. What really makes such activity valuable is that the mind looks not only at the cells and fibres, but through them into the great world of organic relations, that world of which man himself is a living part. An ultimate synthetic view is the justification of his special studies.

To one who holds this conception of the nature and function of philosophy the present situation is matter for sincere regret. For instead of regarding it as their business to unify knowledge and help their students to some mental organization, some flexible progressive world-view, a large number of our philosophers are epistemologists, and consider that their main vocation is to discuss the possibility of knowledge. Now epistemology is a legitimate subject of inquiry, and logically prior to other investigations; yet it is of very subordinate importance, and this for the evident reason that it is bound to come to a positive conclusion. Otherwise it undermines its own foundations. For if the mind is not to be trusted in the creation of other sciences, it is equally unworthy of confidence when it examines the nature and conditions of knowledge. The epistemologist uses the same mind as the chemist, and, if the latter cannot attain to knowledge, neither can his critic. It may be decided that the best name for all our constructions, no matter how frequently verified, is faith rather than knowledge. The name matters little, so we are agreed upon the use of our terms. But this would not affect the point I make, for it would remain true that the chief function of the philosopher is to contribute to the organization and constant reorganization of such knowledge as we have. For him to be a narrow specialist, wasting his time in quibbles about the possibility of knowledge, is an anomaly. His great function remains unperformed, and philosophy, as he represents it, falls into deserved suspicion and discredit.

When this view is stated, some one is almost sure to say, "No one can know all science, and this conception is therefore not possible of realization." Of course, no one can know all science,

nor even all of one science, but it is perfectly possible for a diligent man to be acquainted with the leading conceptions of the various sciences and to know what their larger problems and mutual relations are, and it is precisely with these that the philosopher is concerned.

Without some such general view of life, we are like men studying a canvas a square inch at a time and never seeing the picture. It is with a life, a human society, or a world just as it is with a child's picture-puzzle: the separate and isolated parts are largely without meaning, and only when put together do they make sense.

The world has need of philosophers. They could be of great assistance to us all in helping us to a general view of life that would give meaning and dignity to its disconnected parts. And some day there will be a happy conjunction of a philosopher with the true conception of his primary function and a university president able to appreciate and willing to support him. The department they will establish in their university will not be obsessed by Kantian ideas and run after "pure knowledge *a priori*," but will return to the nobler and more useful conception held by the world's greatest thinkers generally down to what, I believe, will ultimately be recognized as the German episode in the history of philosophy. The students fortunate enough to receive instruction in this university will be conducted to a unitary and comprehensive conception of the world, and not be lost in the endless maze of *Erkenntnistheorie*. The teachers will cherish an ideal of mental organization which may be likened to the Republic of the United States, which grows constantly with the growth in population, intelligence, and wealth of its component states and by the admission of new states. So taught, the young men and women will have a place for everything they learn. They will attain to an ordered inner life, and have some sense of the result of the ages of the growth of life and the development of thought, and some knowledge of the larger features of the vast process in which our life has an organic place.

With regard to the liberal minister, it is clear that he has a similar function, although it is to be performed for a different constituency, for the men and women whose college days are

over and who are now carrying on the world's work. They, too, need help in synthesizing and conciliating life's varied and conflicting interests. For them the churches ought to be graduate schools where they may be assisted to a great, courage-inspiring, and effort-sustaining *Weltanschauung*. Such a view of the world is not a philosophic luxury, but a practical, religious necessity, when the mind reaches a certain stage of development. When a soul in trouble exclaimed, "I will lift up mine eyes to the hills whence cometh my help," he referred to the summits of his thought, to an inspiring conception of God. This is the picturesque Hebrew way of expressing the soul's joy and strength in a great thought.

Nothing is more relevant to the present situation than this fact. In spite of the low views of truths urged upon us today and the depreciation of the importance of constructive thinking for religion, there is no successful preaching, no inspiring gospel, which does not present a sublime world-view. No one has ever succeeded who has not been able to set forth a conception that stirred the mind and fired the imagination by its grandeur. The Hebrew prophets have had the greatest influence on the religious life of the world. They were the most important factor in the transformation of the national religion of Israel into a universal religion, and their utterances, even in translation, have been the strength and consolation of the centuries. And, though they had moral passion in abundance, they were fundamentally thinkers. They were the first philosophers of history, and their utterances were lofty because their thoughts were lofty. They saw their God actively directing the destinies of nations, and conceived the unfolding of a divine purpose to be the highway of history. Amos rises to the magnificent conception of Jahveh as the world-ruling God of justice; for Hosea he is the universal Father; the first Isaiah is a statesman seeking to conform the foreign policy of his fatherland to the divine plan of which he assumes to be the interpreter; and Jeremiah reaches the thought of an inner law and a human instinct for God. The second Isaiah is literally carried away by the glory of his religious idea, and his trumpet tones calling his people to encouragement and trust thrill the reader of these far-off days.

The same principle is repeated in the history of Christianity. Paul, the great apostle, who saved the religion of Jesus from perishing as an obscure Jewish sect, who planted churches over the Graeco-Roman world, and who was a marvel of energy and activity, was inspired by his philosophy of history. For him the history of the world before Jesus was merely a time of preparation, and everything before him merely led up to the truth he had to preach.

There is, then, no such thing possible today as a religion out of relation to the intellectual conceptions of the age. Of course, it is known by all that religion is impulsive in its origin and emotional in its nature, and that, though it defends itself with arguments, it is not based on reasoning. But it is also true that there has not been any simple impulsive faith among civilized people for centuries, any faith uninfluenced by the reflective intelligence. Faith does begin in feeling, but by a law of its nature it goes on to reason, to a believed conception that remains after the critical intelligence has pruned away the superstitious elements which were associated with it in the early stages of its growth.

The man who said that he hated theology and botany but loved religion and flowers was, therefore, more epigrammatic and sensational than wise. It is pleasant to be a child, and live by impulse, habit, and authority, but when we become men we must accept thought for our portion. The poet may sing

"Backward, turn backward, O Time, in your flight,
Make me a child again,"

but the process of life is irreversible. To reach a simple faith without any thought in it, it would be necessary to go back beyond Christianity and beyond the prophets of Israel to the world's childhood. The attempt to do this would make us not children, but sophisticated men. There is nothing for us but a rational faith, and we can have no noble feeling in the absence of great thoughts. Moreover, the distinction between the intellectual and the emotional life can be made altogether too sharp and too complete. These two aspects of our existence are in organic relation, and neither can be successfully isolated. Indeed, a common but very precious experience proves that the difference

between faith and reason may easily be exaggerated. The highest moral truths and deepest religious insights seem to grow out of a feeling or instinctive stage into clear self-consciousness. When we have had an hour with Emerson, or have heard some inspiring sermon, do we not often say that we have learned much and yet in a sense have learned nothing? For all that the teacher has helped us to see we knew before, but in us it was inarticulate and unclear. What has happened is that now we know what we meant, we see what we felt, we can say what we did not know how to utter. Perhaps the greatest service of the preacher is that he helps men to be their noblest selves. He does for his congregation what Socrates did for the youth of Athens. The old philosopher-inquisitor realized the nature of his function, for he said that while his mother was a midwife he was an accoucheur of souls.

But when our ideals are born and we see them in all their beauty, we naturally desire a view of life in which they shall appear legitimated, and we are strengthened and made happy if philosophy offers to us a conception of the world as a place congenial to these highest interests. Israel's prophets inspired the nation with a religious interpretation of history. Our corresponding problem is to give a religious interpretation to the doctrine of evolution, and to other true and approved ways of thinking concerning the world and our place therein, and thus to enable the life of aspiration to feel at home.

It is vain to try to isolate the moral and religious life from the intellectual life of our time. Neither ethical culture nor religious faith can thrive entirely apart. Both are for men in a certain situation, and what that situation is it is the function of the intelligence to determine. We do well to admire the statement of Micah, "What doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly and to love mercy and to walk humbly with thy God?" But we must not forget the last three words, for they are essential. One may do right desperately in a universe which he believes to be indifferent or even bad, but he is a stronger as well as a happier man for a conception of the cosmos in which his passion for right has significance, and in which his love of goodness is seen to be the heart of reality coming to consciousness in him. To have

the conviction that our ideals are at home in the world that has produced them, that they are factors in evolution and guide life in the making, is to be freed from fear and assured that, as we work out our salvation, it is after all God that works in us both in the will and the deed, in the beautiful dream, the aspiration, the prayer, as well as in its realization. The synthetic view of the moral life, the religious life, and the life of thought is thus the fruitful view, and when the mind has been properly educated the three blend in one life. The attempt to ignore any one of these aspects of what is normally a concrete, organic whole weakens them all, and history shows that when religious men ignore the intellectual life of their age they relapse into mysticism and suffer mental and moral decline.

In these days certain substitutes for thought, for an inspiring outlook, have been proposed, but the help they offer is illusive. Thus we are told that there are unknown spirits who may come to us in the darkness of the subconscious regions of our life. But this suggestion is unattractive. Religion is surely something other and nobler than a subterranean or kitchen-door connection with we know not what spiritual powers. No, we must try the spirits, all spirits, as the Scripture says, and they must come to the front door of our nature and show their credentials. It is the goals of life that are divinely beautiful, and we can never worship other than our highest thought of God, the One in whom our noblest ideals are united. We look for him not in the region of the abnormal and pathological, but in the other direction, knowing well that our highest thought falls short of the reality we worship, and that the sweetest and divinest human ideal is but a lure to keep us in the path that leads to him.

It remains to show that the synoptic view of life is the religious view, and that the reason why so many feel themselves to be orphans in the world is the fragmentariness of their thought. This is best illustrated in the history of the relation of our concepts of man and the world. Long ago the distinction between them was drawn, although we have evidences of a time anterior when it was still unmade. But, once established, it was soon exaggerated, and man began to think of himself as an alien, and opposed to the world, which was then conceived of as a dead

mechanism, a piece of machinery, or as under the control of an evil spirit. For a long time religious feeling was well expressed in the old hymn,

“I’m but a stranger here;
Heaven is my home.
Earth is a desert drear;
Heaven is my home”;

and many who sing no hymns are oppressed by the fear or the suspicion that a materialistic philosophy will prove true, and thus negate their dearest longings and hopes.

Now in the interest of clear thinking, of wise social action, and ultimately of the religious life, it is essential that the distinction between the human and the natural be drawn with the utmost rigor. We cannot reach the third stage of human intelligence by skipping or slurring over the work of the second. There are many people who are still fascinated by the idea of a primitive natural life that never has been lived on earth, and who admonish us to follow nature without realizing that the methods of nature in the lower stages of her development can never be imitated by man. We cannot imitate her in farming or rearing our children. Her method in improving forms of life is to produce a great excess of individuals and destroy all but a few. We must understand natural processes that we may use them, but it is mere superstition to regard them as examples for human imitation.

On the other hand, the biologists have made it clear that man is no stranger here, but that he is a child of the world’s life, an organic part of the one great process, and there is every reason to believe that this is as true of his mind and spiritual nature as of his body. He is thus domesticated in the world; all that he is, and all that he aspires to be, all his heroes draw their being from this nature which men in the second stage of development considered alien or positively hostile. The result is the naturalization of religion. For the old ways of thinking, which accounted for the world on some materialistic theory, are forever impossible. No view of the world can for a moment be treated as worthy of consideration that offers no explanation of the highest product of evolution, the intellectual, social, moral, and religious life of man.

And since this life actually is, since we are absolutely compelled to regard it as an organic part, a result, of the world-process, it follows that that process must be interpreted in terms of its outcome. It was a great saying of Aristotle that "what each thing is when fully developed, when its growth has been brought to perfection, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family." And we may add that this principle holds when we are speaking of the world of which these are but parts.

We have, then, only to keep clear the distinction between man and nature and then combine them in a synoptic view, that is, see them in the organic unity which is the concrete reality and not in the opposition which is only an abstraction of thought, and the result is as much religion as philosophy. If we have no life that is not natural, then the divinest prayer of the divinest man in history is but the world-life become conscious and articulate, and as from this elevation we view the task before us, of building up, teaching, and ennobling our race, we understand perfectly how a great genius could say, "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." When naturalism is thus made thorough-going, it is transfigured. It does not mean that man is swallowed up in a process that goes mechanically on, but rather that he must change his conception of that process, since he is its outcome. Put together the two things that belong together, man and the universe, and then ask what kind of a universe it is that is flowering out into a human world of thought and love and righteousness, of joy and peace and hope. A materialistic philosophy is possible only when the part of nature that lies below the realm of life and purpose is under consideration. But there is no such nature. The only nature we know is the nature that has produced and sustains human life, and the only rational way to interpret that nature is by its product and fruit rather than by its lower stages and earlier phases. If you try to study either man or nature in isolation, you necessarily fail of understanding, for both are actually parts of one organic whole. But combine them in a single view, enlarge the scope of your vision, and you attain to a religious interpretation of reality that is sublime, that conserves all values and sustains all that is dearest and most precious in humanity's faith and hope. So far from being a stranger, a

lonely wanderer in an alien universe, the philosopher-saint, with his thoughts and his aspirations, is the consummate product of the age-long process of its growth. And as we survey the world from this height, we can say with Jacob of old, "Lo, God was in this place and I knew it not."

SOME PROBLEMS IN THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

IRVING KING

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

The reviews of my recent book, *The Development of Religion*, have revealed certain misunderstandings both as to the general point of view and as to the meaning which it was intended to convey in specific places.¹ The problems discussed are fundamental ones, and the present article aims to restate some of them in the hope of making more clear the precise points at issue.

Some of the criticisms seem to show a misconception of the nature of the science of religion, as well as of the point of view of this particular book. The scientific discussion of any series of phenomena gives an essentially external view of them. Thus, to give a scientific description of an emotion or an idea is not equivalent to possessing the idea or being thrilled by the emotion. Consequently the scientific account always seems cold and unsatisfactory to the person who has the actual experience. This is particularly true in the case of all attempts to describe religious phenomena in the exact terminology of science. In reading such an account the person who is fortunate enough to possess a well-developed religious experience inevitably feels that something has been left out, that the description does not seem real, the vital essence of the matter has been left untouched. But this is one of the necessary limitations of the scientific treatment. It is not that there are phenomena which science cannot describe, but rather that any and all descriptions of an experience are cold as compared with the experience itself. What description of a color of the spectrum could take the place of one glimpse of that color by the organs of sight?

Now religion presents to the scientific investigator a series of phenomena, and all these phenomena are capable of descrip-

¹See George A. Coe, "A New Natural History of Religion," in the *Harvard Theological Review* for July, 1910.

tion. In some cases the description will not be very adequate, because the data necessary to an adequate description are lacking; but we must nevertheless proceed upon the hypothesis that a full scientific account is possible. This is nothing more nor less than what the physicist does, although he knows that there are regions which he has as yet failed to penetrate with his hypotheses. He does not dare to set absolute limits to his investigations, for to do so would practically vitiate much of his work. Science must work upon the assumption that it has a closed system of relations within which it can state every phenomenon. This theoretical presupposition renders science possible, even though we may have to admit that no science has actually carried its work so far as the working hypothesis assumes to be possible. In my book I have made the statement that a scientific account of a set of facts "has no meaning except within a closed system of definite relations." This was intended to mean that, while no science may actually be a closed system, it deals with each phenomenon on the supposition that certain universally valid and inclusive principles exist,—for example, that of causation, of the conservation of energy, of the perfect elasticity of the ether. It may finally turn out that these hypotheses are not true, but for the time being the student of science goes ahead with his work on the supposition that they are true.

In just the same way, if there is to be a proper science of religion, there must be the hypothesis of a closed system within which every observable fact of religion can be explained. We must be free from the apprehension that we may have to inject here and there some supernatural element, a *deus ex machina*, in order that the account may be rendered complete. It is said that when the astronomer and mathematician Laplace presented to Napoleon his work on celestial mechanics, Napoleon remarked in substance, "I understand that you have written a book upon the heavens in which the name of God does not appear," and that the answer of Laplace was, "Sire, I have no need for such an hypothesis."

Laplace was right, and no one imagines that the modern astronomer is atheistic if he fails to supplement his account of the heavens by introducing now and then a supernatural element.

No more is the science of religion atheistic, if it deals with religious phenomena in the same way. God appears in the science of religion, not as one among other factors, as the specific source of certain impulses and ideas, which are, therefore, peculiarly divine. God is not one factor among others, but rather the obverse of the whole process. He is not an element present in some phenomena more than in others, an element which, therefore, we might presumably weigh and measure. We have no terms with which to describe the nature of the relation which he sustains to the natural world, unless we adopt the makeshift of calling him the element of *meaning* or of *value* present in the whole process of the religious life, an element that must be appreciated rather than described.

The *concept* of God, however, is legitimate material for the science of religion, and it is part of the business of the investigator to find out what that concept is, and how it was acquired, or built up. I have called the deity a "symbol of values," and I do not see how the psychologist, as a man of science, can take any other position than that indicated by this rather awkward phrase. God may be very real to us in our religious life, and yet no one of us would hold that that reality affects the human consciousness in the same way that a beam of light does. The problem here is to find a terminology which will express that reality without confounding it with the reality which belongs to the world of phenomena and which affects consciousness through the senses. If I have read Professor Coe's interesting discussions of mysticism aright, he interprets the phenomena of mystical experience from some such point of view as this, notwithstanding his strictures upon my discussion of these points.

There is a slightly different aspect of the problem of the relation of the divine to the human which may also be referred to here. Some psychologists have spoken of the human consciousness as a part of a larger, cosmic, presumably divine consciousness. If this is merely a symbolic method of describing the fact of human interrelations, the influence of one person upon another, it may be regarded as admissible, but if it assumes an interrelation of natural and supernatural, it is an assumption that needs justification. When I have said that the human consciousness "is not . . . a

part of a larger life, either social or divine," I have had in mind to deny the view held by some that there is a sort of mystical essence of a social or divine life pervading the atmosphere, into which each of us dips to some extent. Perhaps a metaphysics of existence might be worked out on some such hypothesis, and many writers on mysticism seem to assume something of the sort, but I do not see how a strict psychologist can harbor any such notion. As a psychical existence each individual life, as far as we now know, is separate and distinct from every other individual. To say this is not to deny the reality of social interactions or the mutual influence of mind upon mind. In this sense, but not in that of a mystic "social mind," sociality is a precondition of religion.

Returning to the previous question, then, I may say that my book does not attempt to present a "closed system," and yet it is written upon the hypothesis that every observable religious fact is capable of being put in some definite natural system of relations within which are all other observable facts. Such a method will of course shock those who are continually trying to find some place in religious experience which requires the introduction of a force from without, or an idea or feeling which has no natural antecedents; they imagine that if they are able to discover such gaps, or lacunae, they will thereby contribute to the value of the religious force, idea, or emotion. I do not see how the assumption of injected supernatural elements can have anything to do with making an experience more genuine or more valuable. As is pointed out over and over again in the book, these qualities are ultimately determined by the part the experience plays in the rest of the individual's life and in the general plexus of social experience.

Another word regarding the general point of view of the book. The ideal continuously held in mind in attempting to make a scientific description of religion has been to describe what exists, to take an inventory, as it were, of the facts and forces of the religious consciousness. It has not been the object either to discredit or to establish as true any part of this consciousness. The purpose was simply to hold it up, to expose it to view, to pull it apart, as it were, for the sake of determining what from a scien-

tific point of view is actually there. If some say that it is a shameless if not a sacrilegious proceeding thus to pick coldly to pieces what is so full of rich and precious meaning to many a heart, I can admit that the task is largely a thankless one, but must maintain that it is legitimate.

In such a description of these religious phenomena how and where shall one begin? It has seemed to me possible to start from the fact that man is primarily an *active* creature. All development on the mental side has probably been preceded by some sort of active process. One friendly reviewer² found the chief limitation of the book in the narrowness with which it held to this point of view. But surely it makes for clarity and definiteness to adhere to one point of view rather than to be constantly shifting to others. I see no reason why the philosophy and psychology of action should not furnish as adequate a basis as any other for the examination of religious phenomena. At any rate, whether the point of departure is wisely chosen or not will have to be determined by the extent to which it is capable of illuminating a very intricate subject.

Starting in these studies with the concept of man as primarily an active creature, I have kept one question constantly in mind, namely, that of the bearing, the influence, of this primary human quality upon what has followed. Have the complexities of culture any relationship to the fact that man was first of all engrossed in trying to *do* something? In other words, it is the question of genetic relationships that has been uppermost in mind in this description of religious phenomena. To deal with such a question obviously requires much hypothesis, but hypothesis is legitimate in science, if the student does not forget that it is not the same thing as absolutely verifiable facts. This book presents, then, a hypothetical account of certain developmental and genetic phases of religion, which are some of the sub-problems into which the main problem of genesis resolves itself. Religion undoubtedly involves an appreciation and affirmation of certain values. What is the origin of this value-sense? Does it have any definite connection with man's active, projective tendencies? Primitive religion, and to some extent the religion of

² J. H. Leuba, *Psychological Bulletin*, vol. vii, p. 301.

the civilized races, expresses itself in certain active forms, rites, and ceremonies which are popularly supposed to be required of the worshipper by his deity or other higher power. Is it not possible, however, that these rites had another origin? May they not have some relation to the fundamental active tendencies of the group in which they appear? The striking similarity of these ceremonies to the more general play-customs and economic activities of the society suggest that they are extensions of these activities, that they first existed without any special religious significance and then in some way acquired a religious meaning, that they are to be regarded as contributing to the building up of the religious consciousness rather than as the expression of an already formed religious sense. This hypothesis assumes a definite relation between man's religious development and his active interests, and a careful study of the anthropological record shows that evidence is not wanting in support of such a view.

It will be noted that this does not assume an innate religious sense, but rather starts with something supposedly more primitive and general than an instinct. The question of absolute beginnings is always hard to deal with, but intricate though it may be the scientific student does not regard it as an improper question for him to grapple with. I am far from imagining that I have unravelled all the antecedents of the religious consciousness. In fact, a complete account was not attempted; I wished rather to illustrate the true method of the natural-scientist in this field. He must avoid assuming at the start that which he wishes to explain genetically. If he wishes merely to describe religion as a series of existing historical phenomena, he of course assumes that the religious consciousness exists. If, however, he is concerned with beginnings, he must make a real and not a pseudo-beginning. Many accounts of the origin of religion assume at the start the very things they propose to explain. Thus it is often said that man has a religious instinct, an irreducible something in his psychical make-up, such as "a sense of fitness," a harmonizing instinct, an innate religiosity, a perception of the infinite, and so on, and that this is the core or germ of religion, from which religion has naturally developed. It may be true that man as we know him possesses a germ of religion, an innate re-

ligiosity, but it is necessary for genetic science to try to get back even of that. The tendency of the biologist is to regard instincts not as ultimate data, but rather as temporary halting-places in the study of the development of a species. For him the instincts had a hypothetical beginning in something simpler. But when the student of the science of religion postulates a religious instinct, he is more than likely to use the term merely for the sake of covering up by a scientific terminology the non-scientific hypothesis that there is an irreducible something, a divine spark, in virtue of which we may know that religion is really divine and not a pure invention of priests or a delusion which has survived from an earlier period of culture. The "instinct-theory" in this latter sense is merely a modern version of the wide-spread opinion that all true religion is the direct outcome of a primitive revelation. If we take this view, instead of recognizing that the divinity in our lives inheres in every element rather than in some one of its aspects, we are not, to my mind, prepared to take a really scientific view of the matter. If, however, by the "religious instinct" we intend a stage in the journey backwards beyond which we are willing to go in case still simpler terms of statement should offer themselves, then the use of the phrase does not involve any *a priori* assumption, and we have not shut ourselves out from the sphere of scientific inquiry.

But even though it be legitimate to use the term instinct, I am not sure that very much is thereby gained. It is an open question whether we profit by trying to use biological concepts for the interpretation of the higher types of psychical activity. As a rough-and-ready, purely popular expression, it may do. We may freely grant that much of the content of religion, as of the rest of our lives, is built up out of a raw material of instinct, a term which in its turn may possibly yield to simpler statement. But to admit this is quite different from admitting a peculiar instinct out of which religion developed, and which is therefore, perforce, a religious instinct. To start with such an instinct would be to abandon the main portion of the territory that should belong to the science of the development of religion. In my book, as I have said, the main question is always as to how the religious consciousness of today came to be, and rests upon

the obvious fact that, whatever else may be said about it, the development of this consciousness has been inextricably interwoven with the evolution of man's *active* interests and with his *social* development. Not for a moment do I deny that we are today what we are because of an immeasurable inheritance from our forbears. The problem is how to state that relationship to the past in the most intelligible form, and I do not think that the concepts of biology, while helpful in a general way, are other than clumsy makeshifts when it comes to an exact description of the more complex processes of psychical development. I may remind those critics who have referred to my rejection of a religious instinct that they have overlooked a large and important use which I have made of this very factor in the attempt to show how all sorts of instinctive and play activities have been of fundamental significance in the development of ceremonials and in the origin and development of religious valuations themselves.

Professor Coe, if I understand him aright, takes the ground that there is a religious instinct because there is religious activity which, in turn, is the expression of a certain structure of the psycho-physical organism. I have no objection to admitting that there is such a structural background for the religious life. In fact a large portion of this book is taken up with the attempt to show just what this structure is, and the possible conditions of its development. This psycho-physical structure, of which, according to Professor Coe, religion is the expression, I have tried to show was not there to start with, but had a beginning, and this beginning, vague and shadowy though it may be, is here sketched in a hypothetical way. If, after such a structure is formed, any one wishes to call the resulting activity instinctive, I have no desire to dispute over a mere name. My last words should be that there are other less ambiguous terms, and certainly more illuminating ones, for describing the phenomena.

Coming back to the general starting-point, the philosophy and psychology of action, there are of course many unsolved problems here as everywhere else. It is at best only a working hypothesis, to be justified by its usefulness. I do not assume, as Professor Coe thinks, that the "psycho-physical organism acquires its psychical qualities first through its own 'overt' activities." I

do not know where the psychical comes from, nor do I know of anyone who has even approached a beginning of an answer to the question. That would be a legitimate object of scientific inquiry, but when we discuss religion, we must start somewhere, and to take up the question of the ultimate origin of the psychical would be fruitless in the present state of our knowledge.

I have tried, then, to show how man, who was an active creature, and possessed of a simple psychical life, acquired a more complex life as he grappled with his world, how the needs and values which arose in his consciousness were definitely related to the things he did. Among the various differentiations of consciousness one was religious. The relating of religion to activity and especially to social activity does not make of religion a mere by-product. I have spoken of the religious attitude as "appreciative" rather than "practical," and have tried to see in religious practices and the religious consciousness an extension of, or a development from, some more general social background, but this is not to deny to religion a real and vital place in the process of human development. The view of some functional psychologists that the appreciative side of experience is a mere by-product of practical life is not adequate to the facts of life, nor can any such view of religion be sustained. Religious practices are no more "a sort of 'aside' that has differentiated itself from the primary adjustment reactions" than is any other aspect of present-day human life. If it is permissible to call all the subtle aspects of present culture by-products of primitive biological reactions, religion may be put in with the rest, but in no other sense. Religion is by no means "a luxury rather than a staple food," nor are its activities merely "products of social forces." The whole process of human life involves the subtlest interactions, and religion has been a producer as well as a product. In fine, to call religion appreciative rather than practical and descriptive is not equivalent to the view that religion represents a side-tracking of human energy or that appreciation is necessarily unproductive. The appreciative side of life is fully as vital and important for the life-process as is any other aspect of that process.

Another subsidiary question which the general problem of the

genesis of religion is found to contain is that of the nature of the primitive belief in powers and spirits and the way in which this belief contributed to the origin and development of religion. Here there is need of distinguishing between belief in powers and belief in spirits. Neither belief is in itself religious, for religion does not differentiate itself from other attitudes according to the objects of belief. It is not the object but the inner valuating attitude which makes an act a religious act, or an object of belief a religious object, and the fundamental problem in the psychology of religion is to explain the origin and evolution of this inner attitude. Belief in superior powers is not religious in itself. Most religions are mixed up with various beliefs in powers and spirits, but we should not be misled by this fact to suppose that religion began in such beliefs. I cannot see that the primitive man is at all in a more religious frame of mind when he believes in a spirit than when he believes that he sees a rock or feels the wind blow. In the descriptions of the natural races may be found accounts of many spirit-beliefs that can only by a great stretch of the imagination be coupled with anything that savors of religion.

The distinction between the belief in spirits and the belief in power or powers is indeed disputed ground. The older school of anthropologists have held that the most primitive philosophy of the world was animism, the idea that every natural object is possessed of a personal spirit-part. The natural deduction from this hypothesis was that the first religion was also animistic, and had a belief in a multitude of spirits. According to some writers the belief in spirits has been the chief factor in the development of religion. But in recent years those who know the natural races intimately have brought to light many facts which raise a question as to whether the primitive philosophy was animistic after all. In many of those cases where a more superficial examination assumed that definite spirit-beliefs were present, what is really believed in now seems rather to be a vaguely conceived impersonal power. It is here a question of fact and not of theory. There is among certain primitive peoples a wide-spread belief in powers that are clearly impersonal. Among other peoples there is an intermixture of beliefs in impersonal powers

and in personal spirits. Among others, again, the beliefs seem to be only in personal spirits. The question now is as to whether the one or the other belief is the more primitive. At first it seems incredible that man should not originally have personified the forces of nature and all inanimate objects as well as animals. A good deal of the difficulty here grows out of an *a priori* philosophy. We have so long said that primitive man could think of the forces of the world only in terms of personal agents like himself that it is now hard to believe that anything else is possible. There is no doubt that under the dominance of this idea the beliefs of some savage peoples, and possibly of many, have been misinterpreted. The first missionaries among the North American Indians reported that they believed in a Great Spirit. The best-known name of this supposed spirit is *manitou*, but it now turns out that the idea conveyed by this term is very far from fixed, and that in most cases the word refers to a belief in a quite impersonal and quasi-mechanical essence.

The indications are that similar ideas prevail in widely separated regions of the world, and it is more than likely that they are present in what has ordinarily passed as animism. Whether this view of the world and human destiny as controlled by a quasi-mechanical, impersonal power is really the primitive view of things, or whether it represents a certain sophistication of mind, we can only speculate. In the first place, is it so natural as it has been assumed to be that the simple mind should personify forces? I have read a number of articles intended to prove that the little child is animistic in his beliefs regarding the world, but I have never heard of a single illustration of his supposed animism that could not easily be explained in some other way. Many of the illustrations offered only show how readily a child will adopt any interpretation at the suggestion of an older person. Most of the cases of animism in children are results of the animism into which we adults fall when we are called upon to explain something to them which we imagine they are incapable of understanding. When I have myself tried to observe indications of a tendency to an animistic view of the world in children who have always had natural phenomena explained to them in a naturalistic way, I have never once noted an inclination to look at natural phe-

nomena, objects, and animals as the abode of spirits. I have, however, noted something that has interested me greatly. When these children see a strange and somewhat alarming object or occurrence, they immediately assume what may be called a "take-care" attitude, as if they should say, "Look out; that object may hurt us; take care," but there is not the slightest thought of its being animated by a spirit. Now it seems to me that this "take-care" attitude is perfectly natural and primitive. Why should it not have been the attitude assumed by our ancestors when they were in the presence of what they did not understand? They felt vaguely that there was power of some sort present of which they must beware, or in the proximity of which they must needs be cautious. No doubt this belief assumed various forms, but in all cases it is easy to think of it as a natural unsophisticated reaction of the simple-minded savage to those aspects of his environment which excited his wonder, his caution, or his fear. This is speculation, of course, but it shows that the hypothesis of a primitive animism is not the only possible view of primitive man's attitude toward the world.

In this study of beginnings it has been necessary to go back of reflective thought, and back even of naïve philosophizing. When we pass from the most primitive level, reflection and speculation have unquestionably had a marked influence upon the development of the religious consciousness. In the higher forms of religion, for example in the evolution of the higher conceptions of the deity and at many other points, primitive philosophizing has played its part, even though the influence of reflection has been somewhat overdone in most accounts of the development of human institutions. Yet certainly the impulsive and playful activities, the random, or even chance, variations, the accidental associations, have occupied a place quite beyond that imagined by those who exalt man solely as a reasoning animal and conceive every step he has taken as preceded by conscious weighing of alternatives and thoughtful forecasting of results.

It is possible that there has been a tendency to over-work the social in our present-day thinking, and yet it seems to me difficult to exaggerate the influence of social factors upon the development of religion. In every stage of its development it bears the ear-

marks of social influences. Its values are distinctly social values. The duties it emphasizes are social. Its rites and ceremonies are the activities of social groups clustering around objects which have proved to be of concern to men in groups rather than objects of purely individual interest.

The social quality of religion comes out strikingly in comparing it with magic. Magic is essentially individualistic and private. Here alone can a satisfactory distinction be worked out. It is not true that religion is concerned with spirits, while magic uses mystic forces only. Magic also avails itself of spirits. The question is largely one of the evidence, not a speculative problem. If objection be made to the vague and uncertain character of the distinctions drawn between religion and magic, I can only say that no sharp line can be drawn between the two, as far as any external object or practice is concerned. It is wholly the attitude expressed in the practice that determines whether it should be regarded as religious or magical. The religious attitude is the socialized one, the magical is individualistic, secretive, and even malign.

The deity or deities of a religion are further evidence of its fundamentally social character. The deity of well-developed character and personality belongs to a correspondingly well-developed society. He represents for his worshippers the socialization of the universe. It is easier to think of the values which have come to consciousness in a social medium in some sort of social terms, or possibly we might say under a social symbolism. The account of the ultimate values of human life and aspiration through a social terminology need not be the only possible, or even the truest, account, but nevertheless such an account seems to render them more tangible and hence more available for the practical exigencies of life.

Any account of the origin and development of ideas of deities is of necessity hypothetical, and while social psychology cannot hope completely to solve the problem, it yet has something to contribute to the solution. It can at least say something of the conditions within a social group which would favor the development of ideas of deities. As far as I know, the problem has hitherto been attacked in a somewhat external way; the inner so-

cial and psychical motives and impulses have not been taken into account. Some have said that the first gods were stones, trees, snakes, great natural forces, spirits, ghosts, and so on. Even though these may have been primitive deities, that is, primitive objects of worship, we have not by such an admission explained the origin of the god. If we would approach the question on the psychological side, we must first recognize the reason why these objects attracted primitive man's attention. It was first of all because they were concerned in his elementary processes of food-supply, protection, and reproduction. For the same reasons man has always had a spontaneous interest in many kinds of animals. It is most important to note that there was a great diversity of these primitive objects of interest, and that one and all seemed to be related to the welfare of the savage in some quite acute manner. Possibly the first explanation of this relationship to his welfare was offered by the savage in terms of a "power" of some sort present in the object of interest. The rock protected him because there was a "power" in it. The serpent could escape him or injure him because of its "power." And so of every other object of primitive regard. But these objects of regard were not yet true deities, they were simply objects. Whence came the essential personal element? It might have come through a regard paid to actual men. Just as some natural objects and some animals attracted attention because of their influence upon his life, which he explained in terms of their "power," so some persons were interesting and had a vital influence upon the welfare of their fellows, and these also were believed to be possessed of the "power." The steps from the mere man who is slightly elevated above his fellows because of his "power" to the genuine deity may be worked out hypothetically from the study of the anthropological record. The first deity is little more than a "man-god," but the continued reaction of a social group upon the vague, plastic notion, when it once appeared, served to give it greater and greater definiteness and content. The "all-father" idea of the southeast Australians, and the "culture heroes" of the Indians, furnish interesting stages in the transition from the "man-god" to the full-fledged deity. It is possible also to show that the higher ethical deities were built up upon a social substratum of primitive morals and naïve reflection.

If I were to state in one word the message of this series of studies it would be that the religious consciousness of today is not an adventitious growth, merely modelled more or less generally upon the social life of various levels of culture, but rather an organic part of the great process of human development, built up in exactly the same way that human society has integrated, and capable of being interpreted satisfactorily only by constant reference to the social matrix within which it was formed.

THE MORAL ARGUMENT OF THEISM

GEORGE A. BARROW

MILFORD, MASS.

Construction rather than destruction is, in its time and place, a good motto, but to attempt a reconstruction without first clearing the ground is likely to make the resulting building unstable. In the last quarter-century we have been attacking one by one the received views in theology, and now we are ready for constructive work, but unfortunately, as many students know who are in theological seminaries, even some marked as "liberal," there is little fundamental criticism of the general basis of theism. Theology has made use of the philosophical progress, but has made comparatively little advance in its own field. So we find the traditional arguments for God's existence repeated in only very slightly modified form. It is in the attempt to bring home to us the necessity for a thorough-going criticism that this examination of one of the traditional arguments for God's existence has been undertaken.

It is well, to begin with, to restate the "moral argument" from a non-theistic point of view, to see what it means when put in words that do not imply its results. If the existence of morality in the world proves the existence of God, it is because morality involves the fundamental categories of being. If it does involve them, it is at least as fundamental a part of real being as the non-moral or physical world. We could rest here, if the two were two separate compartments of reality, each contributing its part. Instead, they are closely interrelated. What we do as moral beings affects physical nature, at the least moves our bodies; and physical nature, as represented by our bodies, aids or hinders our moral actions. If, then, morality involves as much of real being as does physical existence, or even more than as much, and if that real being is, as theism declares, one, then the two are in harmony, and the morality is a component part of the same world with the physical life. This view requires that physical

life shall not, in the last analysis, make morality impossible. That is the same as saying that the moral will shall have power to exist in the physical world. This statement of the problem shows it to be even more important than as a merely additional proof of the existence of God. We have to ask whether the fact and nature of morality prove that existence must be such that life is explainable only by One who is self-existent good, the guarantor of the power of morality in physical life.

We have, in treating first the nature of morality, to make somewhat clearer the idea of the morally good, and to inquire whether it involves power over the physical. For our purpose it is enough to point out that it is a human concept, that it involves the conscious will, that it is a social concept, and that it is finite, yet not necessarily involving physical powers.

In the first place, it originates with man. The conception of good comes to us from the life of man. We do apply the terms good and bad to physical events, but only when those events affect man. To call an earthquake evil, simply because it caused loss to man, when it may be the necessary outcome of conditions and the necessary preliminary to further events, is correct only if the good of the universe is coincident with the good of man. To assume that it is so, is to beg the question. All that is essential in the idea of good is that it take account in some way of man's needs. Historically, the moral ideas have originated only among men. Even the highest animals below man seem to have no idea of it. Also good implies the existence of purpose and knowledge of an end. Nowhere in the universe known to us, outside of man, do we find anything but causal sequences. Animals seem not to have reflective actions. But even if they have, it would but extend morality to them, not to inanimate nature. What is good, then, if it is to be existent, must be found in that part of the world where man exists. If the concept then proves to include all existence, all is well, but it must be shown to be thus all-inclusive. The good, starting from the ideas of man's duty and best aim in life, can hardly be taken to imply good in everything. A concept cannot rise higher than its source. Of the things which man possesses in common with all existence, the idea derived from his experience will be valid for all, but in

those things which are peculiar to man the concepts must be limited by the limited field from which they are derived. Good, as a concept, does not include inanimate nature, so yields no inference as to any relation to it.

In the second place, the concept is one of will. If will ceases to exist, then the good must cease to exist. This brings to light the fact that the good must inhere in a will. We have too long dissociated the process and the result. The only thing that gives any concrete good its existence is that it is the object of some conscious will. It is because we must will something that the question, what is best to will, arises. If there is no will, there is no question, and no idea of good. In the world, then, where there is no conscious will, and only as such is the physical world known to us, there can be no self-existent good. What relation there is, is for metaphysics to say; it is not a deduction from the nature of good. The nature of the concept of good as involving conscious will also yields us no inference as to any power over non-conscious nature.

Thirdly, it is a social concept. To the possible objection that our argument about the origin of the idea of good with man has seeming validity only because of its confusion of the historical and genetic with the logical, we reply that the two cannot be entirely separated. Of course we cannot take the earliest forms of morality and call them typical, but neither can we take the moral ideals to concern simply the individual, when they have their principal significance only in the larger world where the individual must sink his private good for the good of the whole. The formal concept of the self-existent good must be a social concept. "Good for something" must tag every act of the human individual. It is only society which can enshrine a larger vision. But the will of society is even more held down to earth than the will of the individual. Unless we accept a theory of thought-transference, and this is hardly inherent in any ethical system, the social will must be mediated in terms of time and space. The good-in-itself, depending on the existence of some will, and effective only through a social will, can hardly rise and dominate those very laws of time, space, and causality in the physical world by which alone it can have being. To argue that it does, requires

the assumption that the whole universe is essentially moral. Again we are moving in a circle, and begging the question. The social nature of the idea of good, as well as the two former aspects, can yield no encouragement in an attempt to prove power over physical nature.

In the fourth place, morality is a finite idea. On the purely formal side, the good is not that which exists, but that which ought to exist. If placed in the world of time, it must lie in the future. Future finite existence depends for man on his will and purpose. Even the absolute good, then, to exist finitely, must depend on the creative will, and this, as we have seen, does not help the argument to prove power in the physical realm, and the existence of God. But of course, we are answered, it is eternal and infinite existence that the self-existent good possesses, and this is outside the world of time. Undoubtedly the fact that man seeks, requires that in the eternal world there shall exist the goal sought, whether attained or not. But here our objectors, if they wish their distinction to bear on our problem, miss the meaning of "exist in the world of eternity." Anything, we grant, which is necessarily implied in any existent thing, exists in the infinite timeless realm. But it exists there only because, logically, it first has also its foot in the world of our experience. Our dreams are facts of that larger universe, but only because they are somebody's dreams. In the same way the final goal of our endeavors has being, and being in itself,—it exists for nothing but itself,—but it has that kind of existence only because as such it is the goal of an existent finite will. Its timeless existence depending on its finiteness, it cannot cut loose and claim independence. There is, then, no help here toward any necessary infinite existence.

In the fifth place, moral good does not necessarily involve physical nature. It is perfectly possible to conceive that the good for man is not the good for the rest of the universe. This is really the underlying idea of a good deal of popular religion in all ages. Man must subdue the hostile world; man must endure a pilgrimage in the world with such help as God gives, in order to be finally taken from the world,—these ideas by no means assume that the physical universe is moral. They imply the opposite,

that the good for man is what the world by itself would never bring, that any power of good affects the world only by destroying it. The theologians of all ages have tried to argue away this practical dualism, but their success, so far as they have succeeded, is due to their idea of God's omnipotence. They undoubtedly, in many cases, allow evil as self-existent, for only a few would go the length of asserting that God created evil. We cannot, as did many of the saints of old, personify the world, for personification implies will, and it is just the absence of will that separates the rest of the world from man. Yet we can postulate an end, not willed, though foreseeable by man, in the physical world. All that makes to this end may be called physically good. Of course, except for man, there can be no physical evil in this sense, for progress, if man does not interrupt, is certain and sure to the impending outcome. This end may be anything,—for example, the complete disintegration of all solar and stellar systems into planetary dust, and even the scattering of this in infinite space so far that its finite energy would be exhausted before new systems could be formed. In such a hypothetical case the moral demands of man certainly are neglected. It would only be by postulating some other world, heaven or spirit realm, that moral endeavor, in face of the coming extinction of man, could have place or meaning. The good which man seeks now would still be a fact in the non-temporal world, but it would have no meaning in the world of time. The good or tendency of the universe, moving inevitably to its end, would be opposed to the demands of the self-existent good of man. There is nothing in the conception of good which can overcome this dualism. We may not accept it as final, but our reasons must be based on confidence in the ultimate power of reason in the universe, or on some conception of divine omnipotence. Monism may be held on other grounds, but as a deduction from the concept of goodness it is not valid. There is nothing inherent in goodness which insures its victory over the physical world.

Although the nature of morality does not insure its victory, and so prove God's existence, there is still the fact of its existence. Morality is not a physical concept, we say; is not, then, the good as existent, even though not physical, an argument

for the existence of the Omnipotent? This is the more usual form of the problem. If by it we mean to ask whether by a survey of our experience we can say that the world appears to include or promise more good than evil, and that this, since nature is by herself non-moral, requires the supposition of some personal power which makes this balance, we can foresee defeat at the outset. To hope to attain knowledge of such a power, even if it is not thought of as omnipotent, implies a close connection between goodness and finite existence, and falls into the same danger as do the arguments from the formal concept which we have just considered. To hope to prove the existence of a superhuman being by a survey of objective existence, assumes that the easiest approach to reality is through the judgment on facts. Let us suppose that the situation is more clear than it is,—that the world plainly lends itself to moral actions. The just and upright man always receives a due reward, and all the purposive actions of man, when moral, attain their ends as surely as the physical laws are now seen to work. The very inevitableness of such a situation might lead us to postulate that, instead of freedom and moral action, men were but automatons. Or, if not, that after all, true existence lay in seeing the right path, and that sin was ignorance, and morality simply common-sense in acting according to our best light. Man, then, making use of the moral laws as he does now of the physical, would no more need the assumption of a *deus ex machina* in the moral world than he does at present in the physical. The very laws which we seek to prove as showing the growing morality of existence may be, if we take them only objectively, as mechanical and non-personal as the fact that while one man cannot build a pyramid, thousands can; showing, indeed, co-operation to be wise, but proving nothing as to the reason why such co-operation is so fit. To hope to attain from a survey of the objective world of human morals to a knowledge of ultimate existence is as hopeless as to dream of finding the nature of matter from laboratory experiments, and for the same reason. Unless a thing is objectively given, argument from those things which are given must be mere hypotheses so long as objective existence alone is conceived. We say, the fact that man can be more or less moral in the world

proves that there are forces in the world working for morality. This statement is true within the limits of its terms,—in the finite world there are moral forces,—but we knew that in the beginning, for we knew men to be moral. As to any superhuman power, we have learned nothing. And as to the ultimate constitution of the universe we know less still. Looking only at the objective side, it seems more likely that man's systems of morality from the lowest to the highest will be shown to be biological, than that the biological, and still less the chemical and physical, laws will turn out to be deducible from the moral. Even perfection in the objective world, then, would not prove God's existence by the existence of morality. As to the imperfection which is the crux of our actual moral life, it is just the powerlessness of man before a nature which often seems careless of his moral needs that forms for us the problem of evil. Certainly imperfection cannot prove God's existence. The very fact of imperfection argues against God's existence, and even if the world were perfect, it would not need personality, even that of God, to explain it. Whether the world, then, is perfect or imperfect, it cannot lead us to God.

Leaving the question whether the world's goodness or badness requires a God to explain it, we may go further and approach the main question. Owing to the incomplete view which man has, he may not be able to prove God's existence from objective morality, and yet the bare existence of the idea of morality, the fact that man can and does make moral judgments, requires, we might conclude, that there be in control of the universe some power which must be called moral. Here we should carefully distinguish between two things, the moral will and the moral judgment. Closely as they may be interlocked, and in practice they are inextricable, they involve two distinct ideas. We may perhaps say that the moral judgment decides what is moral, what the content of our moral code shall be, while the will in the first place determines whether or not there shall be a moral judgment, and, after it is made, whether it shall be followed or not. Psychologically we may be able to resolve the last act, moral or immoral, into the first determination to make or to avoid a decision, but logically these are distinct. Will makes ideals actual, but in

our life the constant falling short of the ideal proves there can be an ideal which does not become actual. Likewise we may decide what is right, and then not do it. Whether this becomes our will through lack of attention or not, the process cannot obscure the fact that we made a judgment which it did not suit us to carry out. Yet, some would say, the will to make such a judgment is the fundamental thing, so we come back to will in any case. It must be admitted that we are in this discussion using "will" in a somewhat vague sense. Will is not simple, and is not separated from intelligence so as to be absent even from judgments of truth. This is due, however, to the broad scope of the word "will," not to the identity of the processes. When I will to walk, there may be something in common with the will to classify the trees I pass, but the two wills, though both involving somewhat similar nerve action, result differently. The result of one remains, for the most part, if no word is spoken, with the brain or at least the nerve centres, while the other has most of its effect outside those nerve centres. This difference of result justifies us in a difference of classification. We therefore distinguish between the will to do and the will to think. Under this last falls the moral judgment. When we analyze our attitude towards the moral code, we see that it is relatively exterior. The will to decide is rather a will to recognize. The attempts to deduce our concrete moral criteria from the *a priori* idea of right inevitably mix with the deduction a consciousness of what mankind judges to be right. When we ask ourselves whether we ought to do a given thing, and are in doubt, the hesitation is not, in general, as to the agreement of this act with the ultimate basis of life, but as to its agreement with some pre-established moral standard, whether our own or the world's. Moralists and philosophers may wish this were otherwise, but even they do not stop to deduce their judgment *a priori* before they come to a decision as to the right in a given crisis. The moral judgment, therefore, as we find it among men, is a judgment of the agreement or disagreement of a contemplated act with some standard of action. To say whether the existence of moral ideas proves the existence of God, we must divide the inquiry, and take first the question of the existence of the moral judgment, and second the fact of the moral will.

In one sense we are beginning backward, for the will to judge is only one phase of conscious will, and God's existence, if provable from the fact of will in general, is of course equally shown in the moral will. Yet our smaller problem still has a place. Even if God is known to exist because of man's possessing a will, there would still remain the question whether the moral judgment is an essential part of God's life. Not even the answer to this is what we are seeking, but only whether the good is so essential that, whatever other manifestation of will there may be, it requires God's existence. In other words, is morality fundamental or derived? Analyzing our attitude when we judge a thing to be right, we find that it is somewhat the same as willing to find the truth about anything. We may judge the righteousness of another's act as well as of our own act, and in that case no will of ours is involved except the will to judge. Taking this case, we say that the act was right,—right because it agrees with our view of morality, either codal, or in general as befitting a man, or as serving God. The judgment is one of agreement or disagreement. When we come to ourselves, there is no essential difference. The view of conscience which makes it, so far as the possessor goes, instinctive, is the very view which makes its proof of God impossible. As instinctive, man cannot tell its origin except in objective terms, and these cannot be valid beyond the limits of experience. Any God deducible from the existence of an instinct may very well be a God limited to humanity, and this is not what we mean. Conscience, or the feeling of duty as exerting a power over the individual, arises from the will of man to decide. He wills to lay out for himself a plan of action, and when it is laid out, because it is a plan for his action, it exerts influence upon him. This is not confined to moral judgment. The disinclination of men to desert their political party arises because of the power over them of that plan of action which they either inherited or formerly thought out. Any plan, willed to be regarded as a possible act of ours, has power over us. This is the explanation of many of the imitative crimes. The account in the daily paper gives rise to the idea that this man could do it too, and finally he does it. All that we have to consider, then, is whether the will to judge right and wrong is proof of God's

existence. Here the peculiar nature of the moral judgment must be taken into account. It is not a question of means to an end, but of logical disagreement. How we shall accomplish the desired moral result we must plan, but that is not a moral question. If it is right for me to attend a certain meeting, and I have plenty of time, whether I walk or ride is not involved in the decision that I ought to attend, however much walking may be right to improve health. We can hardly say that man's ability to discriminate proves a power beyond man, for the animals have in many ways, especially where the senses are concerned, a finer sense of discrimination than we possess. Nor can the abstract nature of the judgment prove it, for man may abstract as much as he pleases, and while his abstractions may be valid, they prove nothing more than his ability to include in one whole more of the world than do the lower animals. That they prove that there is a being who can include more still is not a logical deduction. But—we hear—it is not the fact that man can call a thing right and wrong when he has a code of morality already fashioned that matters; it is the existence of that code that is crucial. Historically, we can hardly call this true. The moral codes have arisen through two factors, the instincts—family, self-preservation, and desires for social life—and reflection on the experience as individuals in the family and race. What is right is by the common run of men taken pre-eminently to mean what experience shows to be best. The idea of a revealed code has weakened this somewhat, but even here we really conceive that God tells us what is best. Apart from the question of man's ability not to follow the code to which he owes allegiance, a moral code seems hardly different from any other. The code of modern hygiene arises from similar instincts and reflection upon them. If a man wills to plan for himself what is most healthy, he tends, unless some stronger motive intervenes, to follow that plan. To this the dietetic cranks and others bear witness. As far as abstraction goes, the abstractions of mathematics are far more subtle than those of morality, yet I do not know of any proof of God's existence based on man's ability to develop mathematics.

There may perhaps be a last objection on this point, that what

counts is man's making a judgment on such things as his actions at all. It is true that this is peculiar to man, yet it may very well have arisen because of the opposition of nature. Man finds that his own natural desires followed out will not allow him to live in this world. Lack of self-control in the plenty of summer means, to the inhabitant of any but the tropics, starvation in the barrenness of winter; so self-control becomes imperative if he is to live. It is here the opposition of his instincts to natural laws that forces him to at least one step in morality. This would not prove the existence of a moral being having power over physical nature, but only man's bowing to physical laws. So of those acts which would destroy the family or the tribe. Even in the lower animals we find some approximation to this. Man is so made that, for the family life to continue, he must yield his natural inclination of self-betterment to those laws which govern community life anywhere in nature. This is more true of the ants or bees than it is of man. It is man's ability to disobey those laws which really distinguishes him from the bees and ants. Man must make a judgment as to the agreement of his contemplated acts with those natural laws under which he lives. That he makes the abstract judgment that he does marks him off from the lower animals, but that he make some kind of moral judgment is forced on him as a finite being living a physical life. The fact, therefore, of the moral judgment proves not to involve or require the existence of an infinite or superhuman personality.

The element in the nature of man which makes by far the greater part of his power over nature is his will. It is this which leads to the control of nature to his own ends. However much in the first place his nervous structure may have given him the advantage over other living things, it is his ability to plan, and to bring all his powers to one end, that makes him indifferent to slight disturbing sensations, such as often lead a dog, for instance, to drop his present intention. It is in the will, then, that we may expect to find the necessity for a God. If the argument from the existence of morality has any validity, the fact of the will to do right must point the way to God. If, however, the moral will is not essentially different from any other will,

the only thing that matters is the existence of will in any form, and we are no longer concerned with morality simply. It is only if the moral will adds something to the argument from will in general that we are at present interested. In one sense, of course, any will is, or ought to be, moral. Whatever we do, if we accept a certain idea of right, should be directed to perfecting ourselves. Even in amusement there is the duty to refresh ourselves as much as possible in order to fit ourselves better to take up our serious work. Here everything is either moral or immoral. But this is an ideal which no one has reached. We distinguish, ordinarily, those purposes which are and those which are not moral. There are certain things which it is neither our duty to do nor our duty not to do. The actions have no moral significance. It may be my duty to walk a mile to regain health, or it may be just a matter of pleasure whether I take the walk or not. In one case, so far as my consciousness is concerned, I do wrong to ride. In the latter case, I cannot do wrong, whatever my decision may be. When we ask ourselves whether there is any fundamental difference between the purpose in the two cases, we see that the difference lies in the motive. Duty, as we have seen, is the appeal of the result of my judgment that a certain contemplated act is in accordance with a certain standard. The purpose to walk to enjoy myself is the result of a judgment, perhaps in the background of consciousness, that such action conforms to the standard of ideas of enjoyment. In both cases the act follows because it is the outcome of a previous will to be moral or to have pleasure. If there is any fundamental difference, therefore, it lies in this difference of the judgment of pleasure and of right. We cannot rightly say that one of these invokes an inner and the other an exterior standard, for the moral standard by being accepted becomes internal, and that standard may, as in certain forms of hedonism, be conceived as identical with the will to enjoy ourselves. This fact, that for hedonism and for perfectionism all will becomes moral, shows that there is not any uncrossable gulf. We have, then, two possible alternatives, either all will is moral or all will is, or can be, moral when at its purest. In the first case, to infer God's existence from the phenomena of will implies the power of all will

over nature,—God exists because the will to believe this has power, which may be taken as a very crude statement of a certain form of pragmatism; in the second case, it assumes that will, when pure, is the true manifestation of the inner being of the universe. In the first case, the moral element cannot be analyzed out, for the will is taken as a whole, and nowhere has there existed the ideal of every purpose being moral. We must take will as we find it, mixed of many elements. The will to believe in God, moreover, cannot be put to a universal objective test, and only such would prove it of universal validity. It may have power, as William James in his idea of pluralism implies, only in a limited sphere. It is in this case no argument for Christian theism. By the word "God" we do not mean merely a power larger than the individual, though that is justifiable from the usage of lower religions, but we mean an absolute, or, better, an infinite unlimited power. Hence any argument which has only conditioned application does not apply to this idea of God. Therefore, since either morality cannot be used as a separate element in will, or, if it is, must be limited in application, the first alternative does not help us to prove God's existence.

The other alternative, that will is the true form of being, is not based on a narrower view of its moral character, but on its general character. If God is personal, it might be that even then he is not moral, or, putting it in another way, the basis of his decisions may be entirely subjective. It might be possible to make the idea of morality absorb this subjective element, but we have seen that, as we use the concept, it is objective, and depends on a conscious judgment of agreement with a (possibly self-made) standard. If the divine consciousness works more like our instinctive or unhesitating decisions, and this is conceivable, then what we call the moral element is not present. Conceivably, then, will may argue God's existence. He may be conscious of his decisions and purposes, but, just because he is not hemmed in by time or other subjects, not feel what we know as moral compulsion. To prove that this is or is not true, we should have to analyze the whole nature and concept of will, and then see whether or not it involved the idea of good. But all this is very different from taking the existence of the moral will to prove

God's existence; it is deducing morality from a preconceived concept, that of God's will, not the induction to that concept. It is asking the question, "Is God, a God in whom we already believe, good?" not, "Must there be a God?" So we lay this alternative aside.

What, then, we are rightly asked, will become of the important problem? It might seem that a negative answer has been implied, and morality declared to have no sure hold on reality; that it is subordinate to physical reality. This is by no means a necessary conclusion. The problem, however, must be restated. It is not now a question of proving God's existence, but of defining the extent and relations of the moral will in man. To indicate the status of the question, a short consideration of it in closing will make the whole argument clearer. The solution to the more limited problem may be sought in either of two ways, the subjective or the objective. On the subjective side we have the deduction, already referred to, from the general nature of man's conscious will. This requires the proof or acceptance of the position that the will is a true revealer of essential being. With this, or instead of it, there is possible an objective argument of the moral quality of the universe. Since the question is no longer one of infinite existence, but only of the world as it appears to us, such an objective study has its proper place. There are, then, these two lines of approach,—the study of what the will involves and the account of what the world offers to the will.

Taking the last first, the primary question is, How do the laws or theories of organic evolution square with a moral interpretation of the universe? This is not the same as the demand for an evolutionary theory of ethics, for that is concerned only with the world after man appears: there is still the larger problem, Is man's morality the expression of the laws which evolved him, or is it a chance variation? In either case, is it useful to him outside the bounds of society? Within society there can be little question. Man must be moral, if he is to live in contact with his fellows. So much hardly needs argument. Yet if the only usefulness of moral action is to build up the racial life, then many things, such as self-perfection, which we now value, drop out

of sight, and the only things that count are the exterior virtues of courtesy, mutual forbearance, and honesty, with the virtues necessary to keep up the family. For many men this is all that there is of morality. The Christian virtues, if we may call them so, of otherworldliness, of devotion to a good not expressible in material terms, have no place in such a system, as they have no place in the lives of a majority of the people even of Christian lands. If a man is to believe that he may be called upon to sacrifice his life to the good of the pursuit of truth, which may, if the truth is unpopular, make him an outcast, he needs something more than the assurance that such acts help his life among men. He knows that they do not, and gets his impetus from the conviction that even the social life is not the highest, but that the universe requires a man to devote himself to truth. His morality requires the assurance that in some way the universe is moral enough to respond to his performance of duty. This assurance remains a mere trust, more or less blind, unless the working of the world of existence can be shown to point at least to this result. Certainly this has not been done. In fact we find many of our leading teachers of ethics admitting that there seems in the sacrifice of life, even for the best cause, something irrational and unnatural. If it is so, then such self-sacrifice, instead of being exalted, should be decried. It is no wonder that, with this view, many find no place for a theory of vicarious atonement. If God is righteous in the Christian sense, and the sacrifice on the Cross not an unavailing protest against a non-moral universe, the world must have a place for vicarious sacrifice and the problem must be faced, "Do the laws of nature tend to this end?" Our negative answer to the argument for God's existence does not yield a positive answer to the problem one way or the other. To really enter on its solution may disarrange some theories in both the biologic and the religious world: in the biologic, for it is certain that biologists have as yet given no place to morality, even in man, except in the modified social sense; and in religion, for to both the old orthodoxy and modern liberalism, religious ethics are non-natural. Both agree that the atonement is opposed to nature. Not to assume its naturalness and try to prove God's existence from it, but to prove this assumption, is the task set before modern religious thought.

What we have been saying of the question of God's righteousness may be summed up by saying that the concept of goodness should not be separated from the idea of personality. Returning to the second alternative as to the nature of will, we see that only in connection with a conscious will, which is essential to personality, can goodness reveal reality. The question, therefore, whether goodness is inherent in reality can only be finally answered from the standpoint of will. The line of attack of which we spoke in the last paragraph may connect with the biological theories, but it cannot prove reality. It is needless to say that such an inquiry into the nature of will is necessary to support modern theological claims. As we have seen, goodness cannot be proved by itself to be in God's nature; if it is his nature at all then, it must be deduced from it. The problem is also necessary to ethics. Those who consciously or unconsciously pin their whole faith to induction will oppose this, but there is some consolation for them in the fact that we are really only taking the last half of a circuit. One of the elements in will is the ability to judge and to act according to moral standards. This is the inductive part of the process. When we have gone thus far, we then have to ask the relation of this element to the others, and this can only be by deduction. While we insist that the idea of righteousness shall take account of the active will, we also insist that the will take account of morality. Yet even this, it may be said, is not the main point, but by so relating this concept to the whole idea of personality we make the proof of God's existence depend on one line of argument alone. It is not that this weakens the proof, but that it forces us by the terms of the problem to monism, and this is at least settling the question beforehand. In the first place we must note that if the presence of will in the world proves the existence of God, it can only be because will is of the true nature of being. In such a line of argument, if we are to come to Christian theism at all, monism is either assumed or proved. Much of the modern discontent in theology is due to a forgetfulness of this. Many hope to prove a God who exists in a pluralistic or at least not completely unified world. If God's existence is so limited by other existences, all that we mean by "God" is the highest expression of humanity taken as a whole. This

is not historical Christian theism, but it may be possible, and it rests with the students of philosophy to consider the question. This possibility must be kept in mind; the problem is necessary to any attempted solution of the nature of goodness, and upon the answer to it depends our answer as to the place of morality in existence. If God is not omnipotent, if good is not efficient outside a limited human area, then our ethics must acknowledge this, and take the natural laws as not interpretable in ethical terms; if God is the Absolute, then ethics has the right to claim the moral life to be the true being, and inherent in the self-existent. We may rest content in this discussion if we have shown that the moral argument for God's existence is secondary, but necessary to determine the rightful place of ethics. It is really the question, "Is God good?" which comes after the question, which must be answered on other grounds, "Does he exist?" In this more limited task we may hope that the "moral argument" will find its true place. The usual solution is no real answer to the problem as we stated it in the beginning, whether or not physical nature gives a place to morality.

*HEBREW OSTRACA FROM SAMARIA*¹

In 1908 Harvard University began the exploration of the large hill in central Palestine which marks the site of the ancient Hebrew capital Samaria. The chief results of the year's work² were the discovery of a Roman statue of heroic size (probably representing Augustus), a well-preserved Roman altar, an imposing stairway, about eighty feet broad, and the massive foundation-walls of a large building, the connection of which with the Herodian temple to Augustus was considered possible.

The campaign of 1909,³ in charge of Professor George A. Reisner, aided by Mr. Clarence S. Fisher, furnished the proof that the temple just mentioned, at the summit of the hill, was really the work of Herod. Underneath these Roman remains was recovered part of a massive Hebrew structure, believed to be the palace of Omri and Ahab, consisting of a series of chambers grouped around courts. On the western side of the hill the gateway, flanked by two round towers, was investigated, and was found to be Roman work resting on older square towers of the Greek period, which in turn occupied the site of still older Hebrew towers. On the eastern side of the hill the extensive ruin, with its monolithic columns still in position, was shown to be a basilica adjoining the forum of the Herodian city.

In 1910 the explorations were continued at all the points named, but especially in and about the palace building at the summit. This building, though not yet completely explored, is now known to have covered more than one and a half acres, and shows four periods of construction, tentatively assigned to Omri, Ahab, Jehu, and Jeroboam II.

The belief that the building was originally erected by Omri and Ahab was based on archaeological grounds, and seems greatly

¹ Based on a special report from Professor George A. Reisner.

² See this Review for January, 1909.

³ See this Review for April, 1910.

strengthened by the discovery of an alabaster vase inscribed with the name of Ahab's contemporary, Osorkon II of Egypt.

Of unusual interest is a series of ostraca found during the past summer at the level of the Osorkon vase, and comprising some seventy-five fragments of pottery inscribed with records or memoranda in the ancient Hebrew character.

That these inscriptions were originally written not on jars but on fragments appears from several considerations: (1) The beginning and ending of the successive lines of writing were nicely adapted to the size of the fragment, which in many cases involved crowding at the end of a line or carrying part of the word to the next line. (2) The writing crosses the turning lines on the fragments at various angles, whereas labels on jars are regularly written horizontally. (3) Several fragments, each with a separate inscription, fit together, and were therefore originally parts of the same vessel, whereas it is obvious that the same jar would not need more than one label. (4) In two cases the inscriptions seem to be labels written on jars before breaking, but these are distinguished by great brevity and by the large amount of unwritten surface.

The script in which these ostraca are written is the Phoenician, which was widely current in antiquity. It is very different from the so-called square character, in which the existing Hebrew manuscripts of the Bible are written. It is practically identical with that of the Siloam Tunnel inscription, and this fact settles at a stroke the disputed question whether that inscription can be as old as the time of Hezekiah. It is also the same as that of the Moabite Stone of Mesha dating from the ninth century B.C. This correspondence would suggest the eighth or ninth century as the date of the ostraca, and this view is confirmed by the place of discovery, which would cause them to be assigned to the time of Ahab.

The inscriptions are written in ink with a reed pen in an easy, flowing hand and show a pleasing contrast to the stiff forms of Phoenician inscriptions cut in stone. The graceful curves give evidence of a skill which comes only with long practice.

In many of the inscriptions the ink is so well preserved that the readings are subject to no doubt, and in only a few cases is there

uncertainty. Such distinctness after twenty-eight centuries in a damp soil is a marvel.

The reading of the ostraca is facilitated by the dots or strokes of ink, which in accordance with ancient usage divide the words from one another. There is much sameness in the records, so that on many of the broken ostraca the missing portions can be supplied with certainty.

With two exceptions all the ostraca seem to have been dated, though the date is in some cases broken away. This date, composed of the words "in the year" followed by a numeral, stands nearly always at the beginning. The years mentioned are the ninth and tenth, which are always spelled in full, and two others, apparently the eleventh and the thirteenth, which are always expressed by figures. No day or month is given, nor, from the nature of the case, is any needed, because in stating the age of wine or oil the year alone is sufficient. The king's name also is not given, but doubtless the years of the reigning king are meant. In all probability this was Ahab, as we have already seen.

In content the inscriptions are brief memoranda concerning oil and wine. The name of the owner is usually given, as well as that of the person or place from which the object came. The translation of a few of the ostraca will make this clear⁴:—

No. 5. *In the tenth year. For [i.e. belonging to] Shemaryô.⁵ From the Tell. A jar of fine oil.*

No. 6. *In the tenth year. Wine of the vineyard of the Tell. With a jar of fine oil.*

No. 8. *In the tenth year. From Saq. For Gadyô. A jar of fine oil.*

No. 12. *In the tenth year. From Yasat. A jar of fine oil. For 'Akhino'am.*

⁴The numbers given refer to the enumeration in Professor Reisner's special report on this subject.

⁵It is of course often doubtful what vowels to supply in reading these names, and the doubt is increased by the infrequency of the vowel letters. Where the same name occurs in the Old Testament, the vowels represented by the masoretic points have usually been inserted.

No. 13. *In the tenth year. From 'Abi'ezer. For Shemaryô. A jar of old wine for 'Asâ. From the Tell.*

No. 19. *In the 11th year. From Shemâda'. For Kheleş, 'Aph-
sakh, Ba'alâ [and] Zeker.*

No. 33. [In] *the 11th year. From Sarar. For Yeda'yô, Mar-
anyô, Gady[ô]. . . .*

No. 42. *In the ninth year. From Shaphthan. For Ba'alzamar. A jar of old wine.*

No. 47. *In the 11th year. From 'Abi'ezer. For 'Asâ, 'Akhi-
melek, [and] Ba'alâ. From 'Elnathan.⁶*

No. 49. *In the 11th year. From Kheleq. For 'Asâ, 'Akhi-
melek, Ba'alâ, [and] Ba'alme'onî.*

No. 50. *In the ninth year. From Yasat. For 'Abino'am. A
jar of old wine.*

No. 51. *In the 11th year. For Badyô.⁷ The vineyard of the
Tell.*

Simple as is the reading of these records, the interpretation is not always so certain, especially when the names of several men are mentioned. But in general the ostraca seem to be labels attached to jars, or groups of jars, in the cellar or store-house, giving date, ownership, and origin of the jars, with the nature of their contents. Where no owner is mentioned, as is the case with most of the jars from the Tell, the palace is probably the owner. This Tell, or Vineyard of the Tell, was perhaps one of the royal vineyards. Where several names of men are mentioned, we have perhaps cases of joint ownership, whether of a single jar or of a

⁶ The copy of the ostrakon reads *m* as the third letter of this name, but there is a break of the fragment across the letter. Since *m* and *n* are very much alike, it may be suspected that the break has obscured the reading. If, however, *m* be the correct reading, we may have here an error of the Hebrew scribe; of such errors at least two others seem to occur in the ostraca. 'Elnathan seems the more likely form of the word.

⁷ The reading of the first letter in this name is doubtful.

group of jars of wine or oil. In this regard No. 14 is instructive, the names of several owners being followed by the number of jars belonging to each.

Of special interest are the proper names found on these ostraca. From the nature of the records the names of gods appear only as elements in the formation of the names of men. Thus the general word for God, 'El, occurs in 'Eltsha', 'Elnathan (see note 6, preceding page), and possibly in 'Eltsh (abbreviated from 'Eltsha'(?)), 'Elbā, and 'Elā. The quiescents being rarely expressed in these ostraca, the pronunciation must in many cases be considered as tentative only.

As might be expected, Ba'al occurs in several names, as Ba'alā, Ba'alzamar, Ba'alāzakar, * Ba'alme'ont, and 'Abiba'al. The Book of Kings reports a great development of Baal-worship in Israel during the reign of Ahab, whose queen, daughter of Ethbaal, king of Tyre, was specially devoted to this cult.

The name of Israel's god occurs with about equal frequency. Naturally it nowhere occurs in the full form Y H W H, any more than in Biblical compounds. But the form Y H W, common in Biblical compounds, and the form Y H, found both separately and in compounds, are also absent in the ostraca. If the W is consonantal, the pronunciation may have been Yawa; if vocalic, it was probably Yō, as in so many Biblical names.

In two names the Y W forms the first half of the word, namely, Yōyada' and Yōyashib. In six others it is the second element, as Badyō, Gadyō, Yeda'yō (the same as Yōyada' just given, the two elements of the name being reversed), Maranyō, 'Egelyō, and Shemaryō. Of these names Gadyō occurs on twelve of the ostraca, Yeda'yō on two, and Shemaryō on four.

Of names of men a considerable number are found, many of them having Biblical equivalents. A selection of these is here given, and in the parallel column the equivalents, or words of similar formation, from the old Testament:—

* The first element is written here Ba'alā, with final 'ā, which seems to be a scribal error for Ba'alā, with final 'āleph.

OSTRACA	BIBLE
'Abiba'al	'Abi'al, 'Abtyah*
'Abi'ezor	'Abi'ezor
'Akhimelek	'Akhimelek
'Akhino'am	'Akhino'am
'Eld	'Eld
'Elisha'	'Elisha'
'Asd	'Asd
Ba'al ^a	
Ba'alzamar	
Ba'alzakar	Zekaryah
Ba'alme'ont	Ba'alme'on
Gadyō	Gaddi'al
Gerd	Gerd
Kheles	Kheles
Khanan	Khanan
Khanan'am	'Ek'am
Yeda'yō	Yeda'yah
Yōyada'	Yōyada'
Yōyashib	Elyashib
Yo'ash	Yō'ash
Meriba'al	Meriba'al
Maranyō	
Nathan	Nathan
'Abdā	'Abdā
'Egelyō	'Art'al
'Uxxā	'Uxxā
Raphā	Raphā
Sheba'	Sheba'
Shemida' (Shemyada'?)	Shemida'
Shemaryō	Shemaryah

It is interesting to note that, while some of these names are mentioned several times in the Bible, a great many of them occur in the account of the reign of David. But this is not surprising, since the interval between David and Ahab is only about one century.

Of the names of places mentioned in the Ostraca *SKM* must be *Shechem*. Other place-names seem to be *Khasoreth*, *Shaphtan*, 'Azā, *Yasat*, *Qasah*, and *Saq*.

*The letters *a*, *i*, *o* with circumflex above them (*ā*, *ī*, *ō*,) are used in the transliteration of names in this article to indicate the presence of 'aleph, yod, and waw respectively.

Now it is evident that these ostraca have great interest for the epigraphist and the Hebraist. They are the earliest specimens of Hebrew writing which have ever been found, and in amount they exceed by far all known ancient Hebrew inscriptions. Moreover, they are the first Palestinian records of this nature to be found. Of particular interest, too, are the proper names, especially those compounded with the names *Ba'al* and *Yô*.

It is not improbable that thousands of such records may exist at Samaria. In some part of the hill, less overturned than the summit has been by the burrowing of later builders, it is likely that multitudes of business documents await the explorer, documents giving records of sale, barter, contract, and all phases of private and social transactions.

More than this, may we not even hope for historical records? We know that the kings of Israel had their court annalists. And while we may be sure that their work was committed mainly to perishable material, other parts of it may have been written on stone, pottery, or clay. Such possibility is enough to kindle the imagination of every student of Palestinian history.

With this year's campaign the first Harvard expedition to Samaria closes. The work of preparing the results for publication is now well advanced. Including the publication, the cost of the undertaking has been sixty-five thousand dollars, which is fifteen thousand dollars more than the original gift for this purpose. By these generous gifts, which have made possible this first expedition, Mr. Jacob H. Schiff has added another to his notable contributions to the cause of learning.

But so large is the area of ancient Samaria, that the great bulk of the exploration still remains to be done. While the hill has been mainly attacked at what is probably its most complicated, and architecturally its richest, portion, and while the results in certain directions have far exceeded our expectations, it is usually the unexpected that happens in exploration, and the other parts of the hill may yield treasures more surprising than Herod's temple, Ahab's palace, or the ostraca records.

It is therefore earnestly to be hoped that the work may not stop with this first expedition, but that other patrons of research may see the opportunity for further discovery which the hill of

Samaria presents. The claim of Samaria, in comparison with Greek and Roman sites, is particularly strong, since remains from classical antiquity are already abundant, whereas, notwithstanding much excavation in Palestine, the work at Samaria is the first to bring to light important remains of the early Hebrew times.

DAVID G. LYON.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

Harvard O.R.
HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME IV.

APRIL, 1911.

NUMBER 2

ITALIAN MODERNISM, SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS

WILLIAM FREDERIC BADE

PACIFIC THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

During the past year a prolonged stay in Italy gave me occasion to visit most of the larger cities between Naples and the Alps, and supplied the opportunity of personal contact with many of the men who are now at the helm of Italian social, religious, and philosophical movements, while at the same time I was able to obtain first-hand acquaintance with the thoughts and desires of the Italian laborer. I soon became aware of the variety, intensity, and complexity of the issues which are now agitating Italian public life. It is true that Latin blood warms more rapidly, and reaches a higher temperature in controversy, than that of the Anglo-Saxon. But no superficial grievances are those over which conflict now rages; both in politics and in religion the contending parties feel that the joust of the tournament-field has become a battle for existence.

To an outside observer the most significant thing in Italian life today is the widening breach between the Roman hierarchy and the proletariat. I was in Florence in the autumn of 1909, when the news was flashed over the continent that Professor Ferrer had been executed by the Spanish authorities. Repeated efforts had been made to secure the intervention of the Vatican on his behalf; while meantime the anticlerical press had industriously circulated the report that the activity of the Spanish Jesuits was responsible for the outcome of Ferrer's prosecution, and that his conviction had received the secret approval of the Holy See.¹ Ferrer had become a great favorite in Italy, especially

¹ It is but just to state that this charge was met by a denial from the Vatican, —with small effect, however, in allaying public feeling.

in masonic and socialistic circles, and the announcement of his execution aroused throughout the country extraordinary manifestations of popular indignation, which took the form of enormous parades and mass meetings of remonstrance. The Italian press, practically with one accord, described the death of Ferrer as another blow aimed by a mediaeval church at modern social and intellectual progress. Editorials glowed with passionate denunciation, and recalled the case of Giordano Bruno, from the pedestal of whose monument in Rome orators harangued the crowds that swarmed into the Piazza Campo di Fiore. In Florence every shop was closed, and the barred shutters bore the legend, "Closed on account of international mourning." Similarly in other cities, notably in Rome and Milan, all business came to a standstill; the people listened to inflammatory speeches, and paraded the streets in numbers estimated in some instances to have exceeded fifty thousand. In numerous places churches were set on fire, and priests beaten in the streets. In Florence press and people even demanded that the *Via dell' Arcivescovado*—"Archbishopric Street," between the bishop's palace and the Duomo—be rebaptized with the name of Francesco Ferrer! Most of the demonstrations took place under socialistic auspices, but the multitudes that participated in them far outreached the numbers that socialism can claim in Italy. The masses of the working-people in the Italian cities have developed a state of mind in which they are ready to believe the faintest assertion of the church's hostility to their interests.

Social phenomena of this nature are always significant. They can occur only where an influential part of the population has not merely grown aggressively independent of ecclesiastical authority, but has also lost fear and respect for the same. Still more significant, in this instance, is the fact that this revolutionary feeling is spreading among the working-classes—a stratum of society which has heretofore blindly submitted to the dictates of the church. It is true that in the country districts and in the small villages the common people still constitute the faithful who yield unquestioning obedience to the Roman hierarchy; but in the larger industrial centres, where a socialist propaganda has been carried on, the number of those who are either indiffer-

ent or hostile to the church is so great that it may well be a cause for alarm to the Vatican.

The effort to discover the antecedent causes of these phenomena leads to an inquiry into the general political and economic situation in Italy in its relation to the church. The Vatican's attitude during the past decade toward movements for the betterment of living conditions among Italian wage-earners is found to be no inconsiderable factor in the situation. For in Italy, as in other Latin countries, religious problems are much complicated by dominant political and economic tendencies.

But a word of caution is needed at this point. It is precarious to generalize on Italian social conditions and tendencies without taking into account the great regional differences which exist. "Italy is only a geographical expression," said Metternich in allusion to the great diversity of governments and interests that characterize the different parts of the Italian peninsula. Since the unification of Italy into a kingdom there has been a gradual growth of uniformity in national characteristics; but the inherited regional differences are still so great that it is all but impossible to make any general statements about internal conditions. Lombardy and Sicily represent the extremes; but Tuscany, which lies between them, is very different from either. Furthermore, each of the larger divisions has its own crop of local differences, such as it would be impossible to find within a given area in any other part of Europe. As Villari² pertinently observes, the various Italian schools of painting, sculpture, and architecture, some of them crowded into the restricted area that holds Pisa, Florence, and Siena, are but manifestations of differences that extend in each case to the whole life of the people. They are survivals of the communal particularism of the one-time city-states.

The greatest contrast, obviously, exists between the North and the South. The inhabitants of the former describe their region as *L' Alta Italia* and refer contemptuously to the Southerners as *Meridionali*. Lombardy and Piedmont are progressive, and have grown wealthy by a great variety of successful industries. In

² L. Villari, *Italian Life in Town and Country*, 1905.

the South agricultural occupations predominate, and the mass of the population is wretchedly poor. On the Sorrento peninsula once populous villages are almost entirely depopulated. Its half-starved inhabitants have heard the call of that new world of plenty toward which the Italian Columbus was the first to turn the daring prows of his Spanish caravels. Walking through streets of empty, forsaken houses, and cities once full of wealth and splendor, now left to a few squalid idlers, one realizes that Italy has a Southern question of critical importance. The usual baleful association of illiteracy and crime with destitution confronts one at every step. One report gives the percentage of illiterates among military recruits from the provinces of Piedmont and Naples as fourteen per cent and fifty-one per cent respectively, while in Sicily it rises to fifty-five per cent. The Mafia and Camorra are characteristic products of Southern Italy, where during two given years the number of murders per hundred thousand of the inhabitants ranged between twenty-four and twenty-eight, whereas in Lombardy and Venetia it was only two and three. The moral poverty of religion as practised in some of the southern provinces is sufficiently indicated by the fact that in some of the criminal associations formed among the *mafiosi* in Sicily images of saints are introduced as part of the initiation rites.

These regional differences serve to explain the contrast between the many beautiful examples of religious life which one meets among cultivated Roman Catholics of the North, and the degrading forms of superstition which religion has assumed in the South. One who has witnessed ritual functions connected with the pretended liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius at Naples,³ or has seen the loathsome spectacles afforded by some of the pilgrimages—that to Casalbordino, for instance—not to mention the numerous nodding saints and curtseying madonnas, can only wonder why the Roman hierarchy still maintains an attitude of acquiescence toward what Free Catholics and modernists are denouncing as palpable imposture. Certain it is that no severer critics of these practices have arisen than are now to be found among modernists in Italy. Apropos of the excommunication

³ For a description see Renato Fucini, *Napoli a occhio nudo*. A brief translated extract is given in Arthur H. Norway, *Naples*, p. 140.

of Loisy and the case of a Camorrist priest of Naples whom the ecclesiastical authorities failed to punish, one of them takes occasion to observe that "something is seriously wrong in a church where the gates swing wide before a priest who has sinned openly against society, but close remorselessly before one who has dared to declare that St. Thomas did not set forth truth in its finality."

I

The history of economic class-struggles in Italy began early. In his *Communist Manifesto* F. Engels makes her the first of the capitalistic nations. In keeping with this finding is the fact that banks, the calculus, and modern forms of commerce all originated in Italy. There the mediaeval city-state reached its completest development. Florence, for instance, grew out of the successful struggle of the *bourgeoisie* with the nobility. In the modern struggle of the Italian proletariat for better conditions of living socialism is on the firing-line, and its attitude toward the church, as we have seen, is bitterly hostile. What has led to this hostility?

For the purpose of our inquiry it is not necessary to review the beginnings of socialism in Italy. It will suffice to call attention to a few progressive movements of recent years. Notable among them is that of the agricultural population in the valley of the Po. It requires no imagination to picture the lot of an Italian farm-laborer who out of paltry earnings averaging seventy-five dollars a year had to pay the living-expenses of his family, not to mention the extra tax imposed by sickness. Even more pitiable was the condition of the so-called *risaiole* (rice-girls) in Lombardy and Venetia. Bent over under a broiling sun, they stood up to their knees in a swamp all day. Thirteen hours they worked, and in many places walked ten miles daily to and from their places of employment. For this work, which exacts an awful toll of disease and death, they received as a rule not more than twenty cents a day. Since the law regulating the employment of children in factories did not apply to agricultural occupations, children were largely employed at ten cents a day, often displacing the poor women. It is a malarial region,

and the consequences are sufficiently indicated by the mortality statistics. In the summer of 1901 ninety-six deaths occurred in a certain community of forty-two hundred persons. There had been no epidemic, yet fifty-five of the ninety-six were children.

These conditions in the early nineties led to the organization of the Mantuan Federation of the Society of Workmen and Farmers.⁴ But it did not succeed in achieving results until it went over to the socialist party, which gave it a coherent organization. The real struggle began in 1898. "Leagues for Betterment" sprang up like mushrooms in the rural districts, and "Leagues of Resistance" were formed to support the striking organizations during the period of unemployment. In three years they forced the landlords to a general increase of wages ranging from seven to twenty-four per cent. The *risaiole* secured an average increase of eighteen per cent, and the right of determining by contract the length of the day's labor.

During the struggle the strikers had to encounter the opposition of the "Catholic Leagues," composed mainly, according to Achille Loria,⁵ of barons, tutors, and priests. The poor laborers felt that they should have had the assistance, not the opposition, of the clergy where the betterment of social and economic conditions was so urgently needed. Socialists were quick to come to their aid. Under the circumstances it is not surprising that laboring people in Italy feel friendly toward socialism, notwithstanding the uncompromising hostility of the Roman Catholic church. This new clash of interests helped to deepen the popular impression that the church is the defender of barons, capital, and inherited privileges, and consequently unfriendly to schemes for social betterment involving the reduction of the employer's profits. It probably would be fairer to say that the church, as a conservative institution, simply ranges itself on the side of things as they are. But the laborer does not regard the matter from this point of view.

Thus it appears that the conservatism of the clergy, resulting

⁴ Roberto Michels, "Der italienische Sozialismus auf dem Lande," in *Das freie Wort*, 1902.

⁵ Achille Loria, *Problemi sociali contemporanei*, Milan, 1895.

in part from papal dictation, in part from training, forms an element of our problem. In 1873 the opposition of the Roman Catholic church to the state led to the abolition of the theological faculties at the universities. The consequences have been gratifying to the clerical party but unfortunate for Italy. It inaugurated those anticultural tendencies which have placed the Roman hierarchy not only in declared antagonism to the state, but to modern social progress as well. It is the penalty which an institution pays for living a life of negations. The mass of the Italian clergy is saturated with anticultural ideas. Suppressed at the universities, the study of religion has been restricted to Roman Catholic theology. As such it has become a veiled science of the priests and has secluded itself in their seminaries. Of these Italy alone is reported to have about three hundred, of which hardly more than forty or fifty have teachers who deserve to be called professors.⁶ Professor Minocchi tells of a visit he paid in 1903 to the present pope, who was then Cardinal Sarto.⁷ During the interview conversation turned on the book of Abbé Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church*. Cardinal Sarto took occasion to say that there were many important and beautiful pages in it, and that Loisy had clearly proved that there was need of considerable overhauling in the current science of the church and its seminaries. When Professor Minocchi expressed surprise that he, as cardinal, did not exert his authority to improve the state of ecclesiastical studies in the seminaries, Sarto replied: "Alas! I should like to; it is not my will that is lacking; it is the men. For my own diocese I have scarcely anybody to whom I can intrust a curriculum conformable with modern requirements. The professors in the seminaries are in general old, badly educated, and with many prejudices, and one cannot remove them as easily as one would like." Parenthetically we may add here that the hospitable attitude toward modern ideas implied in this interview was apparent only. For, as Professor Minocchi adds, "six months later Cardinal Sarto was Pope Pius X, and was condemning Loisy."

⁶ *Süddeutsche Monatshefte*, June, 1908. Cf. also Nos. 25 and 27 of *Das zwanzigste Jahrhundert*, 1908, on the Italian seminaries.

⁷ In his "Autobiographical Notes of a Modernist," *The New Age*, June 2, 1910.

A book⁸ said to have for its author a confidant of Pius X deplors the lack of energetic, high-minded men among the Italian clergy, and charges that even among the higher dignitaries of the church there are individuals who "unhesitatingly mount upon the shoulders of the devil in order to attain their ends." In the "*Encyclica ferox*," as the students of the *Collegium Germanicum* at Rome have nicknamed the antimodernist encyclical, the present pope has a word of implied praise for the qualities which give modernists distinction among the rank and file of the Italian clergy,—upright life, untiring energy, and devotion to study. But in the same encyclical he commands the directors of the seminaries to "seek with utmost diligence to know the youths who desire to enter the clergy; and if you find among them any one of proud disposition, with any resoluteness, bar him from the priesthood."

In an earlier communication to the Italian bishops on the subject of modernism and Christian democracy he directed them not to permit young clerics to attend the universities except for the weightiest reasons and with the utmost precautions; newspapers they must not be permitted to read at all, and periodicals only with episcopal permission. The seminary libraries, mere remnants of what was not confiscated by the state, have received few additions since 1800, and the books are in any case kept under lock and key.⁹ "Is it not true," asks one writer, "that the library in ever so many seminaries is the most inaccessible part of the building, and full of dust and bad odors? There is no need of a reading-room, for the simple reason that no literary or scientific periodicals are kept."¹⁰

A clergy recruited in this way, mostly from the lower strata of society, and trained remote from all vital contact with modern life and thought, is not likely to exhibit power of initiative or to interest itself in social reform. If it produces leaders, it will be by accident, not by design. Nevertheless the clergy of this

⁸ Pio X: Suoi atti ed intendimenti, 1905.

⁹ Preszolini, Il cattolicesimo rosso, p. 31, "Le Biblioteche non contengono che i resti di quelle non incamerate dallo Stato, e in ogni caso non vi si trova nulla che passi il 1800, e anche quello e tenuto sotto chiave."

¹⁰ Rivista di Cultura, October 16, 1906, p. 118; Studii religiosi, vol. i, p. 288.

small country has to provide about two hundred and ninety bishops. The result, as regards intellectual and administrative ability, can hardly be satisfactory. Yet they are the ones who exercise ecclesiastical surveillance over the rank and file of the young clergy to prevent them from becoming tainted with modern ideas and to keep them from straying beyond the bounds of the Thomistic theology. There is both truth and humor in the remark of a bright young modernist priest who found it necessary to rebel against the ruling of an obscurantist bishop. "Ill fortune," said he, "awaits the flock whose shepherd is himself a sheep."

The strength of prejudices implanted by early training and the bilboes of such discipline explain why the work of noted lay theologians like Mariano, Labanca, and Chiapelli remains without influence upon clerical education. To be caught reading theological books without the church's imprimatur is a serious matter for a young priest. Hence, in the words of an Italian writer, "Obedience has become the cardinal virtue of a good Catholic. From a religious society which fears above everything schism and heresy, from a body of priests whose watch-word is to close the eyes, to conceal differences, and to avoid personal initiative, no free and independent characters can arise."¹¹

We have seen that the hostile attitude of the Vatican toward the state helped to inaugurate anticultural tendencies among the clergy. What was at first a political issue between ecclesiastical and lay authority developed on the part of the church into a settled disapproval of intellectual activities and nationalizing tendencies which the state endeavors to promote. It follows that the increase of national feeling in Italy involves in some measure the abstraction of allegiance from the Vatican. An Italian holding a high position said to me, "It is difficult for an Italian to be a good Catholic and a good patriot at the same time, owing to the uncompromising attitude of the Vatican, which tries to enforce its pretensions to temporal power as an essential dogma of religion."

The papal bull *Non expedit*, issued by Leo XIII, forbade faith-

¹¹ Prezzolini, *op. cit.* p. 15.

ful Catholics to participate in the general elections. It was intended to embarrass the government, which the Vatican considers illegitimate. In the minds of the faithful this intransigent attitude had the effect of handing over the state to atheism and irreligion.

The dilemma thus created is now resolving itself to the disadvantage of the church, for the present generation is occupying itself increasingly with national politics. Soon after his election Pius X appears to have realized that abstention from the general elections is a disastrous policy for the Vatican to pursue. When the question of divorce came up at the elections of 1904, the *Non expedit* was "integrated." This consisted in not renewing the prohibition, as on previous occasions, thus leaving the matter to the individual initiative of every Catholic citizen. At the same time an intimation was conveyed to certain bishops in northern Italy that by way of exception the Holy See would not be displeased if on this occasion the faithful should participate in the elections.¹² The result was that many socialistic candidates were defeated by clericals, and a Catholic party whose energy was chiefly directed against socialism made its appearance in politics. In other words, the *Non expedit* was intended to be a standing protest against a political revolution, but it was deemed expedient to sacrifice it in order to forestall an impending social revolution. The warfare between socialism and Roman Catholicism is now carried into politics.

It seems important to define at this point the fundamental issue between the Vatican and Italian socialism. To say that the church expressly ranges itself on the side of what would be called in this country "the interests" would be doing scant justice to Roman Catholicism, which in its own way has shown a real sympathy for the material well-being of the masses. Its ideal is that of a people well nourished, not too venturesome in its thinking, and submissive to theocratic rule. However, it founds the social redemption of the submerged not upon the demands of justice, but upon the moral obligation of charity. The laborer should appeal to the employer's sense of Christian duty,

¹² Cf. Roberto Michels, *Proletariato e borghesia*, pp. 219 ff.

and the latter should yield obedience to the Golden Rule. This view was taken by Leo XIII in his encyclical *Rerum novarum*, in which he deplored the misery of the laboring classes, but at the same time condemned socialism unreservedly.

Now this appeal to discretionary charity socialism rejects as unworthy of the laborer. It bases its programme of social reform, or revolution, upon the principle of justice, and uses the economic power of its associations to enforce what it regards as the laborer's rights. Along the line of these differences a mutual antipathy has widened what now seems an impassable gulf. The exigencies of the conflict, as in the case of the above-mentioned Mantuan movement, have forced the church to ally itself with the conservative elements of society, which are mainly represented by the wealthy and privileged classes.

On the other hand, socialism in Italy has accepted the charge of irreligion and abandoned itself, however needlessly, to atheistic and materialistic theories. Hence the statement of an Italian writer that "the theistic socialism of the middle of the nineteenth century has definitively disappeared. The emancipation of the laboring class is conceived as the outcome of historical determinism, not as an object of evangelistic propaganda."¹³ Thus it is as true as it is tragic that the church, which by tradition and vocation should be the helper of the oppressed, supports the *habentes* against the *non habentes*, while socialism, which by virtue of its moral fervor in the pursuit of social betterment should be religious, declares itself not only anticlerical, but antireligious.

But since socialism is not inherently irreligious, nor Roman Catholicism incurably feudalistic, there was room here for a new movement which could mediate between the two. It started under the direction of an able young priest, Don Romolo Murri, and called itself Christian Democracy. The *democristi*, as they are popularly known, proposed to emancipate the proletariat, first, by elevating the sense of Christian duty among employers; secondly, by establishing associations founded through the effort of the wage-earning classes; thirdly, by raising the laborer to the dignity of a sharer in the profits, and thus transforming the exist-

¹³ Prezzolini, *op. cit.* p. 58.

ing social order. Moralized capitalism was made equivalent to co-operativism.

If the philosophy of the movement was at many points weak, at least its purpose was meritorious and full of good promise. It set itself the task of reconquering for the church what the latter had lost by negligence and lack of intelligent sympathy. The movement grew with wonderful rapidity, attracting to itself the progressive element among the clergy together with such laymen as the late Senator Fogazzaro, whose famous modernist novel, *The Saint*, was appropriated almost as a campaign document by Christian Democracy. Indeed, it was in connection with this movement that modernism first showed its real strength in Italy. It should be observed that its interest there was primarily in social reform, rather than in intellectual problems. Murri had as a student won prizes in scholastic theology, and, strange as it may seem in a man of such ability, has never abandoned scholasticism. His philosophy would hardly bring upon him the disapproval of the Vatican.

Thoughtful defenders of the new social ideals, however, were not long in discovering that the mediaeval theology and philosophy of the church were the offspring of an aristocratic view of the world and could not furnish a suitable basis for a democratic movement. A new world-view was needed as a dynamic for this programme of social reform, and modernism came forward with enthusiasm, glad to find itself practically useful. Influential clerics, silently deprecating the quarrel between the Vatican and the Quirinal, fell into line. At one time it seemed as though Cardinal Svampa of Bologna and Cardinal Agliarda of Rome had joined the progressives. Bishop Bonomelli even made noteworthy concessions to socialism when he said that he saw in it "the approach of a profound economic transformation of society whose outcome no one can as yet foretell or foresee. It is inevitable, however, and will be good."¹⁴

But the apparent reliance of the movement upon an economic theory opposed to the traditions of the church, and the opposition of rank and wealth whose hostility the hierarchy could not

¹⁴ *Il secolo che nasce*, p. 11.

afford to excite, brought upon Christian Democracy the disapproval of the Vatican. By the encyclical *Graves de communi re* of 1900 the new party was forbidden to engage in political activity. The following year the Sacred Congregation of Ecclesiastical Affairs declared its hostility. Still severer measures were adopted by the present pope in 1905 and 1907, including the suspension *a divinis* of Don Romolo Murri and the interdiction of Fogazaro's lectures and his *Rinascimento*. *The Saint* was placed on the Index, thereby enlarging its already enormous circulation.

Since the Christian Democratic party had derived its strength from a Roman Catholic membership it could not withstand papal condemnation. There were some among the leaders who were ready to defy the Vatican. But an article attributed to Cardinal Svampa advised submission.¹⁵ "The proposals of resistance," he wrote, "we must disapprove. Because superior authority which possesses light that we do not have has intervened, the sacrifice of individual opinion is an obligation and should be a glory."

But even among the clergy many submitted with ill-concealed reluctance. The more ambitious of the younger members of the priesthood had joined the movement because it brought them into contact with modern thought and social ideals. It was hard to check the enthusiasm with which they had welcomed this new outlet for their energies. The following, which I translate from an anonymous book by one who calls himself a modernist priest, shows what feelings of resentment are smouldering beneath the surface.¹⁶

"The progress of Christian Democracy," he writes, "was unable to do more than hurt the susceptibilities of the Italian episcopate; an episcopate of a sort ignorant and do-nothing, full of haughtiness and negligence, bound by a double cord to the rich classes of their respective dioceses, and often maintained by them; an episcopate which lives remote from every contact with the popular mind, and is indifferent to every sense of sympathy with the ideals of our society. . . . The young priests, guilty of sympathizing with the labor movement, have been persecuted,

¹⁵ *L'Avvenire d'Italia*, March 20, 1905.

¹⁶ *Lettere di un prete modernista*, Rome, 1908, p. 60.

expelled from the seminaries, and made to obey the rancorous whims of authority."

Elsewhere in the volume he speaks of the "sleepy theodicy" preached by the papacy, which "blesses the inequalities of earth with the mirage of a coming celestial paradise"; and says, "In a word, the Catholic church of today is a big insurance society for the blessed of the earth, for gluttons of every caste and country, and is destined to die incapable of initiative or reform."

Discussing the future, he expresses his conviction that in the minds of the younger clergy there is germinating something more vital than Christian Democracy, now dead and buried. This something he calls Christian Socialism, or Christianity socialized; a conception which affirms resolutely the inseparability of the religious sentiment and the hope of social redemption. The success of socialism in conquering the masses he ascribes to the fact that it kindles the hope and desire for a secure material happiness on earth. Hopeless to him is every scheme for the elevation of the proletariat that rests upon the good pleasure of the employer. Socialism, at least, knows "that economic progress and the uplifting of the downtrodden can be achieved only at the cost of a relentless warfare against opposing class selfishness."

The conclusion of the discussion is so significant that I quote it in full:—

The ancient authority of the Vatican will hurl, as once did the Sanhedrim at the Rabbi of Nazareth, its anathema against the new hopes of its persecuted sons. But that anathema will fall back upon its own sterile dotage. In our social hopes with assurance we see reborn the better spirit of that evangel which is becoming the religion of humanity, offering the beauty of its hope to the hungering eyes of the oppressed. Perhaps we shall see a new Church, in the better meaning of this much abused word, rising beside the old. Whether my enthusiasm is giving me illusions I do not know, but I seem already to see a priesthood called to another mission than that humiliating one to which it is reduced today, with, for example, its cold ministry of the stereotyped word. I am dreaming of a priesthood that shall come to men with the mission of the Master and of comfort. I am dreaming of rites which shall symbolize to the eyes of a sane and virile society the beauty of life, and the light of progress unobstructible (p. 68).

In recent Italian literature no act of the Vatican has been more widely and severely criticised than its condemnation of Don Murri's movement. Everywhere in Italy men of thought and culture expressed to me their opinion that the fatal mistake of the Holy See has been its failure to understand the importance of this social movement. It was a life-preserver thrown out for the rescue of Italian Catholicism—only to be spurned. In the opinion of liberal minds in Italy the papacy has definitely committed itself by its own act to the maintenance not only of a mediaeval philosophy, but also of a mediaeval ideal of society. Italian socialists find in this further justification for their hostility to church and religion, and are using it to inculcate hatred of both in the minds of the wage-earning classes. The Ferrer riots only revealed, as by a lightning flash, the psychological changes which have been taking place there where ancient faith and goodwill toward the church seemed most deeply rooted—among the Italian proletariat.

In hierarchical circles the number and strength of those who are seeking a readjustment of the church to modern social conditions and needs are much underrated. A pamphlet, entitled "Why we are Christians as well as Socialists,"¹⁷ expresses the feelings of many good Catholics who refuse to accept the Vatican's ruling that Christian and socialistic activities are incompatible with each other. Unfortunately prudential reasons prevent most of them from coming into the open. Their literary campaign, as a rule, is one of anonymity. This is an undeniable weakness. No moral reform has ever been achieved without the personal leadership of men who made fearless public avowal of responsibility for their convictions.

A noted Florentine journalist and editor has drawn an attractive picture of what might have happened if Don Murri had been given a cardinal's hat. Might not the Pope one day have descended the steps of the Vatican with Murri by his side, both on their way to give their salutation and benediction to one of those groups of socialists whose spirit and work find few parallels outside the annals of apostolic Christianity? It may seem the fancy of a dis-

¹⁷ *Perchè siamo cristiani e socialisti: a cura dei socialisti cristiani di Roma, Rome, 1908.*

ordered brain; "but it well represents what should have been the papal attitude in order to save Roman Catholicism. It is now too late. The latter is dying, and a universal Catholicism is rising in its place."¹⁸ Murri has become an active opponent of ecclesiasticism and the leader of the National Democratic League, a new name for what he has been able to save out of the wreck of Christian Democracy. He is the first priest who has been elected by socialists to a seat in the Italian parliament, where his fine ability is on the side of the Radicals.

II

Turning now to another phase of our subject, it behooves us to consider Italian modernism in its theological and philosophical rather than in its social relations. The discerning student will already have perceived that Italian modernism differs from that of France and England in the salient features of its public manifestations. The writings of Loisy, Blondel, and Tyrrell are concerned chiefly with doctrinal reform, with the readjustment of the church's teaching to modern thought. Italian modernism, in the person of its two leading representatives, Murri and Fogazzaro, has been chiefly identified with social reform and a vain endeavor to make peace between the Vatican and the Quirinal.

It is a well-known fact that the mass of the Italian people are utterly indifferent to matters of religious doctrine. The causes of this indifference have been convincingly set forth by Professor Labanca.¹⁹ Survivals of the religious indifferentism created by the Roman Empire, the abolishment of the theological faculties at the universities, the repressive action of the Vatican, the long rule of dogmatism, and the settled habit of Italian men of science and philosophers to omit religion from their thinking, have all had a share in bringing about the present state of religious apathy. In any case there can be no doubt about the existence of a widespread religious indifference. Villari goes so far as to assert that the Italians who "know nothing and care nothing about religion"

¹⁸ "Il cattolicesimo romano muore, e ciò che vive è il cattolicesimo umano."

¹⁹ *Difficoltà antiche e nuove degli studi religiosi in Italia*. Translation by L. H. Jordan, in *The Study of Religion in the Italian Universities*, 1909.

constitute "the majority of the upper orders and of the people of culture, and probably of the whole population. The public services, the bar, the medical profession, the universities, the business world, literature and art, are filled with persons who believe in no religious principles."²⁰ It is no uncommon experience to find cultivated university students who have never read a page of the Bible. Books on religion are seldom met with outside of ecclesiastical establishments. The only part of the Scriptures which I ever saw prominently and generally exposed for sale in Italy was a translation of the Song of Songs.

A modernist propaganda in Italy conducted along theological lines is therefore foredoomed to slow progress. Being of an essentially non-theological cast of mind, the average Italian cares nothing about issues that would profoundly stir an American or an English public. But the improvement of social conditions in Italy is so imperative that the economic aspect of religion is a matter of deep concern to all the inhabitants of the peninsula. This explains Murri's dominant interest as a modernist and the great following which he speedily secured. It also throws light upon socialism's easy conquest of the proletariat, whose formal allegiance to the church is unable to withstand the assault of an anticlerical socialist propaganda based on economic considerations. Since adherence to the church in Italy means in most cases adherence only to the external forms of religion, it is not surprising that the resulting defection assumes the aspect of a lapse into irreligion. Professor Labanca doubts whether there is faith enough left in Italy for a real heresy trial. A public which does not possess deep religious convictions of a personal kind cannot be said to lose them when its indifference toward religion turns into active opposition to ecclesiasticism.

Another social phenomenon needs to be mentioned in this connection. Observers who are acquainted with freemasonry in England and America are often surprised to find it engaged in an antireligious propaganda in France and Italy. Needless to say, this is a purely adventitious characteristic of this order in these countries. English freemasonry separated from the freemasonry

²⁰ *Op. cit.* p. 121.

of France in 1877, when the latter declared that belief in God was not obligatory for membership.²¹ In Latin countries this organization has since then played an increasing part in politics, and its democratic, or republican, tendencies have inevitably brought it into conflict with the political pretensions of the Vatican. In Italy it is a very powerful political factor and an uncompromising foe of clericalism. For a politician of radical tendencies to enroll himself among the freemasons is a common occurrence. Signor Nathan, the mayor of Rome, whose strong anticlerical speech last September gave great offence to the Vatican, is a mason of high rank. That the anticlericalism of freemasonry has in Italy developed largely into an antireligious propaganda is probably in no small part due to the long-continued and bitter hostility between the masonic fraternity and the Papacy,²² for in the heat of their antagonisms most Italian masons have failed to distinguish between ecclesiasticism and religion.²³ It seems very unfortunate that the conditions and tendencies described should have produced indifference and antagonism to religion in so many spheres of public life; but this may ultimately prove another case in which the passage from one type of religion to another leads through negation—through irreligion, if you please. Signs are not wanting which tend to show that the present anticlerical reaction, with its accompaniment of irreligious tendencies, is but the trough of the wave. Italian social modernism is preparing the way for an inchoate, but vital, intellectual modernism, that will stand resolutely for the truth of facts and for an untraditionalized conscience.

It is well to remember that in Italy the modernist movement began as a philosophical attempt to bridge the chasm between mediaeval Catholicism and the spirit of the new age. Count Antonio Rosmini (1797–1855) and Vincenzo Gioberti (1801–1852)

²¹ Solomon Reinach, *Orpheus*, p. 572.

²² The Roman pontificate has condemned freemasonry since 1788; in the following year membership in the order was made punishable with death. In 1884 Leo XIII renewed the condemnation of freemasonry with particular solemnity and severity.

²³ The Italian public press is now discussing the interpenetration of socialism and masonry, with anticlericalism as the common bond. Cf. *Sempre Avanti*, July 15, 1910; "La massoneria nel socialismo," *La Voce*, no. 33, 1910.

were the forerunners of modernism, although they were called Reform Catholics. Both were devout adherents of the church, and, like their successors of the present time, were not in entire agreement with each other. Some writings of the former were placed on the Index during his lifetime, and forty of his propositions were censured in 1887. The Rosminians today form a considerable body within the Roman church, and many see in their opposition to the Jesuits the promise of a time when they will join hands with more aggressive modernist reformers. Gioberti's writings are proving an armory of keen weapons for the campaign of ecclesiastical reform. He was in his day a vigorous opponent of the Society of Jesus, in whose aims and activities he saw a grave danger for Roman Catholicism. Jesuitism, he declared, was willing "for the sake of heaven to slay the earth."

Many among the more intellectual leaders of reform do not hesitate to recognize kindred spirits in Dante, Giordano Bruno, Aonio Paleario, and Marsilio of Padua. Especially interesting is the part which Dante is made to play in the reform movement. It is pointed out that the Jesuits, with a few notable exceptions, have cordially hated the poet for three hundred years. His ideals, embodied in his poem, are not theirs. The popes in the simonists' circle of the *Inferno* are his undying answer to the doctrine of papal infallibility. A reformer of practice and political theory within the church, he did not hesitate to fling down the gauntlet to Boniface VIII; in doing so, he said he was "not interfering with the ark, but with the refractory oxen that were dragging it out of the path."²⁴

It is at first sight surprising that the *Divina commedia* escaped a place on the Index beside the *De monarchia*. But a literary masterpiece that had created a language and opened a national literature, a poem that had sung itself into the hearts and lives of a people for three centuries, was beyond the power even of the Jesuits to condemn or dislodge. Only in Spain, in 1612, did the Inquisition dare to proscribe a few of the most obnoxious passages.

On the other hand, it must be recognized that Dante, though

²⁴ Ep. viii, 5; cf. *Purgatorio*, xvi, 109, 127 ff.

accusing individual popes of "trampling on the good and raising up the wicked," preserved a profound respect for the functions and power of the papal office. It is to be remembered, also, that Leo XIII was not only an enthusiastic student of Dante, but established in 1886 a permanent course of lectures on Dante at the *Istituto Leoniano* in Rome. Coming in connection with the Thomistic revival, this was an exceedingly wise move, for there is no more persuasive teacher of Thomistic theology and philosophy than the great Florentine. It has also tended to disarm modernists who are seeking to make capital out of Dante's courageous refusal to subordinate his opinions to papal authority. Nevertheless, the reformers appear to have the better reason in their claim that Dante's influence makes for tolerance and progress.

The particular views and aims of the men whose names are publicly associated with the modernist movement in Italy are not reducible to any definite formula. Many of them would refuse to be classified as modernists. In Italy, as elsewhere, modernism is a very complex phenomenon. But in all cases it means a revolt against absolutism in religion, and an attempt to adjust traditional doctrine and practice to a new intellectual world controlled by the conception of development. The static is in conflict with the dynamic. "The little fifteenth-century world of the Vatican," a phrase often in the mouth of modernists, discloses in a larger way the animus of the movement.

Among its foremost promoters is to be reckoned an able Old Testament scholar, Professor Salvatore Minocchi, formerly of the Royal Institute of Advanced Studies at Florence, now connected with the University of Pisa. He was a classmate of Murri, and studied under the noted Hebraist David Castelli. In 1901 he founded his bi-monthly *Review of Religious Studies*,* which soon became a recognized clearing-house of liberal thought among the Italian clergy. In 1907 he published, with the approbation and protection of Cardinal Svampa, a critical translation of the prophecies of Isaiah. This work and a Commentary on Genesis were condemned "by a device of the Bible Commission,"

* *Rivista di studi religiosi*, 7 vols., Florence, 1901-07.

which consisted in selecting for disapproval the theses he upheld. It was during the year 1907, also, that he travelled in Russia and the Orient "in order to visit, with a free moral and social aim, the Italian workmen who were employed on the Russian railways." "An article of a modernist tendency," he writes, "which I published on August 14th in the *Giornale d' Italia*, on the subject of my visit to Tolstoy and of our conversation on the great problem of the day, made a great stir in Italy, and was even noticed abroad. It brought me to the step of breaking with the Vatican."²⁶ He was suspended, and, like many others, submitted, stopping the publication of his review. He has since then withdrawn from the priesthood, but his modernist activity continues unabated.

One of Minocchi's collaborators in the *Religious Studies* was Umberto Fracassini, president of the Seminary at Perugia. After Pius X issued his famous encyclical *Pascendi* he dutifully submitted. His recently published book, "What is the Bible?"²⁷ evades those questions of critical scholarship which would bring him into conflict with the Vatican. In a review of the book contributed to *La Voce*²⁸ Minocchi, after praising the author's ability, says: "I only deplore that this man of knowledge, full of moral sentiment, should have to torture his thoughts so atrociously in order to remain united with a church that has no words of life for her own faithful sons. After the encyclical *Pascendi* Umberto Fracassini, it seems to me, should not have allowed the opportunity to escape him to bear noble testimony to conscience, science, and the open truth, against this moribund papal Catholicism."

More conservative and less aggressive, but widely known and respected in Italy as a thoughtful scholar is Padre Giovanni Semeria of Genoa. His particular field of inquiry is the early history of Christianity and the origins of dogma. His work, he declares, is the result of a sincere effort to combine devoutness with critical inquiry. "If," he writes, "I have not always been sufficiently exact or profound, it is not because I am a believer,

²⁶ The New Age, June 2, 1910.

²⁷ Che cos' è la Bibbia?

²⁸ "La Bibbia modernista," in *La Voce*, April 21, 1910.

but because I am ignorant. If I have not succeeded in giving to my work a high moral tone, or spiritual warmth, it is not because I am a critic, but because of my moral deficiency, because I am not sufficiently good." In another connection he says that he is serving not merely an historical interest in the pursuit of his studies, but also a practical purpose, in so far as the results help to shake up that traditionalism which "still is too much in honor among us; were it respect for tradition it would be just and proper, but being worship of tradition it is false and noxious."

The scope of this article does not permit me to discuss in detail the work of other interesting leaders who are working and waiting for the dawn of a better day in Italy. Paolo Savi, a Barnabite like his friend Semeria, has gone to his long account. Giovanni Gennocchi was deposed by Leo XIII from his professorship in the Seminary at Rome, but his translation of the gospels is reported to have had a sale of more than three hundred thousand copies. Ernesto Buonaiuti, formerly professor of church history at Rome, was denounced and deposed in 1906 for his article, "*Filosofia dell' azione*," in Minocchi's *Religious Studies*. He is now editor of the *Historico-Critical Review of the Theological Sciences*,²⁹ one of the ablest Italian publications with friendly leanings toward modernism. Gennaro Avolio, the able editor of the *Battaglie d' oggi* of Naples, is working for the abolition of compulsory celibacy of the priesthood, and has founded an institution in aid of priests who renounce clerical orders. The reforms advocated by Avolio find their explanation in the serious indictment which many well-informed writers are bringing against the morality of the clergy in southern Italy.³⁰ Avolio has been excommunicated for his pains.

It would be easy to increase the list of names which have been mentioned here and elsewhere in the article. But no good purpose would be served by furnishing information about men who desire to do their work quietly until the wind sits in another quarter at the Vatican. The traditionalists who in the *Civiltà Cattolica* make merry over the "conspiracy of three or four rationalists" are destined some time to have a great surprise.

²⁹ *Rivista storico-critica delle scienze teologiche*, Rome, 1905-.

³⁰ Cf. Prezzolini, *op. cit.* p. 74.

I do not know on what data Paul Sabatier³¹ relies for his estimate that perhaps half of the younger clergy have already allied themselves with the modernist movement. But my observations and experiences in Italy lead me to think that it is not far from the truth. The social awakening of a large part of the clergy has aroused an uncommon amount of intellectual activity. What has been generally true of great religious movements, that reforms in doctrine originate in attempts to reform practice, may find a new illustration in Italy. But modernists will have to abandon their policy of advance and retreat, of making a courageous stand today and submitting again tomorrow, before they can win a large following among men who value truth above authority or comfort. A "domesticated modernism"—so Minocchi describes the attitude of those who have submitted—may buy peace at the expense of intellectual freedom, but will find that on those terms it is the peace of the dead, not of the living.

There is in Florence a group of independent thinkers to whom the late Professor William James once referred with warm appreciation. Their rallying-point is a remarkable Philosophical Library founded by an American woman. Under the auspices of its *Circolo di Filosofia* a notable convention met in Florence recently for the discussion of sexual problems. Courses of lectures by men of national reputation are provided annually. In 1908 the Italian philosopher Giovanni Papini delivered a lecture under the significant title, "The Religion of those who have left the Churches."³² The lecturer pointed out that according to the last census there are in Italy about two hundred thousand persons who have declared themselves adherents of no religion whatsoever.³³ This number, he averred, was but a small fraction of those who have actually left the churches. After enumerating the various elements that make up this large number, he comes to a class of persons "who have left the church, but not religion; all those who by the strong contrast between their inward aspira-

³¹ *Modernism* (Jowett Lectures), London, 1908; also an article with the same title in the *Contemporary Review*, March, 1908.

³² Cf. *Bollettino della biblioteca filosofica*, no. 2, January, 1909.

³³ *Censimento*, vol. iv, p. 330. Papini groups together those who refuse to declare themselves adherents of any religion and those who claim to be "without religion."

tions and the outward reality, between the spiritual church for which they have lived and fought and the Vatican, have been forced to leave the bosom of the sacred mother church, though they have remained intimately and profoundly religious." These, he thinks, will have to seek the satisfaction of their religious needs outside of the church.

Within the socialist camp, also, there are far-sighted men who are beginning to reassert the claims of religion, independently of Roman Catholicism. Referring to the essentially materialistic Italian socialism of today, one writes: "Humanity is now moving toward a state of spiritual concentration. . . . Socialism is closing its eyes to this irresistible fact of the present time, and is, therefore, as conservative in its way as the church. But truth is stronger than any argument based upon facts which the present has emptied of reality. It is time for socialism to realize that humanity in spite of everything, even in contravention, if necessary, of its material interests, will resistlessly take the way of the spirit. Men have abandoned the papal church in order to make the most of the recent splendid period of material progress, but now they feel the necessity of a return to religion. . . . Nevertheless we are not for a moment thinking of going to Canossa. . . . Let us take the initiative of a reform more radical [than that proposed by the modernists], and, in order to do that, let us begin by recognizing above all the value and reality of man's religious needs. Then men will follow us and not the modernists, who at heart are priests even more completely than the irreconcilable pope."²⁴

The actual place and prospects of Protestantism among these new tendencies challenge inquiry at this point. Many superficial students of modernism have seen in it a movement toward Protestantism. Not a few among Roman Catholics accuse modernists of being crypto-protestants. But it should be clearly recognized that modernism is neither a movement toward Protestantism, nor Protestantism in disguise. It is an independent movement, and has elements of originality and greatness which Protestants may profitably study. Minocchi's reply in the

²⁴ "Religione e socialismo," in *L' Idea Moderna*, April, 1910.

Coenobium,²⁵ denying the rumor that he was thinking of becoming a Protestant, describes the attitude of nearly all Italian modernists whom I know. "Not even in my dreams could I think of becoming a Protestant." The reason he gives, that Protestantism bases its conception of religion upon a static, and modernism upon a dynamic, foundation is completely true neither of the one nor of the other, both being engaged in the transition from a static to a dynamic basis. But the essential point is the fact that modernism is not a feeder of Protestantism.

Furthermore, Protestant denominations in Italy, so far as I have been able to observe, are not profiting by the wide-spread defection from Roman Catholicism. Whether this is because the alienated masses conceive Protestantism to stand for the same kind of mediaevalism from which they are reacting, or whether it is because of a tactless and ineffective propaganda, I am unable to say. Certain it is that the proportion of Protestants to Catholics in Italy is inconsiderable. According to the last census (1901) there were, in round numbers, of male inhabitants more than fifteen years old, 10,280,000 Roman Catholics, 26,000 Protestants, and 13,000 Jews. Considering that foreign residents and travellers are included among Protestants, their number is so small that it constitutes at present a negligible quantity among the social and religious forces of Italy.

The great outstanding fact of the present situation is the anticlerical movement which from various quarters is assailing Roman Catholicism. Socialism from without, and modernism from within, are weakening the absolutism and prestige of the Vatican. A canvass of the leading daily papers of Italy shows that more than half of them are anticlerical. Two of the oldest, *La Nazione* and *Corriere della Sera*, the former of Florence, the latter of Milan, have remained moderately conservative. But the very influential organ *Il Secolo*, over forty-five years old, and now the mouth-piece of the radical group of Lombardy, is strongly anticlerical. A number of very able reviews like the *Coenobium* and *Il Rinascimento* are disseminating the knowledge and influence of modernism throughout the peninsula. Both have been put upon the Index, but they are continuing on their way undeterred.

²⁵ *Coenobium*, 1909, no. 1, p. 150.

No one who has watched of late the horizon of Italy's agitated public life can fail to see that ominous clouds are gathering above the Vatican. Will some Benedetto, as in Fogazzaro's impressive night-scene, succeed in slipping past the cabal of cardinals to carry warning of the coming storm to one who is in truth a prisoner?

In order to help those who may wish to make a more detailed study of modernism and social movements in Italy, I subjoin a list of the more important books and pamphlets. A special effort has been made to ascertain the existence of English translations. Few such are actually known to me, but I have noted the cases in which they are reported to have been made. Various writings by Alfred Loisy and the late George Tyrrell, which frequently bear on conditions in Italy, have been mentioned in the article by Professor McGiffert on "Modernism and Catholicism" (*Harvard Theological Review*, January, 1910) and have, therefore, not been included in the following bibliography. My thanks are due to a number of Italian friends for valuable suggestions.

André, Tony, *Modernisme et modernistes en Italie*, Paris, 1908.

[Anonymous], *A Pio X: Quello che vogliamo: Lettera aperta di un gruppo di sacerdoti*, 1907 (translated into English: *To Pius X: What we Want: An Open Letter from a Group of Priests*, London, 1907). A rejoinder to the Papal Allocution of April 17, 1907.

[Anonymous], *Il programma dei modernisti: Risposta all' enciclica di Pio X, "Pascendi Dominici Gregis,"* Rome, 1907 (translated into English: *The Programme of Modernism*, London, 1908; German translation: *Programm der italienischen Modernisten*, Jena, 1908). A work of first importance.

[Anonymous], *Lettere di un prete modernista*, Rome, 1908. A remarkable book. Valuable for the light it throws on the social ideals of Italian modernism.

[Anonymous], "The Religious Conditions of Italy," *Quarterly Review*, October, 1902. Attributed to a Protestant pastor well known in Florence.

[Anonymous], *Una crisi d'anime nel cattolicesimo*, Florence, 1907 (translated into English: *A Soul-crisis in Catholicism*, London, 1908). A startling arraignment of official Catholicism by a group of modernist priests.

Bonomelli, G., *Il secolo che nasce* (translated into German: *Das neue Jahrhundert*, Munich, 1905). The author, who is the Bishop of Cremona, has written with evident appreciation of the modern social awakening in Italy. In his *Il culto religioso: difetti e abusi*, Cremona, 1905, he exposes superstitious forms of worship. Very useful is another of his

books, translated into German: *Religiös-soziale Tagesfragen*, Munich, 1906. In 1889 his book, *Roma, Italia, e la realtà delle cose*, was placed on the Index.

Fogazzaro, Antonio, *Il Santo*, Milan, 1906 (translated into English: *The Saint*, London, 1906; into German: *Der Heilige*, by Gagliardi, Munich and Leipzig, 1906). This much-discussed novel portrays the religious psychology of the awakened Italian laity.

Gentile, Giovanni, *Il modernismo e i rapporti tra religione e filosofia*, Bari, 1909. The author is professor of the history of philosophy in the University of Palermo, and editor of Giordano Bruno's *Dialoghi metafisici*.

Grille, Giovanni, *La renaissance religieuse dans l'Italie contemporaine*, Paris, 1907 (translated into English: London, 1908).

Holl, Karl, *Modernismus*, Tübingen, 1908. A brief general discussion of modernism.

Holtzmann, Heinrich, *Reformkatholisches aus Italien, Frankreich und England*, *Protestantische Monatshefte*, 1908, pp. 41-74, 171-174. Gives full references to literature.

Jordan, L. H., and Labanca, B., *The Study of Religion in the Italian Universities*, London and New York, 1909. Contains an excellent survey of the modernist movement in Italy.

Kübel, Johannes, *Geschichte des katholischen Modernismus*, Tübingen, 1909. One chapter is specially devoted to Italian modernism. Full references to German publications.

Labanca, B., "I cattolici modernisti e i cattolici tradizionalisti," in *Nuovo sillabo e l'ultima enciclica di Pio X*, Rome, 1907.

Labriola, Arturo, *Riforme e rivoluzione sociale*, 2d ed., Lugano, 1906. The author is one of the foremost radical leaders of Italian socialism.

Luzzi, Giovanni, "The Roman Catholic Church in Italy at the Present Hour," in *Hibbert Journal*, February, 1910. Written by a Waldensian pastor who is not in sympathy with the critical wing of Italian modernism.

Michels, Roberto, *Il proletariato e la borghesia nel movimento socialista italiano*, Turin, 1908. One of the most important recent books on Italian labor and social movements. The author is professor of sociology in the University of Turin.

Murri, Don Romolo, *La vita religiosa nel cristianesimo*, Rome, 1908;

La filosofia nuova e l'enciclica contro il modernismo, Rome, 1907.

La politica clericale e la democrazia, Rome, 1908. Murri is the foremost modernist reform leader in Italy. His chief interest is in social reform. An interesting record of the struggle in which he was engaged will be found in his *Battaglie d'oggi* (*Battles of Today*), 4 vols., Rome, 1901-04. The fourth volume is devoted almost entirely to the Christian Democracy movement in Italy.

Nitti, Francesco, *Il socialismo cattolico*, Turin, 1891 (translated into English: *Catholic Socialism*). The author is connected with the University of Naples. It is the leading book on the subject.

Prezzolini, Giuseppe, *Il cattolicesimo rosso*, Naples, 1908. Important for its keen and fearless discussion of needed reforms within Catholicism. The author, editor of the Florentine paper *La Voce*, is a man of philosophical training. Provides copious references to current literature on modernism. His bibliographical knowledge of the subject is probably unrivalled in the world. Declares himself a "non-cattolico." *I cattolici rossi*, 1909, by the same author. Discusses Newman, Tyrrell, von Hügel, Loisy, Blondel, Laberthonnière, Murri, and Fogazzaro.

Robertson, A., *The Roman Catholic Church in Italy*, London, 1903.

Sabatier, Paul, *Modernism* (The Jowett Lectures), London, 1908. Includes an estimate of conditions in Italy. See also an article with the same title in the *Contemporary Review*, March, 1908.

Salvadori, Count Guglielmo, "Die moderne religiöse Bewegung in Italien," in *Religion und Geisteswissenschaft*, 1908, iii, pp. 248-269. By a well-informed Protestant observer in Pisa.

Semeria, Giovanni, *Scienza e fede e il loro preteso conflitto*, Rome, 1903. *Venticinque anni di storia del cristianesimo nascente*, 1900. Semeria is one of the more conservative leaders of reform within Catholicism.

Thayer, William R., *Italica*, Boston, 1908. The two chapters, "Fogazzaro and his Masterpiece," and "Italy in 1907."

UNIVERSITY SETTLEMENTS IN GREAT BRITAIN.

PERCY ASHLEY

LONDON

A quarter of a century has now elapsed since the foundation of Toynbee Hall in the east of London inaugurated the "University Settlement" movement in the vast and then almost inchoate capital of the British Empire; and the present time seems therefore appropriate for an attempt to form some estimate of the past results and future possibilities of the movement, which soon spread to other towns of England and Scotland. Yet such an undertaking is beset with serious difficulties. Throughout the whole history of the settlements there is indeed apparent an essential identity of purpose, an underlying uniformity of motive; but the individual institutions have been the outcome of the action of various bodies of persons whose aims, as formally expressed, seem often very diverse; different groups have laid the main emphasis on different objects and methods, and what has been counted as triumphant success by one group has been deemed of relatively small importance by another. Further, the wide range of the activities of the settlements, the multifarious nature of their interests and work, render it practically impossible for any one observer to comprehend the whole in his single survey; and the selection which he must needs make tends almost inevitably to be determined, and it may be even unfairly biassed, by his own personal predilections. Within this narrower range, moreover, there is no certain standard by which to measure success or failure; the value of the work accomplished by a settlement is not to be judged solely, or even chiefly, by the statistics of its classes and clubs. If it has realized its objects, however imperfectly, it has exercised upon the surrounding community, in conjunction with all other institutions that in any way and by any means make for good, a subtle and permeating influence which has resulted in a progressive amelioration of social life; but, for

the very reason that this achievement is the result of a number of co-operating forces, the share of the settlement therein cannot be isolated or defined with any exactitude.

Nevertheless, in spite of these difficulties, it seems worth while to endeavor to indicate some of the lines upon which the University Settlements in the United Kingdom have worked, to furnish some examples of their activities, and, subject to the limitations set forth above, to attain to some definite appreciation of their achievements; and, that being done, to face the more difficult task of attempting to form some judgment as to the problems which now beset them, and the extent to which their modes of organization and action may require modification if their career of social usefulness is to be continued.

I

The University Settlement movement originated in London with the establishment of Toynbee Hall in 1885, and although, as already remarked, it subsequently spread to a number of other towns in England and Scotland, London has witnessed its fullest development and most varied manifestations, and has furnished the severest test of its utility in the service of the community.¹ The reasons for the concentration upon London of by far the greater part of the energy and enthusiasm thrown into the movement are fairly obvious. The metropolis offered the most tempting field for the investigator of economic conditions and social

¹ It may be useful to give in this place the dates of the foundation of some of the settlements. In London: Toynbee Hall, 1885; Oxford House, 1887, with connected women's settlements later; the Women's University Settlement, Southwark, 1887; Mansfield House, 1890 (a women's settlement was established in 1892); Bermondsey Settlement (men and women), 1891; Newman House, 1891; Chalfont House, 1891; Browning Hall, 1894; Cambridge House, 1897 (following on a series of missions, with clubs and other societies, established by various Cambridge colleges and some public schools); and the Passmore Edwards Settlement (a new form of an older institution), 1897. Outside London: Chalmers (University) Settlement, Edinburgh, 1887; New College Settlement, Edinburgh, 1889; University Students' Settlement, Glasgow, 1889; Manchester University Settlement (men's and women's houses), 1895; Victoria Women's Settlement, Liverpool, 1897; the Birmingham Women's Settlement, 1899. The above list does not profess to be exhaustive; there are numerous other settlements, of various types, alike in London and elsewhere.

relationships, for its problems, while similar in kind to those presented by other great towns of the United Kingdom, were infinitely more varied, and were complicated by certain factors peculiar to London itself. The vastness of its geographical extent; the consequent segregation of rich and poor, and the intensity of contrasts in social conditions; the drab monotony of life throughout great stretches, especially of the east and south; the unorganized condition of vast numbers of its workers and the economic evils resulting therefrom; the extent and gravity of its problems of ignorance and poverty, and the need for cautious study and intelligent leadership in their solution; the almost total absence of any communal feeling or municipal enthusiasm such as other English and Scotch cities knew—it was in the period before the creation of the London County Council, and when the local administration of the metropolis had reached perhaps its lowest level; and, finally, the admitted failure of the majority of the religious organizations to maintain any real hold upon the mass of the people—all these things made an especial appeal to the leaders of the new movement, who saw in London opportunities, so vast and varied and urgent as to be almost overwhelming, of useful labor for every worker whom they could enlist, whatever his political and religious creeds and whatever the nature of his ability.

The avowed aims and methods of the settlements seemed almost as varied as the problems with which they were intended to cope. In an essay included in the volume entitled *University and Social Settlements*, published in 1898, Canon Barnett defined the original causes of the settlement movement as being (1) “a distrust of machinery,” which led people to seek for some other way than that of institutions by which to reach their neighbors,” and to welcome the idea of a settlement “where they might live their own lives and also make friends among the poor”; (2) the “demand for more information,” inducing those who cared for social reform to live in the neighborhoods where the need for action seemed greatest, in order that they might acquire that accurate and detailed knowledge which can alone afford a sure basis for effective philanthropic and social work; and (3) “the growth of the human spirit,” and the revulsion against the old methods,

due to "the recognition that old forms of benevolence were often patronizing in character, that charities and missions often assumed a superiority in their supporters, and that sectarian philanthropy often developed party bitterness." Consequently its founders intended Toynbee Hall to be, what it has in fact remained throughout its history, a "club-house in Whitechapel occupied by men who do citizen's duty in the neighborhood," but are not bound by allegiance to any common political, social, or religious creed. In regard to none of the questions of the day was there to be a "Toynbee Hall policy"; the settlement as such did not undertake any definite line of social action, and still less did it propose to identify itself with any particular branch of religious work, or indeed, as a settlement, to engage in such work; so long as a resident was prepared to work side by side with others of different views, so long could he determine freely the line which his own personal activity should take.

In this attitude Toynbee Hall has, however, found few imitators. The Passmore Edwards Settlement (which is due to the efforts of Mrs. Humphry Ward) was a reconstruction of an earlier work undertaken by her in 1890, with the support of a group who "wished to create in the poorer parts of St. Pancras a new centre for the action of certain social forces; to test thereby—within a small sphere—the action upon life and within life of certain forms of religious thought; and they pledged themselves to forward an improved study of the Bible and of religious history and tradition in general." But seven years later, when the Settlement in its present form was established, the policy underwent a change; the new settlement, as such, took no religious side and deliberately abstained from any religious work; and it has on the whole avoided the formulation of anything like a "settlement policy" even in social matters.

Certain of the provincial settlements are characterized by the same indefiniteness (as, for example, the Manchester Art Museum and University Settlement); but practically all the London settlements other than those mentioned, and some of those in other towns, represent the desire of one or other of the great religious denominations to remove the reproach which a generation ago was very generally levelled—and with some measure of justice

—against the churches, that the indifference of the masses of the workers was due in large measure to the failure of the churches to enter sufficiently into the daily life of the people and (save by an often indiscriminate charity) to alleviate the dull monotony of their existence or to aid in the solution of the pressing economic and social problems of modern life. The work of the settlement which comes next after Toynbee Hall in order of time—Oxford House—was the first manifestation of this revival of what may be described as home-missionary zeal, and may be added to the list of causes indicated by Canon Barnett; it was definitely associated with a particular Church of England parish, and was commenced “in order that Oxford men may take part in the social and religious work of the Church in East London; that they may learn something of the life of the poor; may try to better the conditions of the working classes as regards health and recreation, mental culture and spiritual teaching; and may offer an example, as far as in them lies, of a simple and religious life.” Oxford House was rapidly followed by similar institutions, each supported mainly by a particular religious denomination, such as Mansfield House (Congregational), the Bermondsey Settlement (Wesleyan), Browning Hall (Congregational), and Cambridge House (Church of England)—to mention only a few conspicuous examples; and in some the definitely religious basis of the work was even more pronounced than in the case even of Oxford House. The warden of the Bermondsey Settlement (Dr. J. Scott Lidgett) writes in a recent annual report:—

Mankind is saved, however, not merely or so much by practical work as by the ideals which are embodied in it. Unless a many-sided work is inspired and organized by such ideals, it is liable to suffer by confusion and distraction. What then are the ideals which give unity to our Settlement work? In the first place, the belief that true religion exists to transform all social life, and to direct every human faculty to its true goal and satisfaction. In the next place, the conviction that the supreme ends of Christianity and progress can only be carried out by seeking to rise above the differences of denominations or parties and to establish the wider comradeship of all who deeply care for the higher interests of the people. And, lastly, the recognition that the supremacy of the divine law of service is the only remedy for all forms of selfishness, with its inevitable hatred and class warfare.

Browning Hall, which, owing to the energy and devotion of its warden (Rev. F. Herbert Stead), has developed from an unimportant Congregational church into a settlement with far-reaching activities, has taken an even more distinctive attitude. "We stand," its warden wrote, "for the Labor Movement in religion. We stand for the endeavor to obtain for Labor not merely more of the good things in life, but most of the best things in life." In connection with this settlement, as with the Bermondsey Settlement, active evangelical work is a conspicuous feature.³

Cambridge House, in South London, was the result of a desire expressed by some of the high authorities of the Church of England for the establishment there of a university centre where laymen could live in order to assist the clergy of the various missions founded by Cambridge colleges and certain public schools in that district—which has been described as the largest area of unbroken poverty in the world; the assistance being chiefly in the formation and conduct of clubs and societies of divers kinds. Thus Cambridge House, while not itself engaged in religious work in the strict sense of the term, is a kind of lay centre and guide for the social work of a number of Church missions, and the connection between the two branches of the latter's work is very close.

Several of the settlements have departments for women workers, either under the same control as or working in co-operation with the men's departments, and almost all make use of the services of women helpers in one way or another. But there are also a number of independent women's settlements; and it is noteworthy that in most of these emphasis is laid upon systematic training for social work. Certainly in the case of the residents in and workers at the men's settlements the educative effect of the work is very considerable, but it is to a large extent

³ The "institutional churches," as they are called,—the most conspicuous examples in London being Claremont and the Whitefield Tabernacle,—are carrying on work which in many respects closely resembles that of the settlements. They are churches around which have been built up a number of clubs and other societies for men, women, and children, the church remaining the centre and main-spring of the whole work. The tendency of such a church, as its work expands, to develop into something very akin to a regular settlement is exemplified by the history of Browning Hall; Claremont appears to be moving in the same direction.

unconscious; in the case of the women's settlements, doubtless because a much larger proportion of the residents intend to devote their whole time to social work, either voluntarily or as a profession, opportunities are afforded for organized training. The earliest independent women's settlement—the Women's University Settlement, Southwark—was founded “(a) to promote the welfare of the poorer people of the districts of London and especially of the women and children, by devising and promoting schemes which tend to elevate them physically, intellectually, or morally and by giving them additional opportunities for education and recreation; and (b) to maintain a house or houses for the residence of women engaged in or connected with philanthropic or educational work in the districts aforesaid”; and in connection with it there was early inaugurated a scheme of training, which has recently been combined with the work of the London School of Sociology. The Birmingham Women's Settlement, formed in 1899, definitely stated as its primary object the creation of “a centre for resident and non-resident workers for systematic study with reference to social work and industrial conditions.” In this case, as also in that of the Victoria Settlement for Women at Liverpool, the courses of study have recently been placed upon a more stable footing as a result of the co-operation of the authorities of the Universities of Birmingham and Liverpool respectively.³

It will be apparent from what has already been said that, taking the movement as a whole, the predominant tendency has been for the settlements to engage, to a greater or smaller extent, in active religious work. The nature of that work is necessarily affected by the particular beliefs characteristic of the denomination with which any given settlement is mainly associated; but, for a number of obvious reasons, the stamp of denominationalism tends to be less conspicuous in the case of those settlements which are non-conformist in origin than in the case of those which have

³ It is perhaps desirable to point out again that the present article does not profess to attempt a complete or detailed survey—such an attempt would require a volume. It is not possible to notice here all the various forms of settlements, and the omission of individual institutions or even of classes (such as the numerous small religious settlements of ladies working under ecclesiastical guidance) must not be taken to imply any failure to appreciate the value of their work.

been established under Church of England auspices and are (as Oxford House) regarded as social training schools for future clergy. It might be supposed that the mere fact of the religious work would repel many of those whom the settlements were intended to benefit, more particularly when the work took something of a denominational aspect; but experience points strongly in the opposite direction. In the first place, the settlements have rarely endeavored to make participation in their religious life a condition of admission to the social advantages which they offer; they have contented themselves with giving opportunities and examples.⁴ Secondly, while it is true that association with a particular denomination probably tends to produce uniformity of type among those connected with any given institution, since the appeal for workers is made primarily to the denomination, and minds which share common beliefs in matters of religion and church organization will probably think alike on other questions also; yet there cannot be any doubt that what the work may lose in breadth of outlook it will as a rule more than recover in intensity. There is ample room for both classes of settlements—those with and those without a common religious basis and ideal; both can find abundant opportunities for useful labor; but to the present writer it appears certain that those whose workers draw their inspiration from a common religious creed (whatever it be) and find in it their guide in social work, are likely to exercise, not perhaps the widest, but certainly the deepest and most lasting influence. Settlements, if their work is to be enduring, must deal with the individual man and woman, as well as with mankind in the mass; the individual needs a faith, and to the ordinary man codes of morality or ethical teaching do not offer sufficient inspiration.

⁴The present Bishop of London, who achieved great success as the head of Oxford House, wrote: "On Sunday, have a Bible-class connected with the (boys') club; but if you take my advice, you will not make attendance at it a test for coming to the club. . . . I doubt the expediency of the test club, unless your rooms are so small that you can only take a small number, and definitely prefer to pick the boys who wish at once to be religious." And of men's clubs: "Here again, you must at once make up your mind whether you are going to cater for Jacob and Esau; if for Jacob, then make any rules you like; there ought not to be the slightest difficulty in working a quiet club for your church working-men. . . . The clubs I speak of are for Esau, and as a first step to making him religious, have no religious test."

One other conspicuous fact in connection with the London settlements is the absence of any central association for the discussion of the various problems encountered in the course of their work, or to serve as a clearing-house for ideas. An attempt was made to form such an association some ten years ago, but the result was only short-lived; and no effort seems to have been made to resuscitate it. The reasons of the failure are not very clear; and at a time like the present, when all the settlements are beset by a number of similar questions clamoring for solution, the absence of any arrangements for joint discussion would seem to be a distinct source of weakness. Some eight or nine years ago a Conference of Northern Settlements was formed under the leadership of the Manchester University Settlement; but that also languished, and though an attempt is now being made to revive it, its organization is so far very informal and undeveloped.

II

Turning now to a general survey of the principal branches of the settlements' activities, the first of these, *religious work*, may be dismissed briefly, not because it is slight or of small importance—sufficient has already been said to indicate that the very contrary is the case; but in its general lines it does not differ very appreciably from that carried on by other religious institutions of narrower scope, and the depth and breadth of the influence exercised by the settlements in this regard is peculiarly difficult to estimate. The variety of the creeds represented, and the impossibility of gauging in casual visits the strength and vigor of the spiritual life of the various settlements, would render it presumptuous for any single observer to offer a detailed judgment or criticism. Nevertheless it may be remarked that in all the references to this matter which are contained in the annual reports of the settlements there is the same note of success and optimism; and that this feeling is justified is beyond doubt. Amid so much work it would be invidious to single out particular examples; but attention may be directed to one recent event, because it seems to the present writer to possess especial significance. In May of the year 1910 there was held at Browning Hall a "Labor

Week"—that is to say, a special mission at which all the speakers were recognized leaders of the labor movement, several among them being labor members of Parliament. In several of the addresses emphasis was laid on the change which in recent years has come over the relations between the churches as organizations and the mass of the workers; the old feeling of estrangement (which was, however, probably never so great as it was represented to be) is passing away. One speaker, Mr. Arthur Henderson, M.P., a former chairman of the Labor Party, could declare his conviction that "happily there never was a time when organized Christianity was seeking as now to know exactly the mind of the mass of the people, and to apply the Master's teaching to the betterment of society"; while another, with a wide experience of London and her poor, affirmed that in his belief "in front of the Christian churches is the most glorious time they have ever experienced. At no time before have men longed for the message as they are longing for it today." Even when allowance be made for the strong personal leanings of the speakers, these utterances do represent substantial truth; and the fact is of vital importance for the future of social reform. It would be idle to claim for the settlements all the credit; they are only one of the agencies which have brought about the change in the outlook both of churches and people; but it may safely be asserted that they have contributed potently, partly by the practical demonstration which they have afforded of the application of religious principles in the solution of social problems, and partly by the training and experience which they have afforded to those who were destined to become priests and pastors and their consequent reaction upon the churches from which they draw their support.

Recreative. The central and dominant idea in the work of the settlements in the provision and organization of recreation has been that of the Club, for men, women, boys, or girls; and the general policy adopted has been to give the clubs so formed, especially those for men and boys, the fullest possible autonomy, subject of course to the ultimate control of the settlement authorities. Two extracts from recent reports will illustrate this. Oxford and Cambridge Houses are each the centre of a Federation of Working Men's Social Clubs, which are non-political and non-

alcoholic, and impose no religious test on their members. In a report on the clubs contained in a recent number of the *Cambridge House Magazine* there occurs the following passage:—

One of the most interesting features of the year's work has been the success of two clubs which had re-constituted themselves on independent lines. These clubs are now entirely responsible for their own finances and management; and the keen interest which the members take in the affairs of their clubs and the excellent way in which those offices are conducted, are strong arguments in favor of the proposition (which is by no means universally held) that independent clubs are generally the healthiest and most efficient, and that the object to be aimed at by the promoters of such clubs as ours should be to render the members capable of managing their own affairs, and then to allow them to do so. This is particularly so with regard to finance; if members have to find the money for carrying on the various activities of the club, they take care to see that it is spent in a way they approve of, and are thus led to take a keen interest in the management of the affairs of the club.

With regard to boys' clubs, where the necessity for financial support and some measure of control from outside is clearly much greater, the following statement of policy appears in the Mansfield House Report for 1909:—

The aim of a Boys' Club, as we understood it, is to supply means for the development of the character of the members on a side which is scarcely touched by the training provided by the state or municipality; the Club should, if it realized its ideal, be a practice-ground in the duties of citizenship. In some directions, at any rate, the sense of unity—the *esprit de corps*—which is rarely planted in a boy at the ordinary elementary school, ought to be taught in a well-organized club, and, arising out of this, the idea of collective responsibility of all members, not only to one another but to the outside public, should be trained up; above all, the Club should offer many chances for developing on right lines the powers of leadership which exist in a fair proportion of boys, and which, if undirected, may quickly result in far-reaching evil.

The provision of opportunities for social meeting and recreation under healthy and comfortable conditions is of tremendous importance in the densely crowded cities, and this fact had long been recognized in England, though many of the clubs formed to meet the needs of the men were not of a desirable kind. In this

regard the settlements have shown little originality;⁶ all they have done is to endeavor to give to the clubs which they have formed a higher tone and to bring them into close touch with the other branches of the settlements' work. Their work has in this respect been decidedly successful on the whole—Cambridge House is the centre of fifteen associated clubs, Oxford House has several, and most of the other settlements have strong clubs connected with them—though the competition of the numerous local political clubs has to some extent checked their development. But in regard to boys' clubs the work of the settlements has been far more distinctive. All the men's settlements have been much occupied with the question of the town boy; all have formed clubs—in some instances, as at Oxford House, it has been found desirable to have different clubs for boys of different grades; and are contributing substantially to the solution of one of the most difficult of social problems—that of the city boy who at the time when he is most impressionable goes from the discipline of the elementary school to make his way in life amid conditions which often, if not positively evil, are at least unfavorable to the formation of sound character. The provision of opportunities for healthy recreation—not only in the clubs proper, but in the cricket, football, swimming, and other outdoor clubs, summer camps, and cadet corps of various kinds connected therewith—together with some amount of discipline and moral influence, is of incalculable importance; and, although progress is necessarily slow, the efforts made have already yielded substantial results. Nor is this all: the workers in the boys' clubs have opportunities of becoming acquainted with the actual conditions of boy life and labor, which not only enable them to advise and guide individual boys, and in some instances to secure apprenticeships for them, but places at the disposal of the State expert knowledge—the value of which is at last being realized—in the effort to deal comprehensively with the problems of industrial training and the wise utilization of the yearly supplies of boy workers, with a view to the de-

⁶ The Working Men's Club and Institute Union, a very large federation of independent and self-supporting clubs in London and the provincial towns, has done valuable work in this direction, but its objects have been almost purely recreative.

casualization of labor and the reduction of the number of the unskilled.⁶ A writer in a recent number of the *Toynbee Record* thus sums up the results of the efforts made:—

Working lads' clubs have been in existence in London for many years. We are therefore in a position to see the results. Our boys are in all parts of the world, many in excellent positions both abroad and in London. We have trained up generations sprung from the poorest of the poor, who are now self-supporting, self-respecting, and useful citizens of the Empire. We hold that our work among lads is tending to stop eleemosynary relief in the future. It is largely preventive work. We see that our lads are apprenticed to good trades, we find them jobs with good masters, we advise them in all their difficulties, and we turn out useful men.

In the case of the numerous clubs for women and girls the lines of work are necessarily somewhat different. In particular the measure of autonomy accorded to the men's and boys' clubs is seldom practicable. The clubs for women take very generally the form of "women's meetings" held in the week-day afternoons, and having in connection therewith thrift societies, clothing societies, and similar associations. In some instances, however, there are club rooms for women which are open almost every evening; and this is generally so with the girls' clubs, whose primary purpose is much the same as that of the boys' clubs—the provision of opportunities for recreation free from the perils which beset girls in other places of amusement, but which feel also the imperative necessity of taking every possible step to promote by gymnasia, medical aid, country holidays, etc., the physical well-being of the girls, the conditions of whose life and work in factories and shops are so often inimical to the future of the race. In these respects much has been accomplished, but there is room, as with the boys' clubs, for almost infinite expansion.

Educational Work. One of the principal objects of the settlements in their early days was the supply of educational facilities—both in conjunction with the University Extension Societies and by the establishment of independent classes and courses of

⁶ The formation of Advisory Committees on Juvenile Employment in connection with the new national system of Labor Exchanges is an important development which should afford many opportunities for the use of the knowledge and experience so acquired.

study; and educational work is still an important branch of their activities. Thus in the winter term of 1909-10 there were at Toynbee Hall courses of lectures or classes in such subjects as "The Evolution of British Society," "Napoleon the Great and his Times," nature study, Bible history, French, German, Italian, and English Literature, Shakspeare, economics, German, French, and Esperanto, physiology, singing, and home nursing; the Bermondsey Settlement has classes in bookkeeping, shorthand, typewriting, arithmetic, German, French, Latin, Greek, English grammar and composition, art-needlework, music, photography, dressmaking, and ambulance work, and had recently University Extension courses on such subjects as Shakspeare, and the architecture and history of London; and at other settlements, where the educational work is less extensive and varied, there are classes and courses of lectures (University Extension and others), and libraries for the use of their students and club members. Practically all the settlements have series of popular lectures on various subjects through the winter months, on Saturday or Sunday evenings; some, as the Passmore Edwards Settlement, pay especial attention to music, by the formation of choral and orchestral societies and the regular provision of good concerts, for which experience shows that there is a real demand; and all have around them societies for the study (less formal than in classes) of literature, economics, history, science, and art; while in a few cases co-operative holiday societies have been formed for continental travel. Regular debates are another important part of the educational work (the Manchester University Settlement has the unusual feature of a debating society for women). Finally, in this connection mention should be made of the Art Exhibitions arranged for a number of years at Toynbee Hall by Canon Barnett, which led finally to the erection of the White-chapel Municipal Art Gallery with its annual exhibitions; the similar exhibitions which have been organized from time to time by other settlements; and the "Manchester Art Museum," not to be confounded with the municipal Art Gallery, founded in 1877 and incorporated with the University Settlement in 1901.

In regard to educational work generally, it must be pointed out that the position has undergone marked changes for the better

since the inauguration of the settlement movement. The great developments of technical education since the enactment of the law of 1889; the provision of evening continuation and higher grade schools by the educational authorities; the improvement of the curricula; the growth of the polytechnics; the spread of public libraries—have all contributed to render unnecessary much of the work in this direction which the settlements originally had in view. The following extract from a recent annual report of Toynbee Hall illustrates this:—

The direct educational work of Toynbee Hall . . . claims less of the time and thought of present-day Residents than of their predecessors, but the various classes and lectures have been on the whole very well attended, and are stamped with an individuality which could not be mechanically reproduced elsewhere. This is largely due to the *esprit de corps* of the students, springing from the sense of co-partnership which is characteristic of all the best work of the Settlement. . . . Contrasting the present educational work of the Settlement with that of earlier years, one must feel that the pioneer work then undertaken has given way to greater and more systematic efforts on the part of the community. Such classes as were formerly held are no longer needed to the same extent within the buildings of Toynbee Hall itself.

But there remains much valuable work for the settlements to do, as the warden of the Bermondsey Settlement has pointed out, both in providing systematic courses for those who on account of age or other reasons would find the conditions in the evening schools established by the educational authorities somewhat irksome, and in providing those opportunities for cultural recreation to which reference has been made above; and also in stimulating in their surrounding neighborhoods "a deeper and more widespread desire for education in the broadest sense."⁷ It is hoped that the settlements may perform a useful service in assisting in the work of the newly formed Workers' Educational Association, which aims at bringing about (with the co-operation of the trade unions) a closer relation between the universities and work-

⁷ It is right to mention here the valuable educational work done by such other institutions as the Working Men's College, which led the way in the higher education of the working classes, the older Polytechnics, the Morley Memorial College, the People's Palace, and the University Extension Societies.

ing-men than has hitherto been attained and lays emphasis on tutorial and class work rather than on lectures.

Educational Work among Children. One branch of educational work which is of very great importance is that among children; and to the development of this the settlements have contributed largely. Their efforts have been directed mainly to (a) attempts to deal with special classes of children with which the education authorities were, or are still, unable to cope; (b) the organization of vacation schools; (c) the provision of organized recreation.

(a) Experiments in dealing with children who are seriously crippled, and for whom therefore transport to and from school and special attention during the hours of attendance are necessary, had been made by the Women's University Settlement, Southwark, and the Victoria Settlement, Liverpool; but the first fully equipped day school was established in connection with the Passmore Edwards Settlement in 1899, the education authority (then the London School Board) providing the trained teachers and school equipment, and the settlement undertaking to supply the necessary rooms and playground, to appoint and pay a nurse, to maintain a special ambulance for the conveyance of the children, and to arrange for dinners at a very small charge and a staff of voluntary helpers to assist during the dinner interval. The school speedily showed its value in the physical and mental progress of the children who came under its care; and the example thus set was speedily followed by private effort and by the public authorities in various parts of the country until it became an integral part of the national system (the powers of the education authorities in this regard having been enlarged).

(b) The vacation schools for children are so well known in the United States that it is unnecessary to describe them in this place. It will suffice to say that the first step in the direction of their establishment in the United Kingdom was taken by Mrs. Humphry Ward in conjunction with the Passmore Edwards Settlement in 1902. The attempt met with marked success; and the work has grown until in 1909 there were in London two large vacation schools, an organized playground (on the plan adopted by the Playground Association of America), and a small experimental school for especially "delicate and necessitous children." Similar

work is also being done elsewhere (for example, by Browning Hall and the Victoria Settlement at Liverpool); its moral and physical results are so beneficent that its extension is greatly to be desired, and it may be hoped that before long the public authorities will unite with private enterprise for its rapid extension.

(c) The belief that recreation, if properly guided, can exercise a powerful influence in the formation of character (a belief for which the experience of the settlements provides abundant justification), has found expression also in the provision and teaching of organized recreation for children. The most elaborate development has taken place out of the Children's Recreation School started, also by Mrs. Humphry Ward, at the Passmore Edwards Settlement in 1897: the school is now open five days a week for an hour and a quarter in the early evening, and also on Saturday mornings. Teaching is provided in numerous handwork occupations, and in combined games. The success of the work led to the formation in 1904 of a committee to develop similar schools elsewhere in the poorest and most crowded parts of London; and in the opening months of 1910 there were thirteen other centres controlled by the committee and working generally on the lines originally laid down at the Passmore Edwards Settlement. The work is carried on with the co-operation of the education authority for London (the County Council); it has been imitated elsewhere (for instance, by the authorities of the Jews' Free School in Whitechapel and of the People's Palace), and there are signs of further development. Here again a settlement provided a useful experimental ground.

Less elaborate efforts having the same general character and aims have been made by the Guilds of Play and other institutions for children which exist in connection with a number of settlements; in these less attention is paid to classes than to organized games.³ One feature of especial interest has been the attempts to revive the English dances, and festivals such as that of the May Queen. The somewhat unfortunately named "Guild of the Brave Poor Things," an organization which originated at the Bermondsey

³ Most useful work of this kind has also been done on a large scale by the Children's Happy Evenings Association.

Settlement, has met with a large measure of success in the effort to bring some light and color and interest into the dull and starved lives of the crippled children.

Public Service. We pass next to a class of activities which for want of a better term may conveniently be grouped under the general head of "Public Service," including thereunder both direct participation in the work of the various local authorities and services which are a substitute for, or an extension of, that work in various fields of administration. The general scope and nature of settlement action in this respect is indicated in the following extract from a recent Report of the Warden of the Bermondsey Settlement:—

The general tendency in the present day is to increase the functions of local authorities, and to call upon them to discharge duties which concern most clearly the moral, mental, and physical well-being of the community. The ground thus being occupied by local authorities will profoundly affect in the near future the conditions of charitable enterprise. It becomes more than ever important to secure co-operation between public authorities and bodies of well-equipped voluntary workers. In the poorer districts such agencies as Settlements are absolutely necessary if such voluntary co-operation is to be forthcoming. At a hundred points the Public Health, Education, and Poor Law authorities need the assistance of such workers, if their best schemes are to succeed and if Acts of Parliament which affect the condition of the people are to be made effective. The same necessity exists in the case of the general philanthropies of the community. . . . All such work, while distinctly civic in its nature, cannot possibly be provided either by the State or by political parties. It can only be secured by the appeals which a Settlement makes to educated and leisured men and women to undertake heavy and often thankless tasks for the love of their fellows.

(a) *Membership of Local Authorities.* The fundamental idea underlying the British system of local administration is that there will be available a constant stream of citizens sufficiently public-spirited to undertake onerous work on the local councils without remuneration and without any idea of personal gain; and that this leisured and relatively well-to-do class will also be educated and intelligent enough to grasp the complex problems of administration. This class can generally be found in the towns outside London; it can be found in some parts of London; but there are

also great areas of London which are inhabited almost solely by a population of whom the vast majority live under economic conditions which make life a perpetual struggle for existence, with scanty leisure. In such areas there is serious danger, as the experience of London has shown, that a considerable proportion of the members of the local councils will be drawn from classes (the small house-property owners, contractors, licensed victuallers, etc.) whose control of local administration is undesirable, or at best that the outlook of the councillors will be narrow and their knowledge limited, with the result that either they will plunge into reckless outlay or confound parsimony with administrative efficiency. The settlements have the opportunity of bringing into a neighborhood and placing at its disposal workers who are educated, disinterested, and independent; and though it must always be difficult for them to provide anything more than a small proportion of the members of local councils and committees (elected or other), they can set an example of civic enthusiasm and service. The difficulty of course is that membership of local authorities involves a longer stay at the settlement than is possible for most residents; some time is required for the resident to become sufficiently well-known locally for him to stand a chance of election, and then it is idle for him to be nominated unless he is prepared to serve his full term (three years); so that the tendency is rather for work on local councils to be left to the permanent staffs of the settlements (the wardens and assistant-wardens, where the latter exist, and the professional or quasi-professional social workers in the case of the women's settlements). In the case of the non-elected bodies (that is, those nominated by local authorities for various purposes, mainly connected with education and poor relief) it is of course easier for non-residents to serve; and so, apart from actual residents, the settlements can be of great use in bringing outside workers into the service of a neighborhood. In both ways they have done much. Thus the Bermondsey Settlement was recently represented on the London County Council (its warden having been co-opted an alderman of that body), the Bermondsey Borough Council and Board of Guardians, local Boards of School Managers, and Children's Care Committees; while in the report of Toynbee

Hall for 1908-09 it is remarked that "we have seldom or never had so many of our members engaged in public work—one as a county councillor, two as borough councillors, one as a guardian, and two as members of the Central Unemployed Body, while the important but neglected office of school manager has been filled by eight residents, rather fewer than in former years. A number of residents and associates have also taken part in carrying out the duties of the Children's Care Committees." The Browning Hall Settlement has given a mayor to Southwark, and a number of borough councillors and members of the Board of Guardians; the Mansfield House Settlement has given a deputy-mayor to Canning Town and has also provided councillors and guardians; the head of Cambridge House is chairman of the Camberwell Borough Council Distress Committee, and the House is represented on the local Board of Guardians and among the managers of local schools; and practically all the settlements in London have furnished members for various councils, boards, and committees of the kind indicated.

It is of course difficult for settlements to avoid, under such circumstances as prevail in London, the appearance of taking sides with one or other of the local parties, and such a position is especially undesirable where, as generally happens, parties in local affairs tend to be identical with national political parties. Fortunately, however, in London there is a large part of the electorate which does not consider that its allegiance in national politics necessarily involves loyalty to the same party in London civic questions; settlement candidates of divergent political views often appear on the same municipal platform; and without taking sides the settlements can do much to influence the elections by themselves providing, and impressing on the electors the necessity of seeking, a higher type of candidate than that which frequently offers.

(b) *Councils of Public Welfare.* One development of considerable importance in recent years has been in the direction of the formation of Councils of Public Welfare, which aim at co-ordinating local charitable enterprise, at directing attention to defects of local administration and other evils which require local or State action, and at influencing public opinion towards reform.

Toynbee Hall is the centre for such a council for Stepney, which works through an industrial law committee, striving for a better enforcement of the Factory Acts, a public health committee, a social studies committee, and a public bodies committee—the last named “having the difficult task of following the doings of the various local authorities, with a view to stimulating their action in the direction of public welfare, and guarding against triumphs of private interest over the common good.” Oxford House has promoted a similar association, which has recently devoted much attention to a campaign against Sunday trading, and to preparing those engaged in the box-making trade for the working of the Trade Boards Act of 1909, the purpose of which is the establishment of a minimum wage. Mansfield House has a Civic Union, whose objects are of the same general character, though membership is practically, but not intentionally, limited to those who are associated with that particular institution.

(c) *Public Health.* The interests of the settlements in the work of promoting public health are very numerous and varied, and it is only possible to enumerate them briefly. One of the most valuable pieces of work is the provision for instruction in the care of infant children; the most elaborate example of this is the St. Pancras School for Mothers, in which the Passmore Edwards Settlement has taken active interest, but somewhat similar institutions exist in connection with the Southwark Women's Settlement, the Birmingham Women's Settlement, and the Bermondsey Settlement. For the care of the sick Browning Hall has a large and successful medical mission; the Manchester Settlement has given much attention to work among physically defective children; the Bermondsey Settlement has organized a district nursing society, with a professional nursing staff; Cambridge House has a health society which is waging war against the spread of tuberculosis; the Southwark Women's Settlement has a health society for home visiting and advice; the Victoria Settlement at Liverpool is closely connected with the district-nursing association; and in general this is a matter to which practically all the women's settlements, or those which have women's departments, devote much attention. The settlements also take an active part in the work of the Invalid Children's Aid Associa-

tion, and the Children's Country Holiday Fund, which sends large numbers of town children away every year; and a new sphere of activity for them has been opened up by the establishment of the system of School Care Committees, which are intended to be "the centre of all work which affects the physical welfare and the future career of the children." The committees are to interest themselves in the general welfare of the children in the public elementary schools; "to endeavor to induce parents to obtain the advice and treatment recommended in the medical report book of the school, and to confer with the school nurses; to determine what children are necessitous," and therefore entitled to be fed out of funds raised by local voluntary contributions or supplied by the education authority; and "to advise and help parents in connection with the after-employment of children." The bulk of the work is evidently connected with public health administration; for it to be done thoroughly an army of workers will be required; the settlements have provided a considerable number, but the supply is at present still very insufficient.

Other manifestations of the practical interest of the settlements in the promotion of public health are the public baths established and maintained by Oxford House and the Claremont Mission; the provision for physical culture by means of gymnasias; the *crèches* for the children of working mothers conducted in connection with Claremont and other settlements; and the attempts to encourage the cultivation of small gardens. In this connection it may be mentioned that Browning Hall has taken an active part in the agitation for the provision of cheap and rapid transit as the best means of relieving the congestion of population in London and so contributing to the solution of the housing problem.

(d) *The Prevention and Relief of Destitution.* Scarcely any of the settlements engage to any appreciable extent in the distribution of charitable relief, but in other ways they have taken an active part in the campaign against destitution. Several of them have formed employment and apprenticeship bureaus, for the purpose of advising parents as to the choice of occupations for their boys and girls on leaving school, and to assist them in finding places, with a view especially to checking that recourse to

unskilled occupations which is so fruitful a cause of poverty. Successful work of this kind has been done by the Southwark Women's Settlement, the Victoria Settlement at Liverpool, the Birmingham Women's Settlement, and in connection with the boys' clubs of other settlements, and though the work has so far been on a very limited scale, it has resulted in the acquisition of knowledge and experience which should be of substantial use, now that the matter has been taken up by the State as part of the work of the Labor Exchanges and advisory committees therefor are being formed. In the case of physically defective children it is of course essential, if any lasting good is to be accomplished, that they should be given the opportunity of becoming independent (if only partially so) of the support of relatives and friends; much attention has therefore been given to their training in various handicrafts, and this branch of preventive work is capable of very great expansion. In this connection, and as illustrations only, reference may be made to the craft schools established by the Guild of the Brave Poor Things, to the St. Crispin's workshop at Southwark, now controlled by Cambridge House and the Southwark Women's Settlement, in which crippled boys, duly apprenticed, are trained in bootmaking, and the schemes for "after-training" which have been framed for the children dealt with by the "special schools."

Attention has already been drawn to the fact that officers and residents of a number of settlements have served on the various authorities established to deal with the unemployed, and the small success of these bodies is due not to the quality of their members but to the inherent difficulties of the problem with which they have been called upon to cope. Other lines of action have been the promotion of thrift societies and penny banks, work in connection with the provision of meals for school children (which is now coming to be a state undertaking, but for which much voluntary assistance, in respect of investigation, etc., will still be required), the supply of workers to the numerous local charitable and philanthropic agencies, and attempts at the co-ordination of charitable effort by the establishment of systems of registration (clearing-houses of relieved cases). Mansfield House has a lodging-house for men, while Browning Hall, which has long been associated

with an active agitation in favor of a national system of old-age pensions, and claims to have had a large share in bringing about its recent institution, has the peculiar distinction of having established, for some of the aged of its districts, a group of cottage homes in the heart of the country.

(e) *The "Poor Man's Lawyer."* Finally, attention may be drawn to one of the most striking developments of settlement activity, the provision of free legal advice to the poor. The system, originally established in the East London settlements, has spread with marked rapidity until it has become a normal and integral part of the work of almost every settlement. It is evident that the ignorance of the poor, even more than their lack of means, renders them frequently unable to protect themselves against the acts of unscrupulous landlords or employers; while on the other hand there is abundant evidence of a natural disposition to "go to law" with one's neighbor on the flimsiest pretext. There is abundant scope for the "poor man's lawyer," who usually limits himself to giving advice, and takes up cases where the lack of means is extreme and the hardship very pronounced, though even with these limitations the amount of useful work accomplished is very great. It is of positive utility, for a legally worded letter which the complainant is helped to write will often secure the attention hitherto refused, or the lawyer may be able to serve as a conciliator between parties (notably in the case of family disputes); and it is of negative utility, for it often discourages applicants from wasting their time and trouble in the pursuit of frivolous or hopeless claims. As examples of the extent of the work (which, it must be remembered, is carried on voluntarily by skilled lawyers), it may be stated that the Legal Department of the Manchester University Settlement dealt in 1908-09 with 2,189 cases, and Mansfield House with 2,154 cases in the same year. These are the highest totals recorded, but nearly all the other settlements show large figures: disputes between employer and employed (especially in regard to compensation for accidents and wrongful dismissal), landlord and tenant (the institution connected with Toynbee Hall bears the significant name of the "East London Tenant's and General Legal Protection Committee"), and husband and wife contribute a very large proportion

of the cases. It is particularly satisfactory to note that the importance and value of the system has received general recognition, as instanced by the invitations sent to some of the more experienced workers in this department to give evidence before the Royal Commission on the Divorce Laws, and the fact that the authorities of the solicitors' profession have co-operated in placing the work at Manchester, and more especially its recent establishment at Liverpool, on a sound basis, while naturally safeguarding the interests of the profession by taking steps to limit gratuitous advice to those who really cannot afford to pay for it.

III

The above rapid survey, imperfect though it is (for many isolated pieces of work of great interest have necessarily been omitted) will yet, it is hoped, have served to indicate the general nature and scope of the work which has been carried on by the British university and other settlements during the past quarter of a century. Clearly the sum total has been very great, and the effect far-reaching. The settlements have set an example of disinterested social service which is catholic in its sympathies and aims; they have provided a common rallying-ground for workers of divers political creeds and religious beliefs; and they have done something (though much more remains to be done) to co-ordinate charitable and philanthropic effort. They have helped to raise the standard of local government; they have served as experiment stations for many schemes—in regard to education, public health, and public assistance—which have become, or are now becoming, recognized and integral parts of a national system, and thus they have hastened the humanizing of administrative methods; they have done much to improve the present lot and future life-prospects of the children; by girls', boys', and men's clubs they have checked the demoralizing influence of the life of the great cities; and they have brightened the lives of great numbers of the poor. They have provided their residents and workers with opportunities for the close study of economic conditions and social problems, and given to many administrators and teachers their first knowledge and practical experience of the

conditions with which they have had afterwards to deal; they have mitigated class suspicion; and they have helped to carry home to the minds and hearts of men the true meaning of religion, and to bring about that awakening of the churches to their responsibility for social and economic reform which is one of the most striking signs of the times. There was never a time when so much earnest thought and effort was being expended as now upon the great questions of education (in the widest sense), national health, industrial organization, and economic well-being; the public conscience was never so aroused or so uneasy; philanthropic enterprise was never so great and varied or charity so large; schemes of reform were never more numerous, and the need for guidance derived from knowledge and experience more widely realized. This temper of the public mind is the result of a consensus of varied forces, economic, political, moral, and religious; it would be idle to attempt to claim for the settlements more than a share in bringing it about, but that share is far from being inconsiderable.

It is apparent, however, that much still remains to be done in the same directions as those hitherto followed; and there is no reason to suppose that the work of the settlements is approaching its completion, or their utility becoming exhausted. New social needs are constantly making themselves felt; old lines of work may be abandoned as the pressing need for them passes away, old efforts and enterprises may become absorbed in those of larger institutions or of the State itself; but fresh openings for voluntary energy and enthusiasm are certain to appear. The utility of the experimental work of the settlements will continue; so will the possibility of supplementing State or local action; and moreover the opportunities for the co-operation of voluntary agencies with the national administrative services are bound to be enlarged. The realization of many schemes for the humanizing of administration—in such matters as the feeding of school children, the reorganization and extension of public assistance on broader and wiser lines, the industrial training of boys and girls, the efforts to decasualize labor—will all depend for their success largely upon the co-operation of great numbers of unpaid, disinterested, and devoted workers of both sexes with the permanent offi-

cials of the State and local authorities. Herein lies one of the great opportunities of the settlements, and also one of their most difficult problems.

The settlements have already brought into the service of their respective neighborhoods a number of workers of better social position and wider outlook; they must bring a much larger number in the near future. While, however, all such workers are of use, if they are willing to act under experienced guidance, it is evident that the greatest value attaches to the services of those who can reside for a considerable length of time in the midst of the community which they are striving to assist. It is, however, often difficult for young men, of the classes from which the settlements draw their residents, to do so; and almost all the annual Reports show that it is difficult for the various institutions to get anything like a sufficient number of long-period residents—men are called away by the exigencies of their professions, even when their interest and zeal remain undiminished. Without a nucleus of residents who can stay at least three years the work of the settlements, as at present carried on, is bound to suffer; with such a nucleus it is possible to utilize, with fair effectiveness, the help of a changing set of short-term residents and of non-resident helpers. Often, however, this permanent nucleus comes to consist solely of the warden or other head of the settlement, and such other permanent officials as there may be; and if there is to be an increased call upon the settlements for public service of the nature indicated above—a call to which they must respond if they are to keep their influence and be true to their purpose—it appears almost inevitable that there will have to be a substantial increase in the “professional” element in the settlements. That element (that is, persons who devote their whole time, either voluntarily or for a livelihood, to the work of the settlements or to that of other charitable and philanthropic agencies with which the settlements are co-operating) has so far shown itself mainly in the women’s settlements or the women’s departments of other settlements; it has been absent, on the whole, from the men’s settlements, where most of the residents pursue unconnected vocations—a fact to which these settlements owe a large measure of their virility; but, if present conditions continue, it seems likely

to make its appearance there also. Such an outcome, if the professional class predominated (even only in the permanent nucleus), might seriously diminish the spontaneity of the settlement work and reduce the scope for individual enterprise; it would probably, on the other hand, secure greater continuity and possibly greater efficiency.

Further, the settlement worker of the future will need to be more systematically trained. The permanent worker, whether he can give all or only part of his time to the service, and still more the man or woman who can go to the settlements in order to get some acquaintance with the conditions of the life and labor of the people, but cannot afford a long stay, can no more be content with knowledge acquired piecemeal and haphazard; what is needed is a systematic course of training and study. Reference has already been made to what is being done in this direction at Birmingham and Liverpool, by co-operation between the universities and the settlements, and in London, first in connection with the Women's University Settlements and now at the London School of Sociology; and it is noteworthy that in all these cases it is the women's settlements which have taken the matter up, mainly for the reason already indicated, that they contain a larger proportion of residents who are making settlement work (in the broadest sense of the term) a career than do the men's settlements. But that there is real need for the extension of this organized teaching (representing all schools of thought in regard to administrative and social problems) for *all* settlement workers there cannot be any doubt.

Again, it has been pointed out that so far there has been little common action upon the part of the settlements. There has been of course, and is, a certain amount of communication and exchange of ideas between the workers in the various settlements; but there has been singularly little joint discussion of methods even where all are working with identical purposes. It is conceivable that in some places this has meant a considerable waste of energy in the struggle with difficulties of which other settlements have found the solution. The settlements can no longer be regarded as isolated efforts; they are becoming more and more allied with other institutions and with the work of the local

authorities and the State; their varied outlook only gives their accumulated experience a greater value; it is time for them to consider the possibility of an organization which, without checking individuality, shall provide opportunities for the common discussion of common problems, and shall facilitate arrangements for placing their knowledge and experience at the disposal of the public administration.

Finally, then, in the judgment of the present writer, the chief problem for the settlements in the immediate future will be that of organization. Their moral and social value has been abundantly proved; their utility to the State is fully demonstrated; their general lines of future service are sufficiently clear. What is needed now is a greater definiteness of method; a clearer appreciation of the extent to which they can co-operate with the State, and, on the other hand, of the extent to which, without the waste of energy and financial resources which results from overlapping, they must continue to go their own way, supplementing public effort or trying new social experiments. Moreover, effective co-operation with State agencies especially, though it is true in regard to other agencies also, must in a large measure depend upon confidence in the permanency and uniformity of the assistance rendered by the settlements. The problem for the settlements is to become systematic without sacrificing their individuality, without checking spontaneity, and without losing that enthusiasm for the social and moral progress of humanity which, from whatever sources fed, has carried them through many doubts and trials to the achievement of so much of lasting good.

JESUS AS LORD

BENJAMIN WISNER BACON

YALE UNIVERSITY

In successive discussions of the title Son of God, which seems to have been Jesus' own self-designation, and Son of Man, which would seem to have been applied to him after his death by the primitive Aramaic-speaking community of believers in his second coming, we have sought to disentangle primitive from secondary tradition. We have particularly emphasized the fact that in its distinctive principles Jesus' own teaching attaches itself to the primitive form of the messianic ideal—Israel as Yahweh's son; not the later theocratic—the Davidic heir to the throne as Son of God; nor the still later apocalyptic—the supernatural deliverer coming on the clouds of heaven as the fulfilment of the promise. In agreement with this view of the teaching of Jesus, our earliest documents, the Pauline epistles, make sonship in the ethical and religious sense the essence of the glad tidings. Since the publication of our argument our conclusions have been confirmed by the important newly-discovered document, the *Odes of Solomon*. The confirmation is especially strong if the view of Harnack be taken, that the Odes in their original form are Jewish, rather than the view of their discoverer, J. Rendel Harris, who regards them as Christian. The Odes give irrefutable evidence of the existence in first-century Judaism, or at least in primitive Christian circles, of a doctrine of sonship in the ethical and religious sense closely in line with what we have urged as the distinctive element in the messianic consciousness of Jesus. The ideal of the odist for Israel is an ideal of spiritual sonship. By the knowledge and love of the Beloved, "the Most High and Merciful," Israel is guaranteed not only sonship to God, but immortality, an eternal dwelling in God's presence.

The point was also emphasized against those who regard the

title Son of Man as "the favorite self-designation of Jesus," and who in logical consistency make apocalyptic eschatology the dominant note in his message, that of three great sources of evidence, (1) the Pauline epistles, (2) Petrine tradition as embodied in Acts and the groundwork of Mark, (3) the Matthaean Precepts of the Lord, it is only the third which gives independent evidence of the currency of the title; and this source, corresponding to the Q-document of critics, is, if not the latest, certainly not the earliest of the three. To the Pauline gospel the title Son of Man is completely unknown. To the Petrine, so far as we are able to reproduce it, it is equally unknown. Its occurrence is strictly limited to the Aramaic source which circulated in that portion of the church which looked to James the Lord's brother as "the bishop of bishops," and to writings directly affected by this Judaeian influence, such as our canonical gospels, including one occurrence in Acts. In early post-canonical literature we find it used only by Hegesippus in his report of the martyrdom of James,¹ by the Gospel according to the Hebrews,² and by the so-called Traditions of Matthias.³

It remains for us to show, as the final link in our chain of evidence for the priority of the ethical and religious form of Christian messianism, that there is no vacancy in the gospels of Peter and of Paul on this score; but that in their christology the doctrine that "Jesus is Lord" occupies the place taken in Matthaean tradition by the doctrine, "Jesus is the Son of Man."

In the Pauline epistles and the Petrine speeches of Acts we meet with many expressions which throw light upon the real origin of the worship of Jesus as a superhuman being. Occurring as they do in completely stereotyped form, and in documents some of which at least are much older than Q and none of which betrays any knowledge of the title Son of Man, they certainly justify the inference that the doctrine, "Jesus is Lord," is not a mere substitute for the Danielic form, "Jesus is the Son of Man," nor an outgrowth from it; but that the two represent rather parallel and independent types of christology. "Jesus is the Son

¹ Cf. Euseb., H. E. ii, 23 13.

² Cf. Jerome, *De viris illustribus* 2.

³ Cf. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* iv, 6 35.

of Man" may be regarded, so to speak, as a translation into the dialect and phraseology of Palestine of the doctrine which Greek-speaking Christians expressed in the confession, "Jesus is Lord."

We have seen in the preceding discussion that Paul does not hesitate to employ such Aramaic terms as *Abba*, *Maranatha*, *Amen*; he certainly does not shrink from addressing gentile converts as "men that know the law." It is, therefore, not easy to suppose that he avoided the title, the Son of Man, the "favorite self-designation of Jesus," because it could not be understood in Greek without a reference to Daniel 7 12-14. No more could the Hebrew phrase *ben 'adam* in Aramaic; yet it found currency there in the form *bar 'enash*, and, having made the transition from Hebrew to Aramaic, it surely could, had there been occasion, have similarly passed over into Greek. In point of fact we know that it ultimately did. But not in Paul's day. It was quite a different term which he borrows from the Aramaic. In fact there lies an important clew to the actual beginnings of christology in that watchword, *Maranatha*, which comes down to Paul from a period so primitive that Aramaic is still the general language of the church. For the watchword of the church echoed by Paul is not *barnash atha*, "the Son of Man cometh," but *maran atha*, "our Lord cometh." It is in fact, as we shall see, the title *κύριος*, the Greek equivalent of the Aramaic *mar*, which is made prominent wherever the question concerns Jesus' divine authority. Only such a title as this, indicative of the holder's right to command obedience in all things, could be expressive of Christian fealty. Accordingly we find it in more than one passage where it is clearly chosen to express this sense of fealty.

First of all, the Pauline passage where this Aramaic watchword occurs (1 Cor. 16 22) is itself significant, not merely because First Corinthians is the best authenticated writing of the New Testament, and some twenty years older than our earliest gospel, but because on this occasion Paul coins a phrase intended to be distinctive of the genuine Christian. Side by side stand the Greek title and the Aramaic equivalent: "If any man loveth not *the Lord* (*τὸν κύριον*), let him be accursed. *Maranatha*." Paul's own dictum is here reinforced by the phrase caught up from

primitive assemblies, kindled to enthusiasm by "visions and revelations of the Lord," assemblies where,

"with echoes long and loud,
The mighty Maranatha smote the air."

Another passage from this same epistle is still more indicative of the part played by the word in primitive tests of loyalty. When it became necessary to distinguish real from pretended utterances of the Spirit, the test which Paul offered was this: "No man can say *Jesus is Lord* but by the Holy Spirit" (1 Cor. 12 3). This is surely intended not as an ordinary pious ejaculation, but as a solemn confession. The principle laid down is manifestly fallacious unless the utterance of the confession is understood as a pledge of fealty and obedience.

Or, if further evidence be required that the title Lord embodied—at least for the Pauline churches—the distinctive element of the Christian's faith, let us take the passage where Paul formulates the essential content of the common faith in writing to believers in Rome—and these were no mere converts of his own who might be supposed to represent only some special type. The form in which the confession is drawn is this: "If thou shalt confess with thy mouth *Jesus as Lord*, and shalt believe in thine heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved" (Rom. 10 9). Once more, outward expression of the common faith of believers takes the form of the confession, *Jesus is Lord*.

These passages are selected from the greater Pauline epistles because it is apparent from their nature that the author is not coining a new title, but purposely employing the one which has most universal acceptance, both in Greek-speaking and Aramaic-speaking churches, and which most fully expresses in a single word the full content of the common faith. That word is *κύριος*, the imperial title expressive of complete sovereignty, ownership, and dominion. When used absolutely, its reference could be to nothing less than supreme lordship over the created world. When used with the genitive of the pronoun ("my Lord," "our Lord," etc.), it expressed a relation of personal loyalty, for which the abstract "Son of Man" gave little opportunity. If anywhere, then, surely in the phrase, "Jesus is Lord," we have the very

phraseology of what was termed "confession of (or in) the Name." Yes; for this lordship, or sovereignty, of Jesus must not only be loyally maintained against the empire, but "angels and principalities and powers in the heavenly places" are to be made subject unto him.⁴

Turn for a moment to a later document. A writer who in the name of "Peter" encourages the Pauline churches of Asia Minor to steadfastness under persecution urges heroism to "glorify God in this name" (of Christ), but inwardly to "sanctify in their hearts *Christ as Lord*." This was after Paul's death, and against an imperial despot who had directed that his decrees be issued in the form "*dominus et deus noster*." But to Paul also this name, Lord, marked the prerogative of Christ against both earthly and heavenly potentates. Every knee must bow, of beings in heaven, or beings on earth, or beings under the earth, and every tongue must join in the supreme confession "that *Jesus Christ is Lord*, to the glory of God the Father." This, then, is "the name which is above every name" given to Jesus because of his supreme exemplification of the principle, "He that humbleth himself shall be exalted,"—the name of Lord.

It will not be without significance to our further inquiry into the origins of this primitive christological confession to ask where Paul finds the name of Lord so given. For answer we need only turn to the parallel passage on the exaltation of Jesus in 1 Cor. 15 25, where a few words, quoted from the scripture that Paul has in mind, reveal the fact that he is thinking of the famous messianic Psalm: "The Lord said unto *my Lord*, Sit thou at my right hand until I make thine enemies thy footstool."⁵ And it needs only the further comparison of Rom. 14 10 f., where the same

⁴ It is not within the province of the present discussion to point out the practical superiority of a formula expressive of the sentiment of personal loyalty over a formula expressive only of abstract belief. Nevertheless, in days like ours, when efforts are being made to find a watchword of union, one can hardly resist asking the question, Why not return to the earliest attested of all? Thousands who differ widely in their definitions of the person of Christ, and their theories of the nature of this redemption, stand ready to unite upon the principle of a common loyalty to a common Master. Why not unite on the confession of "Jesus as Lord"?

⁵ Cf. also Rom. 8 34, Eph. 1 20, Col. 3 1.

fundamental passage (Is. 45 23) is used as in Phil. 2 11, to prove that this bowing of the knee and confession of the tongue are to be "before the judgment-seat of Christ." In other words, this is the Pauline form of the doctrine of Jesus as the Son of Man.

But herewith we begin a transition from passages which merely evidence the practice of the Pauline churches to another group which evidence both the practice and its origin, and which appear not in Pauline literature only, but in that which has best title to represent to us the Petrine type of doctrine.

This can hardly be said to be the case with First Peter, an epistle which even Zahn acknowledges to be Pauline in contents, though bearing—to his mind legitimately—the name of Peter. Because of this Pauline character of First Peter we have simply placed its exhortation to the Pauline churches to "sanctify in their hearts Jesus as Lord" in the group of Pauline evidences. Second Peter, on the other hand, is so generally recognized as both spurious and late as to merit no place in serious comparison of Petrine with Pauline tradition. The case is different, however, with the speeches placed in the mouth of Peter by the author of Acts. These are admitted to present, whether incorporated from earlier sources or composed by the evangelist, a peculiar and very primitive type of christology, easily distinguished from the Pauline because it has no trace whatever of the conception of the pre-existence of Jesus or of the atoning significance of his death. Here, then, is at least an early and independent type of christology, entitled to be designated "Petrine," if only because it is presented under the name and authority of Peter and is in reality different from the Matthaean on the one side and the Pauline on the other. It should not surprise us that the nearest affinity of this type of christology is with the Gospel of Mark in its more fundamental outlines, those least affected by accommodation to Pauline ideas or the influence of the Q-source; for the Markan, too, is a type credibly reported to rest upon the teaching of Peter. But the main point of our reference to the christology of Acts is that the author grounds the church's faith upon the same confessional basis as does Paul, and by appeal to the same scripture. The starting-point of "Luke's" story of the spread

of the gospel is Peter's demonstration to the multitudes assembled at Pentecost, partly on the basis of the phenomena of "spiritual gifts," and partly on the basis of the Psalm quoted in 1 Cor. 15 25, that God had given to Jesus *the name of Lord*.

For the author of the Petrine speeches of Acts one demonstration is vital, all else hangs upon it. It is the demonstration from the coincidence of prophetic scripture and present experience that God hath "made that same Jesus, whom ye [his countrymen] crucified, *both Lord and Christ*." In the conception of "Luke" this marks the beginning of the Christian church. His preliminary chapter (Acts 1) merely recapitulates the ending of Jesus' earthly career, glorified as it had been by the promise of an enthronement soon to follow. Until Pentecost Jesus had not been Lord or Christ. He had been Yahweh's Servant sent to bless Israel by turning them away, every man from his iniquities (Acts 3 26). Pentecost is the Servant's coronation day. From henceforth as Lord he occupies "the throne of glory." "The heavens must receive him," says Peter in his next address, "until the times of restoration of all things." Then God in his mercy will send him *as the Christ*. For it is the nationalistic phase of christology, rather than the apocalyptic, or transcendental, which here appears as the distinctive trait supplementary to the Pauline. The new fulfilments of Scripture appealed to besides Ps. 110 1 are the promises of the outpouring of the spirit of prophecy (Joel 2 28-31), the promises of an heir to the throne of David (Ps. 132 11, 2 Sam. 7 12 f.), and the "prophet like unto Moses" (Deut. 18 15). True, the nationalistic christology shows the influence of apocalypse. It has been, so to speak, transcendentalized. But the only actual trace of the doctrine of the Son of Man "coming with clouds" is in the angels' promise to the witnesses of the ascension: "Ye shall see him in like manner coming again" (Acts 1 11). The real difference from Pauline christology is not that the author reverts toward the apocalyptic doctrine of a pre-existent or transcendental Son of Man. On the contrary, he does not even adopt Paul's doctrine of incarnation. As Pfeleiderer has so justly and discriminatingly pointed out, the christology of the "Petrine" source of Acts is a doctrine of apotheosis, the apotheosis of the Suffering Servant. "Peter"

merely supplements the Pauline doctrine that "Jesus is Lord" by adding an expression of the national hope that he will soon reappear as "the Christ."

Peter's preaching to gentiles is represented in Acts 10 36-43, where the gospel message is summarized in a preliminary statement as the doctrine that Jesus Christ "is Lord of all" (*πάντων κύριος*).

Surely, if the dominant note in Jesus' teaching was the doctrine of the Danielic, transcendental Being to appear upon the clouds, and if Son of Man was his favorite self-designation, it is surprising that "Peter" should lay the very foundations of the church's faith in these successive speeches, and never once employ the title or allude to the predictions. The doctrine of the Lordship is here. It is supplemented now by the doctrine of a preliminary work of the Christ-to-be,—Jesus the Servant sent to effect the great Repentance, the prophet like unto Moses, mighty in deed and word before God and all the people, the son and heir of David—of which little or nothing appears in Paul. The doctrine of the coming Day of Judgment is present, as in Paul (compare Acts 10 42 and 17 31 with 1 Thess. 1 10). Only the phraseology employed, and the scriptures appealed to, give no more ground than in Paul to think of the title Son of Man, or indeed of any apocalyptic teaching of Jesus, as the starting-point of the Petrine christology.

To judge, then, by these two strands of primitive tradition, the Pauline and "Petrine," it was not a self-designation of Jesus, but the manifestation of him as Lord, which became the starting-point of the faith. This result is in complete conformity with the thorough and scholarly discussion of Professor S. J. Case on "ΚΥΡΙΟΣ as a Title for Christ,"⁶ wherein he disproves the current idea that the deification of Jesus was a result of the use of *κύριος* in the Septuagint as a rendering of the Hebrew divine name, and the application to Jesus of Old Testament passages in which the term occurred. The practice existed, but it is not primitive; nor could the confusion have occurred in an Aramaic-speaking community or among those familiar with the Hebrew Scriptures.

⁶ *Journal of Biblical Literature*, vol. xxvi (1907), pp. 151-161.

It is most conspicuous in writers, like the author of Hebrews,⁷ whose only acquaintance with the Scriptures seems to be through the Greek. Neither the address of prayer to Jesus, nor the application to him of Scripture that originally referred to God, gives adequate warrant for the theory in question. As Case points out, prayer addressed to Jesus—always exceptional, and progressively rarer as we approach the earliest times—implies only “that God and Christ have similar positions *in relation to men*,” not that Jesus is treated as God. In particular the one supreme messianic gift, potentially inclusive of all others, is the gift of “the Spirit.” As a pledge of adoption to sonship and heirship, and as the “earnest” of immortality, it is naturally regarded as the all-inclusive object of prayer (compare Luke 11 13 with Mt. 7 11). But the Spirit, while ultimately “the gift of God” (Acts 8 19 f., Jn. 4 10), is in a special and peculiar way the gift of Christ. The “outpouring” of it is secured by his exaltation to the messianic throne (Acts 2 33, Eph. 4 7-12); it is conditioned by his going to the Father (Jn. 16 7 ff., 20 17, 22). Prayer in general, then, might well be “in the name” of Jesus; prayer for the Spirit particularly we might even expect would sometimes be addressed to the risen “Lord.” If cases exist in early times of prayer so addressed, they certainly do not imply confusion between his person and that of the Supreme Deity. On this point the philological argument of Professor Case is conclusive.

In reality the attempt to account for the apotheosis of Jesus by literary causes falls little short of absurdity. The worship of Jesus did not originate in the scriptorium. It was a product of real experience among men most of whom had little to do with the scribes. After it had begun, Scriptural apologetic came into play, and exercised an important, perhaps a dominant, influence upon the form and mode of its development. And this is reflected in the philological phenomena. As Case has again pointed out, when Paul “writes *μαρτυρεῖ* to the Corinthians it is per-

⁷ A notable instance is the quotation of Ps. 102 25 ff. in Heb. 1 10-12 as if applying to Christ as creator. See the present writer's discussion in *Zeitschrift für neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, vol. iii, 1902. Here the doctrine is of course a Pauline doctrine.

fectly plain that he is passing along a phrase which originated with Aramaic-speaking Christians." Moreover, the title embodied, *mar* or *maran*, was not taken from Scripture, but from the ordinary usage of common life. It is the exact equivalent of the Greek *κύριος*, *ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν*, which Paul and "Peter" substitute for it. We certainly "may believe that Jesus was called 'Lord' even during his earthly life."⁸ It was not this usage, however, which gave significance to the title, but the experience of those who after his death felt that they had received a manifestation of his God-given sovereignty. We may at first be tempted by the coincident appeal in so many different passages⁹ to Ps. 110 1 to think of this Psalm itself, either in its original form, or as employed by Jesus, according to Mk. 12 35 f., as having given rise to the conviction. It is true that there is much to indicate that even Paul was not the first to hit upon this scripture as a proof-text in support of the Lordship. Its apologetic use no doubt reacted upon the doctrine it was used to support. But here, as elsewhere, the conviction came first, and the proof-text was discovered afterward. Case is certainly right in saying, "It was not any similarity of usage between *jhvh* and *mar* that led to the custom [of applying Old Testament language spoken of Yahweh to Christ], for in Aramaic this did not exist; but the practice was due to an apologetic necessity on the part of those who claimed that God had exalted their Messiah to a place of heavenly lordship."

Our real question accordingly is this: What was it which produced the conviction of the exaltation of Jesus to "the throne of glory" in the minds of the primitive disciples, an exaltation for which the suitable term to those of Aramaic speech seemed to be *maran* and to those of Greek speech *ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν*? To judge by the coincidence between Acts 2 32 f. and Eph. 4 7-11, it was the phenomena of Pentecost accepted as tokens of a sovereignty conferred upon Jesus. The spiritual gifts were proofs to his followers, who found themselves thus suddenly

⁸ Case, *ibid.* p. 161.

⁹ In addition to Acts 2 34 f. and 1 Cor. 15 25, see especially Rom. 8 34, Eph. 1 20, Col. 3 1. Pss. 110 and 8, combined in 1 Cor. 15 25-27, are made almost the entire Scripture substratum of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

"endued with power from on high," that he had been exalted and enthroned.¹⁰ Fundamentally, the argument of Paul and of "Peter" is the same. The phenomenon of the gift of the Spirit is the datum to be explained. Both revert at once to the common scripture: "The Lord said unto my Lord, Sit thou at my right hand." Thereafter the apologetic varies. According to "Peter" this is that which was spoken by the prophet Joel concerning "the last days." According to Paul this is that which is referred to by the Psalmist when he describes the triumph of Yahweh over his enemies: "When he ascended on high he led captivity captive and gave gifts unto men." The exaltation, or ascension, is proved by the visible and audible phenomena. The Scripture citations are apologetic proof-texts. Latest of all comes the narrative of visible transportation of the glorified body of Jesus through the clouds, while angels explain the significance of the occurrence to astonished bystanders.¹¹

It is among the Scripture proof-texts cited after the event, and not among the causes of the belief, that we must reckon the argument put in the mouth of Jesus by our oldest evangelist in Mk. 12 35-37. The reader will find in my comments on the passage in the volume entitled *Beginnings of Gospel Story* (pp. 160 f., 175) the reasons for regarding this fourth Colloquy in the Temple as an addition by the evangelist to the series which precedes introducing successively the moot questions of Pharisee, Sadducee, and Scribe. The appended colloquy introduces the distinctive tenet of the Christian, the Lordship of the Christ. Jesus debates with the unbelieving Jews the doctrine of his own ascension to "the right hand of God." And the passage by which he is represented as defending it is the same which at the time of Mark's writing had long been a *locus classicus* of Pauline tradition (and probably of Petrine as well) to prove the connection of the risen Jesus with the phenomena of "spiritual gifts."

Were it possible to invert the literary relation of Mark and the

¹⁰ In the Gospel of Matthew, which was not followed by a record of the mighty works of the Spirit, the Lordship is expressed by a declaration of Jesus (Mt. 28 18; cf. Mk. 16 17).

¹¹ On the later and legendary character of Acts 1 6-14 as compared with Acts 2 15 ff., and still more with Acts 3 1-4 31, see Harnack, *Acts*, ad loc.

Pauline epistles, or even to look upon the appended colloquy of Mk. 12 35-37 as of equal antiquity with the series preceding in verses 13-34, there would be better ground for the traditional idea that Jesus himself was the originator of the apologetic based on Ps. 110 1. In reality the proof-text proves too much. Its true application is to the enthronement, the ascension, the seating "at the right hand of God." It is Paul and "Peter," then, who use it correctly, and Mark, together with his dependent fellow-evangelists, who introduces it *mal à propos*.

Our attempt to trace the history of the doctrine of Jesus as Lord indicates then that its origin was in no sense of the word literary. The conviction of the Lordship¹² was the most vital and fundamental one for every Christian, no matter what the special type of his belief. He could be known as a Christian because he confessed "Jesus as Lord." But the conviction did not rest upon wrong interpretation of the Greek Old Testament. That was a consequence rather than a cause. It did not rest primarily upon Old Testament passages at all; though it was affected by these. It did not even rest upon remembered expressions of, or titles applied to, Jesus; though the fact that he had been commonly called *mar* or κύριε (cf. Jn. 13 13) had doubtless its effect, as well as the fact that he had spoken of "the Coming," or "the Day," of the Son of Man. The belief rested upon a great experience, the occurrence of a single, definite day, an occurrence which all Christians from that time forward regarded as "a designation with power of Jesus as the Son of God,"¹³ a day ever memorable as the coronation-day of the risen Jesus. Can we point to such a day?

In a sense we have already pointed to it. Even if Acts did not make of Pentecost the occasion which it does, we should know from the allusions of Paul to an outpouring of the Spirit experienced by every believer in some degree, and by the church as a whole from the beginning, that some great manifestation of the kind had marked its origin. We should naturally think

¹² Whether the Lordship (κυριότης) despised by the heretics in Jude 8, 2 Pet. 2 10, is that of Christ is doubtful.

¹³ Such, according to Sanday and Headlam, should be the rendering of Rom. 1 4.

of that day on which, as Paul relates, an assembled company of "more than five hundred brethren at once" had seen the Lord. But this is by no means all. Few things can furnish historical evidence so strong as an institution, observance, or rite, directly traceable to a given event. Such an observance, or institution, can in our judgment be surely traced to the day of Pentecost, and to this event. The institution exists today. Its existence is attested in the oldest documents of the New Testament; though it so happens that its distinctive name is not mentioned until the Revelation of John, written about 95 A.D. In Rev. 1 10 the day which in the Pauline epistles (1 Cor. 16 2), the travel-document of Acts (Acts 20 7), and the gospels is referred to simply as "the first day of the week" and appears merely as a weekly day of assembly, is called "the Lord's day" (ἡ κυριακὴ ἡμέρα). In our judgment a strictly critical analysis of the evidence will show that "the Lord's day" originally commemorated the day of Jesus' enthronement "at the right hand of God." It was the day when "God made him both Lord and Christ."

By the time our gospels were written the day had come to be regarded as commemorating Jesus' resurrection. In fact, Paul himself makes the "resurrection" (return from Sheol?) to have occurred "on the third day," which (the crucifixion having occurred on a Friday) would make it to have fallen on "the first day of the week." This, accordingly, is the date on which our gospels place the visit of the women to the sepulchre and the finding of it empty; and in common acceptance the weekly observance of "the Lord's day" is supposed to commemorate this event. Why it should be a weekly observance, when the celebration of the resurrection was annual, and why it should fall on the day when (according to later forms of tradition) the resurrection *manifestations* began, instead of the day of Christ's actual victory over "him that had the power of death," the common theory does not attempt to explain.

Is it, then, the fact that observance of "the Lord's day" began with a fixation of this "first day of the week" as that on which Jesus "rose from the dead," whether with Paul as an inference from "the Scriptures," or with the evangelists from the report of the women and other phenomena connected with the empty sepul-

chre? We venture to say that the objections to accepting this as the origin of the observance are absolutely insuperable. Such observance could only begin in commemoration of some great and joyous, but above all perfectly definite and undisputed, event. The experiences of the women and the inferences of Paul from Scripture were not occurrences of this kind. Even were it possible to know what "scripture" Paul has in mind when he reports it as the common faith that Jesus "rose again on the third day according to the Scriptures," we cannot imagine the primitive community sitting down in conference and saying: "Go to, now. We need a day on which to commemorate the triumph of Jesus over the gates of death; let it be, then, the first day of the week; for according to Hosea it must have been 'on the third day' (Hos. 6 (2)). The crucifixion occurred on the sixth day of the week. Let us then substitute the 'first day of the week' for the Sabbath, and institute thus a weekly memorial of the resurrection." Equally unimaginable is the origin of such an observance from the report of "certain women which were early at the grave, and, when they found him not, reported that they had seen a vision of angels which said that he was alive." Granted even the trustworthiness of these late traditions ignored by Paul, why celebrate this day rather than the day when he "was seen of Cephas"? In point of fact the whole group of traditions which centres about the sepulchre, found empty by the women and others "on the third day," is absolutely excluded as accounting for the observance of "the Lord's day," because they manifestly come to light at a time long after the observance of the Lord's day had become well established. Had the early church wished to celebrate the beginning of the *manifestations* of the Lord, they would certainly have taken the day of the manifestation to Peter. But that, according to all we can learn about it, took place at the Sea of Galilee, the mere physical conditions making it practically certain that it was not so early as "the third day." Our only direct witness (Gospel of Peter 14 58-60) states, in fact, that Peter's return to Galilee did not take place until "the last day of Unleavened Bread," a full week after the crucifixion. In point of fact the early church did not attempt to date the resurrection by the discovery of the empty tomb, nor by the connected group of

appearances in Jerusalem, all of which concern themselves with the later disputes about the nature of the resurrection body. Two characteristics of Paul's recapitulation of the resurrection story, as proclaimed not by himself alone but by all authorities, are fatal to the supposition that the sepulchre-group of traditions had anything to do with the origin of the observance of the Lord's day: (1) the entire absence from his list of proofs of any one of these traditions; (2) the fact that the resurrection (that is, the return from Sheol "clothed upon" with the heavenly "body of glory") is dated "on the third day" because of certain "scriptures" and for no other reason assigned. It is hardly probable that the passages in Paul's mind included Hos. 6 2, natural as this might seem; for the New Testament writers never make use of this particular passage. It does not seem probable that Paul rested on Jonah 1 17 like the author of Mt. 12 40. But difficult though it is to say what particular passages of Scripture Paul had in mind, it is not impossible to say what he meant by "the third day," and that it had reference not to the succession of the days of the week at all, but to those of the month, or rather of the feast of Passover and Unleavened Bread.

First Corinthians is written from Ephesus, apparently in the midst of the celebration of a (Christian) Passover. In 5 7 the Corinthians are exhorted to "put away the old leaven, . . . for Christ our Passover hath been sacrificed for us." In like manner the chapter on the resurrection borrows the imagery of the temple service. Christ's death, burial, and resurrection are compared to the wheat buried in the ground but restored again at harvest. The first day of Passover—Mazzoth (Nisan 14) was the day when the lamb was slaughtered. "The third day" in the year of the crucifixion was the day of Firstfruits (*ἀπαρχή*, Nisan 16), when the first sheaf of the wheat-harvest was lifted up to God. When, in the midst of this comparison, Paul writes: "But now is Christ risen from the dead and become the firstfruits (*ἀπαρχή*) of them that slept," and in the same connection points to his burial, and to his having been raised "on the third day," the significance of the date can be no other than the fact of its coincidence with the ritual of Firstfruits, just as the crucifixion had coincided with the slaughtering of the passover lamb. The fact

that in the particular year in question this happened to be also a "first day of the week" was at the utmost a secondary consideration.¹⁴

We are led by this glimpse into Paul's commemoration of the death and resurrection to a realization of what event the early church actually did attempt to celebrate, and when they really dated it.

The crisis in the life of Peter referred to in the prayer of Jesus, "Simon, . . . when thou art turned again strengthen thy brethren," was worthy to be commemorated by the church, because it unquestionably was the crisis of its own birth. Had the church thought of celebrating the beginning of the resurrection *faith*, it must have noted and observed the day when in Galilee, some ten days or more after the crucifixion, so far as we can judge, the risen Lord "appeared to Cephas." It did not do so. Either because this humble beginning was overshadowed by the later, more spectacular triumph, or for some other reason, Pentecost was looked upon as the real birthday of the church, and Peter's experience was but vaguely connected with it. What the church was intent upon commemorating, even so early as the time of Paul's stay in Ephesus, was Jesus' victory over the gates of Sheol. This triumph of the Prince of Life (ὁ ἀρχηγὸς τῆς ζωῆς) over the prince of darkness and death was commemorated, however, in an *annual* festival, coincident with the Passover of the Jews, and in fact with the equinoctial feasts of the many cults which make the vernal new birth of nature a symbol of their resurrection hope. In Paul's time Jewish ritual was still adhered to with sufficient closeness to warrant the marking of a separate correspondence of the crucifixion with the slaughter of the lamb on Nisan 14, and the resurrection with the lifting up of the wave sheaf on Nisan 16. But a century later this refinement has disappeared. The quartodecimans are still celebrating the Christian Passover in Asia where Paul had celebrated it with them, but it is

¹⁴ Clement of Alexandria shows precisely this point of view in arguing for the observance of the fourteenth of Nisan as the anniversary of the death and resurrection. "And the resurrection confirms this [argument for quartodeciman observance]. At all events [Jesus] rose on the third day, which is the first day of the weeks of wheat-harvest, on which it was prescribed that the priest should offer the sheaf [of firstfruits]. (Citation in Paschal Chronicle.)

only the single great Passover day which is remembered.¹⁵ Death and resurrection are celebrated together on the fourteenth Nisan, "the day when the people [that is, the Jews] put away the leaven." Great controversy arises because at Rome and in the West, where the hebdomadal system has become supreme, men wish to insist that "the mystery of the resurrection" shall not be celebrated on any other but "the Lord's day." Asia and the East remain firm in the authority of apostolic precedent, and again and again reiterate the nature and meaning of their observance. "The fourteenth is the true Passover of the Lord, the one great sacrifice, the Servant of God slain instead of the [passover] lamb, he who was bound having bound the strong man [that is, Satan, who had the power of death; cf. Mt. 12 29 and Heb. 2 14 f.], and he who was judged judging quick and dead, . . . who was buried on the day of the Passover, a stone being set upon the tomb."¹⁶

But while we can be perfectly certain that it was the victory of Christ over the power of Sheol which was celebrated by quartodecimans in the annual breaking of fast on the fourteenth of Nisan, and while the greatest importance was attached to the exact determination of the true date of this single day, it is equally certain that the ancient Oriental observance did not attempt to determine from the traditions of manifestations, discoveries of the empty condition of the tomb, Scriptural predictions, or otherwise, just how long after the crucifixion this triumph known as the resurrection, or return from Sheol, had occurred. Indeed, a letter of Basilides, bishop of the parishes in Pentapolis, consults Dionysius of Alexandria as to the hour when the fast commemorative of the Lord's passion should be terminated by the feast of the resurrection, some of the brethren thinking they should do it at cock-crow, others "from the evening." "He was at a loss," says Drummond, "how to fix an exact hour; for while it would be 'acknowledged by all alike' that they ought to begin their festivities after the time of the resurrection of our Lord, and to humble their souls by fasting up to that time, the Gospels

¹⁵ Epiphanius, *Haer.* ἀπαξ γὰρ τοῦ ἔτους μίαν ἡμέραν τοῦ πάσχα οἱ τοιοῦτοι (quartodecimans) φιλοεῖκως ἄγουσι.

¹⁶ Apollinaris of Hierapolis in Paschal Chronicle.

*contained no exact statement of the hour at which he rose."*¹⁷ Dionysius in his reply does not pretend that he can solve this question of the exact time of the resurrection, but recommends a latitudinarian tolerance of difference in mode of observance.

It is perfectly clear from this and other accounts of ancient commemoration of Jesus' death and resurrection that the two were celebrated together, and that no attempt was made to draw such inferences as moderns draw from the story of the women at the sepulchre regarding the day and hour when Jesus had been (in Paulinē language) "clothed upon" with his "body of glory." If for a time memory lingered of the Pauline correspondence between Firstfruits on Nisan 16 and a scripture (Hos. 6 2?) predicting resurrection on "the third day," it soon disappeared. Clement's reference stands isolated. The second-century church, at least in the Orient, thought of, and celebrated, Jesus' death and resurrection as practically simultaneous. Indeed, the Gospel of Peter makes even the ascension take place from the cross itself immediately after the great cry.¹⁸

Dr. Erwin Preuschen even goes so far as to say:

In the Orient Sunday was not known as the day of resurrection, and hence there was no weekly celebration of this day [but cf. Acts 20 7 and Rev. 1 10], but in the Occident Wednesday and Friday were regular fast-days, and Sunday was celebrated as the day of resurrection. It is doubtful whether the Occident possessed in addition a special day in the year for the commemoration of the death and of the resurrection of the Lord.¹⁹

We cannot agree with this scholar that the hebdomadal system of the church originated in the West and was unknown to the East. It is essentially Jewish in character, and would have been most pronounced among the earliest churches, where synagogue practice was taken over with least alteration. The very document on which Dr. Preuschen seems to base his statement regarding semi-weekly fasts²⁰ is almost certainly of Syrian origin, and

¹⁷ Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel, p. 471. The italics are ours.

¹⁸ "And the Lord cried out, saying, My Power, my Power, thou hast forsaken me. And as soon as he had spoken he was taken up" (καὶ εἰπὼν ἀνελήφθη).

¹⁹ New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopaedia, Art. "Easter," vol. iv (1909), pp. 46 f.

²⁰ Didache, 8 1.

the fasts on the fourth day of the week and the Preparation (*παρασκευή*) are expressly set over against those of "the hypocrites" on "the second and fifth" (cf. Luke 18 12). The hebdomadal system of the church is certainly of synagogue origin, all the more because such pains are taken to distinguish its festal "first day" from the festal "seventh day" of "the hypocrites," and its fourth-day and sixth-day fasts from their fasts on the second and fifth days of the week. But Preuschen is entirely correct in saying that observance of "the Lord's day" had no such origin as we of the West, following the Roman tradition of Mark and the Synoptic Gospels,²¹ have been accustomed to suppose. His appeal to the immemorial rite of quartodeciman observance on the part of all the more ancient churches, explicitly and rightly justified as it was by apostolic tradition and practice, is conclusive on this point. Preuschen's inference from the history of the long controversy is as follows:

The Christians of Asia Minor must have celebrated the mystery of the resurrection on the day on which the fast [the annual fast commemorating the Passion] was broken, and this day was not Sunday but the fourteenth of Nisan, around which the controversy revolved. This conclusion is justified by the account of Epiphanius concerning the quartodecimans (that is, those who commemorated the Lord's death on the 14th), in which he relates that fasting and the celebration of the resurrection took place on the same day. . . . The Christians of Asia Minor appealed to an old apostolic tradition according to which Jesus rose on the evening of the day of his death, and the opposition of the Occidentals was directed mainly against the commemoration of death and resurrection on the same day.

In one respect this statement requires correction. It was not the "resurrection" of Jesus in our sense of the word that quartodecimans commemorated "on the same day" as the crucifixion (better, after a vigil corresponding to the vigil of Passover, which extended in many cases "until cock-crowing"), nor did they hold that he "rose" (that is, manifested his presence to his disciples on earth) on the fourteenth. They accepted the same gospels that we do, and were indignant at the charge of going counter to them. They probably held just as Paul did, and perhaps on the

²¹ Even the quartodeciman Fourth Gospel is affected on this point by its predecessors (cf. Jn. 20).

basis of the same "scriptures," that "he was raised (*ἡγέρθη*) on the third day," that is, on the sixteenth, or day of Firstfruits.²² What the quartodeciman festival commemorated was, as Apollinaris clearly (though somewhat rhetorically) states, the "binding of the strong man," that is, the church's victory over "the gates of Sheol," accomplished when Christ "through death overcame him that had the power of death, and delivered us who through fear of death were all our life-time subject to bondage." It is the true Oriental, pre-Christian doctrine of the "Harrowing of Hell" which underlies it, and is reflected in unmistakable terms in the fifth of Hippolytus's *Heads against Caius*:

The heretic Caius [ca. 180 A.D.] objects [to Rev. 20 2 f.] that "Satan had already been bound, according to what is written [in Mt. 12 29] that Christ entered the house of the strong man, and bound him, and despoiled him of us his vessels."

It thus becomes unmistakably clear that the celebration of the Passover among the Oriental churches, as taken over from the synagogue through the very hands of the apostles themselves, became in Christian interpretation a feast of redemption indeed as before, but—of redemption from the darkness and bondage of Sheol. The imagery is perfectly familiar to us from the epistles of Paul, and must have been at least equally familiar to every communicant in "the Supper of the Lord." The mere date when it became known that the tomb was empty, or when individuals were lifted out of their despairing unbelief, whether by "visions of angels" or "manifestations of the Lord," was to the Oriental Christian's mind a matter of quite secondary importance. He resented the attempt of Rome and the West to force upon him a delay in the breaking of his fast until "the Lord's day"; and denied the validity of their ground, namely, that the Jerusalem traditions regarding the sepulchre, which since the days of Mark's Roman gospel had begun to supersede the Galilean as given by Paul (1 Cor. 15 1-11), proved "that the mystery of the Lord's resurrection from the dead" had taken place at a specified day and hour and therefore "should be celebrated on no other day than the Lord's day."

²² Cf. the statement of Clement cited above, p. 219, note.

Our protracted inquiry into the primitive apostolic celebration of the resurrection will be justified by the importance of the result. We need not prolong it by a consideration, however interesting historically, or strong in corroboration, of the later attempts at harmonization. We can only refer the reader to Preuschen's explanation of the curious calculation of the "three days" in the Syriac *Didascalia*, which treats the three hours' darkness on the crucifixion day as a "night." We must also pass over his analogous explanation of the equally curious phraseology of Mt. 28 1. In our judgment the inquiry already fully justifies the statement with which we began, that at least so far as the ancient Oriental churches or those of apostolic or Pauline foundation are concerned, "the whole group of traditions which centres about the sepulchre, found empty by the women and others 'on the third day,' is absolutely excluded as accounting for the observance of 'the Lord's day.'" Their dating on that particular day is a *consequence*, not a cause of the practice.

But this leaves the practice itself still to be accounted for. Moreover, as we have just seen, the hebdomadal system, so far from being a mere Western innovation, as Preuschen appears to hold, is rooted in the most ancient apostolic observance. The innovation of the West consists merely in a perversion of its significance.

The three characteristics which should guide us to a more trustworthy judgment of the origin of "the Lord's day" are (1) its Jewish derivation, (2) its hebdomadal observance, (3) its festival character. It unquestionably began as a commemoration of some signal event in the history of the church. But we have seen that the resurrection was otherwise commemorated, and the mere accounts of "manifestations," even that to Peter, which in the earliest times was by far the most important, were not understood as determining the date of the Lord's triumph over Sheol. One "manifestation," however, did remain fixed in the memory of the church, not only because of the significance which from the beginning appears to have been attached to it, but because, as tradition most credibly avers, it coincided in date with the annual Jewish "Feast of Weeks." If any one day could be pointed to in the whole history of the church worthy of perpetual

commemoration as "the Lord's day," it would be the day when according to apostolic belief he was enthroned "at the right hand of God." The phenomena which accompanied the first "out-pouring of the Spirit" are appealed to in different ways by both "Peter" and Paul as proving the exaltation of Jesus to the supreme Lordship (Acts 2 33, Eph. 4 7-10). Both apostles see in it a fulfilment of the coronation ode, Ps. 110: "Yahweh said unto my Lord, Sit thou at my right hand, until I make thine enemies thy footstool." So vital was this conviction to the primitive church that it became incorporated in the earliest baptismal confession: "He ascended into heaven and sitteth on the right hand of God."

But is it capable of proof that this supreme day of the "demonstration of the Spirit and of power" was really a "first day of the week"; and, if so, was there any reason why it should be commemorated by weekly, instead of annual, observance? Both questions can be answered in the affirmative. Lev. 23 1-21 gives the "perpetual statute" of the feasts of wheat-harvest, introduced by the law of the Passover on Nisan 14 (ver. 5). Verses 9-14 give the "perpetual statute" of Firstfruits "on the morrow after the Sabbath" (Nisan 16). Next follows the "perpetual statute" of Pentecost, which celebrated the conclusion of the seven weeks of wheat-harvest:

And ye shall count unto you from the morrow after the sabbath [of Passover week], from the day that ye brought the sheaf of the wave offering [Firstfruits]; seven sabbaths shall there be complete: even unto the morrow after the seventh sabbath shall ye number fifty days . . . and ye shall make proclamation on the selfsame day; there shall be an holy convocation unto you; ye shall do no servile work; it is a statute for ever in all your dwellings throughout your generations.

This law of Pentecost, or "the Feast of Weeks," is the foundation of the Jewish hebdomadal system. The new moon of Nisan fixed the annual calendar, whose first great feast was Passover at the full of the moon. Nisan 16 with its ritual of the sheaf of firstfruits was the starting-point for the seven-weeks' period of wheat-harvest, culminating in Pentecost, which would thus by

one interpretation always fall on "the first day of the week."²³ Moreover, it constituted a kind of second Sabbath, which, as we know, was the mode of observance of "the Lord's day" in the primitive Christian communities. Of these communities nothing is more certain than their assiduous devotion to the festal system of the Law. Passover and Pentecost, so far from being discontinued, were redoubled in significance. The redemption-feast, as we have seen, became the feast of the new and greater redemption through the death of Christ, a commemoration of his breaking of the bars of Sheol. Pentecost also continued in redoubled honor, observed even in the Pauline churches (1 Cor. 16 8, Acts 20 6, 16). And not only so, but the intervening period of the seven weeks of wheat-harvest long continued, as among the Jews, to be a period of continuous festivity, "the joy of harvest." Says Drummond, summarizing the statements of Eusebius:

So full of joy was the time [of Easter] that they feasted for seven whole weeks, till "another great feast," Pentecost, came in.²⁴

No doubt whatever exists as to the new meaning attached by Jewish believers of the earliest time to the festival of Pentecost as an annual observance. It was the day on which he who had "become the first fruits of them that slept" entered into the full possession of the inheritance; and of this fact had given the assurance by a showering of the Earnest (*ἀρραβών*) upon his followers. But what of the old-time significance of the day to pious Jews as the foundation of the hebdomadal system? Is it likely that for Christians there would be in succeeding years no special significance in the period of rejoicing, which was marked for them above their fellow Jews by the fact that it had been filled with successive manifestations of the risen Lord? According to the tradition these manifestations had followed in rapid succession from the time when, some ten days after the crucifixion, the Lord "appeared to Cephas" down to Pentecost itself. It was

²³ Orthodox rabbinic interpretation of the legal date "the morrow after the sabbath" seems to have given it the sense as early as New Testament times of Nisan 16, regardless of the day of the week. Samaritan and sectarian practice made Firstfruits (and consequently Pentecost) fall invariably on Sunday.

²⁴ Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel, p. 466.

the period during which "he presented himself alive after his passion by many proofs, appearing unto them by the space of forty days." And if early Christian observance of this festal period followed the same analogy as the other observances which they took over from the religion of their fathers, their kindred, and their own childhood, it would be almost inevitable that these "manifestations" should follow the hebdomadal order and begin to be dated uniformly on "the Lord's day."

If, then, we look to Paul, and not to the relatively late tradition of the Roman editor of our second canonical gospel, for an explanation of primitive observance of "the Lord's day," we shall find it in the wide-spread and primitive Oriental observance of a festival of corn-harvest, which among Jews at least covered a period of seven weeks, beginning and ending—in the year of the crucifixion—on "the first day of the week."

That inferences regarding the first Lord's day were based on Scripture rather than on tradition is clear from 1 Cor. 15 4. When at last tradition forsook the older Galilean narrative, and began to build on the Jerusalem form first known to us in the Roman Gospel of Mark, it was inevitable that the resurrection "on the third day" should be interpreted not with reference to Passover and Firstfruits, but with reference to "the Lord's day" of an established Christian hebdomadal system.

Our study of the primitive institution of "the Lord's day," intricate as the course of argument must be, leads to a conclusion thoroughly in harmony with that based upon literary and philological grounds. Primitive christology rested not so much upon Scripture, nor even upon phrases caught from the lips of Jesus, as upon the experience of the church. First had come the reawakened faith of Peter, then of the Twelve. Peter's brethren were "strengthened" in the conviction that God had raised Jesus from the dead. But the experience which created Christianity was the "baptism of the Spirit." In it was given the assurance of his exaltation to "the right hand of God." By it he was "manifested as the Son of God with power."

For believing Jew and Greek alike this implied that God would soon send Jesus back again to judgment as "the Christ." For it is Paul's teaching as well as Peter's that "we must all stand before

the judgment-seat of Christ." And so far as doctrinal content is concerned, no more was implied when Christians of Semitic mode of speech declared that Jesus had been manifested as "the Son of Man." It does, however, make a great difference to moderns whether by the strict canons of criticism we are obliged to hold that this christology of the apocalyptists, resting as it does upon the more morbid developments of later Judaism, has its ground in fundamental elements of the teaching of Jesus himself; or whether we may hold, in accordance with the argument now brought to its conclusion, that the doctrine of Jesus as "Son of Man," and the doctrine of Jesus as "Lord," are parallel developments of a common experience. That experience we believe to have been the gift of the Spirit of adoption which teaches us to cry Abba, Father. Historically speaking, there could be no other mediation of that Spirit to humanity than through him who has taught us, once and for all, by word and action, in his life and in his death, what it is to be a "Son of God."

BEYOND MORAL IDEALISM

GEORGE PLIMPTON ADAMS

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

To an increasing number of people the idea that a religion which means to be something more than an heroic moral idealism has any significant place in the modern world seems open to grave doubts. Moreover, a large body of traditional metaphysical doctrines and systems are being subjected to much the same sort of criticism which religion is called upon to face. Three general arguments are used to show that both traditional religion and traditional metaphysics are no longer able to do what clear thinking and enlightened practice demand.

Both religion and metaphysical idealism—for this is usually the traditional philosophy that is in question—seem to concern themselves with more ultimate and absolute truths than ever arise in the actual world of scientific and moral judgments. Moral idealism, on the other hand, is content with the humbler task of the organization of our social experience, the relief of poverty, the freeing of human life everywhere from the obstructions which greed and ignorance impose,—with acting everywhere in the light of ideals wholly relative to the best we know and can do. Religion and metaphysical idealism purport to relate us to destinies so ultimate and so absolute that either we dare not trust in their efficacy for us in our present toil and labor, or else we scoff at them for their aloofness. To trust in absolute ideals and truths, and to suppose that in the blank contemplation of these deliverance will come, instead of setting to and winning those ideals which, because they are relative, can really serve us, is declared to be futile.

A second failure attributed to the older religion and metaphysics is their blurring of certain profound and unresolvable distinctions which common sense and practical life have found to be indispensable. The necessary and matter-of-fact differences between good and bad, between the real and the ideal, are blunted

and blurred, we are told, so that we are actually deceived about our world and our hopes. That which an enlightened judgment would regard as evil is taken up and "sublated" in the religious experience and in absolute idealism, and declared to be evil only because of our failure to see how good it really is. The result is, in Professor Perry's phrase, "a moral promiscuousness," where the all-goodness of the world "contradicts the moral distinction between good and evil." Or, again, the very essence of religion is supposed to consist in blurring the distinction between the actual and the ideal. The world, so religion is supposed to say, is in its true nature a perfect and complete system; the apparent separation for us between the real and the ideal is but illusory. Must not the moral consciousness judge such a religion to be utterly perverse? For morality, "the ideal is always something not as yet reached, and every apparent instance of its realization in an actual experience is an illusion which close inspection or more adequate analysis will dispel. For religion, on the other hand, the actualized ideal is not only real, but is the supreme and, in the full sense of the word, the only reality, and it is the apparent reality of that which conflicts with the ideal that is the illusion."¹ But why struggle for an ideal which is already real, why labor for a cause which already possesses the world?

A third way of stating the central defect of religion and of metaphysical idealism is to say that they involve ideals and values and entities which are transcendent with respect to those which experience shows us. The moral world, like the scientific world, is autonomous, in need of no external sanctions and standards such as religion is supposed to provide. The scientific and democratic motives demand this freedom from everything extrinsic and irrelevant. In the consciousness of this demand, the older religion and the older metaphysics have in substance perished.

These three counts in the indictment,—the three fallacies of absolutism, of the blurring of obvious distinctions, and of the transcendent,—are closely connected with each other. Any discussion of one implies some reckoning with the others. I shall here limit myself, however, to the third of these supposed fal-

¹ A. E. Taylor, *The Problem of Conduct*, p. 471.

lacies. I think it can be shown that no wholesale protest against all transcendence, as being futile and irrelevant, is quite to the point, least of all in the interests of moral idealism. I shall hope to make it clear that the motive—at any rate, one chief motive which has led to the belief in certain transcendent ideals and meanings—is a significant one, that it is the partial recognition of this motive which makes possible both morality and moral idealism, and that the difficulties which are found with traditional religion and metaphysics concern rather the form in which this motive has found expression than the motive itself. I mean that there is still reason in going somewhat beyond moral idealism, and recognizing that moral idealism, in order to do and to be what its best wishers might desire, must be something more than moral idealism. That this more than moral idealism will differ profoundly from traditional metaphysics and theology, ought to go without saying; the objections urged against the old habits of thought are valid. But let our care be that in bringing to light the ambiguities and failures of traditional systems, we do not neglect what of permanent value may be there.

Now the motive here referred to, a motive which has been the inner source of much of the enthusiasm generated by Christianity and by historic idealism, can be stated abstractly thus: Any moment of experience,—yes, any fact whatever,—has more meaning and more value than that fact itself discloses, or than the moment of experience itself verifies. The existence and meaning of things are in some measure incommensurable. When stated in terms of the moral experience, this principle means that the moral significance of a deed overflows the bare limits of the deed itself, that the deed means more than it simply is, that its influence and effects literally transcend its own meagre and brief life as a deed. When stated in terms of the religious experience, or better, of the religious attitude, it means that there are more significant and comprehensive meanings which attach to an act performed, or to a life lived, than belong to it as a merely human experience in a limited social environment. For the religious attitude the meaning possessed by an act is fraught with it knows not how much cosmic significance; the act or life is creative of something which adds to the total worth of things, and a worth

that will be conserved. But in whatever form this principle is stated, whether abstractly or as a principle of the moral or of the religious consciousness, it is throughout a principle of transcendence, the transcendence or disparity, namely, between what anything is and what it means. Morality and religion both live by just their recognition of this transcendence. A moral idealism which would save itself by setting up a barrier beyond which no meanings and values are to be sought, a moral idealism which limits its endeavors to the world of human and social activities in the interests of the supposedly modern abhorrence of everything transcendent, such an idealism is only half aware of its own significance and power.

With the whole modern demand for autonomy, the modern protest against any ideals so transcendent that they seem to be arbitrary and irrelevant, to be brought forcibly into our experience from some remote Beyond,—with this profound motive of modern reflective thought, both moral idealism and religion have to reckon. One may say, indeed, that this is the insight of all critical philosophy, that standards, ideals, truths, and values must grow out of and reflect the concrete situation in which they are to prove effective. If an ideal or value or plan of action is imposed from without, no matter with what transcendental and supernatural sanction, it is not the duty of any rational or moral being to recognize it save as it reflects his own interests and his own deepest purposes. Whether one calls this self-realisation or autonomy, democracy or naturalism, it is this right and duty to form and express one's own interests, to let the concrete situation reflect itself in relevant ideals and values, that is to be prized above all else. "To set up 'ideals' of perfection which are other than the serious recognition of the possibilities of development resident in each concrete situation, is in the end to pay ourselves with sentimentalities, if not with words, and meanwhile it is to direct thought and energy away from the situations which need and which welcome the perfecting care of attention and affection."² It would thus seem to be the very life of moral idealism to protest against all metaphysical ideals and transcendent values which religion seems obviously to insist upon.

² Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 422.

A return to the naturalism and sanity of Greek ethics is urged in behalf of a sound moral idealism. Greek ethics at its best, we are told, at any rate conceived the problem in the right way. The Greek moralists undertook the definition of a natural Good, consonant with the interests which struggle to assert themselves in the natural world of a cultivated and eager society. How much more human and moral was this than the striving after remote, transcendental duties, supposed to have their origin in a non-natural or supernatural realm, with which Christianity and absolute idealism have concerned themselves. The return to the Greek definition of morality in terms of natural interest rather than duty, but reinforced by the wealth of modern biology and psychology, with their rooting of all interests in the one continuous world of nature,—this is the programme of a pure moral idealism. The subjection of natural interests to transcendent standards, the dominance of religion and metaphysical idealism in the modern world, has served but to confuse men, to withdraw them from devotion to the common task; morality, single-minded and pure of heart, proceeds with its task of discipline and organization untroubled by the thought of those vague and remote issues in the presence of which all thought and action seem vain and hopeless.

When, however, we come to closer quarters with religion and historical idealism, when we look for the actual motives which inwardly seek expression in something beyond moral idealism, when we ask for the main use which the ethical religions and historical idealisms have made of this concept of transcendent norms, we find indeed that they are but endeavoring to express in their own way and more explicitly, just that motive which lies at the heart of the moral consciousness and of moral idealism. I shall consider very briefly four concepts, found both in the higher ethical religions and in historical idealisms, which illustrate this fundamental motive,—the concepts of symbolism, of revelation, of loyalty, and of mysticism. The fundamental principle here involved is, once more, the insight that things and acts which are taken up into either a moral or a religious interest actually possess more meaning than seems to belong to them as empirical things or acts.

First, symbolism. The history of religion is, in large part, the history of man's attempt to provide symbols for values with which he feels himself vitally concerned, and which he thinks of as requiring symbols just because they are more comprehensive and potent than any fact which he ever verifies empirically. The fetich, the totem, the idol, the sacrificial meal, the sacraments, are symbolic of meanings which are incommensurable with any given fact or given thing. The inveterate tendency to pantheism in all the higher religions is the outcome of regarding *all* facts as symbolic of some mysterious and divine Whole. John Smith, the Cambridge Platonist, gives a typical expression of this motive in the following words: "True religion never finds itself out of the infinite sphere of the Divinity. A good man finds every place he treads upon holy ground. To him the world is God's temple; he is ready to say with Jacob, How dreadful is this place! this is none other than the house of God, this is the gate of heaven."³

Here would seem to be the bond between the aesthetic and the religious consciousness. Art is merely an artificial and consciously controlled attempt to construct and appreciate objects whose function it is to symbolize meanings which transcend the object as a mere thing. Thus the belief that the things of experience mean more than we ever adequately verify, that our experience is symbolic of a meaning which cannot be exhausted, but which at best we can only symbolize,—this it is which makes the concept of symbolism so central a one in the higher religions. Philosophy, too, has in its own way expressed this motive, when it has spoken of the incommensurability between experience and things-in-themselves, when it has said that our experience can only symbolize, and but partially express, the real nature of things. "You seek the meaning and the end of your action; you ask for some sufficient reason for living; do you not feel that it is contradictory to address yourself to the science of phenomena, seeing that, from the strictly scientific point of view, phenomena have not in themselves their own *raison d'être*? That which you seek is beyond phenomena, and it is symbols alone that can, not make you comprehend it, but reveal it to you."⁴

³ Quoted by W. R. Inge in *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 309.

⁴ Sabatier, *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, p. 325.

Secondly, revelation. The concept of revelation, which seems remote enough from common sense and concrete experience, is nevertheless an essential ingredient of all religion. For the religious attitude, once more, things mean more than they are, and what is this but to say that the "more" which anything means is revealed through the object. The object is a symbol of that which it but imperfectly reveals. To say with the pious that God reveals himself to man is to say that what man possesses in his experience is a symbol of what he might possess, of a Good which is not yet made completely his own. For naturalism or factualism, facts are just what they are experienced as being, and nothing more. "Everything is what it is, and not another thing," as Bishop Butler tersely expressed it, not meaning, however, to state the principle of naturalism. For religion, as for idealism, there is in the least and most unworthy fact a prophecy of that greater wealth of meaning but partially revealed in the fact as it appears. The religious attitude is then necessarily one of faith in the unseen potentialities and meanings of things.

Thirdly, loyalty. At no point does religion seem more to conflict with reflective thought than in its demand that a man shall serve causes and purposes which are given him to serve, rather than those purposes which are continuous with his own interests. For, as we have seen, reflective thought is convinced that no ideals are significant unless they are projected from the spontaneous, natural interests of man. His interests, his desires, his impulses are but to be clarified and organized in his ideals. He is to form his ideals. They are to be the ministers of his natural wants and interests.

Well and good; but religion asks of a man that he *serve* the ideal, that he use his energies and his life as an instrument not as an end, that he regard himself with his natural interests as a loyal subject of purposes which he does not create, of plans to which he in no wise contributes, but which are given him to serve and to further. "The essence of religion is that man is *not* shut up in himself as an individual, but able to escape into a wider consciousness, of which his mind and will may become the organ."⁵ Not as a free maker of ideals, but as a loyal servant of the Most High,

⁵ Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, vol. ii, p. 620.

does the religious attitude find its worthiest expression. Is there any solution of this antinomy between morality with its freedom to make ideals, and religion with its insistence on the service of ideals which are already there inviting loyal service? Yes, if one is willing to confess that one's interests and desires, one's very self indeed, has more meaning and really is more than one himself ever verifies. One may then say, "This which I now wish to do or to be, this present ideal of mine which expresses my interests as I now know them, and which I have accordingly framed,—this is no worthy ideal, because my interests, my desires, my self, are more than they now show themselves to be. I do not and cannot completely experience the whole meaning of myself. Hence it may be that in devoting myself to an ideal which demands more than my present interests, as I know them, would of themselves freely give,—it may be that in truth I am actually fulfilling the real requirements of my interests." The ideal which seems so remote and so transcendent would, so the religious attitude believes, be freely chosen, could one determine the whole of what his self means.

Fourthly, mysticism. From various quarters it has come to be recognized that in some sense mysticism occupies a central position in all religion. One need not go to the extreme of saying, with Boutroux, that the essence and foundation of all intense religion is mysticism. But mysticism,—in the sense of a profound discontent with the obvious, a search for those more remote meanings which overflow the barriers of the common presuppositions and discourse of men,—this indeed, with the sense of symbolism, of some sort of revelation, and of inclusive purposes which demand the loyal devotion of men's energies, probably accounts for most of the attitudes which we call religious.

Is not, now, the distinctively moral attitude and moral experience remote enough from all this? Is this all fancy and myth, with which stern duty has nothing to do? What has the religious attitude with its search for the meanings of things which overlap their existence as things,—what has this to do with doing one's duty and obeying the moral law? How is the religious attitude related to the moral attitude, to a purified moral idealism? The answer is that the moral experience also is vitally

concerned with the truth of the doctrine that one's decisions, one's deeds, have meanings which extend far beyond the brief life of those deeds and decisions as such. To act morally means precisely to act with conscious reference to the more ultimate meaning of one's acts, and not to limit one's vision to the act as satisfying isolated impulses or demands. The only moral argument one can address to the wrong-doer is, "Your deed really is more, and means more, than your present contracted self is aware of. Open your eyes to the thousand unseen implications and influences of this your deed, see it in its context, and see the havoc that it makes."

There is one application of this general principle which is deserving of special notice from the point of view of both ethics and religion. We have seen that for both the religious and the moral attitudes certain facts or deeds are fringed with a network of meanings and values, which the mere facts taken by themselves never exhaust but only symbolize or reveal. Morality consists in seeing something of this real context of meanings and acting with conscious reference to it. But morality has to do with the deeds of conscious selves, and hence the central problem for any reflective morality is, Who, then, is the self whose actions enter into the moral world? Is the self in reality anything more than it seems to itself to be? Does the self mean more than it is? Is there any common-sense view, any patent fact about the self, which needs to be revised and transcended if one would consciously act with reference to what the self means and really is? Now the enlightened moral consciousness and the higher ethical religions have made very much depend on one's insight into the fact that one's self is not the peculiarly private and severed thing that it appears to be, especially when the self is identified with the body. The self, the organized totality of one's interests, really is, and means, much more than such a self at any one moment is able to verify. The moral self is more than the private self, means more than anything that the private self, as just this single being, is ever aware of. Here, if anywhere, morality must transcend the obvious, must see things which are not real, if by real one means things most accessible and immediate. For what is more obvious than just this impervious and thoroughly individual

character of the self, and what seems more remote from sound common sense than the doctrine which declares that these apparently impervious selves have more meanings than they are now aware of, and that in order to realize what these meanings are the illusion of their sundered individuality must be overcome. "The universal will of the moral insight must aim at the destruction of all which separates us into a heap of different selves, and at the attainment of some higher positive aim. The 'one undivided soul' we are bound to make our ideal."⁶

Morality and religion have ever to face the charge of being perverse and paradoxical, mere artifice and exaggeration rather than wholesome, sane contentment with the wiser provisions of nature. Their truths sound strange and hard to common sense with its acceptance of the obvious, its reluctance to go from what a thing is to the more that it means. The paradox of self-sacrifice, of dying to live, of losing one's life to save it, is a paradox as long as one sees only the obvious; perchance it will seem true when one sees through and beyond the obvious to the transcendent meaning of it.

I have tried to indicate that in their radical discontent with the merely apparent, in their search for more meanings than are ever verified, in keeping their vision fixed on the implied meanings of things, both morality and religion have a common root. But does not the distinction and even enmity between morality and religion still remain, even after we have recognized that both share this mental attitude of radical discontent with things as they are, and that both desire to live and act with reference to the more that things always mean? Does not morality always say to religion,

"My paths are in the fields I know,
And thine in undiscover'd lands"?

Morality seems to concern itself with social facts, with making clashing interests compatible, with the control of impulses in the light of certain social principles,—in short, with the organization of life, and all of life's concrete interests. Religion seems transcendent, it seems to bring in unreal agents and sanctions.

⁶ Royce, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 193.

From the point of view of religion, the moral experience is no mere social fact, to be taken merely for what it appears to be; it is endowed with cosmic and ultimate significance, it relates man to a realm over and above the given world of social experience.

Yes, one must answer, religious idealism is beyond moral idealism. The meanings with which religion invests life are more than the meanings which morality and moral idealism give to the deeds brought within its field of vision. But the more than morality which religion and historical idealisms have tried to express,—perhaps all too unsuccessfully—has been just what we should expect if our analysis of the moral consciousness is true. Morality itself, the discontent with the obvious, the search for the final implications of an act, does not all of this, does not even morality itself mean something beyond itself? Is the mental habit of looking for meanings,—this mental habit which has generated morality, which is but another name for reflection,—is this to rest content with morality itself as a mere fact, or is it to ask for the meaning of morality too? Psychologically, I doubt not, it is this habit of looking beyond any datum for the meanings that it involves,—for the system that renders it intelligible,—which accounts for the persistence of a religious idealism transcending moral idealism. For the religious attitude, as distinct from the moral, God is a name for the ultimate something which makes morality and the moral search for meanings both possible and significant. Whether it is legitimate to put to the whole of the moral world a question which in the first instance we ask only within that world, is a logical and metaphysical problem, which it would be beyond the scope of this paper to discuss. But whether logically justifiable or not, it has its psychological roots in the habit for which morality itself is responsible, the habit of believing that things have more meanings than, of themselves, they disclose. Once become conscious of what you do, as a moral agent, in putting the question as to what a contemplated act really means for the larger system to which it belongs, and you will find yourself asking for the meaning of this whole moral world itself. You will have advanced from moral idealism to a religious idealism.

I have more than once spoken of religion and historical idealisms together, as if they were inwardly connected. Historical idealisms are those systems of thought which have regarded as legitimate this question as to the total or cosmic significance of the world of moral activity. In this respect they have been the reflective expressions of religion. Both religion and historical idealisms have tried to say something about a larger system, or setting, which "makes experience possible," or which makes morality possible. Experience, and the facts of experience, are not for either religion or metaphysical idealism mere data, to be described just as they are,—they are regarded as the expressions of something which transcends experience simply in the sense of making it possible and giving it meaning. For opposite ways of thinking, notably for positivism, definite barriers are set beyond which one must not ask, What does it mean? One must "describe the facts of experience," and not raise the question as to any ultimate meaning which these facts may have, or any more basic principles which make experience possible. It is not without reason that Kant with his transcendental problem as to "what makes experience possible," is the chiefest foe of positivism and factualism.

It has perhaps been the mistake of historical idealisms, as of religion, that they have believed themselves able to answer this question about the more ultimate meanings in terms of a final, absolute, and all-inclusive system. It may be that such a solution is not for us now. The concepts of evolution and development, the dynamic concepts, have entered too deeply into our habits of thought to permit us to remain content with older expressions of the religious motive. The motive itself, however, endures; although religious idealism, which is more than moral idealism because it asks for the more ultimate and cosmic meanings of morality and of all human activity, must ever be dissatisfied with its old expressions, and ever seek more adequate formulation.

THE TYPES OF AUTHORITY IN CHRISTIAN BELIEF

CLARENCE A. BECKWITH

CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

This presentation is limited to an exposition and estimate of the chief types in which authority has appeared in the church, to which are added one or two fundamental suggestions.

The first type is naturally that of the Roman Catholic church. Authority here was a gradual growth. At the outset no one could have foreseen the ultimate result, yet the claims of a series of bishops of the early church of Rome, not seldom men of the greatest administrative ability, whose assumptions were favored by circumstances, grew at length into the acknowledged supremacy of the Roman see. This supremacy gradually took the place of the state and subordinated every government to its own law and end, and this claim now extends to every interest of every individual whenever and wherever the church sees fit to exercise its prerogative. Naturally it centres in the ideas and beliefs which concern religion. Its essential peculiarity is that between the hierarchy and the laity a great gulf is fixed across which the laity as such cannot pass. The hierarchy has means of knowledge of which the laity is deprived; it alone can interpret the Scriptures; to it alone has the deposit of tradition been committed; it alone has the right to enforce its judgments of truth and duty. Thus the hierarchy is in possession of a secret which it can share with no other, which it is a sacrilege for that other to seek for itself. The claim contains two further assumptions, that of infallibility and that of concentration in one official person. Infallibility means that authority covers every single relation of life where the church wills to exert it. Concentration in one person means that authority has to find some individual in whom it completely dwells and through whom it may be perfectly exercised. The distinctive quality must not be overlooked: to all save the hierarchy the authority is external, absolute, and final.

When Protestantism was organized in distinction from the Roman Catholic church, it became marked by three different attitudes toward the principle of authority, as found in experience, in the Scriptures, and in the reason.

Luther and those who were immediately associated with him found in their experience of the grace of God in Jesus Christ the immediate authentication of all their religious convictions. Whatever did not square with that experience, no matter whence arising, could not be true. Luther did indeed find in Paul's doctrine of justification by faith alone, and in the gracious and forgiving words of Jesus, that which spoke with sweet and convincing power; but not everything in the Scriptures was of equal authority over either his conscience or his thought. Calvin knew of no Scriptures which could be appealed to if the mind was not quickened by the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit. In the hidden court of the individual consciousness was heard that divine voice to which nothing external, such as church or creed or both, could add either truth or cogency. The authority was that of God or Christ or of the living Spirit, and not that of man. Luther with his great confession at the Diet of Worms stands with Socrates before his judges at Athens, with Jesus before Pilate, with Savonarola before his enemies at Florence, obedient to the inner voice of his experience. That, and that alone, which had created the experience of the Christian man and was essential to that experience was of paramount authority. Naturally, whatever was grounded on individual experience was liable to the danger of particularism and undue subjectivity, was too much at the mercy of emotion, lacking in universal applicability.

It was precisely this liability which led the Scholastic Reformers to assume another attitude toward authority. Feeling the need of some common standard to which to appeal, recourse was had to the Scriptures. They had renounced the authority of the church as such, and, confused by the differences which seemed irreconcilable in individual experience, they turned to the Scriptures as that which lay back of both church and experience, by which both were to be tested. Thus the oft-cited words of Chillingworth fairly represent the Protestant position: "The Bible and the Bible alone the religion of Protestants." This

position was, and has continued to be, one of grave difficulty; it centred in two questions, first, as to just what the Bible is, and secondly, as to the interpretation of it. To meet the difficulty concerning the Scriptures various expedients were resorted to. It came at length to be asserted that the vowel points of the Hebrew text were directly inspired by God and hence were trustworthy and authoritative. This proving inadequate, it was affirmed that not the Scriptures as we have them in any extant text but only the original autographs, when interpreted in the sense intended, were inerrant and infallible. But though this claim were allowed to be true, yet since the original autographs are hopelessly inaccessible, it is not worth while to attempt to disprove the position. Still further, though the Scriptures were admitted thus to be inerrant, yet this view would require an interpreter equally inerrant and infallible, and also the universal recognition of such an interpreter as inerrant and infallible. But such an interpreter has not appeared in the Protestant church, or, if he has, neither Lutheran nor Reformed nor Arminian nor any other branch of the church has acknowledged him. The attempt to set the Scriptures over against the church as an ultimate authority on the basis named is therefore futile. If the Scriptures are authoritative, the authority is relative and consistent with such incompleteness as actually characterizes both the Scriptures and all interpretations of them.

The third attitude of Protestantism is that which finds the source of authority in the human reason. Rationalism proposes, first, to test the historical documents and all alleged facts of Christianity by the same criteria which are applied to other so-called historical and literary phenomena; secondly, to interpret the Scriptures by the same standards which are valid for other books; thirdly, to verify traditional beliefs by the same canons which are suitable to other beliefs. The fundamental position here is that all documents and all existing beliefs have had their origin not in a supernatural sphere but in the mind of man, that they contain therefore nothing extra-human, and that they are amenable to human reason. Only that is revelation in which truth is actually disclosed. If there is mystery, this signifies that revelation has not yet taken place or is only partial. Whenever

revelation occurs, it is marked by these signs: it is the "revelation of something which can be construed by the mind, which is conveyed to it in terms of human thought, which can be expressed in coherent propositions." Thus the revelation is not external but internal, not absolute but relative, not complete but progressive, to, because in, the mind of man. No dogmatic propositions which involve a supposed truth above or contrary to the reason can coerce or bind the intelligence. The authority lies therefore in the truth, and in the truth only so far as known.

These, then, are the four chief historical types under which authority has presented itself: the authority of the church, the authority of experience, the authority of the Scriptures, and the authority of the reason or truth. Each has occupied a large place in the development of religious belief, and probably each has never been more sharply defined or more widely influential than now. Even in the Roman Catholic church, where one would least expect it, authority of immediate experience, authority of the Scriptures, and authority of the reason contest the field with the absolute authority of the church, and the strength of the Modernist movement shows that the end is not yet. On the other hand, among Protestants one sees that the authority of the church is in many circles becoming more effective in the determination of belief.

A further analysis of the forms of authority here sketched shows that it is of two kinds: that which attaches itself to the church and the Scriptures is external; that which belongs to experience and the reason is internal. The authority of the church and the Scriptures is complete and final, while that of the reason and experience is more or less partial and progressive.

In addition to the forms of authority already indicated is yet another which is destined to play a large part in the immediate future, the view advocated by Professor Rudolf Seeberg in Germany and Principal P. T. Forsyth and D. S. Cairns in Great Britain. This characterizes the so-called "Positive Theology," the starting-point of which is the "primacy of the given." Revelation is marked by an objective content. In and by means of the cross of Christ God's personal redemptive relation to the world

was changed once for all. In this fact Christian experience finds its creative source. Yet we come to this neither by the Scriptures as infallible nor by historical criticism but by present-day experience. Since this implies that the supernatural exists today, it lays a foundation for the supernatural in both the New Testament period and in the New Testament itself. Our faith is not something which we share with Christ as directed to God, but it is directed to Christ in whom God reconciled himself to men. The authoritative element in Christian belief is thus the changed attitude of God toward the sinner, which authenticates itself in the sinner's experience of God's grace or reconciliation traced to the deed of Christ. Not dogma, therefore, but a deed, not the Scriptures as such, but a fact enshrined in the Scriptures, not a truth offered to intelligence nor a mystery offered to faith, but an experience of God offered to man for acceptance and verification.

The theories thus outlined serve to indicate the large place which authority has made for itself in Christian belief. We may now seek to evaluate these in part in the order in which they have been presented. That no one of these theories has been able to hold its own to the exclusion of all others does not prove the falsity of all of them, but possibly only that while each contains a partial truth, it requires to be supplemented by the rest and perhaps by still other conceptions. No idea held for so long a time and by so many people is wholly false. While neither age nor common consent is a sufficient criterion of truth, yet, on the other hand, no belief is wholly wrong which has been cherished by large bodies of men and over long periods of time. Not alone in the present has the Spirit of Truth been active, guiding men into all the truth. Our business here is a sympathetic inquiry into the deeper meaning of these attitudes of mind.

The Roman Catholic theory of authority at its best embodies two principles of permanent value. One is that of the social unity of believers. The individuality of the Christian life is a priceless truth. Each man shall bear his own burden, and every one of us shall give account of himself to God. But this is only half the truth; we are also members one of another. The church long ago made this an article of its faith, but only in our day have

both psychology and ethics shown why it is that self-consciousness and personality are possible only in the social group. Secondly, this unity does not mean identity of function. On the contrary, the functions of the church are, as the apostle declared, of the greatest diversity. The more highly organized the community, the more diverse the functions. Yet all functions are not equal, although all may be equally necessary. By virtue of wisdom or power or goodness, some men are, and indeed must be, leaders. Some must teach, some must care for the common interests, some must minister to the needy out of hearts of love. And the correlate of this is also true; some must be taught, some must accept and obey the rule of leaders, some must welcome the good which others bring. This is evident in every stage of historical human life and appears to lie in the nature of things. So far as one can see, there is no possibility of this condition being outgrown. Wherever there is leadership of any kind, there must be some degree of assumption, of responsibility, of authority. Nowhere is this more clearly evident than in the case of Jesus. He spoke with authority because *he* could speak in no other way. The apostle Paul issued serious and urgent commands to the Corinthian church, but he had no alternative. The great bishops of the early church had to assume, and to execute, great tasks for which they were set. In the mediaeval period among untrained and unorganized peoples the church had to teach and rule with authority often rigorous and exacting. In her claim of infallibility which finds a voice in the Pope of Rome, and in the impassable gulf opened between the hierarchy and the laity, the Roman church has fatally overstepped the rightful bound of authority. Yet even this does not militate against the idea that with her present constituency it would both impair her high ministry and threaten her very existence, were she in a day to renounce all her singular claims and proceed to establish a pure democracy among her adherents. And this has its measure of truth in the Protestant church.

The Protestant theory which found the source of authority in the Scriptures was a position of great strength. It singled out from among the three sources affirmed by the Catholic church—the Scriptures, tradition, and the interpretation of the church—

the fountain-head of all doctrine and belief. If Protestantism had to choose any book as the source of authority, it was fortunate in its selection of the Scriptures. Moreover, we who preach still find here an inexhaustible mine of texts, religious, ethical, social. Still in our theological seminaries exegesis and Biblical theology are studied seriously with the aim of ascertaining the thought of God. Still the prophets illumine the pathway into the deepest problems of the personal life; still the psalmists reveal to us the divine secret of struggle, aspiration, triumph, and peace; still the letters of the apostle to the gentiles are unique and unsurpassed in great thoughts, tender sympathy, profound insight, and Christian judgment called out by the exigencies of experience. Here, too, is our most authentic description of our Saviour's life and deeds, our most authentic account of his words and his self-revelation of the Father. And if he is what our faith postulates and our love responds to, then the documents in which he is enshrined cannot fail to speak to us with a finality found nowhere else. It is still true, as Coleridge said, that the Bible "finds" us at greater depths than any other book. After historical criticism has done its legitimate work—and no impediment must be placed in its path—the Scriptures will continue to offer the supreme revelation of God and his purpose of redemption, of Jesus Christ as his Son, and of man's ideal destination to individual and social redemption.

The reason why many have sought the source of authority in experience is not far to seek. Authority derived from the church or from the Scriptures is necessarily external; it has therefore an element of remoteness. At best it is at the outset second-hand. It may be valid for others; how can I know that it is valid for me? But of that which arises in individual experience one has not the same doubt. There is such a vividness, an immediateness, a cogency, a convincing and compelling power, that no argument is required to persuade nor external measure to enforce it. The mystic asks for no outer proofs; all his evidence is within. Prophets upon whom the Lord's hand was heavy, or who beheld the Lord on a throne high and lifted up, needed no council of men to substantiate their message. One key to the entire theology of the apostle Paul is his experience on the Damascus road.

No one can understand Augustine's theology who is not familiar with his *Confessions*. Large portions of the Christian church ask for no other proof that Christ is the living and all-sufficient Saviour than the fact that he has saved them from their sins. Any theory of authority which ignores experience as at least a proximate source of belief is lacking in one essential element of reality. There may be danger of subjectivity, individualism, even fanaticism and separatism, but the danger must be accepted and met by suitable means.

Authority as grounded in reason has its rightful advocates. "Truth" is here the watchword; truth is the ultimate authority. It requires no validation; its force is neither derived from nor enhanced by decrees of councils; it is not more true because found in the Scriptures, and its authentication does not depend on the fluctuating fervency of experience. It shines by its own clear light. It points the way and there is no alternative but to follow. The position has been taken that every man, even the Roman Catholic, is ultimately a rationalist, that is, that the final court of appeal as to whether there is a God, or a revelation, or an infallible church is the private judgment of each individual. This would be true if as a matter of fact every man exercised his private judgment, if every man had arrived at his belief concerning God, revelation, and the church by a process of reasoning, leading from a state of indifference or doubt to positive conviction. But this is no more true than that the foundation of the empirical state is the "social contract." Even among Protestants not one man in a thousand has the idea of God or revelation or his particular church as result of a course of reasoning. Nor is one man in ten thousand a Protestant even because he has balanced the arguments pro and con for Protestantism as against Roman Catholicism or the Greek church. Partly by imitation, partly by custom, partly by acquisition of a self-unconscious habit, we grow into the beliefs by which we live. We find ourselves possessed by these, and then perchance look round for the authority by which to justify them. On the other hand, those who discover their final authority in the rational principle, or truth, occupy a perfectly impregnable position, so long as they deal with the abstract. The moment, however, they push into

the concrete, trouble begins. Pilate's question without its despairing sneer asks itself afresh, "What is truth?" And the answers, instead of a rational unity, are a medley of confused voices. If one may refer to the actual positions of those who maintain that truth is the final authority, instead of coming upon agreement in their ranks, one is distracted by the most conflicting and even mutually exclusive declarations as to what truth is. There is no unanimity as to the historical and literary phenomena on which Christianity is based, nor as to the interpretation of these phenomena; rather is there a wide and contradictory divergence of view. While, therefore, as a principle the statement that truth is the final authority remains unchallenged, its application is subject to well-nigh insuperable difficulties. At best it is an ideal toward which we strive rather than a goal already reached.

The position that authority resides in something "given" in Christianity deserves serious consideration. Its two chief excellences are, first, that the ultimate reality of Christianity is not conceived apart from experience, since present-day experience involves the supernatural and hence guarantees the truth of God's redemptive action; and, secondly, experience is not divorced from the historic deed of God in Christ, since experience is explicable only with reference to this deed. Thus authority is grounded partly in experience and partly in that by which it is created, namely, the data of the gospel. It is safe to say that no notion of authority can ever be adequate which ignores its relation to a living experience, for only in experience does its full value emerge. On the other hand, the theory under consideration answers to the demand that authority have an objective basis also. Moreover, it is not indifferent to the New Testament as containing the authoritative record of the objective basis or divine deed, although it is not necessary to interpret this divine deed in the way proposed by the advocates of this theory. The essential claim of Protestantism is thus preserved, that the New Testament is the supreme depository of God's purpose of grace in Jesus Christ, and therefore the ultimate authoritative source of our knowledge of redemption. It is, however, to be noted that the "datum," or the "given," in Christianity does not stand over

against the human mind as something contrary to the reason, or as above the reason, or as mystery insoluble yet accredited by the reason and therefore to be received. It is indeed a mystery, but only in the Pauline sense—a reality once hidden but now become manifest and therefore known. Accordingly authority attaches itself not to an inscrutable secret but to a divine deed, which evinces its essential nature in every man's experience of the forgiveness of sins, and becomes ever more luminous with the unfolding of that experience.

One or two further aspects of authority require consideration. The first is its bearing on personality. The earliest form of this arises in the relation of children to parents and contains all the elements which emerge later in more explicit diverse forms. From the first unreflecting response of the child to the natural and inevitable authority of the parents on through his submission to the sovereignty of the state in the whole circle of civic relations embodied in school and other spheres of action, the influence received by him from the church in its Bible instruction and varied ministries, his acquiescence in the indeterminate social conventions (the more effective the less they are codified), his beliefs and judgments, which he has in great part uncritically reproduced from the beliefs and judgments of others—in all these experiences are to be seen the operation of authority, and that too wholly in the region of personal relations. This reliance upon personal authority is universal and shows that it is partly instinctive and partly self-conscious. Its psychological basis is twofold: imitation, and the impossibility of any one's verifying for himself all the contents of his knowledge. Most of our fundamental and cherished beliefs have already become an integral part of our consciousness before we come to reflect upon them, and these abide with us, revealing their presence and power in the great moments of our experience. We have, moreover, to depend upon others for the larger portion of our more ultimate conceptions of the physical world and the facts of practical life. Reasons why we accept testimony of particular persons vary with each of us; temperament, sex, general habits of thought and feeling, groups of interest in which one has continually lived, special past experiences, family and social traditions, more in-

timinate associations, indeed numberless influences to which one yields but of which one is self-unconscious. We have thus a deep, ineradicable tendency to believe other persons and to believe most in those who, other things being equal, are good. We believe what they say, and, more than this, we believe in them. They create confidence in us, and we are content that it should be so, even if we cannot fully explain to ourselves the final ground of our confidence or wholly vindicate its content to others. How it is that Jesus effects his unmeasured power of teaching and of redemption in the souls of men I but partly understand, but this I know, that to those who freely open their consciousness to him there is no limit to his revelation of God or of the ideals of individual and social life which he makes and will make to them. There is a secret here, but it is the secret of personality. Ultimately the highest authority resides in the highest person.

Another aspect of authority lies in its teleological import. We believe, not because we have proved and not because any one else has proved. We often believe in spite of proof, although not in spite of all proof. Nor does our belief depend upon Bishop Butler's balance of probability. Our great beliefs are the answer of our entire personality to the total reality of things. The particular belief may be fragmentary but it is not thereby discredited. If we are to live, some things must be true. Paradoxical as it is, we do not create our deepest beliefs, rather are they created for us. Augustine's position is forever true, "Faith precedes knowledge." We are, for instance, theists not because, but one may say in spite of, or at least irrespective of, the common theistic proofs. One after another these have been shown at the bar of pure reason to be baseless, yet theism as a conviction was never so vital or deeply rooted as today. This only means that because our great beliefs cannot completely justify themselves in logic, they are not therefore discredited. As they have arisen from the necessities of life, so life will justify them. There is in belief and in experience a prophetic element. Partial it may seem to be, but it is an integral part of an infinite whole which is indestructibly immanent in it. In the ideal and not in the actual, in the future and not completely in the past or the present, in the whole and not in any fragment, in the inevitable outcome of

the moral order and not in any momentary stage of it, in God and not in man, lies the ultimate authority for our belief in virtue, redemption, and the immortal certainty of conquest in the divine struggle for existence.

From this point of view light is cast in various directions. First, it discloses why, if authority begins as dogmatic assertion, external coercion if need be, it cannot remain such; it exists not for itself but that later it may renounce itself as "might." It disappears as force that it may reappear as impulse and obedience of the free spirit to the divine ideal. In other words, authority is not external and static, but developmental and functional. This is possibly the severest criticism to be passed on the notion of authority in the Roman Catholic church. If, moreover, one seeks in the Christian experience of any man or age the authority for his belief, one must not separate this from its teleological significance. "That apart from us," said the ancient writer, "they should not be made perfect." The Scriptures are authoritative not simply as a book with a revelation closed and sealed, but as the living word of God interpreted in the light of God's unfolding purpose of grace resplendent with the promise of consummation. There is indeed authority in the reason, not as an isolated notion or idea, but in so far as it partakes of the eternal Logos which permeates and enlightens the whole world. There is a "given" element in Christianity which is authoritative, but its ultimate meaning is found not in itself but in that to which it points—an earnest or pledge of a completed redemption.

The ultimate source of authority in Christian belief is the personal consciousness of Jesus Christ in his disclosure of the character and redemptive purpose of God, which is the creative and informing spirit of the Christian church, the central element and all-determining principle of the Scriptures, the organizer and ideal of Christian experience, the divine light which illumines the reason, the datum without which Christianity would not be.

REVERENCE AS THE HEART OF CHRISTIANITY

CHARLES A. ALLEN

WAVERTLEY, MASS.

When we stand by the sea and watch a storm dash huge waves on the rocks with furious roar and tumult, the power of the ocean fills us with awe. When the storm passes by and the night comes on and the stars shine out, at first one by one and then in throngs, till the great dome is all aflame and infinite spaces open above us, lighted with innumerable fires,—while the grandeur of the scene awakens awe, the mystery and boundlessness of these evening skies awaken wonder also. But when the day dawns and we look around us and see some lovely landscape, we no longer feel either awe or wonder; both have disappeared with the shadows of the night and the mystery of the stars; we feel only admiration. Then, if we enter some home where sons and daughters gather around the chair of an aged mother, we see that they feel no awe, for she is feeble and they are strong; and perhaps there is no admiration, for her form may be bent and her features wrinkled; but when her children think of what her sweet goodness has been to them through many years, they feel a nobler sentiment. It is not mere respect, however, such as we always render to age; it is not mere gratitude and love; it is reverence.

In these pictures from nature and life we find suggestions of the differences between four distinct sentiments of human nature, each of which is the heart of a different type of religion. When they are thus vividly pictured, any one can see the differences. Yet they are often confused, and the consequences of this confusion are mischievous. For if we fail to note the difference between the lower and the higher sentiment, it is easy for us to live content with the lower type of religion, because we do not feel or understand the higher type. Thus we may content ourselves with a religion of mere awe or wonder, or with

a mere respect for certain ceremonies and edifices and sacred days, and may never rise to the religion of reverence because "reverence" means to us only awe or wonder or respect. It is a common mistake of those who are interested in religious organizations to think that they are very religious because they believe in the miraculous powers of certain relics with a kind of awe or rest their Christian faith upon the traditions of certain wonderful happenings in the past or are regular churchgoers and have great respect for the places and customs of worship, even though they seldom or never seem to appreciate the divine glory of goodness in men and women around them. Such a type of religious feeling is often hardly to be distinguished from paganism, however much it makes Christian professions and takes the Christian name.

In the religions of the Bible the appeal to reverence is characteristic; and in Christianity we find a distinctive type of reverence, which recognizes a divine presence, not only in saints and prophets, but in all human nature, in even the most degraded, and therefore feels the infinite value of every soul.

We may clearly discriminate between these sentiments by observing, as I have suggested above in certain pictures from nature and life, that they accompany different perceptions. Awe, for instance, usually accompanies a sense-perception of the stupendous power and magnitude of nature; wonder, a recognition of the limitations of our knowledge; admiration, mainly an aesthetic perception; reverence, always a moral perception. Awe can never be modified into admiration or reverence, any more than the feeling of weight can be transformed into a perception of colors. But awe can be followed by the higher sentiments or be felt simultaneously with them, while each retains its distinctive character, just as our absorbed attention to some objects of sight, in which we are heedless of all sounds, may be followed by a similar attention to certain sounds, or the eyes and ears may simultaneously observe their appropriate objects.

Therefore, we find that a careful writer like Professor Momerie defines reverence as "the surrender of the spirit to the attractive influence of goodness," and James Kidd says that it "is excited by nobility of character," and Martineau, that "rever-

ence" is "devotion to goodness," that "a religion of reverence bows before the authority of goodness," and that "a being manifestly under the influence of principles higher than our own awakens our reverence; a being with evident force of resolve to execute, more unfailingly than ourselves, what is simply on our level excites our admiration." Martineau elsewhere says of "wonder, admiration, and reverence," that "in the gaining of knowledge we have the first; in the perception of beauty, the second; in the presence of higher character, the third." But, as Goethe has said, Christianity teaches us to reverence what is beneath us, as well as what is above us,—which can be true in no other sense than Channing's, namely, that reverence recognizes moral goodness as divine, not only in the saint and in God, but also in the lowliest human soul; for the least germ of goodness is God's "real presence," and in reverencing even the possibilities of goodness we are reverencing "God in man." Thus, as Channing says, "Christianity lays the foundation of a universal love by inspiring reverence for the human soul, be that soul lodged wherever it may."

But the higher forms of religion are constantly tending to slip and slide into the lower forms, because most men feel the higher sentiments so faintly; and therefore a religion which centres in reverence may easily become some kind of paganism, without changing its name or disowning its saints, by merely substituting some lower religious feeling for reverence.

In the Middle Ages Christianity was apprehended very gradually by converts from paganism, in whose religious life awe and wonder and similar sentiments were predominant and reverence was seldom felt. The appeal to which they could most readily respond was, therefore, the appeal to awe and wonder; and the teaching of the Church was "subdued to what it worked in, like the dyer's hand." Awe for its great saints, for instance, was compelled by tales of their miracle-working power. Thus the memory of Francis of Assisi was glorified by legends of miracles, which awakened awe in those who could but dimly appreciate and reverence his saintliness.

A similar appeal to a lower sentiment we find today in the tendency of some minds to return to a nature-worship which appeals

to awe and admiration and wonder, but not at all to reverence, because such minds have ceased to believe in an Infinite Person whom they can really worship. In the strict sense of the word, there is no religion in nature-worship; for nature-worship is either mere superstition or else mere aesthetic enjoyment¹; the sentiment of it can be nothing nobler than mere awe or wonder or admiration, whereas, as Martineau observes, "the transcendent form of reverence," that is, our reverence for the Supremely Good, "constitutes proper religion." Similarly Professor Upton says, "Religion proper does not clearly show itself in human nature till reverence for an authority manifested in the conscience presents the soul with a supreme ideal, in which the presence and the authority of the Eternal One are felt to be revealed."²

In the strictest sense, the essence of religion is not reverence, but loyalty to God. Nevertheless Martineau is right in saying that "the ascendancy of the greater soul over the lesser," which creates loyalty, "is won by touching the springs of reverence"; and, therefore, whatever appeal may be made to our awe or wonder or admiration can never for a moment control us, if the appeal to reverence calls us to our true allegiance,—as, for instance, when the awe or wonder or admiration that created the pagan religions of ancient times, and even the reverence for the divine justice and beneficence which was sometimes felt, came into contact with the reverence for the divine holiness and for the moral possibilities of human nature which Christianity taught

¹ For even the most intense feeling of a Divine Presence in the beauty of the universe does not involve any feeling of self-surrender to a higher goodness. Therefore the aesthetic recognition of God is a mere admiration which we welcome on account of the pleasure it gives us; yet simultaneously with this aesthetic feeling the feeling of self-surrender to goodness may be awakened by some moral ideal, in which we recognize a revelation of God which commands our reverence and obedience.

² So Edward Caird says, "The natural man [that is, the savage] is capable of fear and presumption, but never of reverence; he can be superstitious or profane but never religious. In other words, he does not really look up to the power before which he trembles, or, in any sense, conceive it as a better self, with which he can identify himself, even while he bends before it. And this means that he does not in the proper sense worship at all; for he does not rise to the idea of any being who deserves the name of God, as being higher than the self and yet not a mere object or not-self" (*The Evolution of Religion*, vol. i, p. 179).

the world. It was the profound and powerful appeal of Christianity to the latent reverence of earnest men for the highest goodness, when this goodness was revealed to them in the gospel-story, and the intense faith in the divine redeeming love which it awakened, that, more than everything else, account for the wonderful spread of Christianity in the first centuries of its history, and are the evident reasons why some branches of the Christian church today show much more vitality than others.

Martineau would also say that our feeling toward *ideals* of goodness is not reverence and therefore cannot be proper religion, if these ideals do not represent realities of character in man or in God, but are only thoughts in our own minds; for "a conception which reports itself as empty of reality can no more receive our reverent embrace than the shade of a departed ancestor or guide. . . . We cannot venerate our own idea." And therefore "the posture of a *religious* nature is reverence for character above us," and "to paralyze these [personal] relations" by substituting awe or wonder or admiration for reverence, "is to relapse into paganism."

But the method of Jesus was very unlike the pagan method. So far from trying to excite awe and wonder by his marvelous healing power and resting upon it his appeal for loyalty, he even tried to suppress these feelings of awe and wonder because they might dull the souls of his hearers to higher feelings. His "works" were works of compassion and love, and he appealed to them as expressing his philanthropy. We see this in his reply to the Baptist's disciples, when he points to these works and mentions last, as if it were the most important, although it involved no wonderful power to control natural processes, that "the poor have the gospel preached to them"; for this was the supreme expression of his philanthropy. But his healing power he seems to have found a perplexity and an embarrassment. After his first day of preaching and healing, when he had cured the demoniac in the synagogue of Capernaum and multitudes came to him in the evening, bringing "all that were sick," he fled from the city early the next morning; and when the apostles followed him, begging him to return and continue these wonderful cures, he refused, for he would rather go to other places, where the awe

and wonder of the people and their eagerness to be cured of bodily diseases had not been so aroused as to stifle the nobler feelings. He made no appeal to these wonderful cures to establish his authority as a teacher. His aim was, rather, by his preaching to appeal directly to men's hearts and awaken in them penitence and reverence and spiritual hunger and thirst and by this nobler appeal to win their deference and loyalty. "Let us go elsewhere into the next towns, that I may preach there also; for to this end came I forth." They who did not respond to this nobler appeal were not the kind of disciples that he wished to win. Nicodemus professed to be convinced by the miracles; but Jesus refused to accept him as a disciple, and required of him to be "born from above" of a nobler spirit than mere awe and wonder; whereas they who found a higher life awakened within them by the appeal of Jesus needed no other evidence that his words were the truth of God.

The same is implied in the account of the coming of Jesus at night to his disciples, when he walked on the boisterous sea and entered their boat. They fell down in marvel and awe, exclaiming, "Truly, thou art the Son of God"; but he received their homage in silence and gave them no blessing,—such as he afterwards gave to Peter, when, moved not by awe but by reverence, he confessed his Master to be the true Christ and Jesus saw that Peter for the first time in some degree understood that He was becoming the true fulfiller of ancient prophecy, the true deliverer of his nation, not because of any wonderful power to control nature and to cure disease or any hope of re-establishing David's throne by military strength, but because of the exalted ideal to which he had consecrated himself and by which he pointed out the way of true salvation,—the ideal of a greatness which is glorified by humility and by self-forgetful devotion to the highest welfare of humanity. He thus suppressed in his disciples the feelings of awe and wonder so that he might awaken nobler feelings.

Therefore we must discriminate between these sentiments. For, as I have said, they accompany our perceptions of certain realities in nature and life; and, because these realities are so different from one another, the names for the sentiments should

be carefully distinguished. To confound these words makes it hard to distinguish the realities. No authority of great writers or of popular usage can justify such carelessness. For, as Martineau says, "words are made mischievous by indeterminate use." Yet some writers of the highest repute have been careless in this respect. Thus Emerson says that "the stars awaken a certain reverence, because, though always present, they are inaccessible,"—where he really means awe and wonder at the majesty and mystery of the stars. The author of *Ecce Homo* defines religion as an "habitual and permanent admiration,"—forgetting that admiration is merely one of the lower sentiments of religion (in the most general sense of the word "religion") and is lacking in some very religious people, as in many of the Puritans, who were indifferent to the beauty of nature and art, but profoundly revered righteousness. Another writer¹ defines reverence as "the feeling of admiration which instinctively goes with the thought of the divine power, wisdom, beauty, and goodness." He does not discriminate the admiration that wisdom and beauty and strength of will arouse from the awe that power excites and the reverence that goodness awakens. By using "admiration" in this vague and general way as including every feeling that nature and life excite in us, and by taking "reverence" to mean the kind of admiration excited by "the divine power, wisdom, beauty, and goodness," he deprives himself of any exact and specific terms for the feeling awakened by beauty and wisdom and for the feeling awakened by goodness, thus limiting his vocabulary and confusing in his readers' minds these different feelings and making it impossible for them to understand what Christianity really is. Lecky remarks that "reverence diminishes as civilization advances," that "great evils have grown out of it," such as "religious superstition and political servitude," and that "nearly all the social and political spheres in which reverence was fostered have passed away," where he evidently means a dread of unseen powers or a spirit of mere deference and dependence in both social and religious relations, thus confounding the highest type of religion with the lowest by this amazing misuse of a word. When thus

¹ A Catechism of Liberal Faith (Unitarian Sunday School Society, 1895), p. 67.

misused, words become mere tricks and frauds, so that people are led to think that reverence is only a kind of admiration or is quite the same as awe or dread or wonder, and then easily content themselves with mere admiration or awe or dread or wonder, and never clearly understand what it is to reverence either man or God, and so lose the habit of reverence and lapse from Christian faith into paganism.

This reverence has characterized all distinctively Christian institutions. It is, for instance, the mutual reverence of husband and wife as immortal souls that hallows the wedded tie in Christendom, as it is hallowed nowhere else,—a reverence that teaches patience, tenderness, forgivingness, and created the Christian home. It is the mutual reverence of fellow-citizens, of the rich and the poor, of the wise and the weak, as all alike children of God, that is, to use the words of Stopford Brooke, “the foundation of all noble and enduring democracy,” and created the ideal of the Christian state,—an ideal never yet fully realized, but which is gradually transforming our modern world. It is reverence for the most degraded human being, because, to quote Martineau once more, “the meanest is but the highest in the germ,” that created our Christian philanthropy, the noblest of all philanthropies; for even Buddhist philanthropy lacks just this reverence, does not see the infinite possibilities of human nature and the divine ministry of suffering and sorrow for the spiritual training of mankind, and therefore is more intent on removing the sufferings of human life than on promoting the spiritual growth of human souls.

Judaism did not teach this enthusiastic reverence for the human nature of all men as alike children of God and brothers in a common humanity. But Christianity revered even the slave and the savage, the felon and the outcast, demanded the abolition of all distinctions of race and caste, protected womanhood and childhood with special tenderness, and made the bondman and his master feel their essential equality before God. Neither did Judaism teach the highest reverence for God, such as Christianity taught when it interpreted his holiness, not as a mere separateness from sinners, but as a hatred of sin that longs to save every sinner from his sin and to communicate to him the divine holi-

ness, and therefore is forever seeking to "save that which is lost." It is with this distinctive Christian meaning of the word that Martineau says: "There can be no holiness [in God] that is not affectionate."

Stoicism, indeed, said something about human brotherhood, but in a feeble and half-hearted way as the mere academic talk of philosophers; for it was inspired by no reverence for human nature (even though a Seneca may have spoken some fine words about the sacredness of man), because, with its philosophy, it could feel no reverence for God. Therefore it created no great philanthropies, such as Christianity created, and no great popular movements of social regeneration and reform, such as Christianity has often inspired. For Christianity was unique, not in merely teaching a *doctrine* of human brotherhood, but in creating and widely disseminating a *faith* in the infinite value of every soul and the nobler feeling of brotherhood which this faith awakened. There is a sharp contrast between the spirit of Epicurus or of Marcus Aurelius, of whom Lecky says, "seldom has such active and unrelaxing virtue been united with so little enthusiasm," and, on the other hand, the magnificently enthusiastic spirit of Paul and Francis of Assisi, a fervent, self-sacrificing, profoundly reverent love of all mankind. Therefore, as the author of *Ecce Homo* says, "in every age the Christian temper has shivered at the touch of Stoic apathy." And whenever religion lapses into Stoicism, as there is a tendency in some Unitarianism today, the same chill benumbs its enthusiasm.

Reverence is capable of cultivation; but it can be cultivated and taught by personal influence only. There is a grave mistake in Emerson's words, "the soul knows no persons," if these words are taken in their usual sense; and Martineau is wiser when he says: "In matters of devout faith reverence for persons gives perception of truth in ideas." For, while the mere intellect, dealing with things and thoughts, knows only the impersonal, the soul, on the other hand, knows only persons, because its life is fed by those truths and sentiments of which we are made conscious by the influence of persons upon us, that is, by the influence of character; and, as Emerson himself sees, "character is higher than intellect." Therefore the "Over-Soul" must be personal, in

the sense of having moral character; otherwise we cannot reverence him; and, if we cannot reverence him, our religion can have no moral power over us, for we can have no feeling of loyalty to him. Then, further, the fellow-men whose goodness we reverence are our spiritual helpers, because "the light of the knowledge of the glory of God" shines through them into our own souls and wins us to aspire to the divine goodness that they reveal. Even the innocence and humility and trust of childhood are revelations of holy ideals; even the prodigal son in his repentance helps us to believe in the possibilities of human nature and in God's forgiving love; and the sinful woman at Simon's feast, whose many sins were forgiven because she had loved much, reveals to us the redeeming power of a generous love. Thus the personal influence of goodness in every form, even when it is but a faint spark in a sinful soul, awakens our reverence and teaches us the holiest truth.

It is the transcendent power of Jesus in all the ages since his time, that in him the supreme word of true religion was made flesh, and that by his life the distinctive truth of his religion, the faith in a divine love which is forever seeking to "save that which is lost," became an intense conviction in multitudes of souls.

It was a distinctive truth, because no saint or sage had ever taught it in any land, but the deep experiences of his own soul gradually revealed it to him. For in the Sermon on the Mount we find no teaching of such a divine love as is taught in the fifteenth chapter of Luke, and there is not the least expression of interest in the publicans and sinners. It speaks of God's *benevolent* love only, which sends the bounties of nature impartially to the evil as well as to the good, and forgives our trespasses, when we ourselves are in a forgiving spirit toward our fellow-men. Reconciliation must begin with our own seeking after God, —a doctrine which is distinctively Jewish. But early in the ministry of Jesus the love which healed those who were sick and suffering in body began to reach out to those who were in spiritual need; and a little later he was called "a friend of publicans and sinners," because his kindness drew these outcasts to him and wakened aspirations for a better life in men and women whom

respectable people abhorred. When, at length, he began with heavy forebodings that last journey to Jerusalem, his love became more tender for those who, like him, were "despised and rejected,"—they because they were so evil, he because he was so good. It was then that he told the three exquisite parables of the Lost Sheep, the Lost Coin, and the Lost Son, to justify the ever-deepening humanity of his ministry by proclaiming a novel truth about God's relations to mankind and our own duties to one another. Thus in the discipline of trouble and disappointment his heart was taught what no saint or sage had ever learned, that man is always God's child, still having divine possibilities of goodness within him and still dear to the Infinite Heart, though apparently lost like the sheep and the coin and the wayward boy, and that, therefore, these degraded men and women have an imperative and holy claim upon us for reverent pity, trust, and love; for God has always been seeking them, even when they seemed to be far away from him, as the shepherd sought his wandering sheep. And this is the distinctively Christian doctrine of "grace."

Still, while reverence is thus exalted as the heart of Christianity, awe and wonder and admiration have their place in true religion; but we must insist that they should be always subordinated to reverence. For goodness is supreme in this universe. It is, for instance, the great saints and prophets who rule the hearts of the generations that come after them, and thus guide with power the course of human events. And there is no beauty or mystery comparable to that which flows into a human form when it is glorified by simple goodness and the Eternal God seems to make it his shrine. Ruskin says that there never was a really beautiful woman whose beauty was not the expression of the lovely character of either herself or some immediate ancestor. But, on the other hand, if we make reverence a mere Cinderella and clothe her sisters with the queenly robes,—if we exalt power or mystery or beauty as more divine than goodness,—then all the highest power and mystery and beauty of human life disappear. The fine arts, for instance, when in admiring loveliness of form and color they forget ethical ideals and are willing to glorify the sensuous beauty of that which is ethically base, be-

come themselves degraded and lose the vision of the highest beauty. But when admiration and awe and wonder become the handmaids of reverence, then they are transfigured into their grandest and fairest forms, and we recognize that there is no beauty so lovely as the beauty of holiness and no power so mighty as the power of unselfish, reverent love.

We do not truly worship God when we bow before him as the Almighty merely, for power is only his throne; or when we admire the beauty of creation, for this beauty is only his royal robe; or when we admire the intelligence with which all things are made and governed, for this is only his sceptre; or even when we wonder at the inscrutable mystery of his nature and providence. If we do not see that goodness alone makes him truly divine, then the throne is empty or some being of cruelty and malice may sit there whom we cannot worship, and the robe and sceptre tell us nothing of God himself, and the mystery makes him merely the Unknowable Existence. But when we adore the Eternal Goodness, we come into the presence of the living God, who sits on his throne of power, and wears his robe of beauty, and wields his sceptre of intelligence, and illuminates all the mysteries of the universe with the light of his love.

Then, when the moral revelation of God, that comes to us in our own hearts by the influence of saintly human lives, has given us faith in the Eternal Goodness, we can believe in the presence of this goodness in the most terrific manifestations of power in nature around us, even though nature gives us no assurances of an overruling goodness. Thus the awe with which we look upon these manifestations of power may be blended with reverence for the Unseen Love. Then we can also look upon the stars with reverence, not, as Emerson thinks, because they are "inaccessible," but because they testify of a Divine Presence, which the heart of Christian faith, enlightened by the influence of saintly lives, recognizes and reverences as the Eternal Goodness.

In his lectures on *Belief in God*, President Schurman speaks of "the faith of the modern scientist," who looks upon the world "with awe and wonder and a deep sense of mystery"; and he adds that "this attitude towards the universe is much more reverential than is too often found in those who have learned that the heart

of things is also infinitely good and loving. . . . To the scientist God is the principle of order, to the artist the soul of beauty, to the man of virtue the will that is absolutely holy. . . . Modern culture protests against the Puritan enthronement of goodness above truth and beauty. It regards them as co-equal graces."

President Schurman's vague use of "reverential" as covering awe, wonder, and admiration, confuses his thought. Undoubtedly Puritanism undervalued beauty and scientific truth in order to emphasize the supreme importance of goodness and of that spiritual truth which is revealed to us "through the human experiences of the conscience and affections." But in this emphasis Puritanism, even when it became fanatical in consequence of its bitter hatred of the moral corruption which at that time had often been blended with the artist's love of beauty, was yet intensely Christian and very noble. And the Puritan narrowness which is offensive to modern culture does not justify any lowering of moral ideals to an equality of honor with aesthetic ideals.

It is the great practical problem of true religion at all times, how to lift the world out of paganism, the worship of mere power or mystery or intelligence or beauty. We find an answer to this problem by cultivating reverence, by recognizing the supreme divineness of moral goodness, though it be in some homely form or feeble frame or lowly lot or narrow intelligence, and above all by adoring every manifestation of self-sacrificing and holy love, as when the dying Bunsen said to his devoted wife, "In thy face I have seen the Eternal One." But when we think to honor God or to exalt man by our mere awe or wonder or admiration, thus putting mere power or beauty or mystery or intellectual strength and skill on a level with moral goodness, as modern culture does, we sink into paganism.

The test of any Christian profession is not its dogma or ritual or history, but the practical expression it gives of reverence by its self-sacrificing enthusiasm of faithful service for the highest welfare of humanity. In surrendering itself to this spirit and to all the generous activities that this reverence creates, the church is surrendering itself to Christ in true discipleship. And in this

true discipleship which is "the unity of the Spirit," all controversies will be silenced and all Christians will co-operate in resisting the paganism of much of our nominally Christian civilization.

The innermost secret of Christianity, then, is a distinctive type of reverence. As a reverence for the Eternal Goodness who is ever seeking to save that which is lost, it is true worship. As a self-reverence which aspires to the noblest ideals because each of us is a temple of a Holy Spirit whose goodness we must ever more and more apprehend and emulate, it is true saintliness. And as a reverence for the divine image in even the most degraded of men and for the possibilities of goodness there, it is enthusiastic philanthropy.

The statement urged in this article that the Christian faith in human nature is distinctive of Christianity, has been often contradicted. A few quotations from eminent authorities in support of this statement will be interesting.

"He who has never looked through men's outward conditions to the naked soul and there seen God's image commanding reverence, is a stranger to the distinctive love of Christianity." Channing, in *Life*, Centenary Edition, 1880, p. 458. "The true Christianity,—a faith like Christ's in the infinitude of man." "Alone in all history, he estimated the greatness of man." "Thus is he, as I think, the only soul in history who has appreciated the worth of man." Emerson, *Divinity School Address*. In Christianity, "the individual has an infinite worth, as being the aim and object of the love of God." Hegel (quoted in J. H. Stirling's *Philosophy of Law*, 1873, p. 27). "The true meaning of the Christian faith," is its "reverential estimate of the human soul," its "sense of the infinite worth there is in man." Martineau, *Hours of Thought*, vol. ii, pp. 286, 258. "It [Christianity] assumed, for the first time in history, the infinite worth of the human soul." Dr. Hatch, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 334. "The Christian doctrine of the inestimable value of each immortal soul is the distinguishing and transcendent characteristic of every society into which the spirit of Christianity has passed." Christianity "displays an anxiety for the moral well-being of the castaways of society, such as the most humane nations of antiquity had never reached," "wholly foreign to the genius of Paganism." Lecky, *European Morals*, 1887, vol. ii, p. 34. "The special work which awaited Christianity was the transfusion into the mind of the world of its own distinctive principle, the value of a human soul." Dr. Matheson, *Spirit of Christianity*, vol. i, p. 297. "Christ saw man at his true value and died to give expression to his estimate; he is man rightly weighing man. The struggle of Christ in history is to bring men up to the point of duly valuing their fellow-men." Dr. Munger, *The Appeal to Life*, p. 18. "Faith in the infinite worth of the human personality in the sight of God,—if there was anything new in the thought of Jesus, it was this." Professor G. B. Foster, *Finality of the Christian Religion*, 1906, p. 481.

NOTE ON THE OSTRACA FROM SAMARIA

In the account published in this REVIEW for January, 1911, of the discovery of Hebrew ostraca at Samaria in 1910, it was suggested by me that these seemed to be of the nature of labels indicating ownership, in some cases joint ownership. A more detailed examination has led me to modify this view in favor of that held by the discoverer, Professor Reisner. In his view the ostraca were memoranda sent from the country with jars of oil and wine. The name preceded by *lamed*, "to," "for," would then be that of the consignee, who was not necessarily the owner, and the names following would not indicate joint owners, but would be variously understood according to circumstances. In some cases the consignee's name is followed by that of his father, in others by that of the messenger, or of the messenger and the messenger's father, etc. Thus No. 49 would read: "In the 11th (?) year. From Kheleq. For Asâ [son of] Akhimelek. Ba'alâ [son of] Ba'alme'on," Ba'alâ being the name of the messenger or porter.

In view of the importance of the ostraca, and of the wide-spread interest excited by their discovery, it is proposed to publish them in advance of the other results of the excavations.

The newspaper reports, that there have been found an Assyrian letter addressed to Ahab and a tablet containing the inventory of the furniture in his palace, are without foundation.

DAVID G. LYON.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW OF THE CHURCH IN THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES.** *By Adolf Harnack. Translated by F. L. Pogson. Edited by H. D. A. Major.* (Crown Theological Library.) pp. 14+349. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1910. \$1.75 net.
- KANT AND HIS PHILOSOPHICAL REVOLUTION.** *By R. M. Wenley.* (The World's Epoch-makers.) pp. 10+302. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1910. \$1.25.
- THE END OF DARWINISM. AN ESSAY.** *By Alfred P. Schultz.* pp. 19. Monticello, N.Y.: Alfred P. Schultz. 50 cents.
- UNITARIAN THOUGHT.** *By Ephraim Emerton.* pp. 10+309. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1911. \$1.50 net.
- THEOLOGY AND HUMAN PROBLEMS.** *By Eugene William Lyman.* (The Nathaniel William Taylor Lectures, Yale University, 1909-10.) pp. 12+232. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1910.
- NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY.** *By Henry C. Sheldon.* pp. 8+364. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1911. \$1.50 net.
- THE MESSAGES OF THE POETS.** *By Nathaniel Schmidt.* (The Messages of the Bible.) pp. 24+415. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1911.
- THE BOOK OF ESTHER. CRITICAL EDITION OF THE HEBREW TEXT WITH NOTES.** *By Paul Haupt.* (Reprinted from The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures, January, 1908.) pp. 90. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1908. \$1.05.
- THE BOOK OF MICAH. A NEW METRICAL TRANSLATION WITH RESTORATION OF THE HEBREW TEXT AND EXPLANATORY AND CRITICAL NOTES.** *By Paul Haupt.* (Reprinted from The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures, October, July, 1910.) pp. 116. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1910. \$1.06.
- THE COMING CREED.** *By Parley Paul Womer.* pp. 10+88. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. 1911. 80 cents net.
- ESSAYS IN MODERN THEOLOGY AND RELATED SUBJECTS. GATHERED AND PUBLISHED AS A TESTIMONIAL TO CHARLES AUGUSTUS BRIGGS ON THE COMPLETION OF HIS SEVENTIETH**

- YEAR, JANUARY 15, 1911. *By a few of his Pupils, Colleagues and Friends.* pp. 16+347. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1911.
- SPIRITUAL SABBATHISM. *By the late Abram Herbert Lewis.* pp. 16+223. Plainfield, N.J.: The American Sabbath Tract Society. 1910.
- TRUTH ON TRIAL. AN EXPOSITION OF THE NATURE OF TRUTH, PRECEDED BY A CRITIQUE OF PRAGMATISM AND AN APPRECIATION OF ITS LEADER. *By Paul Carus.* pp. 6+138. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1911.
- THE BASAL BELIEFS OF CHRISTIANITY. *By James H. Snowden.* pp. 14+252. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1911. \$1.50 net.
- THE CODE OF THE SPIRIT. AN INTERPRETATION OF THE DECALOGUE. *By Wilford L. Hoopes.* pp. 8+154. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. 1911. \$1.20 net.
- WHAT NATURE IS. AN OUTLINE OF SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM. *By Charles Kendall Franklin.* pp. 6+74. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. 1911. 75 cents net.
- PROTESTANT THOUGHT BEFORE KANT. *By Arthur Cushman McGiffert.* (Studies in Theology.) pp. 16+261. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1911. 75 cents net.
- FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS FOR FREE CHRISTIANITY AND RELIGIOUS PROGRESS, BERLIN, 1910. REPRINTED ADDRESSES.
- THE RELIGIOUS VIEWS OF BJÖRNSSON AND IBSEN. *By Kristofer Janson, Christiania.* pp. 10.
- THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JUDAISM FOR THE PROGRESS OF RELIGION. *By Hermann Cohen, Marburg.* pp. 18.
- THE ART OF PREACHING IN GERMANY. *By Friedrich Niebergall, Heidelberg.* pp. 10.
- THE TWO-FOLD GOSPEL IN THE NEW TESTAMENT. *By Adolf Harnack, Berlin.* pp. 11.
- A SURVEY OF LIBERAL RELIGION IN THE UNITED STATES. *By Thomas Slicer, New York City.* pp. 15.
- PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY IN GERMANY DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. *By August Dorner, Königsberg. Translated by G. E. Maberly-Oppler, Berlin.* pp. 37.
- WHAT WE WANT, A CONFESSION, NO PROGRAMME. *By Christof Schrempf, Stuttgart.* pp. 13.

GOD AND THE RELIGIONS. *By Heinrich Lhotzky, Ludwigs-hafen on Lake Constance.* pp. 13.

THEOLOGICAL STUDY AND THE CHURCH. *By Heinrich Weincl, Jena.* pp. 10.

THE THEOLOGICAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES OF BIBLICAL CRITICISM. *By B. W. Bacon, New Haven, Ct.* pp. 19.

DOES THE NEW TESTAMENT GAIN OR LOSE IN SIGNIFICANCE FOR RELIGIOUS LIFE BY HISTORICAL CRITICISM? *By Freiherr Von Soden, Berlin.* pp. 8.

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN GERMANY. *By Otto Baumgarten, Kiel.* pp. 9.

ECCLESIASTICAL LIBERALISM AND THE FREE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES. *By Caspar Schieler, Danzig.* pp. 10.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PERSONALITY OF JESUS FOR BELIEF. *By Wilhelm Bousset, Göttingen.* pp. 16.

THE RELIGION OF GOETHE AND SCHILLER. *Two addresses delivered in Weimar, August 11, 1910, on the International Liberal-Christian Congress by Paul Jaeger, Freiburg i. Br., and Karl Bornhausen, Marburg i. H.* pp. 27. Berlin-Schöneberg: Protestantischer Schriftenvertrieb. 1911. 9 pence net.

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME IV.

JULY, 1911.

NUMBER 3

SCHOPENHAUER'S CONTACT WITH THEOLOGY

WILLIAM MACKINTIRE SALTER

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

In lectures the charm of which his students will never forget, Dr. C. C. Everett used to speak of Schopenhauer as the most brilliant of the profound philosophers. This German thinker is perhaps little read in England, and still less in America, where the levels of culture are low, and the primitive life-instincts still fresh and strong. But among old and reflective peoples the case is bound to be different; so far as he is known at all, he is certain of a hearing—and a not unsympathetic one, whatever the final verdict. He has already ploughed deep in German thought, and his influence in France and Italy is considerable. Perhaps he is (or would be) most easily understood in India, his doctrine, in capital points, being parallel to the Buddhist philosophical writings. As we in America get further on, in age and in reflective habits, he will probably be more and more read here; and one of the crucial problems of philosophical thought may come to be, how Schopenhauer shall be disposed of.

In venturing to speak of Schopenhauer's contact with theology, I have in mind the broader use of the term, as standing for some kind of reasoned treatment of the first principles of things. What I mean is that Schopenhauer concerns himself more or less with the same fundamental questions that theology is occupied with, and that he has views which may be compared with current (or at least historical) theological teachings. One might even say that theology is one special form of philosophy rather than something to be contrasted with it,—though of course theology (or certain types of it) may accept preliminary data that philosophy (or certain types of it) would disregard. A philosophy that does not cope with the intimate and deep-lying difficulties that theology attempts to solve is hardly philosophy at all. A philosophy

may be even anti-theological, as was Nietzsche's, and none the less—or rather all the more—be comparable to theology.¹

Schopenhauer's general view of the world is that of the relative idealist, but absolute realist. What is material is phenomenal, subjective, but the ultimate reality of the world is not dependent on any one's feeling or knowledge or thought for its existence.² It is will,—with which consciousness (whether its own or that of an observer) has only a passing and no necessary connection. The function of consciousness is a purely practical or pragmatic one:³ it arises under certain circumstances as a guide (or light) to action, helps the will to attain the objects of its desire—that is, within limits, for any final satisfaction of the will is in the nature of the case impossible. But the will may act instinctively and unconsciously, and does so in the inorganic and lower organic worlds, and to a considerable extent even in animals and men. Occasionally, indeed, consciousness attempts something more than a pragmatic rôle; it essays to see things as they are, irrespective of their practical uses. From this disinterested curiosity and pure contemplation spring philosophy and art. But philosophy and art are rare products—only exceptional men, and those exceptionally situated, are capable of them. We all, indeed, in rare, happy moments may share in the elevation and joy they bring; but at bottom we are will, not intellect, and in the common run of our days have the fate and lot which our nature entails.

I. THE DOCTRINE OF HUMAN NATURE AND OF THE HUMAN LOT

What is it to *be* will,—not merely to see and interpret the world in the light of it (philosophy), but to be it one's self (experience—something very different from philosophy or any intellectual exercise)?

¹ A special reason for attending to Schopenhauer at the present moment might be said to be that thereby one is initiated into an understanding of that strange, new phenomenon in European thought, Nietzsche. It is idle to read Nietzsche without a preliminary acquaintance (and a pretty thorough one) with Schopenhauer.

² I have elaborated Schopenhauer's view of this subject in an article, "Schopenhauer's Type of Idealism," published in the *Monist*, January, 1911.

³ I may be allowed to refer to my article, "Schopenhauer's Contact with Pragmatism," in the *Philosophical Review*, March, 1910.

Schopenhauer raises this question with regard to the whole world, but practically it is what will as experience means to us human beings that is in the foreground of his inquiry; here alone, indeed, can the question be answered directly, for it is only ourselves that we know at first hand; as to animals, plants, and the elements we can only reason and infer.

The question is, of course, a very personal one; it goes to the heart and marrow of us. Nor have we any assurance that the answer will be pleasant or satisfactory. Many of us would appear to be ready to do almost everything—work with our hands, travel, read books, even take up mathematical or philosophical problems—rather than think about ourselves; is it that we divine something not quite pleasing in ourselves? All the same, let us ask the question, taking for the time Schopenhauer as our guide.

Will, Schopenhauer explains, comes from want or is want—and want is of itself an unpleasant sensation. It means the absence or deprivation of something, and this is painful—so that in a sense the will, or at least willing, has its origin in pain—and actual willing is to get rid of pain. And when we get what we want, and perhaps after struggling long, the satisfaction or pleasure is momentary—we have it and then it is gone. Yes, it is principally negative, says Schopenhauer, and means little more than that we are no longer in pain; the painful wish or want no longer exists—that is about all. Plato, he says, recognized the negativeness of pleasure, making practically only two exceptions, namely, pleasant scents and the joys of the mind.⁴ And when one want is satisfied, another arises of the same general nature, and with, sooner or later, the same passing and negative result. Indeed we seem in this way to be committed to an endless succession of wants, much as the mind, in searching for explanations, is committed to an inevitable and interminable succession of causes—and both successions, as Schopenhauer conceives them, are wearying. Or if for the moment a new want does not arise, we come to be in a more unhappy plight still, for nothing occupies us, we have a feeling of emptiness, of boredom; we might do something, and there is nothing to do—

⁴ Plato, *Republic*, ix, p. 204.

hence tedium, languor, *Langeweile*. It is a more intolerable condition than want itself, and desperate are the measures sometimes taken to escape from it. And so between these two the will oscillates; thrown now on the Scylla of want and pain, and now on the Charybdis of tedium and boredom, it does not have a happy time of it. Some of our wants become passions; they carry everything before them, perhaps clouding the reason and drowning the conscience—the sexual passions particularly. Even men of genius feel them, Schopenhauer says; they soar to the heavens, and then earthly instincts oppose and they fall back. We find Schopenhauer in his university days, with reference no doubt in part to this phenomenon, picturing life as a restless, painful conflict of reason and the eternal in us with the animal, of the few moments of bright, happy life with the oppressive hours of illusory pleasure. The sceptre of the Earth-Spirit rests heavily on men—and Schopenhauer himself felt it.⁵ In a cooler, more objective way he later devoted a chapter to sexual love,⁶ in which he shows how what has been said of wants in general preëminently applies to it; it begins in pain and ends in satiety—the satisfaction being chiefly in the allaying, the temporary annulling, of the desire. It accords with all this that to Schopenhauer the main reality of life (so far as the will is concerned) should be pain. This is the positive thing. Pleasant things to which we become accustomed no longer give pleasure; but painful things do not cease to be painful.⁷ The three greatest goods—health, youth, and freedom—we are hardly aware of while we have them; not so with sickness and age. The hours go all too quickly when they are pleasant; when they are painful they go slowly enough. The pleasure that counts for much is the contrast to some previous pain; sometimes, as I have said, our pleasure is little more than relief from pain.

I have been speaking of wants and their satisfaction; but

⁵ Cf. J. Volkelt, Arthur Schopenhauer (Leipzig, 3d ed., 1907), pp. 45–46.

⁶ “Metaphysik der Geschlechtsliebe,” in *Werke* (Frauenstädt ed.), vol. iii, pp. 511–523.

⁷ *Werke*, vol. iii, p. 680; cf. p. 659, “Wir fühlen den Schmerz, aber nicht die Schmerzlosigkeit; wir fühlen die Sorge, aber nicht die Sorglosigkeit; die Furcht, aber nicht die Sicherheit.” (When not otherwise indicated, the citations are from the Frauenstädt ed. of Schopenhauer’s works.)

sometimes they are not satisfied—and here comes a new kind of experience. Want is pain and its satisfaction is only negative; but to be crossed, thwarted in our wants, is worse yet. And this is man's lot to a greater or less extent. With some, perhaps with many or with most, their wants are more often crossed than met. They barely live, barely maintain themselves—to say nothing of failure to experience any of the richness and fulness of life. Necessity hunts them through all their days and does not allow them the pleasures of thought and reflection. Schopenhauer evidently felt keenly the pitiable condition of what we call the masses.⁸ He refers to negro slavery, to the operatives in factories, to the children of tender years working ten, twelve, and fourteen hours a day. This or something analogous is the fate of millions on millions. Their existence is little more than a fight for existence. And then that which they fight against—death—overtakes them at last; sometimes, though rarely, from very weariness they welcome it. Even those called successful in life, the high in station, do not always get what they want, and fear, anxiety, and trouble more or less pursue them. Crowned heads are sometimes uneasy in their minds, and the innocent and the good are liable to untoward accident and unmerited ill; how, says Schopenhauer, have the Ophelias, the Desdemonas, the Cordelias, been at fault? Moreover, though we manage to escape all the accidents and injustices that fall to the lot of so many, though we are among the few entirely happy ones, this is only for a time—sooner or later in common with the humblest laborer we too have to die, and few of us wish to.

Yes, Schopenhauer goes further. To him there is something abnormal, something contrary not only to the will, but to reason, in death; something abnormal and contrary in pain, any kind of it. Pleasure we ask no questions about, but pain—why should it be, why should it be at all? Any particle of it seems to spoil the fair plan of things. It is something incomparable—not balanceable by any amount of pleasure. The happiness of thousands, says Schopenhauer, cannot be weighed against the anguish and martyr-death of one soul. If there were a hundred

⁸ Werke, vol. ii, p. 368; compare his reflections, when fifteen and sixteen years old, in travelling through France, as cited by J. Volkelt, op. cit., p. 9.

times less suffering than there actually is, the mere existence of suffering would still damn the world. If the world is to be perfect, final (*Selbstzweck*), there must be no suffering in it—and no death.⁹ The language may seem fantastic and exaggerated, it involves an idealism completely strange to the modern spirit; yet a deep truth may lie behind it.

But man not only wants and suffers—he acts: how does he act? What are we as acting beings in relation to one another? Schopenhauer does not question that there are disinterested people in the world, he does not doubt real morality; but to his mind they and it do not abound. He even admits that there is occasionally real badness, malice;¹⁰ and the greater part of our right actions, he thinks, are due to the influence of law and public opinion. Unselfish love, spontaneous justice, that is, principle, are rare; we do not ordinarily expect them and are surprised and touched when we see them; as Hamlet says, “To be honest, as this world goes, is to be one man pick’d out of ten thousand.”¹¹ The need of law and government, that is, of organized force, is partly to compel those men to be just who would not be so of themselves, and to chain the brutality that lurks in the many. Naturally men are egoistic, and even when we are faithful to the bargains we have made, we drive as hard ones as we can in the first place. This is taken for granted in the world of affairs: every one, we say, looks after his own interest; one class wants as much wages as it can get, another as much profits, another as much interest, another as much rent. Our ordinary political economy but traces the laws which self-interest follows in different situations; if man were ideally just and disinterested, this political economy would fall to pieces, its whole character as a science depends on taking self-interest as a principle. Accordingly society, particularly industrial society, is a war of interests: *bellum omnium contra omnes*. Once violence was common, with

⁹ Werke, vol. iii, p. 662.

¹⁰ Werke, vol. ii, pp. 393, 398; by this is meant seeking the harm and suffering of others, without expecting to gain thereby, that is, disinterestedly. Compare a psychological explanation, vol. ii, pp. 429–430.

¹¹ Werke, vol. ii, p. 191. Compare the lines of Theognis (83–86) to the effect that you could not find one shipload of really trustworthy and incorruptible men upon the face of the world.

slavery the result; and because violence ceases, we must not imagine that the war ceases. Schopenhauer points to cunning as an equally potent weapon of war, and he even thinks it is a less respectable weapon than is force.¹² Yet in this strife, this war, whether of individuals or of classes, we hurt one another; yes, Schopenhauer says (the full significance of the statement we shall see later), the principal source of the gravest evils that befall man is man himself: *homo homini lupus*. The rule of might instead of right which Kant held impossible even to think of as a natural law, since it would contradict itself, is really, Schopenhauer says, the actual and matter-of-fact law we see in nature—not only in the animal, but in the human world; society as it largely exists is just this self-contradictory thing, not in idea merely, but in practice. Socrates is put to death and Christ is crucified; in such acts a characteristic trait of man comes to expression. From this point of view Schopenhauer once compares the world to Dante's hell—the difference being that here man himself is the devil to his fellows; and the arch-devil Schopenhauer finds in those world-conquerors who get some hundred thousands of men lined up against one another and then call out, "Suffering and death are what you are born to, now fire away at one another with musket and cannon!" And, he says, they do it¹³ (apparently he thinks there are some fools in the world as well as devils). Aside from this reckless, colossal egoism, there is the tame prosaic egoism of every day. Most men know, Schopenhauer observes, innumerable sufferings of others in their vicinity, but do not set about mitigating them, because this would involve some self-denial on their part. If we meet a stranger, our first thought is apt to be, "Can he be of use to us?" If not, we are not specially concerned about him. And so, on the other hand, when we ask information or counsel of another, we lose confidence if we find that he has some interest in the matter one way or the other. Self-interested creatures

¹² Werke, vol. ii, pp. 394-399, cf. p. 428. Compare the speech of the Athenian envoys at Lacedaemon: "Mankind resent injustice more than violence, because the one seems to be an unfair advantage taken by an equal, the other is the irresistible force of a superior" (Thucydides, i, 77).

¹³ Werke, vol. iii, p. 663; cf. vol. ii, p. 383, "Woher denn anders hat Dante den Stoff zu seiner Hölle genommen, als aus dieser unserer wirklichen Welt?"

we mostly are, and the spectacle is not pleasing, and the consciousness of it (when we are capable of undeceived consciousness) not pleasing either.

For this leads to another point: we human beings, Schopenhauer holds, are much given to self-deception. We like to appear well in the eyes of others—the ordinary man is not half so much concerned about what he is as about what others think of him,¹⁴ and this is the cause of many complications and much misery in the world; but (something subtler far) we like to appear well in our own eyes, and so we hide ourselves from ourselves, we cover up our real motives, we like to think there is nothing wrong about us,¹⁵—for there is nothing so unwelcome as shame. Sometimes we can stand the contempt of others—but self-contempt is intolerable and we do anything and think anything rather than allow it. And yet how pitiful this sort of a being is, a being, the theologian might say, who loves darkness rather than light because his deeds are evil!

Undoubtedly, it is not a flattering view of actual human nature which Schopenhauer gives, and it has more in common with the older theological views and with the New Testament than with the genial liberalism of our day. But because a thing is not flattering or pleasant, it does not follow that it is untrue. Schopenhauer says that in considering this graver side of things first, he parts company with ordinary moralists and takes Dante's way, which first conducted into hell. And he thinks it an educational mistake to do differently. He questions the policy of giving a pleasant picture of the world to children, of allowing them to think that rectitude and virtue are the maxims generally followed. The children will find out the truth later, he remarks, and then think none the better of their teachers; better say, giving a first example of honesty and sincerity, "The world lies in wickedness; men are not what they ought to be; but do not allow yourself to be misled, and do you be better!"

¹⁴ Compare Schopenhauer's view of "ritterliche Ehre" summarized in Volkelt, *op. cit.* pp. 264-265; also of the masks (of virtue, patriotism, religion) men put on, particularly the mask of politeness—yes, sometimes even that of "Freude und Glück," *ibid.*, pp. 268-269.

¹⁵ "Wir betrügen und schmeicheln Niemandem durch so feine Kuntzgriffe, als uns selbst," Werke (Grisebach ed.), vol. i, pp. 386, cf. 421; vol. iv, pp. 459 f.; vol. v, pp. 215 f.

And now, beyond all the facts I have mentioned,—which show how different experience of will is from objectively contemplating it,—is the perishableness of the things we strive for, the passingness of time and of all things in it. The pure phenomenality of the world, the dream-like character of everything in it, made a deep impression on Schopenhauer. Things are and they are not—there are few more moving expressions of this fact, outside of some of the Psalms and of Marcus Aurelius, than in the pages of Schopenhauer. It is as if his soul longed for the eternal and found it not.¹⁶ The present is alone real, and in a moment it, too, with all that is in it, is gone.¹⁷ Even as a boy Schopenhauer felt this. It was the basis of the contrariety in temperament between himself and his mother, tingeing his thoughts with a certain melancholy.¹⁸ When in France at the age of fifteen and sixteen, he thought of the thousands of human forms long gone to decay that had traversed the amphitheatre in Nîmes, whose ruins he visited; in Toulon he pictured to himself the joyless and hopeless life of the miserable galley-slaves of the pre-revolutionary time; in Lyons he compared the unheard-of horrors of the Revolution that had only a few years before taken place there with the unconcerned business and bustle now going on at the very places of execution. "It is inconceivable," he wrote, "how time in its might wipes out the vividest and most horrible impressions." And in these travels we find him translating a poem of Milton's, in which the longing to escape from the realm of time comes to expression.¹⁹ For if things go, what is the use of fixing our hearts on them? "What in the next moment no more is, what completely vanishes like a dream, is never worthy serious effort," says Schopenhauer.²⁰ He is speaking of striving and getting, we must remember—that is, from the standpoint of the will; not of will-less contemplation, philosophic or

¹⁶ Compare what he says, "des Menschengestes, der gerade weil er so vergänglich ist, das Unvergängliche zu seiner Betrachtung wählen sollte," Werke, vol. iii, p. 505.

¹⁷ The existence of the present is "ein stütes Sterben," Werke, vol. ii, p. 367.

¹⁸ Of course it was not this alone that led to the break between them; see the details in Volkelt, pp. 13-16.

¹⁹ Volkelt, p. 9; cf. "Nachlass" (Grisebach ed.), vol. iv, p. 365.

²⁰ Volkelt quotes this, p. 261.

artistic, nor of true moral action, both of which do give joy, he holds, and lift us out of the changeable and the perishable altogether. But the vanity of the efforts of the will proper is more than a thought with him, it is a feeling and a conviction. We take such pains, spend such labor, he in effect says, and what is the result? The things we get are not what we expect them to be. He enlarges in particular on the deceptive nature of honor and fame, and on the illusory nature of sex-attraction; and life in general, he holds, is brighter in anticipation than in experience.²¹ But more than this, the things do not last after we have got them. It is so of life itself. How we strive for it! 'T is the first good to most of us, we will give anything else for it—yet what is it? To the mass of men, labor, care, disappointment. Schopenhauer sees the slave, sees the factory operative, the factory child; and he thinks that sitting in the woollen mill, and doing over and over again ten, twelve, and fourteen hours a day the same mechanical tasks, is purchasing pretty dearly the privilege to breathe.²² He raises the question whether the profits cover the cost.²³ Moreover, the existence we so painfully win, we soon lose. Man alone has clearly the idea of death—and the more sensitive and thoughtful more clearly than the rest; and hence man, above all the higher man, is haunted by the fear of death. In his seventeenth year, Schopenhauer tells us (writing late in life) he was seized with the same sense of the misery of existence that came to Buddha in his youth, as he contemplated sickness, age, pain, and death.

In all this Schopenhauer thinks he has got hold of the broad permanent features of the human lot and of human character. He does not believe that man changes much or will change. He is not idealistic or Utopian as to man's future. Indeed, should all mankind's wants be met, a goal of striving be reached and Utopia be here, he questions whether a fearful *Langeweile* would not set in—yes, and whether an over-population might not eventually arise, which would start striving and want all

²¹ See Volkelt, pp. 262-267.

²² Life is "ein Geschäft, dessen Ertrag bei weitem nicht die Kosten deckt" (quoted by Volkelt, p. 245).

²³ "Nachlass," vol. iv, p. 350.

over again.²⁴ Even if Utopia could be endured, men would still die, so that real satisfaction on the earth would still be impossible. But there is no reason to concern ourselves with these remote possibilities. Schopenhauer thinks of man very much after all as the world has generally thought till recent years. I believe it was Sir Henry Maine who pointed out how rare had been the idea of progress in the history of humanity. It might be called an Occidental invention. Plato did not know it, nor Aristotle. Nor apparently did Christianity—at least we find Jesus once asking, “When the Son of Man cometh [that is, when the culmination of earth’s history arrives], shall he find faith on the earth?” and the coming, as ordinarily pictured in the New Testament, is not to greet something perfect that has been evolved, but to separate the bad from the good and to institute an irrevocable judgment. The idea of man’s gradually, progressively moving towards perfection is perhaps not more than two centuries old. Schopenhauer thinks it is an illusion. He has what we might call a static view of man. The generations succeed one another, but they are much the same. Man is a species much like any other—the monkey, the lion, any given tree or plant—in that it has certain constant qualities. There is no progress to more and more perfect oak-trees, or to more and more perfect lions; there is none to more and more perfect men.

By such a view as this human life is not robbed of significance, but the significance changes. Once in a while conditions are favorable and we see a perfect tree. So at rare intervals, in happy conjunctions of circumstances, we see perfect (relatively perfect) specimens of the type of man. The significance of human life is in producing these specimens—they are the flower of time; but they do not necessarily come at the end of a so-called temporal evolution, but here, there, any time, when the conditions are favorable.²⁵ Schopenhauer has in mind the men

²⁴ Werke, vol. ii, pp. 113–114.

²⁵ Cf. Volkelt, pp. 3, 303, on the “aristokratischer Zug” in Schopenhauer’s philosophy and his “aristokratischindividualistische Erlösungsphilosophie.” Here, it may be noted, is the starting-point for Nietzsche’s doctrine of the Superman; he quotes (Werke, vol. ii, p. 266, “Taschenausgabe”) from Schopenhauer: “die Menschheit soll fortwährend daran arbeiten, einzelne grosse Menschen zu erzeugen—und dies und nicht Anderes sonst ist ihre Aufgabe.”

of philosophical and artistic genius, and the holy men or saints, of whom presently. The point now is that Schopenhauer expects no change in the general constitution of human affairs. If he would still recognize in some sense "a far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves," it is not an earthly one. Individuals (aside from a crisis which may be compared to conversion) do not radically change; their actions may, more or less, but not the principles of their character.²⁶ Changes are in knowledge, not in will; bad men can no more be turned into good than lead into gold, the egoism of a given person no more be reasoned or persuaded out of him than the cat can lose its instinct to catch a mouse. Schopenhauer thinks it childish to believe that men's characters can be changed by presenting to them rational ideas, by begging, imploring, and so on;²⁷ intelligence may be increased, that is all. So society will not radically change. Egoism must be expected to continue and to work its havoc; the masses must still sacrifice themselves and suffer, and only so can leisure, the opportunity for genius, arise; illusion and disappointment will still largely characterize the human lot; sickness, old age, and death will still await all alike. The men of genius will have their happy moments and produce their immortal works, which all at scanty intervals may enjoy; the self-forgetting, self-denying, loving, and serving saint may know joy; but *im Grossen und Ganzen* humanity will continue much as it is today.²⁸

²⁶ Werke, vol. ii, p. 347. That character may gradually develop and come to full expression only in the course of a life, goes without saying; but development is not change.

²⁷ Werke, vol. ii, p. 359; cf. vol. ii, p. 320, "Die Tugend wird nicht gelehrt, so wenig wie der Genius," etc.; also p. 434. Cf. Theognis, lines 429-438: "To beget and rear a child is easier than to instil good principles. No one ever devised means for making fools wise, or bad men good; . . . no amount of teaching will make a bad man good." These lines are quoted both by Plato and Aristotle (Symonds, *The Greek Poets*, vol. i, pp. 263-264).

²⁸ Schopenhauer once ventures on a priori considerations which make the case more hopeless still. Even perfect intelligences, he says, would in time exhaust the world, and then, for lack of novelty, find existence a bore. The world, as simply the manifestation of will, is a closed world. "Weil nämlich das Wesen aller Dinge im Grunde Eines ist, so ist alle Erkenntniss desselben nothwendig tautologisch; ist es nun ein Mal gefasst, wie es von jenen vollkommensten Intelligenzen bald gefasst sein würde; was bliebe ihnen übrig, als blosser Wiederholung und deren Langeweile, eine endlose Zeit hindurch?" This is the blackest thought in Schopenhauer.

All this of the human world, and perhaps the reader will say it is enough. But the outlook on nature is, to Schopenhauer, no more comforting. It is one thing to observe nature, to see the ideas of things, to feel the beauty of all that appears—but what it would be to *be* those things is another question.²⁹ What would it be to be a stone forever falling or trying to fall, with its one single meaningless tendency? Happy, we may say, is it that it is unconscious! What would it be to be those restless chemical elements, flying, avoiding, uniting, separating, those electric sparks, darting and hissing, those vital forces, incessantly toiling and ever defeated, shaping nothing that lasts, producing new individuals to take the place of old ones only to see them go too, never reaching a goal, condemned to see species vanish as well as individuals, and to face the time when the last lingering products of their hands will be no more? Happy, perhaps, are they that they do not know the end from the beginning,—do not, save as they come to partial consciousness in man, know at all! And this is saying nothing of the apparently inevitable conflict between these lower forms of life and existence. Schopenhauer knew the facts which Darwin has brought home to us before Darwin, and a world in which beings maintain themselves by consuming one another and every devouring animal is the living grave of others and owes its life to a whole series of martyr-deaths, excited a kind of horror in his mind. A ravenous animal, even an animal clutching its prey, has a kind of terrible beauty about it—art often makes it a subject; but what would it be to *be* that animal—not to say, to be its prey? The thought almost sickens us, and when men say that a world in which such things happen and come near being the rule is the best possible world, Schopenhauer answers, Absurd, a crying absurdity.³⁰ For it appears to be

²⁹ "Inzwischen heisst ein Optimist mich die Augen öffnen und hineinsehen in die Welt, wie sie so schön sei, im Sonnenschein, mit ihren Bergen, Thälern, Strömen, Pflanzen, Thieren, u. s. f.—Aber ist denn die Welt ein Guckkasten? Zu *sehen* sind diese Dinge freilich schön; aber sie zu *sein* ist ganz etwas Anderes" (Werke, vol. iii, p. 667). Again, "Jeder Zustand, jeder Mensch, jede Scene des Lebens, braucht nur rein objektiv aufgefasst und zum Gegenstand einer Schilderung, sei es mit dem Pinsel oder mit Worten, gemacht zu werden, um interessant, allerliebst, beneidenswerth zu erscheinen:—aber steckt man darin, ist man es selbst,—da (heisst es oft) mag es der Teufel aushalten" (vol. iii, p. 425).

³⁰ Werke, vol. iii, p. 667.

so all up and down the line: animals live in part on one another; men in part on animals; the animals or men that do not live on one another live on plants that are only their kindred lower down; the plants themselves are ravenous, they steal of the water and the earth. The unbrotherly strife that so largely exists in human society exists throughout the world—a hungry will is everywhere; and since it is all of one kind, Schopenhauer compares it to Thyestes of Greek legend, who ate his children, that is, consumed his own flesh. And there is no change, no progress, in the lower world any more than in the human: the lion remains a lion, the tiger a tiger, the snake a snake for ever and ever, just as a bird does, or a fish, or a tree.

Such are the broad lines of the world as Schopenhauer sees it—the world, that is, not now as observed, contemplated, by a will-less intelligence, but as experienced, felt,—as known to one who is a part of it. Behind all its seemings, the world is will, and this is, broadly speaking, the nature and lot of the will.

Browning exclaims,

“All’s right with the world”;

Schopenhauer says, “Something is wrong with the world”; and perhaps Schopenhauer comes nearer to the profoundest consciousness of man. One need not deny his exaggerations of the unhappy or evil side of life: when he says, for instance, pleasure is negative, the distinction seems more academic than real; when he says the will is never satisfied, this may suggest its infinity rather than any reflection upon it; when he says the millions suffer, we may ask, do they need to suffer; when he says there is no progress, we may ask whether there cannot be progress; when he says there is egoism and strife, we may ask whether there may not be love and joyful co-operation. But that the world as it exists is wrong, whatever it may be or might be or will be, wrong too in a deep way, radically wrong, is a different matter, and it is a view that makes the nerve of some of the great religions of the world,—for instance not only of Buddhism, but of historic Christianity. There are things that ought not to be, and yet they are. It is a repellent antinomy; and yet in it, or rather in the first of the two propositions, it may be that what is highest in

man comes to expression. Had not Schopenhauer had some dim sense of a perfect world, he could never have condemned the world as it is—and if we on the other hand find the world satisfactory, it may only be because our idealism is low or is gone. It has always been so. It was Jesus' thought of the kingdom of heaven that made the existing kingdoms of the world appear to him like a vale of darkness and Satan. It was Sakyamouni's vision of a possible state in which should be neither sickness nor age nor pain nor death that made the present life of man seem so pitiful and sad. Moreover, the ideal in the light of which man views the real may make the inspiration by which he transforms it. It is the idealist, not the optimist, who becomes hero, reformer, saviour. It is those who feel the world evil who help to make it good. This is the secret of the great redemptive religions, Buddhism and Christianity. Into religions of this kind, as contrasted with mere nature and natural religions, not only idealism, but the profoundest searchings of the mind to find a way of redemption, and the most ardent energies of the will, may go—into these religions they have gone.

The world is radically wrong. This, then, is what Schopenhauer says. He does not say it like one bringing an indictment against the world, he has no personal grievance, he has no more respect for fretfulness, for misanthropy and hypochondria than any one else;³¹ he rarely used the term Pessimism by which his views are commonly dubbed,³² and when he does, it is principally by way of opposition to Optimism, which seemed to him a wicked way of thinking, a mockery on the nameless sufferings of men; he simply finds the world taken from the inside as experience—and apart from the rare moments of philosophic and artistic contemplation in which we simply look at it, and from the transcendency of ourselves altogether which is the essential meaning of morality—the opposite of what we conceive a perfect world would be; it is a world of egoistic striving in which there is never rest, a world in which things cross one another and prey on one another,

³¹ Compare, for example, *Werke*, vol. ii, p. 468; vol. iv ("Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik"), p. 190.

³² T. Bailey Saunders justly comments on this, in his *Schopenhauer* (London, 1905), p. 84.

a world of pain and age and death. Once he calls it the worst possible of worlds, but by this he says distinctly he does not mean the worst conceivable. I might illustrate his meaning by comparing it to the troubled business of some merchant that goes, but barely goes, and, if it got worse, would go under; so the world is just barely so ordered that it can exist. A worse would involve non-existence.³³ Elsewhere he mentions specific ways in which it might be worse;³⁴ and still again he says that a more violent will to live, with its extremer sufferings, would make a hell³⁵—for, notwithstanding the strong comparison which I quoted earlier, our actual world stops, in Schopenhauer's estimation, short of that extreme. The case is the same with nature at large, nature and man are essentially alike:—to use the wonderful language of the New Testament, "the whole creation groaneth and travaileth together."³⁶

How does such a world—with man as its crown and revealing its inmost essence—come to be? There is the dark and inscrutable problem. Schopenhauer strives to keep close to facts, and to venture on no wild speculations. And yet, as if against himself, or at least his professions,³⁷ he has his dim gropings, his conjectures and vague views. The wonderful thing is the way in which his latent idealism and implicit and absolute ethical sense come out in them. We in these days are apt to take the world as we find it for granted: not so Schopenhauer—according to the implicit logic of his mind, only the good, the perfect, can be taken for granted; the original of things, the primitive datum,

³³ Werke, vol. iii, p. 669. So Leibnitz's optimism did not maintain that this was the most abstractly desirable world, but the best of all worlds that could exist, or were possible.

³⁴ Werke, vol. iii, p. 670; an alteration in the chemical constitution of the atmosphere, and an elevation of the temperature of the globe, are examples.

³⁵ Werke, vol. ii, p. 468.

³⁶ Schopenhauer quotes Aristotle approvingly, *ἡ φύσις δαίμονια ἀλλ' οὐ θεὰ ἐστὶ* (De divinat., c. 2, p. 463), and opposes pantheism, saying that a God who could have allowed himself to be turned into a world like ours, must have been plagued by the devil, Werke, vol. iii, p. 398; he believes in the *θεὸς καὶ πᾶν* of the pantheists, but not in the *πᾶν θεός*, vol. iii, p. 739. The "unendlicher Naturgeist" is simply the "beharrlicher Wille zum Leben"; on the moral, or inner, side the world is anything but a theophany, vol. iii, p. 678; cf. Volkelt, p. 189.

³⁷ Werke, vol. iii, pp. 679, 736-737; cf. Frauenstädt's Einleitung, Werke, vol. i, pp. 38-39.

that which is beyond all explanation, because it needs none, cannot be like this faulty world we see.³⁸ We regard pain and sickness, old age and death, as a part of the natural order of things; but no, says Schopenhauer, they are not natural; they could not be, but for some violation of the final law of things, they are results, penalties of wrong-doing somewhere.³⁹ Let us for the moment transplant ourselves into a very different atmosphere from the modern one and conceive of ourselves as tarrying for a while in purgatory, as Dante conceived it,—how far should we be from right if we imagined that what we saw about us was the natural, normal order of things, if we did not recognize that it had its cause and its reason for being outside itself, that it was but a passing state for souls who had done wrong and were now learning to do better, that it was a provisional world entirely? By some such comparison we may perhaps make real to ourselves the kind of speculation Schopenhauer was led into in regard to this strange and unsatisfactory world in which we live. It is not a world that has its own justification, he repeatedly declares; it cannot be explained by itself—there is no proof that it exists for its own sake, its own advantage. And the explanation Schopenhauer gives, or rather ventures on, is moral. As implicitly as the Greeks of Homer's world felt, when some calamity or ill overtook them, that there must have been wrong-doing somewhere which now the gods were punishing,⁴⁰ so Schopen-

³⁸ I am giving here the implications of Schopenhauer's thought, not quoting him; but (*Werke*, vol. iii, p. 194) he speaks of the order of nature as not the only and absolute order of things, and says that ethics is inseparable from this conviction; cf. vol. iii, p. 740, where it is reckoned among the distinctive marks of his philosophy, as contrasted with pantheism, "dass bei mir die Welt nicht die ganze Möglichkeit alles Seins ausfüllt." He repeatedly speaks of "ein ganz anderes Dasein, eine andere Welt," for instance in vol. iii, pp. 495, 497.

³⁹ Schopenhauer speaks sympathetically of the religions that recognize "dass Schmerz und Tod nicht liegen können in der ewigen ursprünglichen und unabänderlichen Ordnung der Dinge, in Dem, was in jedem Betracht sein sollte," *Werke*, vol. iii, p. 188. Frauenstädt recognizes the distinction: "Denn die Verneinung des Willens zum Leben ist nicht Verneinung des Urseienden, der absoluten Substanz, sondern nur Verneinung jenes intelligibelen Willenacts, dessen Erscheinung diese unsere räumlich-zeitliche Welt ist," *Werke*, vol. i, Einleitung, p. 87.

⁴⁰ So also to Aeschylus, when a man suffers, it is a divine Nemesis upon sin (Jebb, *Classical Greek Poetry*, p. 181).

hauer says, "Every great suffering, whether it be physical or spiritual, tells us what we deserve, for it could not come to us, had we not deserved it."⁴¹ I remember, when first coming on passages of this sort, saying to myself that Schopenhauer was far more under the influence of the older theological ideas of mankind than he was aware of—and it would perhaps not be exaggerating to speak of him not only as the metaphysician *par excellence* of our modern world, but as the moralist-metaphysician, the theologian, *par excellence*.⁴² It is only that he was a "theologian" after his own kind, and not perhaps quite after the manner of the divinity schools. He is not theist, though he has a friendlier feeling for theism than for Spinozism or pantheism, since it contemplates a time when this world was not.⁴³ But he is also removed from the smooth and easy ways of modern rationalism,⁴⁴ which traces the evil in life and in man to circumstances and conditions, and ignores the headlong, egoistic will,—which thinks man is what he is by his habits and his actions and not by his nature. Schopenhauer is so far with Luther and with Augustine against Pelagius.⁴⁵ He thinks that not only does man act as he ought not to act, but *is* what he ought not to *be*; yes, that his actions come from his nature, being simply called forth

⁴¹ Werke, vol. iii, p. 666. Volkelt, p. 281, says, "In der That, es tritt uns bei Schopenhauer in seiner Lehre von der Weltschuld eine altehrwürdige Weisheit, ein uraltes düsteres Ahnen der Menschheit entgegen."

⁴² Volkelt, p. 279, says, "Schon in seiner Jugend bemerkte Schopenhauer gegen Schelling, dass das Moralische das Allerrealste sei, dem gegenüber alles, was sonst als real erscheint, in Nichtigkeit versinke"; cf. Schopenhauer's express words (Werke, vol. iii, p. 506), "Das Moralische ist es, worauf nach dem Zeugniß unseres innersten Bewusstseins alles ankommt." Still further, Schopenhauer, while emphatically dissenting from the view that theism is inseparable from morality, will not admit that the same may be said of metaphysics in general, meaning by this the view that the order of nature is not the only and absolute order of things: therefore, he adds, one might propose it as the necessary credo of all just and good men; "I believe in a metaphysic," Werke, vol. iii, p. 194, cf. vol. iv ("Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik"), p. 109.

⁴³ Werke, vol. iii, p. 189; he also has severe words of reprobation for naturalism, saying that it is a "fundamentaler" and "verderblichster Irrthum," yes, really an "eigentliche Perversität der Gesinnung," to give the world "bloss eine physische, keine moralische Bedeutung." As to Schopenhauer's attitude to pantheism, cf. Volkelt, p. 189.

⁴⁴ Cf. Werke, vol. i, "Ueber die vierfachen Wurzeln," p. 122; vol. iii, p. 718.

⁴⁵ Werke, vol. iii, pp. 693, 694, 718.

by external occasions, as the action of the forces of nature in general is called forth by the occasions, not produced by them—out of the good treasure of his heart a good man brings forth good things, and out of the evil treasure an evil man evil things (this saying of Jesus Schopenhauer quotes with absolute approval).⁴⁶ Hence it is not so much a change in conduct as a change in nature that man needs.⁴⁷ Down deep is the need, and the sin, of man—and down deep, beyond anything we have experimental knowledge of, is the guilt. Man comes into the world with this headlong, unscrupulous, sometimes ferocious will to live—circumstances have not made him so, he has not made himself so by any temporal act, any more than the animal has made his will to devour, or the plant its will to seize on nourishment wherever it can get it. How can we account for such a fact, how can we keep morality (right) at the bottom of things, how avoid the conclusion that it is an insane, immoral world in which we live?

Schopenhauer answers: by supposing that the will, which, in its varying forms, is the driving force and essence of this world, somewhere in the wide reach and infinite space of things fell, wandered from the right course, became estranged from the bliss at the heart of things; and that here in this world, which it fashions—for something of subtle, creative, divine power still attaches to it and it trails clouds of glory as well as of shame—here in this world it is undergoing expiation,⁴⁸ is coming to a knowledge of itself; and that thus it is led by its very suffering and finiteness, by sickness, by old age, by death, to renounce itself, to transcend itself, to wish to cease to be any longer as this striving individ-

⁴⁶ Werke, vol. iv, "Die beiden Grundprobleme," p. 251, quoting Luke 6, 45.

⁴⁷ Werke, vol. iii, p. 693. Schopenhauer is stating here the Pauline position, but at bottom he is at one with it: "Wenn auch die Schuld im Handeln, im *operari*, liegt; so liegt doch die Wurzel der Schuld in unserer *essentia et existentia*, da aus dieser das *operari* nothwendig hervorgeht, wie ich in der Preisschrift über die Freiheit des Willens dargethan habe." Volkelt says, p. 285, "Kant's Lehre vom radikalen Bösen ist der Schopenhauerischen vom Leben als einer Schuld nächstverwandt."

⁴⁸ "Das Leiden ist in der That der Läuterungsprocess, durch welchen allein, in den meisten Fällen, der Mensch geheiligt, d. h. von dem Irrweg des Willens zum Leben zurückgeführt wird" (Werke, vol. iii, p. 731). Cf. Volkelt, p. 357. Perhaps I should say that instead of "this world, which it fashions" in the text, a more correct expression would be "this world, in which it manifests itself."

ual, cut off from other individuals and warring with them, to cease to be altogether, if living and striving alone are life, but really rather to re-enter that bliss, that rest, from which it came, and which cannot be named or conceived, save as the contrary of all we know as fitful, uncertain, struggling life. At bottom it is the same profound ethico-philosophical process of thought that led to the doctrine of the Fall of Man,—a doctrine which the present day finds so absurd, and yet which Schopenhauer declared the one doctrine which reconciled him to the Old Testament, pervaded in general as he found it to be with shallow optimistic hopes.⁴⁹ We in these days more easily dispense with the idea of a fall, because, if we conceive of perfection at all (as we ordinarily do not), we put it at the end or the summit of things; but if we put perfection at the beginning or at the basis of things, as Christianity does in its idea of God,⁵⁰ and as Schopenhauer essentially did, then there must have been a fall—otherwise we cannot account for the imperfect world we find.⁵¹ Why the will erred, how it erred, how it could have erred, Schopenhauer does not say, and knows he cannot say—they are questions beyond all power of answer. But the idea of a fall (*Abfall*, *Abirrung*, *Verirrung*, *Wahn*—such are his phrases) seemed to him a metaphysical and a moral necessity.

⁴⁹ Werke, vol. iii, pp. 666, 713.

⁵⁰ Mr. Bernard Shaw's "God" is one who can make something more perfect than himself; not so the Christian idea.

⁵¹ When preparing at Weimar for the University and reading the tragedies of Sophocles, the conviction came to him, "dass alle zeitlichen Uebel gegründet seien in einem unbedingten ewigen Urübel" (so Volkelt, p. 11, citing W. Gwinner, Schopenhauer's Leben, 2d ed., pp. 746-747). To save the essential rightness of things Schopenhauer even goes further than Christian theology, for it conceives of man as put here in this world without his will, which Schopenhauer calls a "schreiende Ungerechtigkeit" (Werke, vol. iii, p. 692); according to Schopenhauer, man is here because of his will,—it is his will that makes the world and all things in it, so that in his suffering and disappointment he but experiences what he has made and finds out its sorry character. In complete intelligence, indeed, he would not have made it. But if man as he exists here is the work of a different being from himself, then the responsibility for what he does (seine Schuld) falls back on his author (Werke, vol. iii, p. 676). "Daher ist er nur in dem Fall, dass er selbst sein eigenes Werk sei, d. h. Aseität habe, für sein Thun verantwortlich" (Werke, vol. iv, "Die beiden Grundprobleme," p. 73). Consolation is accordingly to be found not in the physical, but in the moral, view of things (Werke, vol. iii, p. 676), and his philosophy, he holds, is the only one that does full justice to morality (ibid.; cf. Volkelt, p. 331).

There is, then, no arbitrariness in the world; there is rather eternal righteousness (over and over Schopenhauer uses this phrase); we ought to be unhappy, therefore we are so. We blindly choose individual life and now in living we see what we choose. Guilt and misery are equal; and if in a special case one man sins and another suffers, yet, more deeply seen, the one who sins and the one who suffers are the same—the same in kind, the same in essence. He who injures another really, like Thyestes, bites into his own flesh. The eternal order does no wrong. We, will—in men, animals, plants, and insensate things,—we, the world, are responsible for what we suffer in the world.⁵² Such, if I may say so, is Schopenhauer's theodicy.

II. THE DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION

To the early Christian view the world as it then was, full of sin and suffering and death, did not deserve to stand, awaited its end, and would soon have it. A new world would arise in which right would dwell, in which sorrow and crying and pain would be no more, in which death itself would cease—a world in which the face of nature would be made over, in which not only men should no longer war, but the lion should lie down with the lamb and the leopard with the kid, in which a great love and a great peace should enwrap all things. It was a dream into which all the idealism of a people's mind and heart was concentrated.

The world has grown sadly wiser since the days of Jesus and Paul and the writer of the Apocalypse; and to our steady science, and unwinged philosophy, and limited moral demands, the idea seems fantastic. And yet occasionally those who live in their minds and moral imaginations more than in their senses have

⁵² Werke, vol. ii, p. 415: "Will man wissen, was die Menschen, moralisch betrachtet, im Ganzen und Allgemeinen werth sind; so betrachte man ihr Schicksal, im Ganzen und Allgemeinen. Dieses ist Mangel, Elend, Jammer, Qual und Tod. Die ewige Gerechtigkeit waltet: wären sie nicht, im Ganzen genommen, nichtswürdig; so würde ihr Schicksal, im Ganzen genommen, nicht so traurig sein. In diesem Sinne können wir sagen: die Welt selbst ist das Weltgericht. Könnte man allen Jammer der Welt in eine Waagschale legen, und alle Schuld der Welt in die andere; so würde gewiss die Zunge eintreten."

kindred thoughts, and, allowing for changed intellectual conditions, a similar idea confronts us in Schopenhauer. If, indeed, death is natural, a part of the normal order of things, if pain and suffering are only what we must expect, if sin and wrong are to be taken for granted, in other words, if there is nothing strange, repellent, and unnatural about the world as we find it, then is Schopenhauer's idea nonsensical and the speculation by which he reaches it a trouble over nothing; but if so, equally nonsensical is the historic Christian idea that has come down to us today, not altogether changed, in the common conception of heaven. The nerve of Schopenhauer's, as of the Christian, view is that wrong and suffering and death are somehow contrary to us, contrary to the mind as well as the heart, something abnormal or irrational, something requiring explanation, something that cannot possibly be conceived as ultimate, unless irrationality and deviltry are put at the heart of things; for it is because what we see and experience, the whole melancholy spectacle of the world, is not natural, that Schopenhauer and the original Christian tradition were led to conceive a second nature, a super-nature, another order and scheme of things, in which all that perplexes and affronts and confounds us has disappeared. Professor Deussen of Kiel speaks of Schopenhauer as a philosopher *christianissimus*⁵²—and in some of Schopenhauer's meta-

⁵² *Erinnerungen an F. Nietzsche* (1901), p. 104. Compare Professor Hans Vaihinger of Halle: "Man kann im Gegentheil sagen, dass keiner der neueren Philosophen so tief in des Wesen des Christenthums eingedrungen ist, und den Kern desselben so warm vertheidigt hat, als Schopenhauer. Man vergleiche nur, was Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Herbart und selbst Schleiermacher über das Christenthum gesagt haben, mit dem, was sich bei Schopenhauer findet. Insbesondere sind es drei Grundbegriffe des Christenthums, welche bei Schopenhauer tiefste Würdigung finden: das Böse, die Liebe, die Weltverachtung" (*Nietzsche als Philosoph*, 3d ed., pp. 66-67). Schopenhauer speaks of Christianity as "jene vortreffliche und heilbringende Religion" (*Werke*, vol. ii, p. 458). He distinguishes its kernel from its husk, explaining, "Bei keiner Sache hat man so sehr den Kern von der Schale zu unterscheiden, wie beim Christenthum. Eben weil ich diesen Kern hochschätze, mache ich mit der Schale bisweilen wenig Umstände: sie ist jedoch dicker, als man meistens denkt" (*Werke*, vol. iii, p. 718). The ethics of Christianity he declares indestructible (*Werke*, vol. ii, p. 458, cf. p. 483), but it is its sense of man's need of redemption (of a change of nature, not merely in conduct) that makes his real point of contact with it; see vol. iii, p. 693, also pp. 718-719. Protestantism, despite Luther's serious views, is on the whole, to his

physical presuppositions, as well as in certain aspects of his ethics, this is true.

We have seen that Schopenhauer accounted for the world and its evil by an original aberration of the will, and that he cleared the essential nature of things of taint by saying that as the suffering is the will's, so is the guilt. In this is implied the essential freedom of the will, to which Schopenhauer held along with Kant, and, if space allowed, I should be glad to give some account of the wonderful little treatise in which his view is expounded.⁶⁴ As man is, Schopenhauer holds that his actions are all determined: with a certain character (and every man has an inborn character) a given stimulus or situation inevitably calls forth a certain act—there is as much, and, at bottom, the same, necessity in human conduct as in natural events. And yet man feels responsible for his acts, he knows they are his acts and not another's—we are the doers of our deeds: and if there is any sense in this deep consciousness and feeling, then when we have done wrong it must be that it was possible for us to do otherwise; and if our act springs inevitably from our character, it must have been possible for that character to be different; and if we have not mind, an "Abfall" from Christianity (vol. iii, p. 718): it is an "ausgeartetes Christenthum" (vol. iii, p. 719).

Schopenhauer honors especially the older, severer, ascetic type of Christianity. The whole passage deserves to be quoted: "Der Protestantismus hat, indem er die Askese und deren Centralpunkt, die Verdienstlichkeit des Cölibats, eliminierte, eigentlich schon den innersten Kern des Christenthums aufgegeben und ist insofern als ein Abfall von demselben anzusehen. Dies hat sich in unsern Tagen herausgestellt in dem allmäligen Uebergang desselben in den platten Rationalismus, diesen modernen Pelagianismus, der am Ende hinausküft auf eine Lehre von einem liebenden Vater, der die Welt gemacht hat, damit es hübsch vergnügt darauf zugehe (was ihm dann freilich missrathen sein müßte), und der, wenn man nur in gewissen Stücken sich seinem Willen anbequemt, auch nachher für eine noch viel hübschere Welt sorgen wird (bei der nur zu beklagen ist, dass sie eine so fatale Entree hat). Das mag eine gute Religion für komfortable, verheirathete und aufgeklärte Pastoren sein [cf. John Henry Newman, *Discussions and Arguments*, p. 42]; aber das ist kein Christenthum. Das Christenthum ist die Lehre von der tiefen Verschuldung des Menschengeschlechts durch sein Dasein selbst und dem Drange des Herzens nach Erlösung daraus, welche jedoch nur durch die schwersten Opfer und durch die Verleugnung des eigenen Selbst, also durch eine gänzliche Umkehrung der menschlichen Natur erlangt werden kann" (vol. iii, pp. 718-719).

⁶⁴ "Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, I. Ueber die Freiheit des Willens," *Werke*, vol. iv, pp. 8-102.

determined the character here in this earthly life, we must have done so elsewhere. Without responsibility, no ethics—neither morality nor immorality in any genuine sense of the word; and without ultimate freedom, the possibility of alternative choice, no responsibility; if we, in our very selves, are not the doers of our deeds, we are not accountable for them. This is the argumentation; and according to Schopenhauer we are responsible. It is our inmost will that makes us what we are—that will which is simply revealed to us by the successive circumstances of life, not shaped or created by them. We cannot understand this freedom: understanding is limited to single acts which may be traced back to this as their ultimate ground; but freedom itself is un-understandable, we can see its place and necessity, but we cannot comprehend it, or even clearly, objectively conceive it—it is, Schopenhauer confesses, a mystery, and, in his eyes, a holy one, since all the sanctities of life hang on it. The will has gone wrong—and in this way, to this extent, the world is wrong: such is Schopenhauer's logic.

But if such is the evil of the world, and such its origin, how shall we escape from it—how pass from the purgatory which this world essentially is? Many, disappointed, beaten, or baffled in life, have recourse to suicide. Nothing serves to bring out the peculiar and distinguishing character of Schopenhauer's philosophy better than his treatment of suicide. He does not call it a crime, but it is to his mind a vain and foolish act—it does not end the trouble; for the trouble is that one wants happiness and cannot get it—and one dies wanting happiness and because he cannot get it; that is, he dies willing life and happiness—his will is alive in death as truly as in life, it is the cause of his death; yet in this will which seeks life and the happiness of life is the root of all the trouble, for instead of allowing suffering and disappointment to quiet and allay this will, one goes on craving as strongly and lustily as ever, and is like a sick man who, rather than suffer a painful operation—which would cure him—to be completed, prefers to remain sick. For the will is not, according to Schopenhauer, the result of life and the bodily organization, it is the cause of them or rather the reality of them; and the uncured will, the will untaught by the real lessons of life, gains nothing

by suicide—being only deepened and confirmed in its illusions by this desperate act. In other words, the suicide has lost his chance of finding the meaning of life—he goes from it after all his years no wiser than when, full of headlong will, he came to it. Will unredeemed, will vain and empty, not going to happiness or knowing what happiness is,—such is the spectacle which the suicide presents to Schopenhauer's mind. We escape from suffering, not by quitting the world, but only by stilling the will to live, which makes the world. Wherever there is will to assert a separate, individual existence, craving its own separate, individual welfare and happiness, there is bound to be suffering, according to his reading of existence. The world—this world as we know it—is the result of the action and clashing of innumerable wills of this description; hence the suffering, which we all sooner or later taste. Not escaping from suffering, but fathoming its meaning, is the true human task.

Did Schopenhauer, then, we may ask, believe in immortality? In a sense—a deep sense—I would answer, yes. Our consciousness may go, our intellect, but the will and the peculiar type it assumes, the character—in other words, our profoundest being, often unknown to us in our own life—this does not go; it belongs to a realm of the indestructible—it is this and what is like it that has made the world, and it belongs to the inner essence of the world. Schopenhauer's phrase is "indestructibility," a more absolute term than immortality. In nature, that is, among plants and animals, there is no essential difference between the individuals of a species, they are all one idea and there is no occasion for the perpetuation of the individuals,—there is only the indestructibility of the type, that is, of the will incorporated or objectified in it. But there are radical differences between human individuals; as Schopenhauer puts it, "each man is a particular idea," "an entirely peculiar idea"; hence in the case of men the indestructibility of the idea carries the essential indestructibility of the individual with it. Intellect, consciousness, are more or less passing things, but the will cannot be destroyed—and if it wills to live, it will live; if it wills to seek after happiness, it will seek after happiness; and if it dies, as the suicide ordinarily dies, because of an inextinguishable thirst for

happiness and life, then in some other manner of existence it is bound to pursue the same illusory search and striving as here." The difference of Schopenhauer's from our ordinary view—or at least a difference—is that to him immortality is a fate rather than anything else, that separate, striving life elsewhere is no better than separate, striving life here; and that the supreme task is to transcend this egoistic will, lustful of life and pleasure, once and forever.

Suicide, then, is no way out. The real way must be of a different character—it must take account of the seat of the trouble. In fact, Schopenhauer points out two ways—one partial, the other complete. The trouble, I need not repeat, is in our interested, craving will. Well, one way is to leave the standpoint of the will altogether, as we do in philosophy and art—to become pure, observing, contemplating intelligence and appreciation. When we can lose ourselves in philosophic study, when we can contemplate the beautiful, the sublime, or the terrible in nature, putting our personalities and our personal fortunes out of view, a singular elevation and rest come over us—for the moment anxieties, cares, hopes and fears, fortune and misfortune, merit and demerit, are gone, "*und uns ist völlig wohl.*" It is that painless condition, Schopenhauer says, which Epicurus praised as the highest good and the state of the gods—for we are for that moment freed from the miserable driving of the will, we celebrate the Sabbath from the labors to which we are condemned, the wheel of Ixion stands still. Philosophy and, above all, art are, to Schopenhauer, the flowering of life, and extraordinary and almost rapturous are the expressions he sometimes uses—it is a veritable redemption from our individuality, its finiteness and its woes, which they bring. He quotes Goethe's lines,

*"Was im Leben uns verdriesst,
Man im Bilde gern genießt"*

("What in life vexes us, we yet enjoy in a picture"), and recalls

"So lange keine Verneinung jenes Willens eingetreten, ist was der Tod von uns übrig lässt der Keim und Kern eines ganz andern Daseins, in welchem ein neues Individuum sich wiederfindet, so frisch und ursprünglich, dass es über sich selbst verwundert brütet" (Werke, vol. iii, p. 574). Compare: "Was jeder im Innersten will, dass muss er sein" (Werke, vol. ii, p. 433).

a period in his youth when he was constantly trying to see himself and his doings from outside and to picture them—probably, as he adds, to make them more enjoyable. If only the moments of philosophic and artistic joy could last!—they are like the ray of sunlight that sometimes cuts through a storm and, though in the midst of it, is unaffected by it. For a few indeed they may last, those so gifted and so fortunately circumstanced that their lives can practically be given up to philosophical activity or to artistic creation. They are among the perfect specimens of our human type, they are the favored ones of earth—those for whom, as Nietzsche asserted in essential sympathy with Schopenhauer, the world and all the rest of mankind exist; they make a kind of justification of the world. But these perfect ones are rare, and the times when most of us can enjoy their works are rare. For the great majority, life is in the main not philosophic and aesthetic contemplation or creation, but struggle, struggle to live, suffering, disappointment, sickness, old age, death—yes, even genius does not escape the last-named fates; and sometimes genius is a tragedy, for there are those who have the power to see and create, and circumstances do not allow them to do so.

Hence another way of redemption is needed for man—even for the genius. The fact is, we live, and cannot merely look on life; we live, and philosophy and art do not change life; we live, and have the lot of living things, birth and change and death; we live, and cannot rid ourselves of the demands of life—sometimes using ourselves up in the struggle to live at all; we have put ourselves into being and now we feel the yoke-straps of the necessity we have created. Even to elevate a few above care the rest of us must work with more care—the men of genius stand on the backs of the laboring multitudes.⁶⁶ And so, confronted with these imperious realities, philosophy and art may seem not only a partial, but an illusory, redemption. They take man away from life, and how does that help those who have still to live? Thus Schopenhauer is led on to a deeper doctrine.

The doctrine, it must be admitted at the outset, is of an unheard-of hardness and extremity—that is, is so to us of the Western world, full of the pulse of life and with all our naïve confidence

⁶⁶ Here is another starting-point of Nietzsche's.

in it unbroken. The blood of the Vikings and of primal man is still in us—we come into the world lustful and willing, and we continue to crave and to will without end. Very well, says Schopenhauer (in principle), so far as this is the case I have no medicine for you—I have medicine only for such as are sick; the will is almighty and I lay down no rules for it. But if perchance the world is not to your mind, if your lot, the common human lot, is not to your mind, if you yourself are not to your mind, if you would rather be something different from this hungry, craving, restless, ever dissatisfied, beaten, and baffled being that you are, I can perhaps show you a way out—and this is, to be abrupt and bald, to cease to wish to live a separate, individual existence. For, he argues (and it is the gist of his general philosophy), the world and life are the manifestation, or objectivation, of will, of my will and your will and the wills in animal, plant, and stone; the contradictions and confusion of the world and life are the manifestation of the inner contradictions and confusion of will itself, each individualization of it wanting its own way, I wanting mine, you yours, others theirs, each asserting itself, subjecting others or subjected to them, each implicitly saying, “I,” “I,” and tolerating others only as they serve it (make the I more I), the world having only so much order as is necessary to keep these contradictions going. Hence, since the craving for individual life is the seat of all the trouble, there is no way out but to still the craving, to let it die and cease to be.

I have said Schopenhauer “argues,” I have even spoken of his “prescribing” to those who are sick. But in reality arguing and prescribing amount to little in his estimation. It is a matter at last of each man’s experience, of each man’s intuition, and of each man’s will. If, notwithstanding all that has been said respecting the unsatisfactoriness and even bitterness of life taken as experience, one still has courage and the will to live, he can go on living and death need have no terrors for him—for death has no power over the essential will, and while one wills to live, one will live in some form or other; will is the essence of the world, and birth and death only affect its manifestation, not its content. In the Bhagavad-Gita Krishna raises by thoughts like these the

mind of his young pupil Arjuna, when, seized with compunction at the sight of the arrayed hosts (somewhat as Xerxes was), he loses heart and desires to give up the battle in order to avert the death of so many thousands. Krishna leads him to this point of view, and then the death of thousands no longer restrains him; he gives the sign for battle. It is the point of view of Goethe's Prometheus, who says,

"Here sit I, form men
After my image,
A race, like myself,
To suffer, to weep,
To enjoy and to rejoice,
And thee not to heed
As I."

It is only as by experience or reflection one is led to a different view, as one becomes weary of birth and death, weary of striving to maintain a separate, individual existence, weary of the contradictions, the clashings, and the miseries of a world in which this individualistic striving comes to outward and visible expression, as one pines and longs for another type of existence, for a different kind of world from that we know—it is only so that Schopenhauer's other alternative has any practical meaning or application to him.⁵⁷ The will is sovereign and it can choose.

But if one chooses to be a different being and have a different world, one can be it and have it. The non-existence of this world is just as possible as the existence of it.⁵⁸ The will has fallen from the normal and eternal order of things (dimly conceived, but absolutely held to, by Schopenhauer) and can rise to it. We must radically distinguish Schopenhauer's thought from what is often called the pessimistic view of man as a being of no account—of no significance and no power; Schopenhauer's pessimism is as different from that of the *blasé* man of the world or of a contemner of human beings and trifler with them like Napoleon

⁵⁷ The alternatives are powerfully and movingly stated in *Werke*, vol. ii, pp. 334–336.

⁵⁸ "In der That ist die Unruhe, welche die nie ablaufende Uhr der Metaphysik in Bewegung erhielt, das Bewusstsein, dass das Nichtsein dieser Welt ebenso möglich sei, wie ihr Dasein" (*Werke*, vol. iii, p. 189).

and all the other conquerors, military and commercial, who ride over men's prostrate forms to glory, as light from darkness. Man's life on the earth is vain, but not man—and Schopenhauer's essential thought is that man might be at better business, yes, be a better thing than he is.

The difficulty is in conceiving how man can transcend the will to live—for the wish to be, to assert ourselves, to prolong our days and even to live forever as this particular individuality, seems to belong to our very nature. And yet, Schopenhauer says, he who goes to meet death bravely and unconcernedly (he has in mind the soldier or hero of any type) triumphs over the will to live; to such a man there is something more than life, and he had rather die than not heed the call—and it is a total perversion of his consciousness, a psychological untruth, to say he does so only as he expects to live again. Schopenhauer quotes Schiller with approval: "*Das Leben ist der Güter höchstes nicht.*"⁵⁹ To him morality itself, as disinterested love, transcends the individual will to live; it is a striving in quite an opposite direction from that towards happiness, welfare, life;⁶⁰ in love, he was aware, one may give up life. But if in these ways man's lust for life may be conquered, so in others it may not be so much conquered as quieted, made dead. Schopenhauer tells of Raymond Lully, a youthful courtier who afterwards became famous in the annals of the church. Enamoured of a beautiful woman, he was at last bidden to her chamber, where he went expecting the consummation of his desire, but instead she opened her bodice and showed the bosom horribly eaten by cancer. He turned, left the court, and went out into the desert to do penance; he became dead to life. So the sight of any irremediable illness, or of slowly creeping old age, or of

⁵⁹ Werke, vol. iii, p. 408, the reference being to the Braut von Messina.

⁶⁰ Werke, vol. ii, p. 427; cf. vol. iv, "Die beiden Grundprobleme," p. 113. In vol. iii, p. 240, Schopenhauer even uses language that will seem to many extreme: "Das Unmoralische im Willen als eine Unvollkommenheit desselben anzusehen, wäre ein grundfalscher Gesichtspunkt: vielmehr hat die Moralität eine Quelle, welche eigentlich schon über die Natur hinaus liegt, daher sie mit den Aussagen derselben in Widerspruch steht. Darum eben tritt sie dem natürlichen Willen, als welcher an sich schlechthin egoistisch ist, geradezu entgegen, ja, die Fortsetzung ihres Weges führt zur Aufhebung desselben." Again (vol. iii, p. 564), he says that virtue and egoism are "von Grund aus Entgegengesetzte."

actual death, may turn one from life—so powerfully may its instability and fleetingness be felt. Or the pages of history may sicken one, the triumph of the unprincipled and vile, the indignities heaped on the poor and the weak, the general sordidness—one may not see “the steady gain of man” of which our American poet speaks, and even today, in the midst of all our wealth and “progress,” Matthew Arnold’s line,

“The millions suffer still and grieve,”

may seem true. Yes, a kind of tragedy may seem to lie at the basis of the world, and, as the glories of the Periclean age rested on slavery (the necessary subjection of the many), so, *mutatis mutandis*, now; that there may be leisure for genius, the rest must toil. Hence it may at last come over one that the root of the tragedy, and the presupposition of all disappointment and of all pain, lie in that strong will to live, and to live at any cost, that he is aware of in himself, and he may sicken of it and desire to cast it out.

Thus, either by violent shock and suffering or by a musing contemplation of the world and a train of natural reflection, the eager imperious will so characteristic of most of us may be quieted, stilled, deadened. The ordinary motives that lead to the striving, troubled life of men then act no longer. If they do arise, as from time to time they may, the effort of the will comes now to be to deny them, to mortify them. Schopenhauer goes far in the ascetic practices he countenances; and the higher, severer, extremer forms of mortification he describes almost with awe. It is not the genius he now portrays, but the saint. The saint denies, for example, that most concentrated form of the will to live, the sexual impulse. He chooses poverty and gives away, not merely to help others, but that the satisfaction of wishes, the sweetness of life made possible by earthly possessions, may not lure his will again. He does not strive when others do him wrong—wounded vanity or pride no longer stirs him. He gives to his body sparingly, lest it grow strong and bloom and reawaken the will; he fasts rather and chastises the body, in order to break and kill out that will to live of which it is the expression. And when death comes to him, it is not pain nor dis-

appointment, but release;⁶¹ for Schopenhauer recognizes the difficulty of self-suppression, the ardor of the conflict, and says that victory may never be complete while the body lasts. It may seem a gloomy picture, but in the dim background there is to Schopenhauer's vision a kind of unearthly light—like the light in the gloom of a monastery chapel, or those churches one may find in Italy that have no beauty or grace when seen from without, but are radiant within. For to Schopenhauer, the saint, or he who is on the way to become one and to the extent he has gone, has freedom as no one else in the world has, he has rest such as cannot come after the proudest earthly victory, and joy for which there are no words. The genius, the philosopher or artist—he, too, has for the moments of his contemplation or creation transcended the standpoint of the will, he lives in another atmosphere than the feverish one in which most men pass their days, he has an elevated joy; but it is all for moments only, and when the will reasserts itself, when the needs and cravings of life are felt, he is in purgatory again. The saint's joy is as deep as his renunciation of the will is, and it is as perduring as that. He may even seem to delight in life again, but it is as one detached from life. He may go about doing good, he may smile, he may sing, he may even dance (Schopenhauer cites the Shakers, the Rappists, the Russian Raskolnik, the ancient Essenes), but it is because he is so absolutely at rest from himself, because there is nothing he wants, because he is now in himself, as it were, all things, all joy and peace. If outward suffering comes to him, he is, like Horatio,

“As one, in suffering all, that suffers nothing,”

—for there is a core of his being beyond the reach of suffering; that is a higher in him than the will to live, and that is untouched.

It is impossible, without verbally transcribing whole passages of Schopenhauer, to give an idea of the emotion he shows in describing the saint. Perhaps because he was not a saint himself and did not pretend to be, he loves the more to dwell on the idea which,

⁶¹ Werke, vol. ii, pp. 449–451: the fasting may go as far as starvation, pp. 474–475.

as it were, haunted his soul and drew him toward it despite himself. The saint is one who, however poor, joyless, and full of privation his outward condition may seem, is filled with inward joy and the true peace of heaven. The man who has his wants gratified is like the beggar who gets an alms and the next day hungers again; the saint like one who comes into an hereditary possession—he is above care and want forever. Nothing troubles him more, nothing can trouble him, for he has cut all the thousand cords of will which hold us bound to the world, and—as desire, fear, envy, anger—drag us hither and thither in constant pain. He now looks back smiling and at rest on the delusions of this world, which once were able to move and agonize his spirit but now stand before him as indifferent as are chessmen to the players when the game is ended, or as, in the morning, the cast-off masquerading-dress, which worried and disquieted us in a night of carnival.⁶³ Life and its forms pass before him still only as a fleeting phenomenon, as does to one half-awake a light morning-dream through which reality shimmers and which no more deceives; and like this dream they, too, vanish at last, without violent transition. From this, Schopenhauer adds, we can understand in what sense Madame Guyon, toward the end of the story of her life, so often says: "To me everything is indifferent; I can will nothing more; often I do not know whether I exist or not."⁶⁴

We see from all this how little our ordinary ideas of pessimism agree with the view of Schopenhauer. He belongs rather among the mystics, quietists, illuminists, men like John Tauler and Meister Eckhart.⁶⁴ He has essential sympathy with Cath-

⁶³ Cf. John Henry Newman: "We should consider ourselves to be in this world in no fuller sense than players in any game are in the game; and life to be a sort of dream, as detached and different from our real eternal existence, as a dream differs from waking; a serious dream, indeed, as affording a means of judging us, yet in itself a kind of shadow without substance, a scene set before us in which we seem to be, and in which it is our duty to act just as if all we saw had a truth and reality, because all that meets us influences us and our destiny" (Parochial and Plain Sermons, vol. iv, p. 221).

⁶⁴ Werke, vol. iii, pp. 720-721; vol. ii, p. 244; vol. ii, pp. 461-462.

⁶⁴ Of Eckhart's book, *Die deutsche Theologie*, he says, "Die darin gegebenen Vorschriften und Leben sind die vollständigste aus tief innerster Ueberzeugung entsprungene Auseinandersetzung Dessen, was ich als die Verneinung des Willens zum Leben dargestellt habe" (Werke, vol. ii, p. 457). Only second stands Tauler's *Nachfolgung des armen Leben Christi* and *Medulla animae*. The New Testament is the first initiation, and the mystics the second, to this higher lore.

olic Christianity and with the spirit of Buddhism. Indeed he reverentially describes a phenomenon that is essentially the same under widely different creeds, a phenomenon that belongs to human nature rather than to any specific intellectual atmosphere—he himself remarks on this.⁶⁵

Still less does Schopenhauer's conception of the ultimate destiny of the self-renouncing will correspond with the ordinary pessimistic spirit. I approach a subject of great difficulty here; but the impressions which many have of Schopenhauer's teaching are most superficial. They fancy that he holds that the world is a huge mistake, and that Nothing is the end of it. They think that ceasing to will to live is ceasing to be and that blank non-existence was what he coveted for himself and all men. Even a scholar like Otto Pfeiderer calls nihilism his eschatology.⁶⁶ But many times Schopenhauer indicates that the nothing which the saint awaits is relative, not absolute⁶⁷—there is nothing of this world in it, that is all. Nirvana is the word he often uses (borrowing from the Buddhist vocabulary), which means an extinguishing; but this of itself is not decisive, for the will to live *is* extinguished in the saint, and with the will life sooner or later, and this is the sole positive reference and meaning of the term—but whether there may not be something else in man than the will to live, and whether there may not be some other state or condition than that which we call life, is wholly undetermined. Schopenhauer quotes what the Buddhists say: "Thou shalt attain Nirvana, that is, a state in which four things do not exist—birth, age, sickness, and death." That this state is a mere nothing is a presumptuous assertion. The case may be as with death in general, of which Schopenhauer said in substance that we know what we lose by it but not what we gain.⁶⁸ Our posi-

⁶⁵ After speaking of St. Bonaventura's *Vita S. Francisci* and Spence Hardy's *Eastern Monachism*, and remarking that they tell the same story, he says, "Auch sieht man, wie gleichgültig es ihr ist, ob sie von einer theistischen, oder einer atheistischen Religion ausgeht" (*Werke*, vol. ii, p. 454). Compare his comments on the Trappist order, as surviving revolutions, ecclesiastical changes, and unbelief, and preserving itself down to the present day in all its purity and awful (*furchtbaren*) severity (*Werke*, vol. ii, p. 467; vol. iii, p. 725).

⁶⁶ *Religionsphilosophie*, 2d ed., vol. i, p. 563.

⁶⁷ *Werke*, iii, pp. 222, 703, cf. 699.

⁶⁸ *Werke*, vol. vi, pp. 289-292.

tive knowledge is all of this world; and this, to the extent that the will to live, which is its principle, ceases, of course itself ceases. And we find Schopenhauer expressly agreeing with the Buddhists in their reticence as against the older Brahmans, who talked of reunion with Brahm. Nirvana to the Buddhists is simply the contrast of Sansara (or this world); when it is defined as nothing, that is only to say that the Sansara contains no single element that could serve for the definition or construction of Nirvana.⁶⁹ But though no knowledge, no faintest picture of Nirvana is possible, Schopenhauer again and again asserts it as a reality; he repeatedly implies this view of it, even where he does not directly assert it; and in a sense the faith in it may be called the crown, and really the basis, the final presupposition, of all his philosophy. In a way, comparison may be made to the unshakable confidence which he shared with Kant, that there is a reality behind phenomena, a *Ding an sich*—parting company as he thereby did with the whole idealistic or empirical school. He did, indeed, believe that he had discovered the real nature of the *Ding an sich*, holding that it was Will. But had he never reached a definite opinion, he would have held to a transcendent reality all the same. So, now that this will (as the will to live) is supposed to be itself extinguished, Schopenhauer holds that something remains other than the will to live, something that has never shown itself in this world, or only by hints and indirections, though, in the nature of the case, he can have only a negative idea of this “something,” as the contrary of the will and the world we know.

Let me quote some of his language. In speaking of one who has renounced the will, he says: “For that which he now is, conceptions fail us, yes, the data for conceptions. We can only call it, that which has the freedom either to be the will to live or not to be.”⁷⁰ The same idea is implied in his discussion of the ultimate freedom of the will: the will (which does not arise, it should be remembered, out of this world, but simply

⁶⁹ Werke, vol. iii, p. 698.

⁷⁰ Werke, vol. iii, p. 642. Volkelt, p. 367, happily says, “Ein und dasselbe Subjekt liegt dem sich bejahenden und dem sich verneinenden Willen zum Leben zu Grunde; und dieses Subjekt wird durch den Akt der Willensverneinung nicht vernichtet.”

appears here) might, he holds, have originally chosen not to appear and be here, or to be something essentially different from what it is—in which case the whole chain of its phenomenal manifestations might have been different.⁷¹ That the will has mysterious depths beyond what appear on the surface is implied, I may add, in Schopenhauer's view of the way in which intellect is called up by it, made to serve it, only at last to be strange and contrary to it.⁷² Again, the very fact that Schopenhauer calls it a fruitless question to ask, "What should I be, if I were not a will to live,"⁷³ is in a way conclusive, for if I am absolutely identical with my will to live (exhausted in it), the question is meaningless rather than fruitless. Moreover, the whole idea of an original fall, or aberration of the will (*Abfall, Abirrung, Verirrung*), which has been explained above, implies another type of existence from that of which we have experience—for how could there be a fall, save away from something, or how could there be an aberration, save as some straight and true path of being was presupposed?

To all this may be added more positive statements. Schopenhauer distinctly declares that in his philosophy the world (this world) does not fill out the whole possibility of being. Metaphysics, he says, is the knowledge that the order of nature is not the only and absolute order of things—and ethics is inseparable from this conviction. Particularly does he give praise to Kant for showing that the kingdom or realm of virtue is not of this world, though the reality of it is indubitable to him. When, he says, in witnessing tragedy we feel urged to turn away our will from life, to will it and love it no more, we become thereby aware that something else in us still remains, something of which we have no positive conception save that it is that which does not will life; and for this different kind of willing there must be

⁷¹ Werke, vol. ii, pp. 338-339; in Werke, vol. iii, pp. 221-222, a perfectly clear statement is made that the will (that is, the will to live) is *not* "das Ding an sich schlechthin und absolut." In vol. iii, pp. 582-583, the "Keim" or "innerster Kern" of our being is distinctly contrasted with the will to live as we have it and with the character which it assumes; cf. Volkelt, pp. 190 ff.

⁷² Schopenhauer calls the essential identity of the subject of knowing with the subject of willing "das Wunder κατ' ἐξοχήν" (Werke, vol. ii, p. 296); cf. my article on "Schopenhauer's Contact with Pragmatism," already referred to.

⁷³ Werke, vol. iii, p. 737.

a different corresponding kind of being—for if not, how could tragedy exercise its beneficent and elevating influence upon us? In this connection he uses phrases like “an entirely different existence,” “another world,” and speaks of life as “an oppressive dream out of which we have to awaken.”⁷⁴ He even dares to turn things round. All, he says, depends upon our standpoint. To those who are wholly immersed in the will to live, and who knowing no other will than this and no other world than that which it begets, what results from the mortification of this will, Nirvana, is indeed nothing. But if we turn our eyes on those who have mortified the will, whose translucent bodies only linger, and who calmly await even *their* disappearance, we have before us not nothing, nor vacancy, but a peace above all rational accounting, a calm like that of quiet seas, a rest, a confidence, a serenity, the mere reflection of which in the countenance, as Raphael and Correggio give it, is a gospel. Yes, “nothing” is relative, says Schopenhauer, and all depends on our standpoint. Nothing is the opposite of something; and if this world is our only something, then the negation of that world is nothing; but if the attitude in which we negate this world is to us the supreme something, then this world itself is nothing, and all its stars and milky ways do not save it from radical illusoriness—all, every bit of it, is manifestation of the will to live, and when that will goes, it goes, all goes.⁷⁵

The state of Nirvana cannot be philosophically described, says Schopenhauer, only experienced, and the experience is individual, incommunicable. It goes by the names of ecstasy, rapture, illumination, union with God, and the like—in it subject

⁷⁴ Werke, vol. iii, p. 495; compare an extraordinarily daring statement as to the order of nature itself, in which, as he remarks, the lowest inorganic things live unattacked forever, while the most perfect, the living, with their infinitely complicated and inconceivably “kunstvolle” organizations, are continually appearing and disappearing: “Dies ist etwas so augenscheinlich Absurdes, dass es nimmermehr die wahre Ordnung der Dinge sein kann, vielmehr bloss eine Hülle, welche diese verbirgt, richtiger, ein durch die Beschaffenheit unseres Intellekts bedingtes Phänomen.”

⁷⁵ Werke, vol. ii, pp. 483–487; compare the comments on this close of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, in vol. iii, p. 703; also vol. iii, p. 583, “Das Dasein, welches wir kennen, giebt er (der Resignierte) willig auf: was ihm statt dessen wird, ist in unsern Augen nichts; weil unser Dasein, auf jenes bezogen, nichts ist.”

and object are transcended;⁷⁶ it is a kind of immediate feeling—philosophy might be said to begin with such feeling and then finally to culminate in it, save that the last stage, ecstasy, is beyond all intellectual analysis or accounting.

Let me sum up, in closing, Schopenhauer's interpretation of the meaning of life. To some, pessimism means that life has no meaning. Not so to him. His thought is like this:—

This world is not arranged to make us happy, and happiness is not the aim of life. There is only one inborn error, Schopenhauer remarks with a touch of pathos, and that is that we are here to be happy.⁷⁷ Life should teach us a different lesson—the sufferings of life should teach us a different lesson. Yes, death should. Life is not a pleasure, but a task, in his eyes. We are here, strange as it may seem to those who have the superficial notions of Schopenhauer which most people, even scholars, have, and oddly as the language may sound as coming from a philosopher—we are here *to be saved*, rather than to have our natural wants and cravings gratified (that is, to be happy). We of this world are off the track, have wandered from the eternal order, and life is to bring us back. Therefore we appear, therefore we are set in space and time, that gradually, through our varied and successive actions and the course of our lives, we may come to find out what manner of being we are. Suffering, pain, disappointment, and the face of death are to keep us from forgetting ourselves—from thinking that we have some other aim in life than this sovereign one. Suffering, rightly taken, is a means of purification (*Läuterungsprozess*); pain and trouble work toward the true end of life, as with the sick man who takes a long and painful cure and knows that the pain is a part or a sign of his healing; the continuous deception and disappointment we experience are, as it were, intended to give us a sense of the nothingness of our ordinary strivings.⁷⁸ Yes, death itself comes

⁷⁶ Werke, vol. ii, p. 485.

⁷⁷ Werke, vol. iii, p. 729; Kant's great service to ethics, in the eyes of Schopenhauer, is that he purified it of all eudaemonism (vol. iv, "Die beiden Grundprobleme," p. 117); eudaemonists Schopenhauer classes along with the optimists, whom he contemns (vol. iii, p. 507).

⁷⁸ Compare Werke, vol. iii, p. 731 (vol. ii, p. 464); vol. iii, p. 658.

under a teleological aspect to Schopenhauer; not only is it a reminder⁷⁹ and a desert (yes, "desert," for, according to his logic, if we were what we ought to be, we could not die, Schopenhauer being at one, in bottom feeling, with Paul),⁸⁰ but for the good man it is release, too, and at the conclusion of his great essay on "Death and the Indestructibility of our Essential Being" Schopenhauer uses language that gives veritable consolation to any man who has struggled with himself and his faults and wondered whether they must be an enduring part of him, for he hints that with this solemn event, in which man parts with his recognizable individuality, he may also part with that he has struggled against, so that death may be a door to freedom. Yes, we may never know freedom till we die, and so, while peaceful and gentle, as a rule, is the death of every good man, something more than this, a willing dying, a glad dying, a joyful dying is the privilege of the saint. Perhaps it was with this in mind that Schopenhauer once said, "I believe that when death closes our eyes, we stand in a light of which our sunlight is only the shadow."⁸¹

We may call Schopenhauer a pessimist, if we will,—he spoke of himself in this way at times; but in the light of what I have been saying and quoting we shall hardly call him an absolute pessimist, since beyond the bounds of time and space, and as the last and eternal essence of things, he contemplates a state that is indeed hinted at in certain higher ranges of human experience, but of which one might say, in semi-Scriptural language, that eye hath

⁷⁹ Werke, vol. iii, p. 699. Death is spoken of as "die jedesmalige und uner-müdlich wiederholte Anfrage der Natur an den Willen zum Leben: Hast du genug? Willst du aus mir hinaus?" The very shortness of life is a means to an end: "Damit sie [the just cited question] oft genug geschehe, ist das individuelle Leben so kurz."

⁸⁰ Cf. Werke, vol. iii, p. 581, "Der Tod sagt: Du bist das Produkt eines Aktes, der nicht hätte sein sollen; darum musst Du, ihn auszulöschen, sterben." Also, "Wir sind im Grunde etwas, das nicht sein sollte: darum hören wir auf zu sein." Cf. vol. iii, p. 652.

⁸¹ Nachlass, vol. iv, p. 185 (§ 290). See Volkelt, p. 378, where this and other passages throwing light on Schopenhauer's views on this subject are quoted. The other references are: Werke (Grisebach ed.), vol. v, pp. 281 ff.; Nachlass, vol. iv, pp. 178, 190; Grisebach, Schopenhauer's Briefe, pp. 116, 185; Lindner-Frauenstädt, p. 526; Briefwechsel zwischen Schopenhauer und Becker (Leipzig, 1883), p. 66.

not seen it, nor ear heard it, neither hath the heart of man conceived it. If we call him pessimist, let us admit that he has more in common with those who condemned this world and looked for another some two thousand years ago in Palestine than with those who are ordinarily spoken of as pessimists today. Relatively a pessimist, absolutely and finally an optimist not altogether unlike Jesus, Paul, and Augustine—that is the way in which I should describe Schopenhauer.⁸²

⁸² Schopenhauer's faith appears perhaps most definitely in his latest works, the *Parerga und Paralipomena*. Here, to quote from Volkelt, p. 368, "Die Verneinung des Willens zum Leben eröffnet den Weg zu einem Reiche reinen, ruhenden, wandellosen, unbedürftigen Seins. Ja, er glaubt an ein 'gutes und lösendes Prinzip' in dieser Willenswelt, das 'zum Durchbruch kommen und das Ganze erfüllen und befreien kann.'" Volkelt cites *Werke* (Grisebach ed.), vol. ii, pp. 659, 229 f., vol. v, pp. 296, 224, Grisebach, *Schopenhauer's Briefe*, pp. 214 f., and refers to Richard Bottger's *Das Grundproblem der Schopenhauerischen Philosophie* (Greifswald, 1898), where, as he says, the last transcendent depths of the world of Schopenhauer are treated in an interesting manner.

*RATIONAL MYSTICISM AND NEW TESTAMENT
CHRISTIANITY*

HENRY W. CLARK

HARPENDEN, HERTS, ENGLAND

I

To the very title of this paper, or at any rate to the idea implied in it, the average religious thinker might conceivably make more objections than one. He might in the first place inquire whether any meaning can be found in the term "rational mysticism"; and, examining it either from the standpoint of reason or from that of mysticism, might complain that it attempts to bring together two quite incompatible things. Reason has usually held mysticism in scorn, looking upon it as a sort of quack method, if the word may pass, of accomplishing, or of pretending to accomplish, what reason accomplishes in the professional and only legitimate way. Mysticism, from the other side, has been ready enough to repay scorn with scorn: it has claimed to find its way to the secret places of truth by a subtle process far more efficacious than that laborious following of the trail which reason practises; and its independence of reason, its irreconcilability with reason, it has always taken as its glory rather than its shame. What—the average religious man might say—what can "rational mysticism" mean? How, indeed, can such a thing exist at all? And in the next place, even supposing you could manufacture the curious compound that "rational mysticism" would be, and could link the two seeming incompatibles together, how are you going to make any connection between your newly created rational mysticism and New Testament Christianity? Rational, indeed, New Testament Christianity is, or claims to be; and to show its harmony with reason (provided that the thing be not pushed too far) is one of the chief objects that Christian apologetics may well keep in view. But the line of mysticism has commonly been held as being to a considerable extent di-

vanced from the New Testament line. Mysticism has not run, for instance (so it has been said), upon the most prominent lines of Pauline experience and Pauline teaching; its language has not, as a rule, echoed the language in which most students have embodied the results of their investigation into the New Testament system; the processes and programmes of the soul, so to call them, which it has advocated have scarcely run parallel with those on which the New Testament appears to lay the principal stress; nor do the great ideas of sin and salvation and faith, which are the fixed and shining ideas of New Testament Christianity, occupy in the mystical system the central place. What connection can there be between mysticism, rational or otherwise, and the Christianity which, according to the consensus of testimony through the Christian ages, the pages of the New Testament enshrine? The average religious thinker might well suppose that in attempting to bring together "rational mysticism" and "New Testament Christianity" one is attempting to make a series of reconciliations among things that can only look at one another askance, and beating oneself vainly against an impossible task.

And yet that the linking of the three things—mysticism, reason, and the New Testament conception of Christianity—that the linking of the three would, if we could but accomplish it, be most welcome, probably no one would deny. The religious man, though he may think himself to have perceived certain possible ways of reconciliation between reason and the Christian religion as he finds it in the New Testament, and on that point may be satisfied, is conscious that something is lacking still. "Wanting is what?" Mysticism assuredly has a not quite negligible answer to give. That warmth—that sense of immediate contact with a higher world and a higher life—that immersion of the whole personality in the eternal tides—that lifting of the entire inner experience away from the level of problem and solution, of seeking and finding, of painful self-adjustment to spiritual facts and forces which seem, when all is said, to be half-hidden as behind a veil—that sublime ecstasy in which the soul no longer possesses its religion, its Christ, its God, but is possessed by them, enveloped in them, conscious not so much

of any relation between itself and them as of a penetration of itself by them through and through,—these things, which are the things for which mysticism stands and whereof it speaks, would be for the ordinary religious man his religion's perfecting and crown. That he knows. Mysticism may have given up some of the things he has; but it has seized upon a great many things he has not. It may appear to have shifted, as to its standing-ground, away from the fundamentals; but somehow or other it contrives to stretch itself into a sun-bathed atmosphere into which he, with his feet never so firmly planted, cannot lift his head. It may not be an altogether safe guide, and in the programmes it issues may slur over some of the first essential steps of the sacred way; but it speaks as from a fair land whose entrance-gate all would rejoice to find. If, now, the average religious man could but keep what he has, his own grip upon the primary factors of the religious life, his own seriousness in face of the tremendous import of the fundamental facts concerning God and man and sin and redemption, and yet add on to that the glow and color and thrill of the mystical experience, what great gain it would be! His customary religion, partly through its emphasis, its right and proper emphasis, upon the relations between himself and God and upon the necessity for their adjustment, leaves him too conscious of his separateness, of the hard outlines of his own personality as distinct from the eternal life he wants to make his own; and even though he may sometimes, in hours of kindled emotion, become thrilled with joy *about* his religion and the benefits it brings, that, he knows, is not the ultimate joy. If he could, while not losing that sense of separateness of his, add on to it a sense of oneness—if he could be, not only reconciled to God, but one with God—if the realization of that seeming paradox were found to be possible—then the ultimate joy would be attained. To find some method of adhering to the fundamental conceptions of New Testament Christianity, and at the same time possessing the experience which the mystics of history claim for their own—this would be, for every man of earnest religious thought and serious religious purpose, a delight indeed.

Perhaps an endeavor to apprehend the true significance and secret of mysticism may at any rate start us toward the desired

goal. For it may be that those who have entered into the mystical experience have not always given a quite accurate account of the experience they enjoy; and a revision of the account (which of course implies no questioning or suspicion of the experience itself) may enable us to see that mysticism has no quarrel with reason after all. And further, this same revision of mysticism's account of itself may bring mysticism into much closer relations with New Testament Christianity than those in which it usually seems to stand—partly by making clearer what mysticism in its essence really is, and partly by a sudden flashing of light upon our conceptions of New Testament Christianity, showing us how those conceptions need to be deepened and enlarged, and how in that deepening and enlarging they come nearer to mysticism's line. And obviously, if mysticism has already appeared to be reasonable, then to move New Testament Christianity nearer to mysticism is necessarily to move it nearer to reason too. Thus, by bringing mysticism into contact, first with reason and then with New Testament religion, and consequently bringing reason and New Testament religion into closer mutual contact in their turn, we may find that in speaking of "rational mysticism and New Testament Christianity" we are venturing upon no union of incompatibles after all.

II

Undoubtedly mysticism has been right in declaring that religion is ultimately and essentially a losing of self in God—that the significance of religion is not exhausted in any grasp which the mind may fling round facts about God, nor in any adjustment of an external kind which a man may make in his attitude towards God, nor in any change in man's judicial standing before the sight of God, but is a far deeper thing. That recognition, already referred to, of a valuable and desirable element in mystical experience—that recognition which practically all men, though they may sheer off from and think extravagant much of the language in which mysticism expresses or expounds itself, are ready to make—is itself strong testimony to mysticism's nearness to the heart of the whole thing. Indeed, all really re-

ligious men would, if brought to the point, make two admissions. They would admit, on the one hand, that if religion calls for anything at all, it calls for much more than a merely external relationship between man and God, however many faculties of human nature that relationship may cover, and however carefully that relationship may be maintained and cultivated once it is made. And they would admit, on the other hand, that if those instincts of our nature which seem to cry for something outside of ourselves on which they may take hold and in whose answering clasp they may find their complement—those aspirations and variously named (or unnamed) movements which so often go forth from the busy harbor of our inner life as if outward bound upon an unknown sea—that if all these may be legitimately interpreted in a religious sense at all, it is to something like real and intimate union with God that they point. Mysticism, in speaking of losing self in God, is true to our ultimate interpretation of religion and true to our ultimate interpretation of ourselves.

But, under the taunt which cold reason so frequently levels against it, mysticism has permitted itself to be caught in a false antithesis, and has mistakenly accepted as inevitable that hostility between itself and reason which reason has sought to force. "This intimate relation between man and God of which you speak"—so reason's complaint has run—"and this knowledge of God which, as you claim, results from that intimate relation, are not facts discoverable or provable by any instruments at my command. The existence of such a relation and of such knowledge cannot be inferred from any premises that lie before my eyes. In asserting it, therefore, you declare yourself more powerful than I am in my own particular field, come in as a sort of confident but unauthorized amateur where the regular practitioner confesses himself baffled, and set up a preposterous claim which I cannot for a moment allow." Mysticism's mistake has been that it has so frequently answered taunt with taunt, and in its indignation has missed the right reply. "Yes," it has answered, "I do take your place in this department, and perform what you cannot accomplish. They who would penetrate the secrets behind the veil must substitute my guidance for yours." In reply to

reason's attempt to rule mysticism out, mysticism has attempted to rule reason out in its turn: it has willingly occupied the false position into which reason has been eager to thrust it, and, as previously suggested, has given a wrong account of itself and of its rôle. What the true answer of mysticism to the taunt flung at it by reason would have been—the answer by the making of which mysticism would have robbed reason of its arms—we shall presently come to understand. For the moment it may suffice to say that mysticism, rightly interpreted, does not take the place of reason at all; and it is on some such line as this that mysticism should have replied when reason complained or sneered, so repudiating the alternative—as between mysticism or reason—which reason has assiduously pushed to the front. By failing to take this line—by foolishly lifting the gage which reason throws down and by entering into the conflict on reason's own ground—by letting itself be drawn into a wholly unnecessary battle—mysticism loses its opportunity, and becomes discredited in a court where a verdict might easily be won.

For mysticism is not, except incidentally, a matter of knowledge. It is a matter of something else and of something more. What mysticism really aims at, and what mysticism has really reached more or less perfectly in the experience of those who are entitled to the mystic's name, is the acceptance of God by man as the actual, energizing, dynamic source of all that man is—man setting himself in such a God-ward relation that henceforth he is, in regard to all that proceeds from him in the way of activity, emotion, and the rest, mediate instead of immediate, a channel instead of a spring. Mysticism aims at the substitution of God's initiative for man's within man's own personality—except, of course, that the initiative of surrender, the initiative in giving up initiative, must on man's part be ceaselessly maintained. Mysticism aims at using the separateness of man's personality only to secure a unity of man's personality with God's—a unity in which man, so far as he is conscious of his own personality at all, is conscious of it only as a thing that has abrogated all its powers save the power of self-abandonment, and that sleeps. It is more than a relation between man and God: it is a relation wherein there is no more *between*: ay, it is more

than a *relation*—it is a mingling, a threading together, a lying down of the man upon God, a folding of God round every part of the man. All this is only to say in other words what has been said of themselves by the mystics of every age; and this is the experience (let their theoretical account of it be what it may) which the mystics of every age have possessed. But from the point of view of our present theme this involves a good deal. The mystical experience, read thus, is at once perceived to be not a matter of knowledge, nor a substitute for knowledge; and the effort to attain it is in no wise an effort that aims at taking reason's place. Of course, if that close fellowship between God and man, after which mysticism strives, be once established, man will necessarily know more of the God with whom he is made one; and thus, incidentally, mysticism may come, over and above being what in its own essence it is, to be a feeder and enricher of the mind. But primarily, the mystical experience is not a matter of the mind. It is not an attitude of the intellect, nor an attitude substituted for an attitude of the intellect, but an attitude of the whole nature, an attitude—or, more accurately, a movement, a development—of life. It is not a knowing God, but a climbing into God on the part of man, a descent into man on the part of God. That is to say (and this is the crucial point) the mystical experience is the emergence of a new fact, not on the stage of the mind, but on the stage of the world-process itself: its establishment indicates, not that something has been learned or recognized or understood, but that a new *event* has taken place, that the next step of the evolutionary process has been passed. In the establishment of the mystical experience life, as man has known it, moves on through the next stage, which is also the last; something happens in the cosmic order and on the cosmic scale. In the nature of the case, the new cosmic event takes place by degrees, in instalments, as it were, since the individual members of the race, in whom life as it is is embodied, ascend only separately and at too rare intervals into the mystical experience which is life as it is destined to be. But this must not blind our eyes to the fact that every single instance of a genuine mystical experience is another instalment of the one movement which life in its evolution is next called upon to make.

And if we could imagine all men entering upon the mystical experience at once, and could realize what this would imply in the way of the substitution of God's initiative for man's, we should immediately see how the establishment of any mystical experience is really an event upon the cosmic scale, the actual making of what did not exist before.

And so, once again, mysticism is not a reading of the world-process, but a contribution to it, the carrying of it on to a further stage: it is not a new apprehension of the order of the world and its relation to God; it is itself an event in that order and that relation. It is the actual making of something that did not previously exist: it is not an adjustment of relations, but the bringing to being of a new reality: it is a veritable becoming on the part of man, and, one may dare to say, a veritable becoming on the part of God, since, this union once set up, God sends himself through, beats himself out through, man, as previously he did not do. The mystical experience is a creative one, not an inferential one, or a substitute for an inferential one, at all. It is an anticipatory experience, on the part of the mystic's individual life, of that condition of things which is to be the goal of the world-process; it is, in fact, that condition of things beginning to be realized. In the mystical experience, life, and all that led up to it, gives itself up once more to the God from whom it came; and God takes into himself once more the life, with all that led up to it, to which he gave birth. It is the process of things which has been brought up, may one say, to its semi-final stage in the personality of man, now seeking and finding its goal, accomplishing the last stage of all, linking itself up with the personality of God, whence it originally set out, and so making itself rounded and complete. And the answer of mysticism, when reason taunts it with an endeavor to supplant reason in reason's own particular sphere, should run something like this: "I do not take your place nor claim to do your work. You search out what is. I make something that hitherto has not been. My part is not to know, but to create. I bring into the system of things a new fact, on which, once I have brought it in, you may work, if you can and will, in perfect consistency with the method on which you have worked

before. I, at any rate, shall not seek to prevent you. There need be no quarrel between us. You expound the order of things. I supply a new element to the order of things. You say that you have no previous knowledge of all these things whereof I speak. Of course not. Until I call them into being, they are not there for you to know. But that is precisely what I do. In this mingling of God with man which I aim at and in part bring about, I conduct the order of things a step nearer to its goal."

III

Does this conception of mysticism assist us in bringing reason and mysticism nearer together? At first it may but seem to thrust them further apart. Yet it is in thus realizing the part it plays as a part which is not reason's part nor a substitute for reason's part—in thus drawing away from reason—that mysticism comes back into a true and harmonious relation with reason again.

The mystical experience, we have seen, is not in strictness a matter of knowledge, of apprehension; it is a becoming, a veritable act, the final stage in the movement of things working itself out. It is the penultimate passing into the ultimate,—the end, so far as it has hitherto been reached, linking itself back to and up with the beginning again, and so making the real and ordained end, completing the whole. It is the actual construction of the final fact. *And it is precisely the construction of a final fact that reason requires to come upon, or to have presented to it and to recognize, if it is to attain a satisfactory view of things, and if its system is to be complete.*

For reason, in its reading off of the facts of the world, with a view to the apprehension of a unified system of things, comes at last to a point at which it perceives (if its eyes be open) that the necessary facts are not all there to be read off. At any rate the last fact is lacking; and so the unity of things cannot be apprehended, because it does not in reality exist. Reason, for example, may, with its theories of evolution, pass beneath the surface of things and believe itself to have hit upon the underlying chain

of method whereby all that exists has come to be; but this by no means gives it the perfect unity it craves. A mere similarity of method and process all through is not unity at all, though it is true that the word "unity" is not infrequently used in the very loose sense implied. To reach that sort of unity is merely to discover that the programme of things has never been changed—and that is not enough. That kind of unity is like the unity reached by repeated striking of the same note on the keyboard of the piano. It is mere similarity of pattern; and you do not, by having a number of things exactly alike, make one whole. A unity in the pattern implies no unity of essential being. Reason demands, for its own satisfaction, a unity of a deeper and more vital kind. A real unity—the unity which reason, when it knows itself and its desires, calls for—is a unity vital and organic, a unity wherein the initial Being sends itself forth, passes through stage upon stage, becoming in a sense other than itself in the passing and yet remaining itself all the while, and at last returns upon itself, settles down upon itself, once more. What is demanded is a unity which is a self-contained, rounded whole. The entire process, though projected out of the initial Being, must be within the initial Being, too; and so far as there is separateness, it must be only such as is caused by the initial Being choosing to travel outside itself. There must be something more than a series of elements connected together in the same way: the elements of the series (it is by metaphor that one comes nearest to making the point clear) must have beneath them, so to say, a guide-rail from which they do not swerve, and which, however long may be its radius and however wide its sweep, curves back again to its starting-point, so that in the end the idea of separateness in the elements is lost in the idea of the fundamental Being which has sent them forth from itself, which has manifested itself through them, and which through the last of them brings all home once more. It is true that reason has sometimes contented itself with reaching what seemed to be a satisfactory theory of the method whereby the previous stages of things have been worked out, and when it has discovered a similarity of method throughout, has declared unity to be found. But if it read its own requirements aright, reason cannot be thus content. It cannot be satis-

fied with merely discovering how things have come to be. Things themselves (not simply the methods of their becoming) must be unified. What reason wants is to apprehend a unity vital and organic—to perceive how all that is has not only followed out an unchanging programme, but is all through actually the initial Being coming out from itself and returning home upon itself again.

This means that reason, taking up the process of things at the point it has reached in man, its last stage (its last stage for the present, that is), must not stop at accounting for that stage, but must apprehend also how that stage becomes, merges into, the really last stage—in other words, how life in man turns again to its source. Not till it apprehends this will a true unity be reached for thought. Reason must apprehend, not only the penultimate stage, as we called it before, but the ultimate. But this is precisely what thought, reason, cannot do, because the ultimate stage is not reached. In man, as thought discerns him, life is still as it were a loose thread, and is not bound back to the beginning of things again. No mere accounting for man puts this right. You may account for man, theorize as satisfactorily as you like as to how he came to be; but that is a very different thing from seeing everything, man included, as one whole. And when reason looks for this latter vision, it cannot attain it, because the wholeness of things is not worked out. Life, as man reveals it, may be traceable downward from its source; but life, in its human individualism, is not using its individualism in order to carry life on to a goal which is one with its source. The final fact, which reason wants to read off, that is, is not there for reason to read—and, not being there, must be made. Reason, having carried its reading off of the existing facts as far as possible, must confess that what is wanted now is the emergence of a new fact, of a new constructive process which shall continue and complete the unfinished process: reason itself leads us up to the point of seeing that something more—something which is not an exercise of reason, but an exercise of life—must take place if reason's own perfect work is to become possible; and in the end, reason has to watch and wait for something to happen rather than to stop at finding an explanation of what has happened already.

In order to obtain for thought the unity which we demand, we must first develop the real and final unity of life. Or, as previously said, it is the final fact of things, constructed or in process of construction, that reason requires to come upon or to have presented to it, if it is to reach a view of things in which it can rest. Reason itself calls to man, "*Be* something more than you are—make the final fact—in order that I may write the last chapter of my book, and not be put to shame."

And in the mystical experience, according to our former interpretation of it, the final fact is in process of being made. Here life returns upon its source. Here the process of things, having got as far as man, is linked up into one whole as man climbs up into God. Through the mystical experience the completely unified system which reason insists upon having is brought about—not perceived but brought about. The mystical experience finishes, one may venture to say, the creative process, and carries things back to God. Mysticism, then, when it understands itself aright and explains itself truly, remains entirely reasonable just because it does not attempt to substitute itself for reason, but does what, according to reason, requires to be done. It supplies reason with the final fact, and, in doing this, justifies itself in reason's eyes. The mystical experience is reasonable, although not a process of reason, nor something put in place of a process of reason. It does not interpret the system of things—it completes it. And inasmuch as this completing of the system of things is precisely what reason waits for, mysticism links itself with reason in separating itself from reason and in realizing what its own particular mission is; and in speaking of "rational mysticism" we do but call the mystical experience by a title to which it has a perfectly valid claim.

IV

But, now, what of New Testament Christianity? If mysticism, rightly understanding itself, finds that it has become truly rational because it creates the ultimate fact which somewhere or other reason needs to come upon in order to make its own system complete, does it also find itself in line with the religion expounded and prescribed on the New Testament page?

We are proceeding throughout this paper, let it be remembered, upon the idea that if we begin from a revised apprehension of what mysticism in its essence really is, we may find ourselves started upon the road to that ultimate reconciliation of seeming incompatibles which we desire. In other words, the suggestion is that the moment mysticism gives a legitimate account of itself, mysticism moves toward reason and reason toward mysticism, mysticism toward New Testament Christianity and New Testament Christianity toward mysticism. The mutual movement of reason and mysticism, we have seen, is made. But does the other mutual movement begin? Do we find that our idea of New Testament Christianity makes anything like an automatic approach to clasp hands with our clarified and rectified idea of what the mystical experience really is?

An affirmative reply is surely the only one that can be given. If we set the mystical experience, as read above, side by side with the conception of the Christian experience given in the New Testament, it becomes immediately evident that these two are one. So soon as we obtain a right idea of mysticism, our idea of New Testament Christianity—if we come to the New Testament with receptive minds—tones itself up to meet it. When mysticism quits its mistaken self-interpretation and moves on to surer ground New Testament Christianity, in our conception of it, hoists an answering signal, and moves in its turn to meet mysticism there.

For let the phrases wherein the mystical experience was described be recalled. Mysticism is a climbing into God on the part of man, a descent into man on the part of God—that is the sum of them all. But if this be a right description of the mystical experience, it is also a right description of the experience declared in the New Testament to be religion's goal. It is true that the New Testament is largely concerned with the means whereby man may find his way from the lower stages of life up to this highest stage of all—with a self-revelation which God has given—with a work which God has wrought—with the manner in which that divine life wherewith man, moving upward, is to unite himself, has in Christ, moving downward, made offer to unite itself with man—with a faith through which man is to

render all these works and arrangements of God, so to call them, effective for his own self-union with God. But, all through, the ideal of a veritable union between man's life and God's (or between man's life and Christ's, which for the New Testament is the same thing, since the divine life, according to the New Testament, mediates itself to man in and through Christ, and moves down, as was just now said, to meet man's upward striving, so that oneness with Christ is oneness with God)—all through, that ideal of a veritable union between man's life and God's life or Christ's life is kept in view. And it is a union in the strictest sense—not a mere harmony, not an accommodation of attitude on the part of one to what the attitude of the other requires, but an actual organic oneness, a true linking of personality to personality and of soul to soul. That, and nothing less, is the New Testament ideal.

To show this in any detail would involve a catena of quotations that is impossible here. But for any one who goes open-mindedly to the reading of the New Testament (after all due allowance for the results of reasonable criticism has been made) its mystical call rings clear. It rings in the ministry of Jesus—in the indisputable fact that, according to the presentation of the four gospels, Synoptic and Johannine alike, it was always his whole personality he sought to impress upon the personality of his hearers, and the whole personality of his hearers, as distinct from their assenting minds, he sought to draw into his own. One may venture to speak of the mysticism of Jesus, not in the sense that he was himself climbing into the divine life, for he *was* the divine life, but in the sense that he set himself before men as the One into whom they were to climb. That Christ was in a manner egoistic—may one put it so?—indicates how mystical he meant men to be; for to that egoism of his only mysticism on the part of men could adequately or appropriately respond. In Paul, again, the mystical call rings clear—in Paul, to whom those who fear the language of mysticism so often fly for refuge and for arms. It is not to be denied that Paul spoke frequently of the *means* whereby the mystical experience was to be won—of the machinery, so to term it, which the wisdom and power of God had set at work in order to make the mystical experience possible for

mankind. But always it was "Christ *in* you," "you *in* Christ," and similar phrases that Paul employed to denote religion's goal; and for himself the aim was that it should be not he that lived, but Christ that lived in him; and he saw all the fulness of God in Christ, and, correlatively, in Christ saw also man made full. And this (unless we water down the words to a quite illegitimate extent) is mysticism undefiled. Indeed, the mystical experience of human life united to the life of God through union with Christ was for Paul so much the very essence of Christianity that he assumed it as such rather than argued it, and spoke of it, as it were, without any note of exclamation at the end of his phrase,—for which reason, it may be, we sometimes fail to be arrested as we ought. And so all through. A reading of the New Testament that is unprejudiced and open-eyed finds it the most mystical book in all the world. Theology may have missed the fact not seldom—and may have missed it, partly, because mysticism's wrong account of itself has failed to waken New Testament echoes as mysticism's right account of itself cannot fail to waken them. With a mysticism which understands itself mistakenly the New Testament has nothing to do; a mysticism which is merely a substitute for knowledge, and which repays reason's scorn with scorn, has no kinship with New Testament religion; it is at least on a different plane, since it is not with intellectual knowledge, or with substitutes for intellectual knowledge, that New Testament religion is concerned. But when mysticism begins to talk of a veritable movement of life into God's, the New Testament and mysticism find that they are speaking the same tongue. It is precisely of such a movement that the New Testament speaks. Mysticism makes the final fact—it is with the making of that same final fact that the New Testament deals throughout. Mysticism, in the sense of a real union between man's life and God's, is the atmosphere which pervades the New Testament from cover to cover; and when once, having heard mysticism expounding itself aright, we pass on to listen to New Testament Christianity expounding itself in its turn, we find that both come forth from the secret place with the same light upon their faces, and that the hearts of both beat as one.

But the matter must be pushed a little further before our task

is ended. "You have not yet done" (it might be said) "what at the outset you were going to do. You have not yet made any connection between the mystical experience and those great terms, with the ideas they connote, which recur most frequently in the New Testament account—between the mystical experience and the ideas of sin, salvation, faith, and the rest—between the mystical experience and evangelicalism, in short. Can this also be done? Is it possible for the religious man to feel that 'immersion of his entire being in the eternal tides' which was spoken of earlier, and at the same time to keep a hold upon all the apparatus of truth which gathers round the evangelical idea of reconciliation with God?"

On the true conception of mysticism, the connection is not only possible, but necessary. Mysticism not only permits the New Testament evangelicalism, but demands it. Interpreting itself truly, mysticism, we have seen, tenders itself not as a method of knowledge, but as a movement of life. But having thus corrected one mistake in the statement of its programme, mysticism is forced on inevitably to the correction of another; and the stress which it has often laid upon "contemplation" as the means of union with God must yield to something else. A "movement of life" means a real activity, and implies either something actually done by man's life for itself, or something actually done upon man's life from beyond itself, in order that the necessary movement may be made: if man is to climb into God, the problem at once becomes one which no method of "contemplation" can solve; and we have now to look for forces, whether acting from within the man or from without the man, whereby the "climbing" shall be pushed successfully through. And, taking the mere facts of the situation, a force acting from without the man—a reinforcement of man's power from beyond himself—is at the very least a thing to be desired. For, aiming at the mystical experience as described, we find ourselves with a retarding and depressing weight in our own nature to lift, with the divine life into which we want to climb so far away, and with a movement away from, rather than toward, the divine life always incipient, and often accentuated, within. These are mere matters of easily ascertainable fact, however exaggerated or distorted

some readings of them may have been. How, in face of facts like these, is the true mystical experience to be attained?

It is here that the evangelical side of New Testament Christianity comes in. It is this question that is answered when the New Testament speaks of all those "means"—as we called them—whereof the New Testament does speak in tones so persistent and so loud. When the New Testament talks of sin, it is talking of that movement away from the divine life which is going on within me. When it talks of salvation in Christ, it recognizes that there must be a force, either within me or without me, under whose impulsive power I am to climb into the life of God, and, because the force within me is baffled, points me to a force without. When it speaks of God reconciling me to himself by Christ's Cross, it is mindful of the distance between me the climber and God the goal—mindful, too, of my helplessness—and tells how the far-off God has in Christ stooped out of his distance, taking upon himself the pain of sacrifice involved in the stooping, to meet and touch me, to fetch me, to take me back again with him in Christ to his height. When it talks of faith, of believing and being saved, it talks of my response to that stooping down on God's part, calls me to identify myself with God in Christ in answer to that identification of himself with me which in Christ he has offered and (so far as from one side is possible) has actually made. That is, all the great terms which evangelical religion finds blazoned on the pages of the New Testament are concerned with the means whereby the mystical experience is to be won: they solve the problem which he who aspires to the mystical experience sets himself; and just in proportion to my understanding of the mystical experience, and to my desire for it, will be, not only my willingness to accept, but my passionate cry for, the New Testament presentation of the Christian faith. There is no fear that if I take the mystical experience for my goal, I shall sever myself from those things which students of the New Testament have held as cardinal through the ages. I shall, it is true, have a central conception (itself, however, a New Testament conception) round which all the New Testament ideas are to be grouped in order to receive their interpretation and in whose light they are to be read. Every doctrine which is given as a part

of the "machinery" for producing the movement of my life into God's must justify itself as a means to that end; and in my conception of religion's goal I shall have a test to which every conception of faith, atonement, and all else must submit. But I shall want faith, atonement, and all else—all the great old words and the realities they stand for—not less, but more. And this, not in any pale, eviscerated significance—not in any significance which implies juggling with the old words but not really putting them to fair use, but in a significance which leaves them with the full value rendered to them still. When I set myself to achieve a veritable union with God,—a union wherein the only initiative I keep is the initiative of surrender—a union wherein God becomes the actual dynamic source of all I am—a union wherein the separateness of my personality is used only to secure its unity with God's,—then I shall prize the more warmly all those ringing words and ideas of the New Testament which tell me how God himself, knowing all the obstacles and gloriously conquering them in his wisdom, love, and power, has made it possible for that union to be achieved. New Testament Christianity need have no fear that for him who understands the mystical experience aright one jot or tittle of the religious programme it inculcates will pass away. It is just in that programme that the needed secret will be found. And the religious man, longing for the warmth of the mystic's experience, yet wondering whether in seeking it he may not be divorcing himself from the primary essentials of a true Christian life, may set his misgivings at rest. For if he understand the mystical experience truly, he will through his pursuit of it come to see all the vaster significance in the great New Testament truths of sin, and faith, and incarnation, and Christ, and Cross.

So, in the end, under a right understanding of the mystical experience, we see mysticism moving toward reason and reason toward mysticism; and we see mysticism and New Testament Christianity at one. And, with mysticism thus linked with reason on the one hand and with New Testament Christianity on the other, our conception of New Testament Christianity (which through its link with mysticism becomes endowed with fresh depth) becomes, through mysticism's link with reason, linked

with reason in its turn, and endowed with fresh reasonableness, too. And so, to speak of "rational mysticism and New Testament Christianity" is to venture upon no union of incompatibles after all: it is to bring together three things whose voices blend, and on whose blended voices there comes the sound of a call we ought to hear. For the whole thing has a practical issue—which is this. Only in driving our religious life up to the mystical heights do we render it at the same time most reasonable and most in accord with the New Testament scheme; because only so do we make the "final fact" for which reason calls, and only so do we use the New Testament "means" for the realization of the New Testament ideal.

*THE COVENANTERS OF DAMASCUS; A HITHERTO
UNKNOWN JEWISH SECT*¹

GEORGE FOOT MOORE

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Among the Hebrew manuscripts recovered in 1896 from the Genizah of an old synagogue at Fostat, near Cairo, and now in the Cambridge University Library, England, were found eight leaves of a Hebrew manuscript which proved to be fragments of a book containing the teaching of a peculiar Jewish sect; a single leaf of a second manuscript, in part parallel to the first, in part supplementing it, was also discovered. These texts Professor Schechter has now published, with a translation and commentary, in the first volume of his *Documents of Jewish Sectaries*. The longer and older of the manuscripts (A) is, in the opinion of the editor, probably of the tenth century; the other (B), of the eleventh or twelfth.

What remains of the book may be divided into two parts. Pages 1-8 of A, and the single leaf of B, contain exhortations and warnings addressed to members of the sect, for which a ground and motive are often sought in the history of the Jewish people or of the sect itself, together with severe strictures upon such as have lapsed from the sound teaching, and polemics against the doctrine and practice of other bodies of Jews. The second part, pages 9-16, sets forth the constitution and government of the community, and its distinctive interpretation and application of the law,—what may be called sectarian *halakah*.

Neither part is complete; the manuscript is mutilated and defective at the end, there is apparently a gap between the first and second parts, and it may be questioned whether the original beginning of the work is preserved. The lack of methodical arrangement in the contents leads Dr. Schechter to surmise that

¹ *Documents of Jewish Sectaries*. Volume I. *Fragments of a Zadokite Work*. Edited, with Translation, Introduction, and Notes, by S. Schechter. Cambridge University Press. 1910.

what we have in our hands is only a compilation of extracts from a larger work, put together with little regard for completeness or order. An orderly disposition, according to our notions of order, is not, however, so constant a characteristic of Jewish literature as to make this inference very convincing.

Manuscript A was evidently written by a negligent scribe, perhaps after a poor or badly preserved copy; B, which represents a somewhat different recension of the work, exhibits, so far as it goes, a superior text. When it is added that both manuscripts are in many places defaced or torn, it may be imagined that the decipherment and interpretation present serious difficulties, and that, after all the pains which Dr. Schechter has spent upon the task, many uncertainties remain. Facsimiles of a page of each manuscript are given; but in view of the condition of the text a photographic reproduction of the whole is indispensable.

The legal part of the book, so far as the text is fairly well preserved, is not exceptionally difficult; the rules are in general clearly defined, and if in the peculiar institutions of the sect there are many things we do not fully understand, this is due more to the brevity with which its organization is described and to the mutilation of the text than to lack of clearness in the description itself. The attempt to make out something of the history and relations of the sect from the first part of the book is, on the other hand, beset by many difficulties. What history is found there is not told for the sake of history, but used to point admonitions or emphasize warnings; and, after the manner of the apocalyptic literature, historical persons and events are referred to in round-about phrases which envelop them in an affected mystery. Even when such references are to chapters of the national history with which we are moderately well acquainted, as in the Assumption of Moses, c. 5, ff., for example, they may be to us baffling enigmas; much more when they have to do, as is in large part the case in our texts, with the wholly unknown internal or external history of a sect. The obscurity is increased by the fact that the allusions are often a tissue of fragmentary quotations or reminiscences out of the Old Testament, chosen and combined, it seems, by purely verbal association, or taken in an occult allegorical sense.² The

² It may be added that the quotations are singularly inexact.

allegories of which an interpretation is given, as when Amos 5 26 f. is applied to the emigration to Damascus and the institutions and laws of the sect, and Ezekiel 44 15 to the classes of the community, do not encourage us to think that we should be able to divine the meaning by our unaided intelligence. It is a fortunate circumstance that the writer comes back more than once to the salient events in the sect's history, for these repetitions of the same thing in different forms afford considerable help to the interpreter, so that the main facts may be made out with at least a considerable degree of probability.

The principal seat of the sect was in the region of Damascus, where its adherents formed numerous communities. It was composed of Israelites who had migrated thither from Judaea; thither also had come "the interpreter of the law," the founder of the sect; there it had been organized by a covenant repeatedly referred to as "the new covenant in the land of Damascus." Many who entered into this new covenant at the beginning did not long remain true to it; the writer inveighs vehemently against those who fell away, accusing them not only of grave error, but of gross violations of the law; but this crisis had been passed, and when the book was written the community was apparently flourishing.

The most coherent account of the origin of the sect is found on pages 5-6:³

At the end of the devastation of the land arose men who removed the boundary and led Israel astray; and the land was laid waste because they spoke rebelliously against the commandments of God by Moses and also against his holy Anointed,⁴ and prophesied falsehood to turn Israel back from following God. But God remembered the covenant with the forefathers, and he raised up from Aaron discerning men and from Israel wise men, and he heard them, and they dug the well. "The well, princes dug it, nobles of the people delved it, with the legislator" (Numbers 21 18). The well is the law, and they who dug it are the captivity of Israel⁵ who went forth from the land of Judah and sojourned in the land of

³ In my translation I have sometimes thought it possible to adhere to the text where Dr. Schechter has preferred a conjectural emendation.

⁴ That is, probably, against the legitimate high priest of the time (perhaps Onias).—The rendering "*by* his Anointed" is grammatically admissible, but would be unintelligible in this context.

⁵ It would be possible to render "the penitents of Israel."

Damascus, all of whom God called princes because they sought him.⁶ . . . The legislator is the interpreter of the law, as Isaiah said, "Bringing forth a tool for his work" (Isa. 54 16), and the nobles of the people are those who came to delve the well with the statutes which the legislator decreed that men should walk in them in the complete end of wickedness; and besides these they shall not obtain any (statutes) until the teacher of righteousness shall arise in the last times.

The migration is referred to in several other places: "The captivity of Israel, who migrated from the land of Judah" (4 2 f.);⁷ "those who held firm made their escape to the northern land," by which the region of Damascus is meant (7 13 f.; cf. 7 15, 18 f.). The time of the migration is plainly indicated in the passage quoted above (5 20 ff.). The men who, after the end of the devastation of the land, "removed the boundary," and led Israel astray, speaking rebelliously against the commandments of God by Moses and against his holy Anointed, prophesying falsely to turn Israel away from following God, in consequence of which the land was laid waste, are most naturally taken for the hellenizing leaders of the Seleucid time. In this period, it seems that a number of Jews, including priests and levites, withdrew to the region of Damascus,⁸ and there they subsequently bound themselves by covenant to live strictly in accordance with the law as defined by their legislator.

With this the other allusions agree. Thus in A, p. 8 (= B, p. 19), at the end of a violent invective against the sinners, of whom it is said, "The princes of Judah are like those who remove the boundary," we read that "they separated not from the people [and their sins, B], but presumptuously broke through all restraints, walking in the way of the wicked (heathen), of whom God said, 'The venom of dragons is their wine, and the head of asps is cruel'⁹ (Deut. 32 33). The dragons are the kings of the nations, and their wine means their ways, and the head of asps is the head of the Greek kings who came to inflict vengeance upon them." This again is most naturally understood of Antiochus

⁶ The four or five words which follow are unintelligible.

⁷ The references are to page and line of the Hebrew text.

⁸ Others sought refuge in Egypt; the temple of Onias at Leontopolis had its origin in the same circumstances.

⁹ So they understood the words translated in the English version "the cruel venom of asps."

Epiphanes; the calamities he brought on the Jews were a direct consequence of the course of the hellenizing party.¹⁰

A definite date for these occurrences is given in 1 5 ff.: "When God's wrath was over, three hundred and ninety years after he gave them into the power of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, he visited them, and caused to spring up from Israel and Aaron a root of his planting to inherit his land and to thrive on the good things of his earth. And they recognized their wickedness and knew that they were guilty men, and they were like blind men and like men groping their way for twenty years. And God took note of their deeds, that with perfect heart they sought him, and he raised up for them a teacher of righteousness to guide them in the way of his heart."

The "root" which God, mindful of his covenant, caused to spring up from Aaron and Israel is the men with whom the religious revival, or reformation, began, the forefathers of the sect (see 6 2 f., and below, p. 375);¹¹ the "teacher of righteousness" is the "interpreter of the law who came to Damascus" (6 7 f., 7 18 f.). The dates refer therefore to the origin of the sect. Three hundred and ninety years from the taking of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar (597 or 586 B.C.) would bring us, by our chronology, to 207 or 196 B.C. The Jewish chronology of the Persian period is, however, always too long by from forty to seventy years,¹² and assuming, as it is fair to do, that our author made the same error, the three hundred ninety years would run out in the middle of the third century. Dr. Schechter suspects, with much probability, that the original reading was "*four* hundred and ninety years," the common apocalyptic cycle (Dan. 9 2, 24; Enoch 89-90; 93, etc.). Making the same allowance for error, we should be brought again to a time not far removed from the pun-

¹⁰ See 2 Macc. 4 16: "By reason of which (sc. their predilection for Greek ways) a dire calamity befel them, and those for whose customs they displayed such zeal and whom they wanted to imitate in everything became their enemies and avengers." Assumption of Moses, 5 1: "When the times of retribution shall draw near, and vengeance arises through kings who share their guilt and punish them," etc., describes the same situation.

¹¹ Cf. "the whole race of the elect root," Enoch 93 8.

¹² See Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes* (3 ed.), vol. iii, p. 189.

ishment inflicted on the people by Antiochus Epiphanes (see above, p. 333 f.).¹³

There is nothing in the texts which demands a later date for the origin of the sect. The last event in the national history to which reference is made is the vengeance inflicted on the heathenizing rulers of the people by "the head of the Greek kings." To the misfortunes of the people in the following centuries, such as the taking of Jerusalem by Pompey or its destruction by Titus, there is no allusion. It may perhaps be inferred not only that the schism antedated these calamities, but that the book was written before them. In the author's frame of mind toward the religious leaders of Palestinian Jewry, he would have been likely to record such conspicuous judgments upon them. A comparison with the Assumption of Moses is instructive on this point. There the sweeping denunciation of the priesthood and the scribes, "their teachers in those times," and of the godless Asmonaeen priest-kings, is followed by the well-deserved judgment inflicted on them by Herod, and after him comes Varus, burning part of the temple, crucifying, and carrying off into slavery. The second of the Psalms of Solomon may also be compared.

The schismatic character of the sect would also be explained

¹³ A comparison with the Apocalypse of the Ten Weeks in Enoch (93 + 91 12-17) is in point here. The sixth "week" (period of 490 years) ends with the destruction of the temple by Nebuchadnezzar; in the seventh a rebellious generation arises, all whose works are apostasy (the hellenizers of the Seleucid time); at its end the "chosen righteous men of the eternal plantation of righteousness" are chosen to receive the sevenfold instruction about God's whole creation (apparently the cosmological revelations of Enoch); the historical retrospect closes before the robbery and desecration of the temple by Antiochus Epiphanes (170, 168 B.C.), of which the seer knows nothing. The chronological error here amounts to sixty or seventy years.

In the Introduction, p. xii, by a typographical error which is repeated on p. xxii, Dr. Schechter says that the 390 years of the text would bring us "to within a generation of Simon the Just, who flourished about 290 B.C.," and twenty years more would bring us into the midst of the hellenistic persecutions preceding the Maccabean revolt (about 170 B.C.). Margoliouth, whose hypothesis 490 does not suit any better than 390, takes courage from Schechter's doubts to disregard the numbers altogether. Gressmann (*Internationale Wochenschrift*, March 4, 1911) is led by metrical considerations to treat all the chronological notices as interpolations, and gives them no further consideration. But even if the figures were introduced by a later hand, they may still represent the tradition of the sect.

if it arose in an age when the character of the political and religious heads of the Jewish people was such as to move God-fearing and law-abiding men to repudiate them with all their ways and works. For it is not merely with a sect, differing from the mass of their fellows in certain opinions and practices, that we have to do, but with a schism. The Covenanters of Damascus are radical come-outers, seceders not only from the land of Judaea, but from established Judaism, on which they look much as the Puritan Separatists in the seventeenth century looked on the English Church; they might have taken to themselves the prophetic word so often in the mouth of the Puritan, "Depart ye, depart ye, go ye out from thence, touch no unclean thing; go ye out of the midst of her; be ye clean, ye that bear the vessels of the Lord" (Isa. 52 11), as they do apply to the religious teachers of the Jewish church the most violent invectives of the same prophet (50 11, 59 4 ff.; see below, p. 344 f.). They will not even call themselves Jews, they are Israelites who went forth from the land of Judaea; their Messiah is to spring from Aaron and Israel, not from Judah; when the final judgment comes in its appointed time, it will no longer be permitted to make compact with the house of Judah, but every man must stand in his own stronghold;¹⁴ when the glory of God shines out on Israel, all the wicked of Judah shall be cut off, in the day of its trial by fire. They reject the temple in Jerusalem, and will not offer on its altar. If we consider that the Essenes, notwithstanding their wider divergence from the common type of Judaism, seem to have regarded themselves as within the pale of the church, and to have been so regarded by others—enjoying, indeed, with the people the reputation of peculiar sanctity—the schismatic character of our sect appears in a still stronger light.

The language of the book is not inconsistent with the age to which the contents would seem to assign it. The vocabulary is in the main Biblical, but there are a number of words which otherwise occur only in the writings of the Mishnic age or later. Some of these belong to the technical terminology of the law schools, some of them appear to be peculiar to the sect. A few of the Biblical words also are used in later senses and applications.

¹⁴ Perhaps we should emend *ma'mādō*, 'station,' i.e. sect.

It is proper to bear in mind, however, that the Hebrew originals of the works with which it would be most natural to compare our text, such as Enoch, the Book of Jubilees, the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, the Gospel, are not preserved; in fact, between the last books of the Old Testament and the rabbinical literature of the second Christian century there is a hiatus in the history of the Hebrew language, so that words which appear for the first time in the Mishna and kindred works may have been, and in many cases probably were, in use much earlier. It is unnecessary therefore to suppose that such words were introduced into our texts by later scribes, though the possibility of such changes must of course be admitted. The particular instances in which Dr. Schechter thinks that late and foreign influences are most clearly to be recognized—the title of the “censor” and the peculiar name for a house of worship—are discussed elsewhere.¹⁵ More remarkable than the vocabulary of the book is its syntax. The consecutive constructions of the perfect and the imperfect are regularly employed, not only in imitation of Biblical models in narrative and prophetic passages, but in the legal part of the book; and in spite of some irregularities, which may in part at least be laid to the charge of scribes, the use of these tenses is generally correct. In this respect the Hebrew of the book differs entirely from that of the Mishna and the contemporary and later Midrashim, in which the characteristic features of classical tense-syntax have entirely disappeared, under the influence, it is generally supposed, of the Aramaic vernacular. In comparison with these writings the vocabulary also is notably free from foreign admixture. There are no words borrowed from Greek and Latin, and only one or two instances where an Aramaic term seems to have been adopted. The orthography also, in its more sparing use of the semivowels to indicate the vowels *u* and *i*, resembles that of the Bible.

The founder of the sect is called the “teacher of righteousness” (1 11),¹⁶ “the only, or beloved, teacher” (20 14);¹⁷ “the only

¹⁵ See below, p. 350, 354 f.

¹⁶ Cf. Isa. 30 20 f.

¹⁷ The Septuagint renders *yāhīd* most frequently by ἀγαπητός, less often by μονογενής.

one" (20 32); he is "the legislator," that is, "the interpreter of the law" (6 7); and this interpreter of the law, who came to Damascus, is the star who, according to Balaam's prophecy, was to issue from Jacob (7 18 f.).¹⁸ He showed them how to walk in the way of God's heart (1 11); as interpreter of the law he ordained them statutes to walk in till the end of wickedness—statutes which shall not be superseded by any others "until there arise the teacher of righteousness in the last days" (6 11 f.). To him, therefore, are attributed the distinctive principles and observances of the sect as they are set forth in this book. "His anointed," through whom God made known to men his holy spirit, and who is true (2 12 f.), is in all probability the same person with the teacher, the star, just as the anointed from Aaron and Israel who is to arise in the future (20 1) is the same as the teacher of righteousness to whose voice they will then listen (20 32; see below, p. 343).

Those of the emigrants who accepted the guidance of the teacher of righteousness, the interpreter of the law, entered into the "new covenant in the land of Damascus" (6 19, 8 21, 19 33 f., 20 12). The idea of the "new covenant" was doubtless suggested by Jer. 31 31 f. (cf. 32 36 f.; Ezek. 37 26, etc.), where the establishment of the new covenant, in the stead of the old covenant which their fathers broke, marks the restoration of God's favor, the beginning of a new and better time. The same use of the passage in Jeremiah is made at length by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews (8 6 f.). The substance of the covenant may be gathered from 6 11–7 5:

All who were brought into the covenant are not to enter into the sanctuary to light its altar, but became closers of the door, as God said, "Who among you will close its door?" and "Thou shalt not light my altar in vain" (Mal. 1 10);¹⁹ but shall observe to do according to the interpretation of the law for the end of wickedness, and to separate from the children of perdition, and to keep aloof from unrighteous gain, which is unclean by vow and ban,²⁰ and from the property of the sanctuary, and from

¹⁸ The same prophecy which was applied by Akiba to Bar Cocheba and by the Dositheans to their founder (see below, p. 362).

¹⁹ The sect rejects the temple in Jerusalem and its worship. Cf. 20 21 f., in the last crisis, "they will lean upon God . . . and will declare the sanctuary unclean and will return to God."

²⁰ Perhaps better, keep aloof, by vow and ban, from unrighteous, unclean gain.

robbing the poor of the people and making widows their spoil and murdering orphans; and to separate between the unclean and the clean, and to show the difference between the holy and the common; and to observe the Sabbath day as it is defined, and the season feasts, and the fast-day, in accordance with the commandments of those who entered into the new covenant in the land of Damascus; to set apart the sacred dues as they are defined; and that a man should love his neighbor as himself, and sustain the poor and needy and the proselyte, and to seek each the welfare of the other; and that no man transgress the prohibited degrees, but guard against fornication according to the rule; and that a man should reprove his brother according to the commandment, and not bear a grudge from day to day; and to separate from all forms of uncleanness according to their several prescriptions; and that a man should not defile his holy spirit, even as God separated for them (sc. unclean from clean). All who walk in these precepts in perfection of holiness, according to all the foundations of the covenant of God,²¹ have the assurance that they shall live a thousand generations.

Early in the history of the sect a serious defection occurred. Men who entered among the first into the covenant incurred guilt, like their forefathers, by following their sinful inclinations; they forsook the covenant of God and preferred their own will, and went about after the stubbornness of their heart, every man doing as he pleased (3 10 ff.); the men who entered into the new covenant in the land of Damascus went back and proved false, and turned aside from the well of living waters (19 33 f.). Their names were struck out of the registers of the sect, as were those of such as fell away in later times.

We can readily imagine that many found the rule of the sect too strict and the discipline by which it was enforced too severe. Our texts, however, speak not of such occasional and individual lapses, but of the repudiation of the covenant by numbers at one time. It seems that another leader had arisen, of very different temper from the founder, who drew away many after him. In the eyes of those who remained steadfast in the faith, the new teacher was naturally a false prophet, a kind of antichrist. He is called the liar ("the man of lies," 20 15), the scoffer (1 14); his adherents are scoffers,²² who uttered error about the righteous

²¹ See below, p. 353.

²² The name comes from Isa. 28 14, where the scornors are the rulers in Jerusalem, who boast of their covenant with death and their compact with hell, who have made lies their refuge and hidden themselves in falsehood. See also Isa. 29 20.

statutes, and spurned the covenant and plighted faith which they established in the land of Damascus, that is to say, the new covenant. They and their families shall have no portion in the house of the law (20 10 ff.). For their unfaithfulness they were delivered to the sword (3 10 ff.), until of all the men of war who went with the liar none was left (20 14 ff.).²² This came to pass about forty years after the death of the unique teacher (*l. c.*). If the emigration to Damascus occurred under Antiochus Epiphanes,²⁴ the end of the episode of the false prophet would fall about the beginning of the first century B.C., and we should have at least an upper limit for the writing of the book. The passion which every mention of this defection arouses suggests that it was fresh in memory, and would incline us to date the writing not very long after the time indicated. It should be observed, however, that the sentence which counts forty years from the death of the unrivalled teacher to the end of the liar's army sits loose in the context, and may be a gloss, in which case the book might be some decades older.

With the remnant who remained faithful through the great defection "God confirmed his covenant with Israel forever, revealing to them the secret of things in which all Israel was in error, his holy Sabbaths and his glorious festivals and his righteous testimonies and his true ways and the pleasure of his will, things which if a man do he shall live by them. He opened a way before them, and they dug a well for copious waters." "In the abundance of his wonderful grace he atoned for their guilt and forgave their transgression, and built for them a sure house in Israel, the like of which did not arise in times past nor until now" (3 12-20). The prediction of the sure house (1 Sam. 2 35) seems to be fulfilled in the stability of the sect itself, or perhaps, with closer adherence to the prophecy, in that of its faithful priesthood.

So much may be gathered from the book about the origin and history of the sect. We turn now to its expectation. As a teacher of righteousness, an anointed one (priest), was the founder of the sect, so in the last times a teacher of righteousness, an

²² It might be surmised that the false prophet had headed an insurrection—perhaps a Messianic rising—which ended in disaster.

²⁴ See above, p. 333.

anointed one, shall appear (6 10 f.). Those who proved faithless to the covenant are cut off from the community, "from the time when the unique teacher was taken away until the anointed one from Aaron and Israel shall arise" (19 35-20 1), that is, during the whole of the present dispensation. Dr. Schechter regards the anointed one who is to appear in the future as the founder of the sect *redivivus*: the present dispensation "seems to be the period intervening between the *first* appearance of the Teacher of Righteousness (p. 1, l. 11) (the founder of the Sect), who was gathered in or died,²⁵ and the second appearance of the Teacher of Righteousness who is to rise in 'the end of the days' (p. 6, l. 11). Moreover, the Only Teacher, or Teacher of Righteousness, is identical with the Messiah, or the Anointed one from Aaron and Israel, whose advent is expected by the Sect."²⁶ The texts, however, say nothing of the disappearance, or a second appearance, or reappearance, or return of the founder; nor do the words "until the teacher of righteousness shall arise in the last days," "until the anointed shall arise from Aaron and Israel," mean that he shall rise from the dead, as Dr. Schechter interprets them.²⁷ The Messiah whose advent the sect expects at the end of the present period of history is, as in the older parts of the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, a priest; and the function of the priest-messiah is not, as in the Epistle to the Hebrews, to mediate between man and God, but to instruct men in righteousness, to guide them in the way of God's heart. That the founder of the sect also was both priest and teacher is by no means sufficient to establish the identity of the two figures. It was the office of the priest to teach Israel the law, "all the statutes which the Lord hath spoken unto them through Moses" (Lev. 10 11; cf. Deut. 33 10); "the priest's lips should keep knowledge, and they should seek

²⁵ Or, as Schechter elsewhere expresses it, "disappeared." Among the synonyms for death, Aaron ben Elijah names "gather in" (Isa. 58 8).

²⁶ Introduction, p. xiii.

²⁷ P. xiii. "We gather from another passage that the Only Teacher found his death in Damascus, but is expected to rise again (p. 19, l. 35; p. 20, l. 1; cf. also p. 6, l. 11)." The verb *'amad* means, as frequently in the later books of the Old Testament, 'appear upon the scene.' In this sense it occurs repeatedly in the book before us, and there is nothing in the context here to suggest a different interpretation.

the law at his mouth, for he is the messenger of the Lord of Hosts" (Mal. 2 7). Ezra is the type of a priest who had not only prepared his heart to seek the law of the Lord and to do it, but to teach in Israel statutes and judgments (Ezra 7 10); he was, according to the books of Ezra and Nehemiah, the restorer of Judaism. It was a departure from the ideal of the law itself that, when the priesthood showed itself unworthy of its calling, the teaching function was assumed by lay scribes, and even in later times there were many priestly teachers among the Scribes and among the Doctors. That our sect looks back to one such as its founder, and forward to another as the great teacher of the Messianic age, is in no way surprising. If the author had meant what Dr. Schechter thinks, it is fair to assume that he would have said it unmistakably; for the identity of the expected Messiah with the dead founder, if it was part of the belief of the sect, would of necessity be a singular and significant part of it.²⁸

The coming judgment of God is represented rather as a judgment on the faithless members of the sect, including those who have seceded from it or been expelled, than in its more general aspects. The long eschatological passage in B (20 15 to the end) is illegible in spots near the beginning, but the general tenor is clear:

In that consummation the anger of God will be inflamed against Israel, as he said, "There is no king and no prince, and no judge and none that reproves in righteousness" (cf. Hos. 3 4). Those who turn from the transgression [of Jacob]²⁹ and keep the covenant of God will then confer with one another; their footsteps will be firm in the way of God (and the prophecy will be fulfilled which says), "And God hearkened to their words and heard, and a book of remembrance was written before him for those that fear God and think on his name" (Mal. 3 16), until deliverance and righteousness emerge for those that fear God, "and ye shall return and see the difference between righteous and wicked, and between a servant of God and one who serves him not" (Mal. 3 18). And he shows favor to those that love him and keep his commandments, for a thousand generations.³⁰ . . .

²⁸ Cf. Acts 1 11.

²⁹ See Isa. 59 20.

³⁰ The quotation is to be thus restored; see Exod. 20 6 and Deut. 7 9. The next two or three lines are very obscure: "From the house of Peleg, who went out (or, will go out) from the city of the sanctuary, and they will rely on God

Each man according to his spirit, shall they be judged by his holy counsel, and all who have broken through the bounds of the law, of those who entered into the covenant, when the glory of God shines out on Israel, shall be cut off from the midst of the camp, and with them all the evil-doers of Judah, in the days when it is tried in the fire. But all who held firmly by these precepts, going out and coming in in conformity with the law, and listened to the voice of the teacher, will confess¹¹ before God. . . . "We have done evil, we, and our fathers also, when they went contrary to the statutes of the covenant, and faithful are thy judgments upon us." And they will not act presumptuously against his holy statutes and his righteous judgment and his faithful testimonies. They will be instructed in the ancient judgments by which the followers of the unique one were judged, and will hearken to the words of the teacher of righteousness. And they will not controvert the righteous statutes when they hear them; they will rejoice and be glad, and their heart will be strong, and they will show themselves mighty against all the people of the world.¹² And God will atone for them, and they will see his salvation with joy, because they trusted in his holy name.

Here the fragment ends. The destruction of those who fall away from the sect is threatened in other places; it will suffice to quote the most important (19 5 ff.):

Upon all those who reject the commandments and the statutes, the deserts of the wicked shall be requited when God visits the earth, when the word comes to pass which was written by Zechariah the prophet, "Sword, awake against my shepherd and against the man that is my fellow, saith God; smite the shepherd, and let the sheep be scattered, and I will turn my hand against the little ones" (Zech. 13 7). But those who observe it (sc. the obligations of the covenant) are "the poor of the flock" (Zech. 11 7). These shall escape at the end of the visitation, but the former (sc. those who reject the commandments) shall be given over to the sword when the Anointed of Aaron and Israel comes, as it was at the end of the first visitation, of which God said by Ezekiel that a mark should be made on the foreheads of them that sigh and cry,

(cf. Isa. 10 20) when the transgression of Israel is at an end, and will declare the sanctuary unclean, and will return to God. The prince (?) of the people with few words (??)." The house of Peleg may be an etymological allegory for the seceders; the city of the sanctuary is probably Jerusalem (cf. 6 11 ff., above, p. 338); but neither the connection with the preceding nor the meaning of the sequel is clear.

¹¹ Text, "and confessed," which leaves the sentence without a predicate.

¹² See also 7 20: "The sceptre" (Num. 24 17) "is the prince of all the congregation; and when he arises he will destroy all the children of Seth."

and the rest were delivered to the sword that executes the judgment of the covenant. And so shall the judgment be of all who enter into his covenant and do not hold firmly by these statutes, they shall be visited even with extermination by the hand of Belial. This is the day in which God will visit, as he spoke, "The princes of Judah are become like men who remove the boundary; on them will I pour out my fury like water" (Hos. 5 10). For they entered into the covenant of repentance, but did not turn aside from the way of faithless men, and wallowed in ways of fornication and in unrighteous gain, and avenging themselves and bearing a grudge against one another.

It is possible, of course, that the judgment of the heathen world, which looms so large in most of the apocalypses, may have had a place in parts of the book now lost, but if it had been a very important feature in the expectation of the sect we should hardly fail to find at least allusions to it in the pages in our hands. The author is almost exclusively interested in the sect itself, in the division which had rent it, and in polemics against laxer interpretations of the law. This limitation of the horizon is characteristically sectarian, and may suggest, moreover, as has been said above, that the writer is not far removed in time from the split in the new organization.

The polemic is especially pointed against certain opponents who are described as "those who build a wall and plaster it with stucco" (4 19; 8 12).³³ They follow a commandment (*šau*); probably connoting, as in Hosea 5 11, from which the phrase is taken, an arbitrary rule of their own, a commandment of men.³⁴ God hates them, his anger is kindled against them (8 18). These "builders" are false teachers; Biblical denunciations of the false prophets are applied to them. (See especially 8 12 f.) Points in which their teaching is particularly assailed are that they allow polygamy and the remarriage of divorced persons during the life of the other party, and hold it lawful for a man to marry his niece;

³³ It is not improbable that the author thought also of the other meaning of the word *tāphēl*, here rendered 'stucco,' viz. something insipid, stupid; cf. Lam. 2 14, in a passage which, like Ezek. 13 10, refers to the false prophets. I see nothing to indicate that "the wall" is the fence or hedge which the Pharisaean rabbis drew around the law to protect it from infraction, as Dr. Schechter thinks.

³⁴ The text explains, "this is the prater of whom it says, they prate unceasingly" (4 19 f.; cf. Mic. 2 11). Dr. Schechter regards this explanation as "a disturbing parenthesis."

that they defile the sanctuary by the laxity of some of their rules and practice about sexual uncleanness; they presume blasphemously to impugn the "statutes of the covenant of God" (the legislation of the sect), declaring that they are not right, and saying abominable things about them (4 20-5 14). The positions so hotly denounced, especially in the matter of marriage and divorce, are those of the Palestinian rabbis as we know them in the Mishna and kindred works, and in so far as the Pharisees had a dominating influence in the schools of the law they may be regarded as in a peculiar sense the object of this invective, which is, however, sweeping enough to include all rabbinical Judaism. Such verses as Isaiah 50 11 and 59 4 ff. are hurled at them; they are compared to Johanneh and his brother, whom Belial raised up against Moses (5 17 ff.).³⁵

The sect prohibited polygamy, which they stigmatized as fornication, arguing from the creation—"a male and a female created he them" (cf. Matt. 19 4), and from the story of the flood—"by pairs they went into the ark," and from the law which forbade the prince to multiply wives unto himself (Deut. 17 17), that is, as they understood it, to take more than one wife. To forestall an objection, it is added: "But David had not read in the sealed book of the law which was in the ark, for it was not opened in Israel from the time of the death of Eleazar and Joshua and the elders who worshipped the Astartes, but was hidden and not brought to light until Zadok arose" (5 2-5; see below, p. 359).

Marriage with another woman while a man had a divorced wife living was apparently put in the same category with having two wives at the same time (4 20 f.; cf. Matt. 5 31 f.). Marriage with a niece (brother's or sister's daughter) they treated as incest, reasoning that marriage between a woman and her uncle stood on all fours with marriage between a man and his aunt, which was expressly forbidden as within the prohibited degrees of kinship.³⁶ The three snares of Belial by which he ensnared Israel

³⁵ The Jannes and Jambres of 2 Tim. 3 8.

³⁶ Such marriages, especially with a sister's daughter, are not only permitted, but especially commended in the Talmud (Yebamoth 62b-63a; see Maimonides, *Issure Biah* 2 14), and are still common in countries where the Jews are free to follow the rabbinical law. On the Karaite prohibition of marriage with a niece, see below, p. 366.

are fornication (that is, plural or incestuous unions), wealth (that is, unrighteous gain), and the pollution of the sanctuary (4 15 f.; cf. 5 6 f.).³⁷

The same rigorous tendency which appears in the attitude of the sect in regard to marriage pervades the whole legal part of the work before us. The rules for the observance of the Sabbath (10 14-11 21) will make this clear.

Concerning the Sabbath, to keep it as it is prescribed.

1. On the sixth day no man shall do any work from the time when the disk of the sun is distant from the western portal³⁸ by its diameter (?); for this is what he said: Observe the Sabbath day to hallow it.

2. On the Sabbath a man shall not engage in any foolish conversation; and he shall not exact repayment from his neighbor; nor shall he give judgment in matters of property; he shall not talk about matters of work and labor to be done on the next day.

3. A man shall not walk in the country to do the work of his business on the Sabbath. He shall not walk outside of his town above one thousand³⁹ cubits.

4. No man shall eat on the Sabbath anything except what was previously prepared or what is spoiling in the field. He shall not eat or drink anything but what was in the camp. If he be on the way and descend to bathe, he may drink as he stands, but must not draw water in any vessel.⁴⁰

5. He must not send a foreigner to do his business on the Sabbath day.

6. A man must not put on soiled garments or such as are brought by a gentile, without washing them in water or rubbing them with frankincense.⁴¹

7. A man shall not exchange pledges⁴² of his own accord on the Sabbath.

8. A man shall not follow his cattle, to pasture them outside his town, except within 2000 cubits. He shall not lift his arm to strike them with his fist; if the animal is breachy, let him not take her out of the house.

9. A man shall not take anything out of a house into the street, nor

³⁷ On the pollution of the sanctuary, cf. Assumption of Moses 5 3; Testament of Levi 14 5 ff.; Psalms of Solomon 2 3.

³⁸ On the portals of the sun, see Enoch 72, etc.

³⁹ Perhaps an error of the text for 2000; see below, § 8.

⁴⁰ Cf. Jubilees 50 8.

⁴¹ This holds on week-days as well as on the Sabbath.

⁴² Perhaps we should read, "make an 'erûb" (a legal fiction by which dwellings or limits were treated as one). The Sadducees and Samaritans rejected this evasion of the law.

bring anything from the street into the house; and if he be in the entry, he shall not pass anything out of it or bring anything into it.

10. He shall not open on the Sabbath a vessel the cover of which has been luted on.

11. A man shall not carry on his person spices, going out or coming in on the Sabbath.

12. Within a house he shall not lift stone nor earth on the Sabbath day.

13. The nurse shall not carry an infant in arms, going out or coming in with it on the Sabbath.

14. A man shall not deal harshly with his slave or his maid or his hired servant on the Sabbath.

15. A man shall not deliver cattle of their young on the Sabbath day.

16. If a beast fall into a cistern or trap, a man shall not lift it out on the Sabbath.

17. A man shall not pass the Sabbath in a place near the gentiles.

18. A man shall not profane the Sabbath for the sake of gain.

19. If a human being fall into a tank of water or into a place of . . . no man shall fetch him up by means of a ladder or a rope or any implement.

20. No man shall bring upon the altar on the Sabbath anything except the Sabbath burnt-offerings, for so it is written, "aside from your Sabbaths."

The dietary laws afford other examples of the strict rules of the sect.⁴³ Fish may be eaten only if, while still alive, they have been split open and drained of their blood; grasshoppers and locusts must be put alive into the water or the fire (in which they are to be cooked); honey in the comb is apparently prohibited. So, again, in a house in which a death has occurred, fixtures, such as nails and pegs in the walls, are unclean; and wood, stone, and dust are capable of contracting and communicating various kinds of uncleanness (12 15-18). The sect sees in these stricter distinctions between clean and unclean the superiority of its ordinances over those of other Jews, whom they regard as sinfully lax. The Pharisees are to them gross latitudinarians!

Oaths are to be taken only by the covenant and the curses of the covenant, that is, the vows by which the members of the sect bind themselves, on their admission to it, to live in conformity with its rule and submit to the authority of those set over them,

⁴³ See 12 12 ff.

and the curses invoked on such as violate these obligations.⁴⁴ Oaths by God, whether under the name *Aleph Lamed* (*El* or *Elohim*) or *Aleph Daleth* (*Adonai*) are prohibited;⁴⁵ nor is it permissible to mention in the oath the law of Moses; the formula of the oath is strictly sectarian (15 1 ff.).⁴⁶ But, though the name of God is not used, "if a man swear and transgress the oath, he profanes the name" (15 3). Obligations voluntarily assumed under oath (vows) are to be fulfilled to the letter; neither redemption nor annulment seems to be allowed, unless to carry out the vow would be a transgression of the covenant.

Another point in which the sect is at variance with the great body of the Jews is the calendar. They represent the faithful remnant to whom God revealed the mysteries about which all Israel went astray, his holy sabbaths and his glorious festivals, and his righteous testimonies, and his true ways (3 12 ff.). The point of this appears when it is compared with Jubilees 1 14: "They will forget my law and all my commandments and all my judgments, and will go astray as to new moons and sabbaths and festivals and jubilees and ordinances" (cf. 6 34 ff., 23 19). The texts before us do not explain what the peculiarities of the sectarian calendar were, but inasmuch as the Book of Jubilees, under the title "The Book of the Division of the Times by their Jubilees and their Sabbatical Years," is cited as an authority for the exact determination of "their ends" (the coming crisis of history), it may be inferred with much probability that our sect had a calendar constructed on principles similar to that of the Jubilees,⁴⁷ in which the seasons and festivals were not determined by lunar observations or astronomical tables, as among the Jews generally, but had a fixed place in a solar year. Such upsetting of the calendar is branded as heresy in Midrash Tehillim on Ps. 28 5: "They do not regard the work of the Lord,

⁴⁴ Similarly the Essenes, at their reception into the order, bound themselves by the "tremendous oaths" which Josephus describes, B. J. ii, 8 7.

⁴⁵ The oath by the Tetragrammaton included *a fortiori*.

⁴⁶ The Essenes excluded oaths altogether, except in the initiation of members. See also Slavonic Enoch 49 1; Philo, *De spec. legibus* ii, 1, and elsewhere (Charles, *Secrets of Enoch*, p. 65). Our sect recognizes judicial oaths (9 8 ff.) and imprecations (9 12), as well as vows under oath (16 6 ff.).

⁴⁷ On the relation of the Jubilees to the sect, see further below, p. 359.

nor the operation of his hands. . . . 'The operation of his hands' means the new moons; as it is said, 'God made the two great lights,' and it is written, 'He made the moon for festival seasons.'⁴⁸ These are the heretics who do not calculate (by the moon) the festival seasons and the equinoxes. 'He will tear them down and not build them up.' He will tear them down, in this world, and not build them up, in the world to come." Perhaps the Boëthusians, who hired false witnesses to deceive the authorities about the appearance of the new moon, were not merely animated by a desire to harass the rabbis, but were partisans of some such calendar reform.

The organization of the sect furnished it an effective means of enforcing its rules by discipline. This organization is so peculiar that it must be described in some detail. Like the normal Jewish community, it consists of three classes, priests, levites, and Israelites, to whom as a fourth class may be added proselytes. In this order they are mustered and inscribed in the rolls of the camp. In some sense all the members of the sect are priests. Ezekiel 44 15 is quoted and explained: "'The priests and the levites and the sons of Zadok who kept the charge of his sanctuary' [*sic*]. The priests are the exiles of Israel who migrated from the land of Judah and [the levites are]⁴⁹ those who attached themselves to them; and the sons of Zadok are the chosen ones of Israel, men designated by name, who arose in the last days." Allegory apart, it appears that the priests were of the Zadokite line, but this legitimacy is assumed, not emphasized. Priests and levites formed part of every court of ten judges (see below, p. 351); and in every company of ten Israelites (the quorum of a religious assembly), a priest, well versed in the Book of Institutes,⁵⁰ must be present, to whose words all must conform. If the priest does not possess the requisite qualifications, and a competent levite is at hand, it shall be ordained that all who enter the camp shall go out and come in at his orders. In a

⁴⁸ Cf. Jubilees 2 2, God appointed the sun . . . for sabbaths, and months, and feasts; and Jubilees 6 37, the observation of the moon disturbs the calendar.

⁴⁹ It seems necessary to supply these words.

⁵⁰ "The book of *hagu*." The rendering 'Institutes' is not offered as a translation of the name, but as indicating the probable character of the work. See below, p. 353 f.

case of leprosy the priest shall come and stand in the midst of the camp and the Supervisor shall instruct him in the interpretation of the law; even if the priest be an ignoramus, it is he who must shut up the leper, for the decision belongs to them (13 1 ff.). To a priest is assigned also the duty of taking the census of the commonalty; he who fills this office must be between thirty and sixty years old, versed in the Book of [Institutes and] in all the prescriptions of the law, to pronounce them according to their prescriptions (14 3 ff.).

A much more important place in the organization is filled by an officer whose title (*mebakker*) signifies 'examiner,' 'inspector,' and may perhaps best be rendered 'Supervisor.'⁵¹ Every "camp," or settlement, of the sect had a Supervisor, and over these stood a "Supervisor of all the camps," who must be a man in the prime of life, between thirty and fifty years of age. To the Supervisor of the individual camp it belonged to instruct the community "in the works of God, and make them familiar with his wonderful deeds of might, and recount before them the things that happened long ago . . .; and he shall have compassion on them as a father toward his children (13 7 ff.)."⁵² We have seen that he has even to instruct the priest in the rules for the diagnosis of leprosy.⁵³ The admission of new members to the sect is also in his hands; no one is permitted to introduce a man into the

⁵¹ Dr. Schechter renders 'Censor,' and remarks, "Such an office, entirely unknown to Judaism, could only have been borrowed from the Romans." But the functions of the Inspector or Supervisor bear no resemblance to those of the Roman censors; and for the identity of the title the translator is solely accountable, not the constitution of the sect. Mr. Margoliouth talks loosely about dependence on Roman administrative models; it would be interesting to learn in what particulars. With the very large authority vested in the Supervisor may be compared that of the managers, or administrators (*ἐπιμεληται*), among the Essenes, "without whose directions they do nothing"; though the functions of the managers in the Essene coenobite establishments were of course quite different from those of the Supervisors of our sect.

⁵² In the partly illegible lines that follow, his dealing with the congregation is compared with that of a shepherd with his flock.—Dr. W. H. Ward suggests that the title *mebakker* may be connected with Ezek. 34 11 f., where the verb is used of a shepherd's looking out for his flock.

⁵³ As in Mishna *Yoma* the High Priest has to be instructed by experts in the ritual of the Day of Atonement, and made to swear not to depart from his instructions.

congregation without his consent. He examines the candidates in regard to their character and intelligence, their physical strength and courage, and their possessions, and enrolls each in his proper place in the lot⁴⁴ of the camp (18 11 ff.). From the following badly defaced lines so much at least can be made out, that the Supervisor had extensive powers of control over the dealings of members of the sect with outsiders in the way of trade. He evidently had also a leading part in the administration of justice and the enforcement of the discipline of the sect, but the state of the text here denies us insight into the particulars.

Courts were constituted of ten members,⁴⁵ chosen *ad hoc* from the congregation, four of the tribe of Levi and Aaron and six Israelites, all well versed in the Book of Institutes and in the Foundations of the Covenant, between twenty-five and sixty years of age. No man of more than sixty shall be a judge, "for on account of the unfaithfulness of mankind his days were shortened, and through the wrath of God on the inhabitants of the earth he bade to remove their understanding before they completed their days (10 4 ff.)." The rules relating to the competence of witnesses are strict. No one may testify against the accused in a capital case who is not a god-fearing man old enough to be included in the census (that is, at least twenty years of age, Exod. 30 14); nor shall a man's testimony be credited against his neighbor who is himself a wilful transgressor of any of the commandments, until he has come to repentance (9 23-10 3). A peculiar provision is made for the case that a single witness (on whose testimony therefore conviction could not be had) sees a capital offence committed. He is to make known the facts to the Supervisor, who records the testimony in writing. If subsequently the offence is committed again in the presence of another witness, the same process is repeated; on a second repetition, the testimony of the three single witnesses combined suffices for conviction (9 16 ff.).⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Probably the lands belonging to the sect.

⁴⁵ That a court must consist of ten judges, the Karaites deduce from Ruth 4 2. So Anan quoted by Poznanski, *Revue des études juives*, vol. xlv, p. 67, and p. 69, n. 1.

⁴⁶ This seems to be the meaning of the somewhat obscure passage.

Besides the penalties of the Mosaic law, the sect has a formidable means of discipline in expulsion, or as it is called "separation from the Purity," which may in some cases be inflicted even on the testimony of one witness (9 21 ff.). Josephus vividly depicts the desperate straits into which those came who, for grave offences, were expelled from the Essene order; being unable to eat food not prepared by members of the order, they were exposed to starvation. This particular consequence would not follow separation from our sect; but the lot of the excommunicated man was evidently hard enough. "When his deeds come to light he is to be expelled from the congregation, as though his lot had never fallen in the midst of the disciples of God; according to his misdeeds men shall bear him in remembrance . . . until the day when he returns to take his place in the station of the men of perfect holiness. No man shall have any dealings with him in matters of property or work, for all the saints of the Most High have cursed him" (20 3 ff.); such have no part in the "house of the law"; their names are erased from the rolls of the congregation (20 10 f.). They are not only cut off from the communion of saints in this world, but are doomed to extermination by the hand of Belial (8 1 f., 19 14 f.). One who leads men astray and profanes the Sabbath and the festivals shall not be put to death, but shall be committed to the custody of men;⁸⁷ if he is cured of his error, they shall keep him for seven years, and afterwards he may come into the assembly (12 3 ff.). A member of the sect who seduces others to apostasy is more severely dealt with: "A man over whom the spirits of Belial have rule,⁸⁸ and who advocates defection (Deut. 13 6), shall be judged according to the law of the necromancer and the wizard" (12 2 f.; cf. Deut. 18 9).⁸⁹

The sect possessed the Jewish Scriptures. The books of the law are "the hut of the King" (i.e. the congregation)—the fallen hut which God had promised to raise up; "the pillar of your images" are the books of the prophets, whose words Israel despised. The founder of the sect, the star out of Jacob, is the

⁸⁷ It is not clear whether imprisonment or surveillance is meant.

⁸⁸ On the spirit of Belial (ruling over Israel) see Jubilees 1 20.

⁸⁹ "Rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft," 1 Sam. 15 23.

interpreter of the law who came to Damascus (7 14 ff.). The authority of the Pentateuch is appealed to in support of the position of the sect in the matter of marriage and divorce; their peculiar statutes and ordinances are the true interpretation and application of the law of God. The prophets are frequently cited, and allusions to passages in the prophets or reminiscences of their phraseology are much more numerous. There are similar reminiscences of the Psalms and of the Proverbs, and perhaps of other books among the Hagiographa. As regards the Old Testament scriptures, therefore, the sect stood on common ground with Palestinian orthodoxy.⁶⁰ The formula of citation is peculiar; a quotation is usually introduced by the words "as he said," rarely "as God said"; or with the name of the sacred author, "as Moses said." Besides the Biblical books, we have a quotation from Levi—probably the Testament of that Patriarch—introduced by the same phrase as quotations from the Bible; and the reader is referred to the Book of Jubilees by name for an exact computation of the last times. There is nothing to indicate that the authority attributed to these writings was inferior to that of the Hagiographa. The canon of the "Scriptures" was not defined, even in the rabbinical schools, until the second century of our era, and in the sects many books enjoyed high esteem which the orthodox repudiated.⁶¹

To a different class belong, apparently, the Book of Institutes, and the Foundations of the Covenant, in which the judges must be well versed. To every religious gathering of ten men or more belongs a priest well versed in the Book of Institutes. The title Foundations of the Covenant suggests a writing (or a fixed tradition) dealing with the obligations and duties of members of the sect. The name here rendered Book of Institutes, on the other hand, is obscure,⁶² but the fact that a knowledge of it is demanded

⁶⁰ In contrast to the Samaritans.

⁶¹ In 8 18 ff., after saying, "Such will be the judgment of every one who despises the commandments of God, and he forsook them and they turned away in the stubbornness of their heart," A adds: "This is the word which Jeremiah spoke to Baruch the son of Neriah and Elisha to his servant Gehazi," referring probably to otherwise unknown apocryphal books. Johanneh and his brother, whom Belial raised up against Moses, are familiar figures of Jewish legend.

⁶² The simplest explanation of the form would be to take it as an abstract noun of the type *fa'l*, like *adhu*, 'swimming' or *fi'l*, *fu'l*, like *soku* (n. pr.), *tohu*,

of the priest and of the judges makes it likely that it contained the "statutes and ordinances" of the sect, its peculiar definitions and interpretations of the law, often referred to as *perush*; in technical phrase, a collection of sectarian *halakoth*, such as is preserved in the second part of the texts before us, which seems to be derived from such a legal manual. The objection to committing *halakah* to writing which was long maintained in the rabbinical schools was not shared by the sects, and would be least likely to exist where the ordinances were not in theory a traditional law handed down from remote antiquity, but were attributed to an individual interpreter, the founder of the sect.

The sect had houses of worship, which a man in a state of uncleanness is forbidden to enter (11 22),⁶³ but nothing more is said about them, except that when the trumpets of the congregation are blown, the blowing shall follow or precede the service, and not interrupt it. It is a natural surmise that they answered to the synagogues both as places of worship and of religious instruction, such, for example, as the Supervisor is required to give. The name, *Beth hishtahawôth*, literally, 'house of bowing

bôhu, etc., from the verb *hagah* (root *hagu*), 'reflect, give thought to something,' also 'read' (aloud), so that the noun might literally mean 'study,' equivalent to *midrash*, or perhaps 'reading.'—If the opinion which connects the sect with the Dositheans were tenable (see below, p. 360 ff.), another explanation of the name might be suggested by a passage in Abul-Fath's account of the origin of the Dositheans. He narrates that a son of the Samaritan high priest, named Zar'ah, a man preëminent for learning in his time, having been expelled from the community for immorality, betook himself to Dositheus, who made him the chief of his sect. This man "wrote a book in which he vituperated all the Samaritan religious heads and set forth heresies." The words are, *haja fihî kul al'a'immetin wa-'abda'a fihî*. Inasmuch as the Arabic *hajivun* formally corresponds to the Hebrew *hagu*, the Book of *Hagu* in our texts might be identified with this controversial writing of Zar'ah, the disciple of Dositheus. The Hebrew verb *hagah* is thought by Kohut (Aruch Completum, III, 177) to occur in Echa Rabbathi on Lam. 1 4 and 3 33 in the sense 'contemn, deride,' equivalent to the Arabic *haja*, 'lampoon, vituperate.' It might then be conjectured that Abul-Fath had heard of a Dosithean book of *hagu* (in Hebrew) and, taking the word in its Arabic meaning, evolved his description of the character of the work from this etymology.

⁶³ Some Karaite authorities, also, transferring to the synagogue the holiness of the temple, forbade a man in a state of uncleanness to enter the inner room of the synagogue (Nissi; see Winter und Wünsche, Die jüdische Litteratur, vol. ii, p. 74).

down' (in worship), is peculiar, and may have been chosen to distinguish these sectarian conventicles from the synagogues of regular Judaism, as the English nonconformists of various stripes would not call their meeting-houses churches. It is possible that the prayers of the sect may have been accompanied by genuflections and prostrations such as, though unknown in the synagogue, have formed in all ages and religions a common feature of Oriental worship; but it is also possible that 'bowing down' simply stands by metonymy for worship, as is often the case with the corresponding Syriac verb, *segad*.⁶⁴

Sacrificial worship was also maintained.⁶⁵ The City of the Sanctuary was eminently holy; sexual intercourse within its limits is forbidden, "defiling the City of the Sanctuary with their impurity" (*beniddatham*).⁶⁶ To this city, probably, the sacrifices were brought to which there is frequent reference. "No one shall send to the altar burnt offerings or oblation, frankincense or wood, by a man who is unclean with any of the forms of uncleanness; for it is written, the sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination, but the prayer of the righteous is an acceptable oblation" (11 18 ff.). On the Sabbath nothing is to be brought upon the altar except the Sabbath burnt offerings—that is, we may suppose, the stated daily burnt offerings with the supplementary Sabbath victims (13 17 f.; see Num. 28 1-10). Votive sacrifices are also men-

⁶⁴ The coincidence of the name with the Arabic *masjid*, 'place of bowing down,' mosque, is hardly a sufficient reason for suspecting Moslem influence, as Dr. Schechter does, who thinks it possible that the word was introduced by a later (Palasha?) scribe as a substitute for the original term.—Elia Bashiatzi (Adereth Eliahu, p. 58), a Karaite writer of the 15th century, gives *Beth hishia-hawiya*, together with *Beth hakeneseth* and *Beth hamidrash*, as the three names of the place of worship. Moslem influence can here hardly be questioned; in a later chapter Elia describes the postures of prayer quite after the Moslem pattern, alleging Biblical authority for all of them.

⁶⁵ The opinion that after Josiah's reform, or after the restoration of the temple by Zerubbabel and Joshua, Jerusalem was the only place where Jewish sacrifices were offered is refuted by an accumulating volume of evidence from various regions. See D. S. Margoliouth, *Expositor*, 1911, pp. 40 ff.

⁶⁶ Cf. the accusation against the orthodox Jews (5 6): "They defile the Sanctuary in that they do not separate according to the law," etc.—It is possible that the prohibition quoted above applied, not to the inhabitants of the city, but to persons who visited it for the purpose of worship, as is the rule for pilgrims to Mecca.

tioned; it is forbidden to vow to the altar anything that has been procured by compulsion; the priest shall refuse to receive such offerings (16 13 f.). There is nothing to indicate where this sanctuary was situated, further than the natural presumption that it was in the region of Damascus, where the sect had established itself. The priests have the precedence of all others in the community; in its registers their names are enrolled in the first rank. Their place in the courts and in the local religious community, and their duties in the examination of lepers, have already been mentioned. Those who officiated at the sanctuary had doubtless their legal toll from private sacrifices of every kind. Lost property for which no owner appears falls to the priests; a man who has appropriated such property shall confess to the priest, and all that he pays in restitution belongs to the priest, besides the ram of the trespass offering (9 13 ff.).

A charitable fund is provided by monthly payment of certain dues by members of the community to the Supervisor. From this fund relief is given by the judges to the poor and needy, to the aged, to the wanderer (?), to such as have fallen into captivity to foreigners, and others (14 12 ff.).

The religious conceptions and beliefs of the sect present little that is peculiar. For God the name *El* is consistently used, without any epithets. *Adonai* is mentioned only to forbid its use in oaths. The only other name which occurs is the Most High (once, in the phrase "the saints of the Most High," that is, the members of the sect). There is repeated reference to the holy spirit: God, through his Anointed, made men know his holy spirit (2 12); the opponents of the sect, by blasphemous speech against the statutes of God's covenant, defiled their holy spirit (5 11);⁶⁷ its members are warned not to defile his holy spirit by failing to observe the distinctions of clean and unclean which God has ordained (7 3 f.).

The "Prince of Lights (*Urim*)," through whom Moses and Aaron arise, is perhaps, as the contrast to Belial suggests, one of the highest angels.⁶⁸ The destroying angels execute God's

⁶⁷ The holy spirit in them. Dr. Schechter adduces parallels in Jewish writings. Cf. Jubilees 1 21, 23, "Create in them a clean heart and a holy spirit."

⁶⁸ Dr. Schechter conjectures that the author wrote *Sar ha-Panim*, the Prince of the Presence, but the passages from Jubilees which he quotes in support of this opinion are hardly convincing.

inescapable judgment on those who turned out of the way and despised the statute (2 6). The fall of the Watchers, which is a favorite subject in the apocalyptic literature, is referred to in 2 18. The chief of the evil spirits is Belial: he is "let loose" during the whole of the present dispensation; he lays snares for men and entraps them, especially in the three sins of fornication, unrighteous gain, and the defilement of the sanctuary (4 18 ff.); his spirits rule over men and lead them to apostasy (12 2 f.); he also exterminates the faithless in the day of God's visitation (8 1 f.). Another name for the devil is Mastema (the commoner name in Jubilees), equivalent to Satan, "the adversary." The angel of Mastema ceases to follow a man who resolves to return to the law of Moses (16 4 f.). According to Jubilees 10 8 f., 11 5, Mastema had permission from God to employ some of his evil spirits to corrupt men and lead them astray.

Concerning the future life we read only that those who hold firmly to the law are "for eternal life,"⁶⁹ or, as it is elsewhere expressed, "have the assurance that they shall live a thousand generations." To a punishment of the wicked after death⁷⁰ or to a resurrection of the dead there is no allusion whatever.

The moral teachings of the sect have been frequently touched upon above in speaking of their rules of life. Man is led into sin not only by the snares of Belial, but by his own sinful inclination and adulterous eyes (2 16; seemingly the *yesser hara'* of the rabbis). It was through these that the Watchers fell; by them the generation of the flood sinned, and the sons of Jacob, and their descendants in Egypt and in Canaan, and brought judgment upon themselves (2 14 ff.). We have seen that the sect insisted upon monogamy, and perhaps rejected divorce altogether. Particular emphasis is laid in several places on the commandments, "thou shalt not take vengeance nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people," "thou shalt reprove thy neighbor and not bear sin because of him" (Lev. 19 17, 18).⁷¹

⁶⁹ See Slavonic Enoch 42 5; cf. 9.

⁷⁰ So far as may be argued from silence, this is an important difference from Jubilees.

⁷¹ See 7 2; cf. Slavonic Enoch 50 4: "When you might have vengeance, do not repay either your neighbor or your enemy. For God will repay as your

Thus, at the beginning of the legal part of the book, the delivery of a fellow Israelite to the gentiles so that he is condemned by their law is said to fall under this prohibition, and further, "any man of those who enter into the covenant who brings up against his neighbor a matter not in the nature of a reproof before witnesses, but which he brings up in anger, or tells it to his elders to bring the man into disrepute, he is one that takes vengeance and bears a grudge." It is forbidden also to exact of another an oath except in the presence of the judges; he who does so transgresses the law which forbids a man to take justice into his own hands. Every one who enters into the covenant pledges himself not only not to rob the poor and make widows his spoil, but to love his neighbor as himself, to seek the welfare of his fellow, and to sustain the poor and needy. As regards the relations of the members of the sect to gentiles, it is forbidden to shed the blood of a gentile or to take aught of their property, "in order to give them no occasion to blaspheme" (12 6 f.), that is, to prevent the profaning of God's name (15 3), a motive frequently urged in similar connection in the rabbinical writings. On the other hand, no man may sell to gentiles clean animals or birds, lest they offer them in sacrifice, nor grain, nor wine—naught of his possessions; nor shall he sell to them his slave or maid servant who have come with him into the covenant of Abraham (12 9 ff.). He may not pass the Sabbath in the neighborhood of gentiles. They are unclean, and garments they may have handled require purification.

No record of a schismatic body such as reveals itself in our texts is preserved in the early catalogues of Jewish heresies, nor have references to it been discovered in rabbinical sources. Like many sects, it exhibits the separatist inclination to outdo the orthodox in zeal for the letter and in strenuousness of practice, and it is not surprising that its interpretations of the law frequently agree with those of other strict-constructionists, such as Samaritans, Sadducees, Karaites; but these coincidences illustrate a common tendency rather than prove historical connection. The

avenger in the day of the great judgment. Let it not be for you to take vengeance" (ed. Charles, p. 67); cf. *Ecclus.* 28 1.

relation to the Book of Jubilees is, however, such as to show that there was some affinity between our sect and the circles in which that work originated. Jubilees is cited as authority on the last times; its calendar probably contains the secrets of God's holy sabbaths and glorious festivals about which all Israel was in error; the rules for the observance of the Sabbath in our book accord in many particulars with the injunctions in Jubilees 50 6 ff. (see also 2 26 ff.); and various other resemblances might be pointed out, such as the preference for the unornamented word God (in Jubilees, God, or the Lord), in contrast with the many mouth-filling periphrases in Enoch; the holy spirit in men; the name Mastema for the adversary instead of Satan; Belial who ensnares men, and the spirits of Belial which rule over sinners, besides others to which Dr. Schechter directs attention in his notes. The relation to the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs is less clear. The saying attributed to Levi (4 15) is not found in the Testament, and the other resemblances Dr. Schechter has noted are vague or belong to the commonplaces. The place of honor given to Judah in the Testaments, as we have them, is strikingly at variance with the attitude of our sect toward that tribe and its princes. The Levite Messiah of the Testaments is not precisely the same as the "Anointed from Aaron and Israel" in our book. In Jubilees also there are salient features, such as the more developed angelology and the form of the Messianic expectation, which hardly permit us to suppose that the book was a product of our sect, however highly it may have been esteemed by it.

The sect gives especial honor to the sons of Zadok, the ancient priesthood of the temple in Jerusalem (Ezek. 44 15, 2 Chron. 31 10, Sirach 51 12 Heb.); they are the chosen ones of Israel, men designated by name, who arose in the latter times (4 8); it was Zadok who brought to light the Book of the Law which no one had seen since the death of Eleazar and Joshua (5 5). The context of the latter passage would suggest that Zadok the contemporary of David is meant, who after the deposition of Abiathar became Solomon's chief priest.⁷² The precedence given

⁷² That Zadok was the name of the "interpreter of the law," the founder of the sect, is a much less probable opinion; the name stands in no connection

to the sons of Zadok may possibly have a side reference to the illegitimate high priests of Seleucid creation, such as Menelaus, though, if this were the intention, we should expect it to be emphasized.

The passages quoted are the only places in the book in which the name Zadok or the sons of Zadok appear, and they are certainly a very slender reason for describing the body which produced the book as a "Zadokite" sect, whatever meaning may be attached to the term. On the contrary, one of the outstanding things in the constitution of the sect is the predominance of the lay element. The Supervisor is a layman; laymen form the majority in every court; the Messiah is the "Anointed from Aaron and Israel." Whether the external testimony upon which Dr. Schechter relies for justification of the name is more adequate will be considered below.

Zadok and the sons of Zadok suggest the Sadducees,⁷ whose name, according to the most probable explanation, designates them as descendants (or followers and partisans) of Zadok. Here again it is a question whether Zadok of David's time is meant, so that the Sadducees were the Zadokite aristocracy of the priesthood, as most modern scholars think, or whether the name of the Sadducee sect is derived from a heresiarch of much later times, as the Jewish legend represents which makes Zadok, from whom the sect descends, a recalcitrant disciple of Antigonus of Socho, about the middle of the second century B.C., contemporary, if we rightly interpret our texts, with the origin of the sect we are studying.

With the Sadducees, as we know them from the New Testament, Josephus, and rabbinical sources, our sect cannot well be identified. There is, however, a sect sometimes associated with the Sadducees, namely, the Dositheans, in whose teachings and customs Dr. Schechter finds such resemblances as lead him to surmise that the Dositheans were an offshoot of our sect. The

with the origin of the sect or its legislation, but with the bringing to light again of the Pentateuch. The author cannot have supposed that the *written* law remained unknown till the second century B.C.; the reforms of Josiah, based on another recovery of the book by Hilkiah, would preclude such a notion.

⁷ The coincidence of names does not count for very much. Abul-Fath names two Samaritan "Zadokite" subsects among the later Dositheans alone.

accounts of the Dositheans in writers of different ages and religious connections, from Origen and Epiphanius down to the Samaritan Chronicler Abul-Fath and the Moslem heresiographer Shahrastani, are notoriously confused and contradictory,⁷⁴ so that many scholars have felt constrained to conclude that there was more than one sect of the name. The Fathers generally agree in describing the Dositheans as a Samaritan heresy, though Epiphanius and Philaster have it that the author of the heresy was by extraction a Jew. They frequently bring him into connection with Simon Magus, in the time of the Apostles. According to Origen, he gave himself out for the Messiah foretold by Moses; his followers had books of his, and legends pretending that he had not died, but was still alive somewhere. Other Fathers give no date for the rise of the heresy, but by coupling it with the Sadducees seem to imply that it was older than Christianity; thus (Pseudo)Tertullian (probably after Hippolytus)⁷⁵ says that Dositheus the Samaritan was the first to reject the prophets as not inspired; the Sadducees, springing from this root of error, ventured to deny the resurrection also. From this Philaster probably drew the inference that Zadok, the founder of the Sadducees, was a disciple of Dositheus. The Samaritan and Moslem authors agree with the Fathers in treating the Dositheans as a Samaritan sect. Abul-Fath, a Samaritan writer of the fourteenth century, puts the beginnings of the sect in the first century B.C., at the time when the yoke of the Jews had been broken by the kings of the gentiles, and the Samaritans were able to return and restore their sanctuary, which had been destroyed by Simon and John Hyrcanus.⁷⁶ The Moslem writer Shahrastani, in his

⁷⁴ See Hilgenfeld, *Die Ketzergeschichte des Urchristenthums*, 1884, pp. 155 ff.; Montgomery, *The Samaritans*, 1907, pp. 252 ff.

⁷⁵ See also Epiphanius; the Sadducees were an offshoot from Dositheus.

⁷⁶ Not in the time of Alexander the Great, as Dr. Schechter has from Montgomery. Abul-Fath, indeed (and Adler's Chronicle after him), introduces this whole story before Alexander, and makes Simon a protégé of Darius; but the testimony that Dositheus appeared after the time of Hyrcanus, which, as a matter of Samaritan history, may be conceived to rest on tradition, is not to be set aside because, in fitting his Samaritan traditions into the framework of universal history, Abul-Fath is in error by two or three centuries about the date of Hyrcanus. This used to be understood; see, e.g., De Sacy, *Chrestomathie arabe*, vol. ii (1806), p. 209.

learned work on Religious Sects and Philosophical Schools (first half of the twelfth century), gives substantially the same date: the founder of the Dositheans, who professed to be the prophet foretold by Moses, the star spoken of in the law, appeared about a century before Christ.

In this state of the evidence it is obvious that no argument can be based on the coincidence in time between the origin of the Dositheans and that of our sect. When the Fathers bring the names of Dositheus and Zadok into conjunction, it means no more than that they attributed certain errors to both Dositheans and Sadducees; just as the Talmudic legend which makes Zadok and Boëthus apostate disciples of Antigonus of Socho is but a mythological way of saying that Sadducees and Boëthusians were addicted to the same heresies concerning retribution, or as the coupling of Dositheus and Simon Magus means that both passed for Samaritan arch-heretics.

The first point of agreement between the Dositheans and our sect which Dr. Schechter notes is in the calendar. Abul-Fath says that the Dositheans did away with the computation of the almanac (tables of lunar conjunctions), making all their months exactly thirty days long, and (thus) annulled the correct festivals and the ordinance of the fasts and the affliction (Day of Atonement).⁷⁷ The circle of thirty disciples, who, with a woman called Helena (Moon), formed the train of Dositheus, according to the Clementine Recognitions (ii, 8) symbolized the days of the month. If our sect employed the calendar of the Book of Jubilees, as seems highly probable, they also had thirty-day months; but it would not follow that the system was original with them, nor that the Dositheans must have adopted it from them. There were, in fact, from very remote times, two years in use within the area of the ancient civilizations, a lunar-solar year, consisting of twelve lunar months of twenty-nine or thirty days each, with a thirteenth month added every two or three years to maintain approximate agreement with the solar year and make the months fall in the same seasons, and a solar year of three hundred and sixty-five days, divided into twelve months of thirty

⁷⁷ Epiphanius avers, on the contrary, that the Dositheans kept their festivals at the same time with the Jews.

days each without regard to the lunations, and five extra days (*epagomenae*). The former was the system of the Babylonians and the Greeks, as well as the Jews; the latter was in use in Egypt from immemorial times until the Roman reforms. From the Egyptians it was borrowed by the Abyssinians; it was employed also for some centuries before and after the Christian era in the calendars of Gaza and Ashkelon. The Persians had the same system; the Yashts contain a liturgy for the thirty regents of the days of the month, the five extra days being assigned to the divine Gathas. Probably under Persian influences, this calendar was established in Armenia, Cappadocia, and other parts of Asia Minor.⁷⁸

Jews and Samaritans not only lived in many of the lands of their dispersion among peoples who used the thirty-day month, but encountered this calendar in commercial centres on the very borders of Palestine with which they had close relations. The advantages of a system in which the festivals came on fixed dates, instead of shifting within wide limits, as they must in the lunar-solar year with its irregular intercalation, are obvious,⁷⁹ and an attempt to reform the Jewish calendar accordingly may have been made more than once and in more than one region. The peculiarity of the system of the Book of Jubilees is not the uniform length of the months, but the admission of only *four* extra days, thus making an even fifty-two weeks (364 days), which was of more concern to the author than the increased error of a whole day in the solar year.⁸⁰ We do not know whether the Dositheans

⁷⁸ See Ideler, *Handbuch der mathematischen und technischen Chronologie*, vol. i, pp. 437 ff., 517; Ginzel, *Handbuch der mathematischen und technischen Chronologie*, vol. i, pp. 170 f., 237. On the calendar of Gaza, Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes* (3 ed.), vol. ii, pp. 88 f.

⁷⁹ We have experience of the inconvenience of this system in the wandering of Easter and the Christian festivals dependent on it; a reform by which Easter should come on a fixed date in the solar year has repeatedly been proposed, and a movement is now on foot in Europe to bring this about by agreement of governments and churches.

⁸⁰ The year of 364 days is found also in Enoch 72-82, and (by the side of the true solar year of $365\frac{1}{4}$ and the lunar year of 354 days) in the Slavonic Enoch. The intercalary days are introduced one at the beginning of each quarter of the year (Enoch 75 1); this is also the method in Jubilees; see 6 23. In effect this is equivalent to a year in which eight months have thirty days and four—those

of Abul-Fath and the Sadducees of Kirkisani (of whom later) agreed in this point with Jubilees, or counted *five* extra days like the rest of the world. The former may be thought probable, but it cannot be assumed as certain. The year of 365 days is also found in the Greek Apocalypse of Baruch, c. 6.

Dr. Schechter quotes Epiphanius⁸¹ on the Dositheans as saying, "some of them abstain from a second marriage, but others never marry"; and, although "the text is not quite certain on this point,"⁸² is inclined to perceive in the statement "at least an echo of the law of our sect prohibiting a second marriage as long as the first wife is alive." The passage in Epiphanius is more than obscure, and the text is for that reason suspected. The passage runs: Ἐμφύχων ἀπέχονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τινες αὐτῶν ἐγκρατεῖονται ἀπὸ γάμων μετὰ τοῦ βιώσαι, ἄλλοι δὲ καὶ παρθενεύουσιν. Whatever this may mean, it certainly is not, "some of them abstain from marriage after the death of their first wives," nor does anything in the context justify the large changes in the text which would be required to force this sense upon it. Casaubon's conjecture *νιώσαι* has nothing to commend it. The simplest solution of the difficulty would be to write *συμβιώσαι*,⁸³ "some of them refrain from marital relations after having lived together, others preserve their virginity." Whether this emendation is right or not, it is clear that Epiphanius describes his Dositheans as a kind of Encratite ascetics, while the prohibition of polygamy—whether contemporaneous or consecutive—by our sect has a totally different ground; of asceticism there is, indeed, no symptom in its ordinances.

Dr. Schechter thinks that the statement of Epiphanius quoted

in which the equinoxes and solstices fall—have thirty-one (Enoch 72 13, 19). It is not impossible that this system is implied in the chronology of the flood in Genesis; see B. W. Bacon, *Hebraica*, vol. viii (1891-1892), pp. 79-88, 124-139; Charles, *Jubilees*, p. 56.

⁸¹ This is not the place to discuss the value of Epiphanius's testimony. His description of the Scribes and Pharisees at least admonishes to caution.

⁸² The text is certain enough, in the sense that all the manuscripts hitherto collated have the same reading.

⁸³ Nicetas, in reproducing Epiphanius's account of the Dositheans, has *τεκνώσαι*, "after having begotten children," which also agrees very well with the context.

above that the Dositheans "abstain from eating living creatures" "may have some connection with the law in our text on p. 12, l. 11, which may perhaps be understood to imply that the sect forbade honey, regarding it as *'eber min hahai* (a limb cut off from a living animal), which would agree with the testimony of Abul-Fath that they forbade the eating of eggs, except those which were found in a slaughtered fowl." *Ἐμψύων ἀπέχονται* does not mean "abstain from eating living creatures," but "abstain from animal food,"⁸⁴ while our sect certainly did not include vegetarianism among its eccentricities, any more than the depreciation of marriage.

Several authors describe the Dositheans as extravagant sabbatarians. Origen reports that their rule was, that in whatever place and in whatever posture the Sabbath found a man, there and thus he was to remain till its end. Abul-Fath gives a longer account of their Sabbath laws, which are much stricter than those of our texts. It was forbidden, for example, to feed domestic animals or give them drink on the Sabbath, they were to be provided on Friday with enough provender and water to last them through the Sabbath. Extreme sabbatarianism is, however, a sectarian propensity which does not have to be borrowed.

Dr. Schechter quotes Epiphanius further as saying that the Dositheans "have no intercourse with all people because they detest all mankind," in which he thinks "we may readily recognize here the law of our Sect requiring the washing of the clothes when they were brought by a Gentile (because of the contamination), and the prohibition of staying over the Sabbath in the vicinity of Gentiles" (Introduction, pp. xxiii f.). What Epiphanius says is that the Dositheans agree with the rest of the Samaritans in the observance of circumcision and the Sabbath, and in avoiding contact with any one because they feel that all men (that is, all gentiles) are unclean. He had already described the customs of all the Samaritans: They wash themselves and their clothes in water when they come in contact with a foreigner; for they regard it as a defilement to come in contact with any one or even to touch

⁸⁴ The familiar title of Porphyry's book on vegetarianism, *Περὶ ἀρωχῆς ἐμψύων*, will occur to every one. Epiphanius himself explains the word in Haer. 18, 1, "they (Nasaraci) thought it unlawful to eat meat."

a man of another religion.⁸⁵ It is, therefore, not a Dosithean peculiarity, but the general Samaritan usage which Epiphanius describes, and it is useless to search for remoter affinities.

The marked hostility to the patriarch Judah with which Eulogius, the Patriarch of Alexandria (died 607 A.D.), charges Dositheus⁸⁶ is natural enough in a Samaritan heresiarch; in the same sentence Eulogius accuses him of scorning the prophets of God, which, again, is not peculiar to the Dositheans, but is the general Samaritan position. It has been remarked above (p. 353) that our sect gives especial honor to the books of the prophets "whose words Israel has despised"; and, however unfriendly the attitude of these seceders to the degenerate Judah of their time, there is no indication of animosity to the patriarch, as there is none in the Jubilees.

From a much later time Dr. Schechter has gleaned some notices of a sect of "Zadokites" in whose tenets also he recognizes resemblances to those of our sect. Kirkisani, a Karaite author of the tenth century,⁸⁷ says: "Zadok was the first who exposed the Rabbanites and contradicted them publicly. He revealed a part of the truth, and composed books [a book] in which he frequently denounced the Rabbanites and criticised them. But he adduced no proof for anything he said, merely saying it by way of statement, except in one thing, namely, in his prohibition against marrying the daughter of the brother and the daughter of the sister. For he adduced as proof their being analogous to the paternal and maternal aunt."⁸⁸

This is a matter about which our sectaries are especially fierce in their denunciations of the laxity of the orthodox. The argument they employ is the same which Kirkisani attributes to Zadok. It is, however, the obvious argument, if the principle of analogy be admitted in the interpretation of the law; it is com-

⁸⁵ Haer. 9, 3; cf. 30, 2: "The Ebionites, like the Samaritans, avoid touching an outsider." A still more extreme fastidiousness on this point is attributed by Josephus to the Essenes; cf. B. J. ii, 8, 10.

⁸⁶ Photius, *Bibliotheca Codicum*, cod. 280 (ed. Bekker, p. 285).

⁸⁷ The *Kitab al-Anwār* was published in 937, not 637, as by a misprint on p. xviii.

⁸⁸ Schechter's translation, Introduction, p. xviii.

mon in the Karaite books, and is ascribed to the Samaritans also.⁸⁹ Kirkisani also says that the Zadokites absolutely forbade divorce, which the Scripture permitted, agreeing in this with the Christians and with the Isawites, whose founders, Jesus and Obadiah of Ispahan,⁹⁰ had likewise forbidden it. We are not told expressly that our sect prohibited divorce, but their prohibition of remarriage during the life of the divorced wife would have the same effect. Finally, Kirkisani says that the Zadokites fixed all the months at thirty days each,⁹¹ and that they did not count the Sabbath among the seven days of the celebration of the Passover and the Tabernacles, making the feast consist of seven days exclusive of the Sabbath. Substantially the same statements are made about the Zadokites by another Karaite author, Hadassi, who flourished in the middle of the twelfth century, and perhaps derived his information from Kirkisani.

What the "Zadokite" writings really were to which these authors refer is not known. It is certain, however, that both the Karaites and their opponents took them to be Sadducean works. In the passage about Zadok, part of which Dr. Schechter quotes (see above), Kirkisani says: "After the appearance of the Rabbanites (the first of whom was Simeon the Just), the Sadducees appeared; their leaders were Zadok and Boëthus. . . . Zadok was the first who exposed the Rabbanites," etc.⁹² Zadok's disclosure of a part of truth was followed by the full discovery of the truth about the laws by Anan, the founder of the Karaites. Not only do the opponents of the Karaites stigmatize Anan and his followers as the remnants of the disciples of Zadok and Boëthus, but the older Karaites expressly claim this origin. Thus Joseph al-Basir (first half of the eleventh century) says that, in the times of the second temple, the Rabbanites, who were then called Pharisees, had the upper hand, while the Karaites, then known as Sadducees, were less influential.⁹³ The Karaite author

⁸⁹ Schechter, p. xxxvii, n. 21.

⁹⁰ Founder of a Jewish sect which arose in Persia about the end of the seventh century.

⁹¹ On this point see above, p. 362.

⁹² Quoted in the original by Poznanaki, *Revue des études juives*, vol. xlv (1902), p. 162, n. 2.

⁹³ Quoted by Poznanaki, l. c., p. 170.

of an anonymous commentary on Exodus preserved in manuscript in St. Petersburg ⁵⁴ polemizes against a disciple of Saadia, the great *Malleus Karaeorum*, about the proper way of determining the beginning of the months (and consequently the dates of the feasts), which the Rabbanites fixed by calculation of the conjunctions, while the Karaites depended on observation of the visible new moon. The ancients, he says, required evidence of the appearance of the new moon.⁵⁵ Saadia, who mistakenly assumed that the beginning of the month had been determined astronomically from remote antiquity—the calendar was, in fact, of Sinaitic origin ⁵⁶—asserted that the taking of testimony about the appearance of the moon was an innovation occasioned by the contention of Zadok and Boëthus that the law required the beginning of the month to be determined by actual observation; witnesses were heard only to prove that observation confirmed the calculation. To this the author replies: “The book of the Zadokites (Sadducees) is well known, and there is no such thing in it as that man (Saadia) avers. In the book of Zadok are various things in which he dissents from the Rabbanites of the second temple with regard to sacrifices and other matters, but there is not a syllable of what the Fayyumite (Saadia) says.”⁵⁷ Saadia himself appears not to have questioned the authenticity of the writings that went under the name of Zadok, with which he seems to have been acquainted, directly or indirectly, for in a passage quoted by Yefet ben ‘Ali he says that Zadok had proved from the one hundred and fifty days in the story of the flood just the opposite of what the Karaites try to prove from them.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Harkavy attributed it conjecturally to Sahl ben Masliah; Poznanski, whom Dr. Schechter follows, thinks it more likely that the author was Hasan ben Mashiah.

⁵⁵ As the Karaites do. See e.g. Mishna, Rosh ha-Shana, 17 ff., 21 f.

⁵⁶ See Poznanski, *Jewish Quarterly Review*, vol. x (1898), pp. 159, 248, 273.

⁵⁷ Quoted in the original by Poznanski, *Revue des études juives*, vol. xlv, p. 176.—The point is that the “Zadokite” writings known to the author said nothing about fixing the beginning of the month by observation. Saadia doubtless based his assertion, not on anything he found in “Zadokite” books, but on Rosh ha-Shanah 22 a-b.

⁵⁸ Poznanski, l. c., p. 177; cf. also *Jewish Quarterly Review*, vol. x, pp. 246 ff.—Saadia probably means that “Zadok” argued from the fact that the 150 days of Gen. 7 24, 8 3, make an even five months (7 11, 8 4), that each month had thirty

Zadokite books thus meant, for all those from whom our information comes, Sadducean books; and so, in the sense that, whatever their age and origin, they contained substantially Sadducean teachings, most modern scholars, also, have understood the name.

The possibility that Sadducean writings from the beginning of the Christian era had survived to the Middle Ages cannot well be denied, especially in view of the preservation of the book of the unknown sect that forms the subject of our present study in copies as late as the tenth or eleventh century; and even if the book which the Karaites took for Sadducean was erroneously attributed to that sect, there is no sufficient ground for identifying it with the texts in our hands or for ascribing it to our sect. A thirty-day month, and the prohibition of divorce and of marriage with a niece, are much too slender a foundation to support so large an inference, and it is hardly legitimate to argue that if we had the entire book, of which only a part—or, according to Dr. Schechter, excerpts—is preserved, we might find other and more significant agreements.

Dr. Schechter has also remarked certain coincidences between the tenets of our sect and those of the Falashas, or Abyssinian Jews, whom, with Beer, he is disposed to connect in some way with the Dositheans. Their Sabbath laws resemble those in the Jubilees and in the texts before us; they also prohibit marriage with a niece; they have a tradition that the Pentateuch was brought to Abyssinia by Azariah, the son of Zadok (1 Kings 4 2); certain features of their calendar may possibly be related to that of the Zadokites as described by Kirkisani. Here, again, the correspondences are not numerous or distinctive enough to establish an historical connection.

Putting together these scattered indicia, Dr. Schechter arrives at a theory of the history and relations of the sect which must be given in his own words:—

We may, then, formulate our hypothesis that our text is constituted of fragments forming extracts from a Zadok book, known to us chiefly

days (cf. Jubilees 5 27), while for the Karaites thirty days was only the extreme length of a lunar month. See Poznanski, *Jewish Quarterly Review*, vol. x, p. 241.

from the writings of Kirkisani. The Sect which it represented, did not however pass for any length of time under the name of Zadokites, but was soon in some way amalgamated with and perhaps also absorbed by the Dosithean Sect, and made more proselytes among the Samaritans than among the Jews, with which former sect it had many points of similarity. In the course of time, however, the Dosithean Sect also disappeared, and we have only some traces left of them in the lingering sect of the Falashas, with whom they probably came into close contact at an early period of their (the Falashas') existence, and to whom they handed down a good many of their practices. The only real difficulty in the way of this hypothesis is, that according to our Text the Sect had its original seat in Damascus, north of Palestine, and it is difficult to see how they reached the Dositheans, and subsequently the Falashas, who had their main seats in the south of Palestine, or Egypt. But this could be explained by assuming special missionary efforts on the part of the Zadokites by sending their emissaries to Egypt, a country which was especially favourable to such an enterprise because of the existence of the Onias Temple there. The severance of the Egyptian Jews from the Palestinian influence (though they did not entirely give up their loyalty to the Jerusalem Sanctuary), prepared the ground for the doctrines of such a Sect as the Zadokites in which all allegiance to Judah and Jerusalem was rejected, and in which the descendants of the House of Zadok (of whom indeed Onias himself was one) represented both the Priest and the Messiah.

The evidence adduced in support of this ingenious hypothesis has already been examined in detail, and the results need only be summarized here: There is nothing in the book before us to warrant classing the men who made the new covenant in the land of Damascus as a Zadokite sect;⁹⁹ neither the external nor the internal evidence suffices to identify the work quoted by Kirkisani as Zadokite (by which he and all the rest understood Sadducean) with the book before us; the connection of the sect with the Dositheans rests in great part on misunderstanding of the testimonies about the Dositheans—misunderstandings, it is fair to say, which are not all original with Dr. Schechter,—in part upon points of resemblance which are not distinctive enough to prove anything. Of the peculiar organization of our sect, which would be conclusive, there is no trace anywhere.

A much more sensational hypothesis was broached by Mr. G. Margoliouth in the *Athenaeum* for November 26, 1910, under

⁹⁹ See above, p. 359 f.

the title, "The Sadducean Christians of Damascus." He takes "the root" which God caused to spring from Israel and Aaron (17) for the same person who is subsequently called the Anointed one (Messiah), and distinguishes this figure from the Teacher of Righteousness, also called the Anointed one, who appeared twenty years later. "Both these Messiahs were dead when the document was composed, but they were both expected to reappear in the latter days."

The first of them, the Messiah descended from Aaron and Israel, in consequence of whose work "they meditated over their sin, and knew that they were guilty men," is John the Baptist. John's father was a priest, and though his mother also is said to have been of priestly descent, "this need not stand in the way of believing that there was a strain of non-priestly Israelite blood in the family." The Sadducees would naturally prefer a priestly Messiah to a Davidic one, and, when John won the recognition of the people as a prophet sent by God, it would not be strange if a priestly party acclaimed him as in some sense a Messiah, or anointed leader of the nation.

The other Messiah, the Teacher of Righteousness, must then be Jesus. That he appeared twenty years after John, so far from being an argument against this identification, would relieve the difficulty of trying to crowd John's whole history into little more than a year. "It is surely not necessary to defend the Lucan tradition on this point at all hazards, and it seems quite likely that the newly discovered document has at last given us the right perspective of events."

If these identifications are correct, the "man of scoffing," or Belial,¹⁰⁰ who is sent to pervert the nation and turn it from the law, can be no other than the Apostle Paul, and it is noted for confirmation that "the period here assigned to his activity and that of his immediate following is about forty years, a space of time not far removed from the result of recent critical computation."

The New Covenant so often referred to in the texts is clearly to be connected with the identical conception and expression

¹⁰⁰ In "Belial is let loose," Mr. Margoliouth finds a witless pun on Paul's apostolic claims.

in the New Testament, nor does it seem to be accidental that the Teacher of Righteousness is several times spoken of as the "only" or "unique" one.

Mr. Margoliouth presents his complete hypothesis as follows:—

The natural and apparently inevitable conclusion of the whole matter, therefore, is that we have here to deal with a primitive Judæo-Christian body of people which consisted of priests and Levites belonging to the Boëthusian section of the Sadducean party,¹⁰¹ fortified—as the document shows—by a considerable Israelitish lay element, besides a real or contemplated admixture of proselytes. They acknowledged, as we have seen, John the Baptist, as a Messiah of the family of Aaron, and they also believed in Jesus as a kind of second (or, perhaps, as pre-eminent) Messiah whose special function it was to be a "Teacher of Righteousness." Paul they abhorred; and they strove with all their might to combine the full observance of the Mosaic Law, as they understood it, with the principles of the "new covenant," again as they understood it. On the destruction of the Temple by Titus, finding that it would not serve any good purpose to linger in Judæa, they determined to migrate to Damascus,¹⁰² intending to establish their central organization in that city, and to found communities of the sect in different parts of the neighboring country. It was at this juncture that the manifesto,

¹⁰¹ Mr. Margoliouth is led to the opinion that they were Boëthusians by the obscure passage in 2 13, which he interprets, "in the explanation of his name (sc. the Messiah's) are also their names,"—the name of the sect points mysteriously to the name of the Messiah. "Now the Boëthusians derived their name from a priest named Boëthus, and the meaning of *βοηθός* is the same as that of the Hebrew name represented by Jesus. The inference would be that the section of the Zadokite or Sadducees who adopted an attitude of belief toward John the Baptist and Jesus were none other than the Boëthusians (perhaps identical with the great company of believing priests of Acts 6 7), who not unnaturally liked to dwell on the identity of meaning between their names and that of the Teacher."—*Boëthos*, it may be remarked, is probably a Greek equivalent for the name Ezra, not for Jeshua.

¹⁰² Mr. Margoliouth thinks that "the end of the destruction of the land," after which the migration to Damascus took place, "can hardly be anything else than the completion of the Roman conquest in A.D. 70." "At the end of the devastation of the land" means, however, not when the destruction was complete, but when the period of desolation was over. The phrase itself, therefore, is no more appropriate to Titus than to Nebuchadnezzar—or to Hadrian. Mr. Margoliouth does not say how he interprets the rest of the passage. Are the men who, at the end of the devastation of the land, "removed the boundary and led Israel astray," the great rabbis of the generations after the destruction of Jerusalem, and does the sequel, "and the land was laid waste because they spoke rebelliously against the commandments of God by Moses and against his holy Anointed one," refer to the war under Hadrian?

bearing as it does unmistakable marks of personal touch, was composed by a leader of the movement.

No scholar who has made an independent study of the texts published by Dr. Schechter can have failed to consider the question whether these schismatics, with their "unique teacher,"¹⁰³ their "new covenant," their "Supervisor," whose name and functions might be compared with those of a bishop (*ἐπίσκοπος*), their loyalty to their dead leader, God's Anointed one (Messiah), who made them know his holy spirit, and their expectation of an Anointed one in the last times, their hostility to the Pharisees, can have been a Jewish Christian sect.

The more closely the documents are examined, however, the less tenable this conjecture appears. One feature of the sectarian eschatology which, if established, would afford the most striking coincidence with early Christian belief, namely, that the Messiah who died in the early days of the sect is to "reappear" (Margoliouth), or "rise again" (Schechter), has no support whatever in the text.¹⁰⁴ The "new covenant" in the land of Damascus is plainly the obligation by which the members of the sect bind themselves to the organization, with its peculiar interpretations of the law and its distinctive observances. Neither in the terms of the covenant nor in the law itself is there anything that suggests Christian origin or influence. That "a man should love his neighbor as himself" is not peculiarly or even preëminently a Christian precept. The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs reiterate it; by the most orthodox rabbis it was recognized as the most comprehensive commandment in the law.

The things which the sect esteems of vital importance lie wholly in the sphere of the law; polemic zeal for a code which is at every point more rigorous than that of the Pharisees is the salient characteristic of both parts of the book. The moral precepts are the commonplaces of Judaism narrowed to a sectarian horizon.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ As has been noted above, *yāhid* is sometimes rendered in the Greek Old Testament by *μονογενής*.

¹⁰⁴ See above, p. 341.

¹⁰⁵ The commandment to love one's neighbor as himself, for example. In the context of the covenant formula, in contrast to Jewish orthodoxy no less than to Christianity, the neighbor is not the fellow man, nor even the fellow Jew, but the fellow member of the schismatic church.

The judgment of God is similarly circumscribed. It is not a judgment of the world or of the Jewish people, but of those who reject and controvert the legal interpretation of the sect, and of those who have fallen away from it.

The code of law which is the constituent principle of the sect and the reason for its existence was given it by its founder, the Teacher of Righteousness. This unique teacher was not a prophetic reformer, but "the interpreter of the law who came to Damascus," "the legislator." The statutes he decreed are final; the sect "shall receive no others until the teacher of righteousness shall arise in the last times."

Mr. Margoliouth thinks that the "teacher of righteousness" to whom the sect attributed its institutions and laws was Jesus. The statement of this conjecture is its refutation. The rôle of a legislator is the last which the character and teaching of Jesus in the Gospels would suggest even to a sect in search of a founder. That he, whose disregard for the Pharisaic rules of Sabbath observance repeatedly got him into trouble, should, within a generation after his death, have been metamorphosed into the author of the sabbatical code in our texts, which outpharisees the Pharisees at every point, surpasses ordinary powers of imagination. The Christian Jews of the first century in Palestine, so far as we know anything about them, conformed in the matter of observance to the authority of the scribes and Pharisees, and alleged the express command of Jesus for this practice (Matt. 23 2). Early Christian heresies sometimes exhibit ascetic features reminding us of the Essenes; but none of ultra-legalistic tendency is known.

As our sect is very zealous for things which have no connection with Christianity, so on the other hand the texts disclose no trace of specific Christian beliefs or conceptions. For the Christian Jews of the first century, the belief that Jesus, who had been crucified under Pontius Pilate, was the Messiah of prophecy, that he had risen from the dead and ascended to heaven, whence he was presently to come in might and majesty, according to the vision of Daniel, to usher in the new era, was the pith and substance of their faith, the "heresy" by which they were separated from their countrymen, the focus of their polemic and

apologetic in controversies with those who rejected their Messiah. It is impossible to imagine a writing as long as this, and imbued as strongly as this with a controversial spirit, proceeding from any Christian sect, in which there should not be so much as an allusion to any of these things; or that a sect which put John the Baptist in so high a place should not make something of baptism in the admission of members.

Apart from these general considerations, Mr. Margoliouth's identifications rest upon a palpable misinterpretation. On page 1 we read: "But because God remembered the covenant with the forefathers, he left Israel a remnant, and did not suffer them to be exterminated. And at the end of wrath . . . he visited them and caused to spring up from Israel and Aaron a root of his planting *to inherit his land and to prosper on the good things of his earth.*" The italicized clauses prove beyond question that the "root" is not an individual, but is a collective designation for the first generation of the sect.¹⁰⁶ The parallel passage on p. 5 says explicitly: "God remembered the covenant with the forefathers, and he raised up from Aaron men of insight and from Israel wise men, and he heard them, and they dug the well." "The well is the law, and they who dug it are the exiles of Israel who migrated to Judah and sojourned in the land of Damascus." In the face of this perfectly plain meaning of the passage Mr. Margoliouth takes "the root" for the person designated in other places as "the Anointed from Aaron and Israel," who led the people "to recognize their wickedness and know that they were guilty men."¹⁰⁷ In this first Messiah he recognizes John the Baptist, and, consequently, in the Teacher of Righteousness who came after him, Jesus. The point of correspondence is the relation between the forerunner and his successor. The text, however, as I have just showed, says nothing of a precursor of the teacher of righteousness; on the contrary, it was this teacher who first brought light to the generation which in the consciousness of its sin was

¹⁰⁶ See above, p. 334.

¹⁰⁷ That the repentance of the people was brought about by the work of "the root" is not suggested in any way in the text; on the contrary, the only natural construction and interpretation of the passage would make the penitent generation the same with that which is called "the root."

groping like the blind, and guided them in the way of God's heart.¹⁰⁸

That by the "man of scoffing" the Apostle Paul is meant is for Mr. Margoliouth a corollary of the preceding identifications, and falls with them. The enemies of Paul were doubtless capable of calling him all sorts of hard names, but there is nothing in the epithets "scorner" and "liar," or in the doings attributed to this figure, which fits Paul better than any other false teacher and sower of discord, while the reference to the fate of the men of war who followed the "man of lies" seems quite inapplicable to Paul.¹⁰⁹

That we should be unable to identify the Covenanters of Damascus with any sect previously known is not surprising. The three or four centuries in the middle of which the Christian era falls were prolific in sects and heresies of many complexions, as were the centuries following the rise of Islam. Through Philo, Josephus, the church Fathers, and the Talmud, we are acquainted with some of them; but it is probable that there were many others of which no reports have reached us. If we cannot, out of the collection at our disposal, put a label on our Covenanters, we may console ourselves with the reflection that here we know one Jewish sect from its own monuments, and that the texts in our hands, mutilated as they are, suffice to give us a much clearer notion of its peculiarities than we get of most of the other sects from the descriptions which have come down to us.

Its affinities with various antipharisaic or antirabbinical parties, such as the Samaritans, the Sadducees, and, in later times, the Karaites, is obvious. It shared with all these a zeal for the letter and the literal interpretation, and a disposition to extend the law by analogy of principle, as a result of which their rules were in general much stricter than those of the Rabbis, who possessed

¹⁰⁸ See above, p. 334.

¹⁰⁹ Gressmann is sure that this "man of lies" must be Bar Cosiba (Bar Cocheba), the Messianic leader of the rebellion under Hadrian. He might have added that the contrast to the true star out of Jacob, the founder of the sect, would be peculiarly pertinent. The punning etymology, "Say not 'Star,' but 'liar'" (Echa Rabbathi on Lam. 2 2), is ascribed to the Patriarch Judah.

in the theory of tradition and in their methods of exegesis the means of adapting the law to changed conditions, and who were also more disposed to give the precedence to the great principles of humanity in the law over its particular prescriptions when the two seemed to conflict. The organization of the sect, on the other hand, has no parallel within our knowledge. In view of the use of the name "camps" for the local communities, and the references to the "mustering" of the members, the "trumpets of the congregation," and the like, it may be surmised that the organization of Israel in the wilderness suggested the plan, and that the Supervisors were meant to correspond to the chiefs of the tribes (for instance, Num. 1 10), each having authority over a separate camp.

The sect seems to have perpetuated itself for a considerable time, otherwise this book would hardly have been preserved. It may perhaps be conjectured that it survived long enough to be gathered, along with numerous younger sects, into the capacious bosom of Karaism, of which it was in various points a precursor. Such an hypothesis would explain how it came about that copies of the book were made in the tenth century and later, we should then suppose by Karaite scribes.¹¹⁰

Dr. Schechter has laid all students of Judaism under new obligations by the discovery and publication of these texts. They will join with their congratulations the hope that he may find yet other treasures among the accumulations of the Genizah.

¹¹⁰ Perhaps the manuscripts may have been in the possession of some Rabbanite controversialist in Egypt, and thus found their way, like various Karaite writings, into the Genizah of the Synagogue.

GOD IN ALL AND OVER ALL

WARREN SEYMOUR ARCHIBALD

PITTSFIELD, MASS.

Each generation and each century seems to have its own peculiar danger and its own peculiar genius. The Christian church, for example, was confronted in the early centuries with the dangerous and subtle opposition of Greek thought; and the genius of the church victoriously faced this opposition with that spiritual interpretation of the life and teachings of Jesus which we find in the Fourth Gospel. Later, in the sixteenth century, the danger appeared in a materialistic church, and the genius of the Reformation was unmistakably present in the religion of the spirit and the liberty of the individual. In the eighteenth century the peril was seen in dogma, or irreligion, or a tepid morality; and the opposition developed Pietism in Germany, Methodism in England, and the Great Awakening in New England. Every century appears to be led into the wilderness to be tempted by the devil in some new guise, and is compelled to find the apt, victorious text in Scripture.

And yet, whatever be the temptation and whatever be the triumphant reply, the issues are always the same,—sin and salvation. In the Greek myth of Proteus, when that old man of the sea was grappled with, he assumed most horrible and terrifying forms. Now he was a fire, now a wild stag, now a screaming sea-bird, now a three-headed dog, now a serpent. Sin is always protean, and presents to the wrestling centuries new and terrible aspects. What, then, we ask, seem to be the principalities and protean powers against which we are compelled to wrestle? I venture to think they may be suggested in one word, Materialism.

This is most noticeable in our economic life. Within a very short period, virtually since 1870, unprecedented fortunes have been made in America. Through all classes the great desire for money has spread like fire. The college man who enters the

broker's office on Wall Street and the Greek immigrant who starts a fruit-stand on the sidewalk are both in search of wealth. America has become synonymous with money. All this is so well known that there is no necessity for any lengthy exposition of it. I wish only to emphasize—what any careful student of events well knows—that this great material prosperity has produced a striking capacity to see the material and a corresponding incapacity to see the ideal.

Nor is this materialism confined to our economic life. For one reason and another much of the keenest thinking of our time is materialistic. The doctrine of the superman and the theory of the survival of the fittest are the stars in the intellectual firmament of many students. A philosophy like that of Nietzsche influences the man in college, in the settlement house, and in the café. The magazines with their adulation or their execration of the great masters of wealth, the theatre with the drama of Sudermann, Hauptmann, and Pinero, give prominence to the value of the material and the futility of the ideal. Christianity is openly ridiculed as a system which perpetuates the socially unfit, violently attacked as the defender of an unjust industrial system, or silently disregarded as an obsolete institution. Not only without the churches but also within our fellowships we find altogether too often the absence of that capacity to see the ideal, and to endure as seeing Him who is invisible. The congregation in more than one church has become the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. Even in the church of a great spiritual leader the mid-week service will be deserted for the opera. In the summer the city church is closed, while the country club is open. Our athletic men and maidens speak much of God's out-of-doors, and quote the Christ who went into the country, who climbed the hills, who knew the flowers of the field and the birds of the air. They do not seem to recollect, however, the rather striking fact that the only habit known to us in the youth of Christ is his custom of going into the church of his fathers on the Sabbath-day. The plain fact is that many people of church-going ancestry are not going to church. A group of young business men in Boston, who happen to belong to the same organization, may be taken as representatives of a large class.

Their fathers were deacons, elders, members of the church, and ministers. Only two out of two dozen in this group attend church. Here are thoroughly good men, actively interested in civic questions, good citizenship, and the body politic, but they are not interested in church attendance. They are proud, and justly proud, of their fathers, but they should remember that even all these, though they obtained a good report through faith, obtained not the promises, God having provided some better thing for their descendants, that the fathers without the sons should not be made perfect. At the bottom of all this feeling, whether we find it in the churches or out of the churches, whether in economic or intellectual forms, is, I am compelled to think, the belief consciously or unconsciously entertained that the things which are seen are of more value than the things which are unseen. Food and raiment are more to be desired than righteousness and the beauty of holiness, because people see very clearly the value of things which perish, and very darkly the unsearchable riches of Christ. For I dare to believe that if men can see God in the churches, they will come to church. To see God in the churches! To make God a visible reality! That is the awful task to which the ministers commit themselves. Without this vision the people turn to things which are visible, temporal, sensual. This is materialism. Whether you find it in economic greed, injustice, and brutality, in social discontent, hypocrisy, and beastliness, in intellectual doubt and spiritual indifference, it is materialism,—the peculiar peril of our time and our country.

To this evil genius of our country the religion of the present opposes two emphatic ideals: social and spiritual. By the social ideal, I mean the proclamation of social justice between employer and employed, capital and labor, rich and poor, learned and unlearned, for we are all brethren and we must all live under the shadow of a great name. By the spiritual, I mean emphasis on the authority of the spirit rather than the spirit of authority. Any one familiar with the young men in the ministry and the congregation will again and again note the appearance of these two aspects in the religious utterance of our time,—social justice and the authority of the spirit. No other-worldly justice can be preached as a compensation for injustice in this world. No

mansions in the sky will be accepted as a substitute for intolerable rents on earth. "Woe unto him that buildeth his house by unrighteousness and his chambers by wrong; that useth his neighbor's service without wages and giveth him not for his work." This prophetic preaching constitutes the ancient and modern message of social justice.

The other message of our time is the authority of the spirit. The character of the last century was the spirit of authority, whether it was found in science, or religion, or ecclesiastical councils. Today the preacher turns to the authority of the spirit. Of course the peril here is the old danger of antinomianism, that Serbonian bog where armies whole have sunk. But into that disaster the intelligent and humble preacher who governs his thought by the classic experience of the past and by communion with the eternal will not fall. Such a source of authority may be called mystical, spiritual, idealistic. Whatever we call it, it is that region above time and space where all leaders in spiritual guidance, Paul, Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Edwards, have conferred not with flesh and blood, but with the eternal God. It is, above all, the region from which Jesus Christ our Lord drew that power and influence so impressive to men that they remembered him as one having authority. This capacity to speak as seeing him who is invisible, this ability to make the ideal a more glorious reality than food and raiment, this genius for the mystical approach to God, constitutes the authority of the spirit.

Now over these two aspects so conspicuous in the thought of our time are the two eternal ideals of the kingdom of God and the vision of God. The kingdom of God is the ideal which looms above the question of social justice, the question of man's relation to man. The vision of God is the ideal which hovers above the religion of the spirit, the question of man's relation to God. It is of the latter that I wish to speak more particularly here.

The thought of God's relation to the world which appeals convincingly to our generation has two mutually complementary aspects,—God's pervasive indwelling in the world and God's supreme purpose of perfection for the world.

God is present in our universe, for the world is the work of his hands and the firmament is his handiwork. God is present in

all men as the inward light which leads them into the eternal. This present help and inward light is, as John Woolman said, "deep and inward, confined to no forms of religion nor excluded from any when the heart stands in perfect sincerity." This inner light has been the source of grandeur in prophet and priest, disciple and apostle, saint and martyr. This inner light was so infinitely real in Jesus that in his spirit there was neither darkness nor shadow of darkness. Our highest prayer must be, "May the light that was in Jesus be in us also!" This conception fits a world in the making, in the rough,—a growing, struggling, fighting, glorious world. It takes into account all the facts, and admits the presence of evil as well as good. It believes that God is the maker and builder of this unfinished world. He is toiling for the increase of the good and the destruction of the evil. As John Scotus said, "There are as many unveilings of God as there are saintly souls." This light shining in the darkness of our world I take to be the manifest presence of God.

It is not enough, however, to know God only as the power which works in the world for good; for this leaves the great question of finality hanging in the air; it does not tell us whether in the long run good or evil will triumph. It does not "live," as Thomas à Kempis would say, "under the shadow of a great name." It needs to be completed by the conviction that in this struggle the sovereign will of God is engaged to make the good triumph over evil, that in the universe there shall be peace. This conception of God, then, recognizes him, first, as the divine light shining in the darkness, even if the darkness comprehends it not; and secondly, as the infinite Father, who has made it his purpose that in this world there shall be peace.

Let me now take this doctrine and submit it to the tests prescribed by the men of our time, and employed by Professor Drown in his article, "A Basic Principle in Theology."¹ These tests are two: first, is it true? and secondly, does it work?

Regarding the truth of any doctrine, a large party in Christendom today would declare a doctrine to be true because it received the sanction of Holy Church under the infallible guidance of her divinely appointed representation of God. And a large num-

¹ Harvard Theological Review, July, 1909.

ber in our Protestant communion, forgetting their origins and slipping into the error of the old church, would declare a doctrine true because "olde bookes" said so. There is, however, an increasing and significant tendency to turn neither to ancient hierarchies nor venerable books, but to life itself. Is it true, he asks, of life? is it true of man? is it true of the perfect man, Jesus Christ? Man is still the measure of all things, even of the eternal. And Jesus Christ, the perfect son of man, is the highest measure of God. If the doctrine is true of him, it is true of God. If a doctrine is not true when applied to men, we reject it as false when applied to God. What is bad in me cannot be good in Him. If it is wrong for the Greeks to lie, steal, murder, and commit adultery, it is also wrong for the gods on Olympus. If it is wrong for the Jews to be men of wrath, war, and blood, it is also wrong for Jahveh. Not through imperfect, but through perfect, humanity shall we venture to measure our conceptions of the infinite. Through Jesus Christ we have our perfect measure of God.

Is this doctrine, then, true of Jesus? In my belief, it is. We find in him these two values, that of the earthly life and of the eternal spirit. The former we have in the historic Christ, Jesus of Nazareth, the man who became obedient to time and space, who was tempted in all points as we are, yet without sin, who continually went about doing good, who had compassion on the multitudes, who suffered little children to come unto him, who died for us on the cross. That brave and radiant figure, full of grace and truth, will never fade on the canvas of a world's remembrance. And the church has followed a wise instinct when through symbol and through sacrament, through the cross and the communion, she has preserved in the minds of men this picture of the Lord Jesus. "Remember the Lord Jesus—how he said—how he lived—how he died,"—these were the words of the disciples and apostles. This labor of the church has been a ministry of remembrance. "Remembering the Lord Jesus,"—that very often describes with deep fidelity the lives of saints and martyrs, the work of holy men who wrought a visible recollection in stone and wood, in sound and color, and the toil of scholars who gave their lives in order that this memory might not pass away from

the earth. The church has always acted over again this divine life in the world.

Yet if the life of Jesus had only this value, and if the work of the minister and priest were only to react and reproduce this life, we should not be saved in our sincerest moments from profound despair. What help is it to a man in misery just to know that one man found peace that passeth understanding? What help is it to a man in sin just to know that one man never yielded to temptation? If there were nothing more than that, life would be torture. It would be just as if I were sinking into the depths of the sea, and, while I gasped and struggled, heard above me sweet voices chanting in solemn music and in ancient words—“*in saecula saeculorum*”—that years and years ago one man passed triumphantly through these waters. As a matter of fact, the Hamlets and Othellos and Lears in real life are not to be found as a rule in the boxes or the orchestra circle. They are outside in the night and the darkness, in the tenement and the broken home. The people in the theatre, however Aristotelian may be their motives, are simply spectators. Now in some such capacity many people attend the churches,—to see a great, divine drama. And if such is the chief end in the worship of God, then of course the drama should be given the best staging and the best cast. But the church must be more than an Oberammergau for the presentation of a Passion Play. Such a service will attract the tourist, but not the sinner. The church will never save the lost, if the service, however noble and splendid, is only a dramatic reproduction of an historical episode. It must be more than that. The life of Christ has more than an historical value. His spirit transcends time and space. And this I feel to be the source of inexpressible riches in the life of Christ. The spirit that was in Jesus must be in every man if his kingdom is to come on earth. And our joy is found in the sight of this eternal spirit forever moving in the hearts of men. The spirit that was in Jesus was manifest in the Apostolic Age, in the days of Augustine, in the century of Saint Francis, in the glory of the Reformers. He has never left us nor forsaken us. He has appealed through different centuries to different men,—to the Platonist

in the first century, to the Pragmatist in the twentieth,—to the Oriental and Occidental, to the Roman and the Greek, barbarian, Scythian, bond, and free. This mystic spirit, triumphant over time and space, into whose communion we all desire more and more to come, I call the transcendent value in the life of Christ.

Since, then, these two values are true of Jesus, I conclude that they are also true of God. For we have agreed that the perfect man Christ Jesus shall be the measure of all things, even of God who is all in all. Therefore we feel the doctrine to be true. For it has been submitted to the test of life, even the excellency of the abundant life as found in Jesus.

If this doctrine has passed the bar of truth, may I now submit it to the second requirement, "Does it work?" This doctrine of God is, I think, peculiarly adapted to our time, because a strong, sincere feeling among our younger men welcomes the pragmatic description of the world. Such a doctrine as I have given squares with pragmatism. For through this vision of God we see a world still in the making, a world where the good and evil, the holy and the unholy, the light and darkness, struggle for dominion. Such a description appeals to the brave man, and he welcomes with joy the thought that in this world God is laboring to bring the good into complete and perfect triumph. He hears his footsteps behind the curtains of sweet light, and rejoices in the struggle because he knows the Lord his God will fight for him. He receives with reverence the belief that God immanent in the world is also transcendent; that his purpose is from everlasting to everlasting, and that he will bring this universe into his peace. This conception of God is therefore peculiarly adapted to that intellectual mood we call Pragmatism.

Moreover it possesses another value in adaptability: it opens the mystic approach to God. The man who lives in a world in which God is at once the eternal spirit, in whom we live and move and have our being, and the infinite purpose, to whose fulfilment the whole creation steadily advances, lives in a world where the highways to God's presence are open and unobstructed. No irresistible grace opens those highways only to the elect; no dogmas nor holy church dooms to eternal hell the multitude of

the damned; no one book contains the only revelation of the infinite spirit; no one institution, however ancient its reverberating service, and however gorgeous its imposing sacerdotalism, can absolutely govern that approach. This approach is open to all who hear and obey the spirit, which from the beginning has spoken in the hearts of men. This approach is an historic highway in Protestantism, and especially to those Protestant societies who laid the foundations of these American colonies. For here, especially in the northern colonies, as Burke said in his great oration, was observed "the dissidence of dissent and the Protestantism of the Protestant religion." Now Protestantism, and especially that which has been called most dissident, is a protest against the obstructed approach to God. No worship of graven images and no idolatry of the mass, no bishop and no priest, no king and no pope, no infallible book, shall stand between man and God. Protestantism in its purity stands for the open door. And Protestantism has been most vital and Puritanism most vigorous when this free, unobstructed, mystic approach to God has been so open and so clear to those who walked therein that God was very near to them. The nearness of God! This is the source of Jonathan Edwards's power, the right door into a true appreciation of that great soul. This is the light which shines on every page in the journal of John Woolman. Both men felt supremely that God was nigh to them. To the Puritan in New England, the sovereignty of God was over all, in all, and through all. To the Quaker in Pennsylvania the indwelling of God, the inner light, made irresistible appeal. Whether they felt that Holy Presence through the sovereign will or the inward voice, they were alike in the essential fact of nearness to God. Both were mystics; both fashioned for their souls a road whereon only the spirit was their guide. Over their lives, over Protestantism at its best, over Puritan and Pilgrim, Baptist and Methodist, Quaker and Moravian, Huguenot and Presbyterian,—over all that "dissidence of dissent and that Protestantism of the Protestant religion" which established the American colonies, may rightly be inscribed what Cotton Mather in the *Magnalia* said of Thomas Shepard, "a trembling walk with God."

This capacity has been the genius of our land and our relig-

ion. This spirit is our rich endowment and our truest inheritance. And it has not vanished from our people. There is alive in the rising generation a great desire to journey on this mystic path to God, to know the reality of his presence, to win the Holy City and to find the Holy Grail. To this spirit in our youth, the thought of God I have attempted to set forth is peculiarly attractive, because it enables theology to give spacious utterance to an increasing desire and an inherited genius. The doctrine, then, passes successfully before that question, "Will it work?" It will work, and enter into the reward of its labor, because it is adapted to pragmatism, which is the intellectual mood of our generation, and to mysticism, which is the genius of our Protestantism.

With deference I submit this attempt to define the ideal which hovers above the spiritual longing of our day. Under the guidance of this idealism we may confidently confront the materialism of our country. This is our peculiar problem. This is the character of the battle in our corner of the field. And this indicates that however different may be the incidents of this long struggle, yet the essentials in the religions of the present and the past and the future are the same, because Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, today, and forever. Only the symbols of that spirit change from century to century. For we wrestle with protean powers, and to the evils of the time we oppose a religion whose spirit is eternal and whose refuge is the everlasting God.

THE PASTOR AND TEACHER IN NEW ENGLAND

VERGIL V. PHELPS

BILLINGS, MONTANA

The necessity of moral and religious training in the education of children and the significance of education in matters of religion have in our day become the subject of much discussion. It may be profitable, therefore, to examine a unique institution of early New England by which religion was linked to education, and religious education was given a high place in the life of the churches. It is remarkable that this institution seems never to have received the attention of a single book, pamphlet, or magazine article.

In early New England a fully organized church had as officers a pastor, a teacher, and at least one ruling elder, and one deacon.¹ The deacon was the treasurer, and the ruling elder the trustee and censor of morals. The pastor was the administrative head of the church, who was expected to inspire its life and activities; the teacher was the educational and doctrinal leader. This office of teacher was undoubtedly the distinctive feature of the New England system. The teacher was exclusively a church officer, and had no more connection with any school than the pastor or deacon; he was as unlike a schoolmaster as a modern theological professor is unlike a teacher in our public schools.² As far as it is possible to make a comparison, the teacher may be described as a kind of theological professor whose sphere of work was exclusively a church.³

¹ The polity also called for the office of deaconess, which never existed in America, although there are several instances of it in Puritan England.

² The teacher taught the church-members, while the schoolmaster taught the children of the town. The former dealt exclusively with religion, the latter was concerned with religion only as religion was then linked to education.

³ If a theological professor were the regular minister of a church, conducted a lecture (or mid-week religious service), and were responsible for the religious principles of his congregation, we should have the counterpart of the teacher. Something like this is sometimes found to-day among the Quakers. In a few instances, a schoolmaster acted as substitute for a pastor or teacher, or even was

The difference between the functions of the pastor and the teacher was as follows:⁴ In general, pastoral visitation and friendly advice were expected from the pastor, while the teacher preached studied sermons and published treatises in elucidation of the truths of the Bible. In the church service the teacher expounded the meaning of a passage of the Bible, after which the pastor applied the truths to daily life and exhorted the congregation to conduct themselves accordingly.⁵ While the exposition of the teacher was carefully prepared, the application of the pastor had in the nature of the case to be extemporaneous.⁶ It was pre-eminently the business of the teacher to read⁷ and expound the Bible in the church service.

In the administration of the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper the pastor and the teacher usually alternated⁸ without any other distinction than the character of each officer might impart to his administration of the rite. In matters of church discipline, over which the ruling elder usually presided, the teacher was called upon whenever there was a point of New Testament procedure to elucidate; but when it was a question of

called to a permanent office. Increase Mather was president of Harvard College while teacher of the Second Church of Boston, but the laws of the colony forbade a minister to be a schoolmaster. Daniel Neal, *History of New England*, vol. ii, appendix iv.

⁴ These generalizations are based on the recorded efforts of the various independent churches to carry out the ideals of their leaders amid the fluctuating conditions of a new settlement.

⁵ The afternoon service was less formal, and the order more variable. Thomas Lechford, *Plain Dealing*, p. 47, and Robert Keayne, manuscript of Boston sermons of Cotton, with three by Wilson and one by Cobbett (described, somewhat erroneously, in the *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 2d series, vol. iv, pp. 313-316, and vol. v, p. 435), indicate no difference in the order of the afternoon service.

⁶ Note Wilson's remarks of January 13, 1642: "What ever I had otherwise provided to speake to you, yet because the time is about spent, so I shud possibly keepe you no longer. Yet soe I will speke but a word or 2 to presse the whel on you, what you have soe profitably heard all ready." See also Cotton Mather, *Magnalia*, vol. i, pp. 311-312, 435.

⁷ Often omitted if there was no teacher. H. M. Dexter, *Congregationalism in Literature*, p. 452, note 147; Dedham church records; Thomas Lechford, *Plain Dealing*, pp. 47, 52; Cotton Mather, *Ratio Disciplinæ*, pp. 63-68.

⁸ In England only the pastor could administer these rites. Mayo, of the Second Church of Boston, says (church records, vol. iii, p. 3): "Ordinances being here dispensed by ye Pastor & Teacher in our several vicissitudes."

daily conduct, the assistance of the pastor was invoked.⁹ If the case of discipline was dependent upon the interpretation of Scripture, the verdict was delivered by the teacher; but if a matter of church life, by the pastor.¹⁰

The teacher was exempt from all administrative work. This belonged to the pastor, assisted by the ruling elders. If, however, any subject arose pertaining to Scripture or doctrine, it was referred to the teacher.¹¹ About the year 1700 it became customary for a minister to preside at funerals and marriages, and the pastor usually performed that function.¹² The teacher, thus relieved from administrative work, spent the week in strenuous study, preparing himself to "explain and defend the principles of the Christian religion."¹³ The fruits of this study were doctrinal and expository sermons,¹⁴ addresses at ecclesiastical councils and meetings, and pamphlets and books, which won from the Great and General Court many a grant for eradicating heresy. Moreover, the teacher was the leader in catechizing. He prepared the catechisms and directed the instruction.¹⁵ The Thursday Lecture, however, which was the traditional sphere of the teacher in England, became in New England an occasion for exhortation as well as instruction, and it was, in fact, scarcely more than a Sunday service in the middle of the week.

But the fundamental difference between the pastor and the

⁹ See trials in Keayne manuscript; Connecticut Historical Society Collections, vol. ii, pp. 75-77.

¹⁰ See Keayne manuscript (excellent); New Haven church records, vol. i, pp. 1 ff.; Connecticut Historical Society Collections, vol. i, pp. 22-51; Thomas Lechford, *Plain Dealing*, pp. 30 f.

¹¹ As at the First Church of Boston on May 20, 1640, when a certain request for a letter was answered by "our teacher and consented to by the church," it being against all Scripture precedent. Keayne manuscript for date. There are many instances in which the teacher and ruling elder sign the correspondence of their church. Both the pastor and teacher kept the church records.

¹² The earlier theory had been that a minister ought not to be "burthened with the execution of civil affairs, as the celebration of marriage, burying the dead, &c." Points of Difference, art. 6. See Boston town records from 1687 for the marriages by Samuel Willard and by Increase and Cotton Mather.

¹³ Cotton Mather, *Magnalia*, vol. i, p. 550.

¹⁴ These expository sermons on entire books of the Bible often extended over several months and even years. See Keayne manuscript, and Richard Mather's *Lectures upon Second Peter*.

¹⁵ The actual work was usually done by the pastor or ruling elder.

teacher, both in theory and practice, consisted in the innate or divinely endowed character of one minister as fitted to be pastor and of another as teacher. An examination of the lives of the various pastors and teachers of New England will make it apparent that this distinction was more than purely theoretical. Note the following characterizations of pastors: "a zealous and pious preacher," "a very gracious, sincere man"; "a very lively preacher and a very preaching liver"; "a very affectionate man, who seldom ended a sermon without weeping"; a man "abounding in zeal, prudence, and charity"; "a man eminent in faith, love, humility, self-denial, prayer, soundness of mind, zeal for God, liberality to all men, especially to the saints and ministers of Christ."¹⁶ Compare these with the following descriptive phrases of teachers: "mighty in the Scriptures"; "a solid man"; "a theological drill-sergeant"; "a living, breathing Bible"; "as clear and smart a disputant as most ever lived in the world"; "sage, sober, grave, and learned"; "had an excellent talent in training up children in a catechetical way in the grounds of the Christian religion"; "apt to teach"; "greatest star in the churches of Christ that we could hear of in the Christian world for opening and unfolding the counsels of Christ to the churches."¹⁷ Descriptions of the pastor and teacher of a church given by the same person especially reveal this contrast.¹⁸

¹⁶ The preceding characterizations are from the following sources: John Hull, *Diary* for June 24, 1649 (Thomas Shepard); John Winthrop, *History of New England*, vol. i, p. 376 (313) (Tomson of Braintree); Cotton Mather, *Magnalia*, vol. i, p. 430 (Samuel Newman), and vol. ii, p. 61 (Samuel Danforth); William Emerson, *First Church in Boston*, p. 1 (Wilson); and Roxbury church records, p. 206.

¹⁷ The first phrase is used to describe many men. The others are: *Life of Richard Mather* (anonymous, but undoubtedly by Increase Mather), p. 32; M. C. Tyler, *American Literature*, vol. ii, p. 168, and H. A. Hill, *Old South Church*, vol. i, p. 339; J. L. Sibley, *Harvard Graduates*, vol. i, p. 27 (the description of John Cotton by Woodbridge); John Cotton, *Plymouth*, in *Massachusetts Historical Society Collections*, 1st series, vol. iv, p. 118 (Reyner); Edward Johnson, *Wonder Working Providence*, p. 21 (Higginson) and p. 59 (Cotton); A. B. Ellis, *First Church in Boston*, p. 327, note, and fly-leaf of *First Church records* (Cotton).

¹⁸ See Edward Johnson, *Wonder Working Providence*, pp. 21 f. for Skelton and Higginson; Roxbury church records, p. 206, *First Church in Boston records*, and Keayne manuscript for Cotton and Wilson; Cotton Mather, *Magnalia*, vol. i, p. 252, and John Cotton (in G. L. Walker, *First Church, Hartford*, pp. 428, 443) for Hooker and Stone; and Benjamin Colman's funeral sermons upon the two

It is evident from this description of the functions and character of the pastor and teacher that the two men were colleague ministers, each contributing an indispensable part to the life and growth of the formative New England churches. The teacher was not, as has sometimes been affirmed, the assistant of the pastor. In many instances both pastors and teachers had assistants, but such assistants were specifically designated assistants, and bore no other title. The teacher was no more the assistant of the pastor than the pastor of the teacher. Greater age, length of service in the ministry, and physical activity were no criteria for selecting a pastor. And more thorough college training, physical inability for visitation, and feeble health never appear to have been the motives leading to the assignment of a minister to the work of teacher. Neither office conferred any ascendancy over the other. A larger salary is no indication of greater esteem or ability.¹⁹ When one man towered above his colleague it was the teacher even more frequently than the pastor; and such pre-eminence was due, not to office, but to personality. This equality of collegueship is also revealed by the pride which each minister took in his title, and the scrupulous care with which the titles were applied in all official documents.²⁰ Even when, as not infrequently occurred, there was slight difference in the inherent characters of the two men, each was expected to "bend himself" to the performance of his half of the work. Otherwise the full strength of the church could not be utilized. By this division of ministerial labor and this co-operation between the leaders of a church, the New Englanders obtained a harmony between the ideal and the practical in life and religion, and a unity of religious and moral education.

Mathers. Henry Ware (Second Church, Boston, p. 17) thus distinguishes Cotton Mather from his father: "As a preacher he differed much from his father; having less strength and more rhapsody, less dignity and more declamation."

¹⁹ See *Good News from New England, 1648*, for a list of salaries. And Second Church, Boston, records for salaries of ministers. A New England salary was based upon need (size of family, age of minister, etc.) and not upon ability.

²⁰ See Dury's letter (in Samuel Mather's *Apology*, appendix, part i, number 8); Charlestown church records, p. 12; Thomas Lechford, *Plain Dealing*, pp. 89 ff.; John Winthrop, *History of New England*, vol. i, p. 217 (182); Cudworth's letter (in *New England Historical and Genealogical Register*, vol. xiv, pp. 101 ff.); Robert Keayne, notes on a council at Weymouth (in Stiles Collection).

Let us next consider the prevalence and evolution of the institution. If we consider the churches of the first generation, in 1630, Salem, Plymouth, Dorchester, Roxbury, and Boston-Watertown²¹ had pastors and teachers. In 1635, in addition to these four, Charlestown, Ipswich,²² and Newbury had the two officers. By 1640, in addition to these, the officers had been elected at Braintree, Hingham, Lynn, Hampton, Hartford, Windsor, Wethersfield, Milford, Barnstable, Taunton (or Cohasset), and Dorchester.²³ In 1650, after the institution had been discontinued in some churches because of the exodus to England, the two offices existed at Braintree, Salem, Boston (First Church), Dorchester, Charlestown, Ipswich, Hartford, Lynn, Newbury, and Roxbury.²⁴ Moreover, Andover-Haverhill, New Haven, Guilford, and Rowley had established the offices in the mean time. In other words, only four churches (besides Boston-Watertown) had the two officers in 1630, and only eight in 1635; by 1640 the number had increased to twenty;²⁵ by 1650 it had receded to

²¹ Boston-Watertown was probably a colony church, with Wilson as teacher and Phillips as pastor, because (1) neither possessed more than one minister; (2) Winthrop invariably calls Phillips pastor and Wilson teacher; (3) the colony raised the salaries of both; and (4) both preached at Charlestown for the first two years, at least part of the time (Roger Clap, *Memoirs*, p. 22). However, it may be said that polity was still indefinite.

²² Bracy preceded Norton for one year. J. B. Felt, *Ipswich*, pp. 218, 222.

²³ If Burr was not the pastor in 1640, he was about to be called and was serving in that capacity. John Winthrop, *History of New England*, vol. ii, pp. 26-27 (22); Edward Johnson, *Wonder Working Providence*, p. 74; Dedham church records, p. 12; Dorchester church records, p. 250 [255]. Mather also had assistants from 1636-1649. Dorchester church records, pp. 7 [9], 8 [10]; 250th Anniversary Proceedings at First Church, Dorchester, p. 104; and C. F. Adams, *Quincy*, p. 15. Plymouth was in search of a pastor to help its teacher from 1636 to 1644. William Bradford, *History of the Plimoth Plantation*, published by the State of Massachusetts, 1898, pp. 456 f.; John Cotton, *Plymouth*, p. 118; for Salem, see J. B. Felt, *Annals of Salem*, vol. ii, p. 626, and *New England Historical and Genealogical Register*, vol. xxxvi, pp. 38 f.; vol. xxxix, p. 374; John Winthrop, *History of New England*, vol. ii, pp. 27, 31; Eliot's list; Stiles's list; *Good News from New England*, 1648.

²⁴ Salem apparently regarded Peters as its pastor, although he was in England. Roxbury, abandoning all hope of the return of Welde, had elected a colleague for Eliot in 1650.

²⁵ Cambridge (with Harvard College to supply the function of teacher), Hampton (rather uncertain), and the Indian churches (with both officers) are omitted. Similarly, nothing is said of churches with a single minister whom they called a teacher.

fourteen. In the year 1660, when practically all the leaders of the first generation were dead, the two offices continued at all of the churches that had possessed them in 1650, except Lynn and Guilford, the Second Church of Boston being in search of a teacher. By 1675, the two offices still existed in the three churches of Boston,²⁶ at Salem,²⁷ Ipswich, Roxbury,²⁸ Rowley, Charlestown, and Newbury.²⁹ Thus thirteen churches had the two offices in 1660, and nine in 1675. By 1690, only the First and Second Churches of Boston, and the churches of Salem, Ipswich, Roxbury,³⁰ and Rowley (six in all) possessed the offices;³¹ and by 1715 only Salem and the Second Church of Boston remain on the list.

The teachership died out at Boston, in the First Church, with Allen in 1710;³² in the Second Church, with Increase Mather in 1723; and in the Third Church, with Willard in 1707.³³ At Salem it ended with the death of Noyes in 1717;³⁴ at Dorchester, with the death of Richard Mather in 1669; at Charlestown, with the death of Shepard in 1677;³⁵ at Ipswich, with the death of Hubbard in 1704;³⁶ at Lynn, with the departure of Cobbett in

²⁶ The First Church records invariably call Allen teacher. The search of the Third Church was rewarded by the call of Willard in 1676.

²⁷ Nicholet was supplying as teacher and was desired permanently.

²⁸ John Eliot, Jr., was supply pastor from 1674 to 1688. Roxbury church records, pp. 132, 142.

²⁹ Both Rowley and Charlestown were having supplies for the assistance of their single minister, Charlestown calling Browne in 1678 and Rowley calling Payson in 1682. Richardson at Newbury (1673-1696) was called a teacher. Joshua Coffin, Newbury, pp. 68, 69, 73, 158, etc.; note also the epitaph on his tombstone.

³⁰ Eliot died in 1690, leaving Walter as the single minister, the "teaching pastor," as the venerable Eliot ordained him, in 1688.

³¹ And in these churches the distinction between the two had practically disappeared.

³² The church records and Allen himself invariably call him teacher.

³³ See titles of his books in H. A. Hill, *Old South Church*, in bibliography appended to vol. ii; Samuel Sewall, *Journal*, for date.

³⁴ See C. W. Upham, *Salem*, p. 485; C. S. Osgood and H. M. Batchelder, *Salem*, pp. 82 ff.; D. A. White, *New England Congregationalism*, as illustrated by Records of the First Church in Salem, pp. 293 f.

³⁵ See church records, p. 12; W. I. Budington, *First Church, Charlestown*, pp. 44, 65, 79, 83; Roxbury church records, p. 198.

³⁶ See J. B. Felt, *Ipswich*, pp. 233 f.

1655; at Newbury, with the death of Richardson in 1696;³⁷ at Roxbury, with Eliot in 1690; at Rowley, with Payson in 1732;³⁸ at Hartford, with Stone in 1663; at New Haven, with Street in 1674; at Braintree, with Flint in 1668;³⁹ and in the smaller churches at some date anterior to 1660.

There were, however, colleague-pastors at the First Church of Boston until 1789; at the Second Church until 1751 (with an attempt to secure one even after that date); at the Third Church, until 1769; at Charlestown, until 1774; at Ipswich, until 1756; and at Hartford until 1666. Andover had colleagues from 1682 to 1697, and Roxbury from 1718 to 1725. Several churches had colleague-pastors, but never had both a pastor and a teacher. This was the unique arrangement at Watertown from 1639 to 1649, and also from 1687 to 1692; Brattle Street, Boston, from 1716 to 1747; the New Brick, Boston, from 1738 to 1753; and the New North, Boston, from the time of its organization.⁴⁰ Furthermore, the churches frequently had assistants for the ministers, especially if the pastor or teacher were in poor health, or overworked, or if the church were temporarily without one or the other minister.

Looking at these facts from another angle, the churches that had both a pastor and a teacher at the time of their foundation were Braintree,⁴¹ Concord, Dorchester, Newbury, Roxbury,⁴² Salem, Taunton, Hampton, Dover, Hartford, Windsor,⁴³ Guilford, Milford,⁴⁴ and Wethersfield.⁴⁵ These churches were organ-

³⁷ See note 29 above.

³⁸ Payson was sole minister of the church from 1696 to 1729, when he was given an assistant.

³⁹ See George Whitney, *Early History of Quincy*, pp. 32 ff.; F. A. Whitney, *First Church of Quincy*, p. 40; D. M. Wilson, *Commemorative Services of the Two Hundred and Fifty Years of Braintree*, pp. 35-37; *Good News from New England*, 1648.

⁴⁰ Chandler Robbins, *Second Church, Boston*, p. 170. The church desired to conform to the custom of the time and have two ministers.

⁴¹ Teacher Flint was not ordained at once, because of his defence of Wheelwright and refusal to erase his signature from a petition.

⁴² Eliot was ordained within five months of Welde.

⁴³ This is the Dorchester-Windsor church.

⁴⁴ The church wished to call Sherman as teacher, and he supplied in that capacity, but declined a call.

⁴⁵ There were two ministers from 1636 to 1639, probably known by the current terms. *Connecticut Ecclesiastical Contributions*, p. 506.

ized between 1629 and 1648. In only six of them did the institution of pastor and teacher continue longer than seven years, namely at Braintree, Dorchester, Newbury, Roxbury, Salem, and Hartford. And only Salem, Roxbury, and Newbury continued the offices beyond 1670. The churches that instituted the two offices within five years of their organization were the First Church, Boston, Charlestown, Hingham, Ipswich, Lynn, and New Haven. Plymouth and the Third Church, Boston, established the offices within ten years of their organization, in 1630 and 1676 respectively,⁴⁶ while the Second Church, Boston, and Rowley elected the officers within twelve years of their organization, in 1664 and 1650 respectively.⁴⁷

Thus it is evident that the institution of pastor and teacher was the general practice of the New England churches about 1640. A church without the two officers could not regard itself as a fully organized church, so that the smallest churches, and even the Indian churches, tried to institute the two offices. This attitude of the incomplete churches "perishing without vision" induced Welde to say that all the churches of New England had both a pastor and a teacher. However, although the pamphlet warfare which crystallized into the Westminster Confession in England and the Cambridge Platform in New England put a quietus upon all discussion against the Scriptural necessity of a pastor and teacher in a local congregation, and although the Cambridge Platform reigned triumphant for almost a hundred years (and has never been formally superseded), yet ultimately the institution ended in the modern system of a single minister. In the larger churches the intermediate stage was that of colleague-pastors, in the smaller, the combination of the two functions in one minister, called "pastor and teacher." The call to a Congregational church is still given in this form. The educational ideal of the ministry in the Congregational churches makes the minister a teaching pastor.

The institution of pastor and teacher fell gradually into disuse,

⁴⁶ The Old South had tried to secure a teacher for seven years.

⁴⁷ The authorities of the colony objected to the call of ruling elder Powell as teacher in 1655, because he was "illiterate, as to his academicall education" (church records, vol. iii, p. 3, and Henry Ware, Second Church, Boston, p. 6).

and with the American Revolution disappeared completely. The reasons for its disappearance are various. Some of them are simple and evident; others are complex and subsidiary. They may be grouped as follows: the increasing opposition to the theory as unscriptural;⁴⁸ the lack of clear Scriptural differentiation of the offices and the theoretical character of the distinction that was made;⁴⁹ the confusion of the two offices, with the elimination of many traditional distinctions;⁵⁰ the difficulty of securing suitable men, especially teachers;⁵¹ church quarrels engendered by the institution;⁵² migrations from the older to the newer settlements, and the returning emigration to England during the Commonwealth;⁵³ inadequate support of the ministers;⁵⁴ the rise of public schools and of Harvard College, all of these being religious schools;⁵⁵ the crystallization of theological beliefs, and the religious, social, and political turmoil during the period of the later Stuarts and early Georges with its tendency to divert public attention to other subjects.

For the origin of the institution, search must be made beyond the solid rock of Scripture on which the Puritans based it, and even beyond the copious and interesting notes with which the Geneva

⁴⁸ See New Haven Colony records, pp. 253-255, for an amusing trial over the question of the Scriptural authority for pastor and teacher.

⁴⁹ See John Cotton on Canticles, and Peter Thacher on Canticles (in H. A. Hill, *Old South Church*, vol. i, p. 180, note; *Cambridge Platform*, 6 : 5; John Cotton, *Way of the Churches in New England*, pp. 13, 14, 44, 54, *Questions and Answers on Church Government and Church Covenant* (probably by Richard Mather), pp. 22-26, *Treatise*, pp. 3 f.; Thomas Hooker, *Survey of Church Discipline*, vol. ii, chap. 1, sect. 19-20; Richard Mather, *Model of Church Government*, p. 23; Thomas Welde, *Brief Narration*, p. 3; Ralph Partridge, *On Church Government*, p. 23; Samuel Stone, *Whole Body of Divinity*, p. 325; etc.

⁵⁰ Plymouth and Salem are typical cases.

⁵¹ The history of every church presents instances of this.

⁵² Due to insufficient salaries, incompatibility of temperament, lack of cooperation of ministers, and theological and political differences.

⁵³ Lynn, Taunton, and the Connecticut churches are typical cases.

⁵⁴ This is a much overrated consideration. Behind most of the instances cited in proof of it there were other causes, such as theological differences, bickerings in church and state, vagueness of ideas, and unsettled conditions. This position is elaborately defended in a book by the present writer soon to appear.

⁵⁵ See *Cambridge Platform*, 6 : 6; *Colonial laws of Massachusetts for 1644 and 1647*; *Colonial laws of Plymouth for 1643 and 1671*; *Colonial laws of Connecticut for 1656 and 1660*; H. T. Blake, *New Haven Green*, p. 184.

Bible was furnished. The seeker comes directly upon Theodore Beza, who undoubtedly was influenced by Calvin (although he never quotes Calvin). It was from Erasmus and the church fathers, especially Ambrose and Gregory Nazianzen, that Beza seems to have drawn most of his ideas. However, the idea that every local congregation should possess both a pastor and a teacher was unquestionably derived from the conception of the church as a local congregation, independent of all outside authority—the early theory of Luther, and especially of Zwingli, Calvin, and the Anabaptists, who derived it from the various democratic agitators beginning with Marsiglio of Padua.⁶⁶

The institution of pastor and teacher was a praiseworthy effort, intended to produce an enlightened church-membership and to foster an intelligent religion. It was a wise recognition of the principle that religion ought to educate and that education ought to make religious. Otherwise religion becomes stagnant and education breeds anarchy. The institution has died, but it was an important element in the growth of a greater institution—the public school system of our day. Thus the vision of the Puritans, embodied in the dream of Pastor John Wilson before he crossed the ocean, has been largely realized. He dreamed that he was in America, and saw a church rise out of the ground, that “grew and became a marvellous goodly church.”⁶⁷

In one particular, however, modern civilization has erred flagrantly from the Puritan ideal: it has separated education and religion. The American Revolution and the contemporary era of French scepticism preached liberty of conscience and the separation of education and religion, as well as the separation of the church and the state. The nineteenth century, rejecting the wisdom of the centuries, that religion is essential to the building of character, undertook in practice to separate education and religion. The unwisdom of the separation is gradually becoming evident, and sunday-schools have spread over the country in order to meet the deficiency in our public schools. The need of moral instruction in our school system is widely

⁶⁶ These conclusions are based on a careful comparison of the Puritan ideas with the writings of the Reformation period.

⁶⁷ See John Winthrop, *History of New England*, vol. i, p. 97 (81).

felt. But we must have religious training in order to make moral instruction effective. Denominationalism must yield to co-operation and to emphasis upon the essentials in religion, common to all denominations. We must have religious instruction in our public schools, and religion and education must again join hands to train up our youth in character and fit them to be citizens. If religion can pervade our public schools and education be included in the work of our churches, the Puritan ideal of life, with its Teacher of God's truth and its Pastor of souls, will be realized among us.

BOOKS RECEIVED

ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS. *Edited by James Hastings.* Vol. III. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1911. \$7.

MAN'S TOMORROW. *By William W. Kinsley.* pp. 6+190. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. 1911. \$1.20 net.

THE DILEMMA OF THE MODERN CHRISTIAN. HOW MUCH CAN HE ACCEPT OF TRADITIONAL CHRISTIANITY? *By Edward H. Eppens.* pp. 6+181. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. 1911. \$1.20 net.

THE GLEAM. *By Helen R. Albee.* pp. 8+312. New York: Henry Holt & Company. 1911.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE BOOK OF ISAIAH IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY. *By Robert H. Kennett.* (The Schweich Lectures, 1909.) pp. 8+94. London: Oxford University Press. For the British Academy. 1910. 3 shillings net.

A VALID RELIGION FOR THE TIMES. A STUDY OF THE CENTRAL TRUTHS OF SPIRITUAL RELIGION. *By Parley P. Womer.* With a foreword by Washington Gladden. pp. 12+180. New York: Broadway Publishing Company. 1910.

BIBLICAL GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY. *By Charles Foster Kent.* pp. 18+296. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1911. \$1.50 net.

KEY-NOTES OF OPTIMISM. *By Calvin Weiss Laufer.* pp. 10+152. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. 1911. \$1 net.

THE FUTURE CITIZEN. *By F. A. Myers.* pp. 12+189. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. 1911. \$1.20 net.

THE BEGINNING OF THINGS IN NATURE AND IN GRACE, OR A BRIEF COMMENTARY ON GENESIS. *By Joseph K. Wight.* pp. 6+188. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. 1911. \$1.20 net.

LE NOUVEAU TESTAMENT DANS L'ÉGLISE CHRÉTIENNE. *Par E. Jacquier.* Tome I. Paris: Librairie Victor Lecoffre. 1911. 3 francs, 50.

ASPECTS OF ISLAM. *By Duncan Black Macdonald.* pp. 14+375. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1911. \$1.50 net.

MESSAGES OF TRUTH IN RHYME AND STORY. *By Thomas à Kempis Reilly.* pp. 10+127. Philadelphia: John Joseph McVey. 1911. Cloth 50 cents, paper 25 cents.

PSYCHIC PHENOMENA, SCIENCE AND IMMORTALITY, BEING A FURTHER EXCURSION INTO UNSEEN REALMS BEYOND THE POINT PREVIOUSLY EXPLORED IN "MODERN LIGHT ON IMMORTALITY" AND A SEQUEL TO THAT PREVIOUS RECORD. *By Henry Frank.* pp. 556. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. 1911. \$2.25 net.

THE UNCAUSED BEING AND THE CRITERION OF TRUTH, TO WHICH IS APPENDED AN EXAMINATION OF THE VIEWS OF SIR OLIVER LODGE CONCERNING THE ETHER OF SPACE. *By E. Z. Derr.* pp. 8+110. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. 1911. \$1 net.

LIFE IN THE MAKING. AN APPROACH TO RELIGION THROUGH THE METHOD OF MODERN PRAGMATISM. *By Loren B. Macdonald.* pp. 4+223. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. 1911. \$1.20 net.

A CHINESE APPEAL TO CHRISTENDOM CONCERNING CHRISTIAN MISSIONS. *By Lin Shao-Yang.* pp. 6+321. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1911. \$1.50.

JOSÈPHE TÉMOIN DE JÉSUS. *Par Augustin Goethals.* (Mélanges d'Histoire du Christianisme, Pt. 1.) pp. 29. Bruxelles: Société Belge d'Édition; Paris: Librairie Fischbacher. 1909.

JEAN PRÉCURSEUR DE JÉSUS. *Par Augustin Goethals.* (Mélanges d'Histoire du Christianisme, Pt. 2.) pp. 61. Bruxelles: Société Belge d'Édition; Paris: Librairie Fischbacher. 1911.

FÜNFTER WELTKONGRESS FÜR FREIES CHRISTENTUM UND RELIGIÖSEN FORTSCHRITT, BERLIN, 5. BIS 10. AUGUST, 1910. PROTOKOLL DER VERHANDLUNGEN. Bd. II. *Herausgegeben von Max Fischer und Friedrich Michael Schiele.* Berlin-Schöneberg: Verlag des Protestantischen Schriftenvertriebs. 1911. 7 marks, 50 pfennigs, for both volumes.

FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF FREE CHRISTIANITY AND RELIGIOUS PROGRESS, BERLIN, AUGUST 5-10, 1910. PROCEEDINGS AND PAPERS. *Edited by Charles W. Wendte, with the assistance of V. D. Davis.* pp. 12+677. Berlin-Schöneberg: Protestantischer Schriftenvertrieb. 1911.

FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS FOR FREE CHRISTIANITY AND RELIGIOUS PROGRESS, BERLIN, 1910. REPRINTED ADDRESSES.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PROTESTANT CHURCHES IN GERMANY. *By Erich Foerster, Frankfurt a. M.* pp. 13.

GERMAN PHILOSOPHY AND THE RELIGIOUS REFORM-MOVEMENT OF TO-DAY. *By Rudolf Eucken, Jena.* pp. 10.

THE HISTORY OF RELIGION AND OLD TESTAMENT CRITICISM. *By Hermann Gunkel, Giessen.* pp. 14.

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A FREE CHRISTIANITY. *By D. E. Troeltsch, Heidelberg. Translated by G. E. Maberly Oppler, Berlin.* pp. 19.

THE PLACE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION IN ETHICS. *By Arthur Titius, Göttingen.* pp. 26.

HAS JESUS LIVED? A REPLY RESTING UPON HISTORICAL AND DOCUMENTAL TESTIMONY. *By Herrmann von Soden, Berlin. Translated by Margaret L. Clarke.* pp. 38. Berlin-Schöneberg: Protestantischer Schriftenvertrieb. 1911. 9 pence net.

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME IV.

OCTOBER, 1911.

NUMBER 4

EMERSON FROM AN INDIAN POINT OF VIEW

HERAMBACHANDRA MAITRA

CALCUTTA

Of the eminent writers who are the exponents of the spiritual movement of the nineteenth century, those whose influence is most widely acknowledged—Wordsworth, Shelley, Carlyle, Emerson—have two notable characteristics: first, they either give a very subordinate place to dogma or reject it altogether; secondly, they lay great stress on truths which from remote antiquity have most deeply impressed the Oriental mind and have been uttered with the greatest power in the East. The influence of Wordsworth as a spiritual teacher will ever be felt, in spite of the “Ecclesiastical Sonnets,” to lie, not in his championship of orthodox Christianity, but in his awakening men to a sense of the Infinite revealed in the finite and to a consciousness of the immanence of the divine Spirit in the outer and the inner world. These are the truths which inspire some of Shelley’s noblest lines. They find utterance in Carlyle’s wisest words. And they occupy the foremost place in Emerson’s message to an unspiritual world. Hence the power with which Wordsworth and Emerson appeal to the Oriental mind. They translate into the language of modern culture what was uttered by the sages of ancient India in the loftiest strains. They breathe a new life into our old faith, and they assure its stability and progress by incorporating with it precious truths revealed or brought into prominence by the wider intellectual and ethical outlook of the modern spirit. Before I dwell at any length on the spiritual affinity between the teachings of the East and the mind of Emerson, it will be convenient to consider some of his intellectual traits, which give us a key to the right interpretation of his faith.

The success of a teacher in spreading his thoughts and principles depends more upon their inherent worth, the earnestness with which they are presented, the feelings and imaginative associations they awaken, than upon the logical force of the propositions in which they are embodied. It is not those who are ready to support every statement by arguments, but those who appeal to the heart and imagination, that exercise the widest influence. Emerson belongs to this latter class. As an exponent of certain great ideas, he relies more upon the value of the ideas themselves than upon arguments. He seldom resorts to careful reasoning. This is partly due to the nature of the truths he teaches, which are almost unprovable and can only be apprehended by moral or spiritual experience. But it is also the result of the disposition of his mind. "I do not know," he says, "what arguments mean in reference to any expression of a thought. I delight in believing what I think, but if you ask how I dare say so, or why it is so, I am the most helpless of mortal men." He values insight more than clever reasoning. "It was a grand sentence of Emanuel Swedenborg," he says, "which would alone indicate the greatness of that man's perceptions: 'It is no proof of a man's understanding to be able to confirm whatever he pleases; but to be able to discern that what is true is true, and that what is false is false, this is the mark and character of intelligence.'" Himself gifted with extraordinary spiritual insight, this is the gift he most admires in others. After he had met Carlyle for the first time, he remarked that he had known many men of humbler intellectual powers who had a clearer spiritual vision than he. He says characteristically, "We know truth when we see it, from opinion, as we know when we are awake that we are awake." His bold counsel to the man who believes without being able to give a reason for it, is, "Trust the instinct to the end though you can render no reason." "Why should I give up my thought," he says, "because I cannot answer an objection to it?" "With consistency," according to him, "a great soul has nothing to do." "To great results of thought and morals," he tells Carlyle, "the steps are not many, and it is not the masters who spin the ostentatious continuity." Living in an age when an argument is demanded for everything, and when logical acuteness is considered

the great mark of superior intelligence, Emerson not only prefers insight to the power to demonstrate, spiritual perception to flawless reasoning, but he boldly defends this preference. With him, as with every great spiritual teacher, the divine intuitions of the soul are "the fountain light of all our day."

While his utterances are deeply religious, his aversion to formal or logical statements keeps them free from the slightest tinge of dogmatism. He shows the most marked aversion to theological disquisitions, and has no sympathy with those who are perplexed by theological difficulties, which he thinks never presented a practical difficulty to any man,—“never darkened across any man’s road, who did not go out of his way to seek them.” Puzzling questions like original sin, the origin of evil, or predestination he regards as the “mumps and measles and whooping-coughs” of the soul. “A simple mind,” he declares, “will not know these enemies.”

Another remarkable trait of Emerson’s mind is its irresistible, ever-present tendency to see things in their entirety, to view everything in relation to the whole of which it is a part, in relation to the cause of which it is the effect, in relation to the idea of which it is the expression. Whatever is suggestive of large relationships has an attraction for him. Astrology interested him as it “tied man” to the universe. “Instead of an isolated beggar, the farthest star felt him, and he felt the star.” A circle made by a pebble in a pond sets him thinking of the paths of the planets. The long intervals between the letters he receives from a friend would make him impatient, “but that they savor always of eternity,” he says, and promise him a friendship not reckoned by years. He begins his essay on “Circles” characteristically: “The eye is the first circle, the horizon which it forms is the second, and throughout nature this primary figure is repeated without end.” In this he sees a hint, an outward symbol, of the nature of God, described by St. Augustine as a circle whose centre is everywhere and circumference nowhere. And thus the least of things leads him up to the thought of the Infinite, the Eternal,—for the light of this great Idea so lights the chambers of his soul that it is reflected back by everything he receives into his mind. His topics range from the Over-soul to farming; but whatever his theme

he "hitches his wagon to a star," to use a favorite phrase of his, and illuminates the homeliest subject by pouring a flood of spiritual light upon it.

The material, the visible, has no finality to Emerson. Its purpose is only to suggest the invisible, the spiritual. The humblest concerns of life are interpreted by him in the light of spiritual truths. The merchant's economy is to him "a coarse symbol of the soul's economy. It is to spend for power and not for pleasure. It is to invest income; that is to say, to take up particulars into generals; days into integral eras,—literary, emotive, practical,—of its life, and still to ascend in its investment." The forms, speech, and manners of men and women who attract him have to him "a largeness of suggestion," and they "carry a certain grandeur like time and justice." Everything has a symbolic or suggestive character to him. Around every circle another can be drawn; this suggests to him "the moral fact of the Unattainable, the flying Perfect, around which the hands of man can never meet." He views the present in the light of the future, the best experiences of our earthly life being to him a foretaste and an assurance of the blessed experiences that are to be ours hereafter. Milton, he says, anticipated the leading thought of Swedenborg when he wrote:

"What if earth
Be but the shadow of heaven, and things therein,
Each to the other like, more than on earth is thought?"

This idea pervades his own thoughts, and hence the sympathy with which he interprets the genius of Swedenborg. To him the spiritual world alone is real; of that original the outer world is a copy; of that cause it is the effect; of that supreme reality it is a hint. He objects, however, to Swedenborg's method of fastening each natural object to a particular theological idea; for, he says, "each individual symbol plays innumerable parts," and "in the transmission of the heavenly waters, every hose fits every hydrant." The high value which Emerson attaches to the spiritual interpretation of the outward world is strikingly shown by his verdict on Shakspere, who, he regrets, rested in the beauty of outward things, without seeking to ascend higher and unfold their spiritual meaning. It needed courage to speak thus of Shak-

spere. But he forgets that the cunning of the dramatist's genius would have failed him here. To Emerson such an interpretation of things seems easy, for it is a leaven that leaveneth all his thoughts. A pervading sense of the Infinite and faith in Mind as the supreme reality are among the most marked characteristics which Emerson and Carlyle have in common. Music leads the mind of the one to the edge of the Infinite. A beautiful face is to the other a key to the hidden meaning of the universe. The steamship is the Scottish brass-smith's Idea sailing round the world, says one. The true ship is the ship-builder, says the other. They dissolve all things into thought, reduce all things to their primal origin—the Mind. Chemistry, vegetation, metals, and animals are to them words of God.

This living faith in the Infinite, this insistent sense of the reality of the Unseen, makes Emerson a mystic in the noblest sense of the word. "By mysticism we mean," says Jowett, "not the extravagance of an erring fancy, but the concentration of reason in feeling, the enthusiastic love of the Good, the True, the One, the sense of the infinity of knowledge, and of the marvel of the human faculties." Something needs to be added to this. He is the mystic to whom the invisible is more real than the visible, who is haunted and waylaid by the thought of the Unseen, who yearns for the Infinite with a passionate yearning. It is mysticism to see more than most men into the depths of life, into the hidden things of the universe. "Men live," says Emerson, "on the brink of mysteries and harmonies into which they never enter, and with their hand on the door-latch they die outside." The writer of these words did not die outside. He had plunged into the harmonies. Hence was it that mysticism had such a charm for him. He thinks the greatest attraction which London has for the imagination is that "in such a vast variety of people and conditions we can believe there is room for persons of romantic character to exist, and that the poet, the mystic, the hero, may hope to confront their counterparts." He regrets that the Swedenborgians in general "receive the fable instead of the moral of their *Æsop*"; still he finds them deeply interesting, and thinks they must "contribute more than all other sects to the new faith which must arise out of all."

That the best elements of mysticism may exist in absolute independence of the extravagance of an erring fancy is shown strikingly by the clearness of Emerson's intellect, by its sustained equipoise, its undisturbed faith in the reign of law, its sympathy with culture and with all that is essentially good in civilization. He says that the laws of nature play through trade as a toy battery exhibits the effects of electricity. The great lesson that natural science teaches us is the universality of law and "the continuation of the inflexible law of matter into the subtle kingdom of will, and of thought." The fact that the earth "never loses its way in its wild path through space" teaches us that a secrete gravitation, a secrete projection, rule not less tyrannically in human history. It is short-sightedness to limit our faith in laws to those of the physical world, for laws "do not stop where our eyes lose them." He unfolds the great thought which Wordsworth expresses so beautifully in his "Ode to Duty,"

"Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong;

And the most ancient heavens, through Thee, are fresh and strong,"

the thought that all law is one, that the law of gravitation is but the law of duty translated into the language of atoms. He does not believe in luck, he does not believe in chance. Success, he holds, can only be attained by "close application to the laws of the world, and since those laws are intellectual and moral, by intellectual and moral obedience." The value of political economy is in this, that it teaches us "the ascendancy of laws over all private and hostile influences." There is no element of caprice in the divine government of the universe. If he is a mystic, he is a clear-sighted one; nay, his mysticism lies in this, that he is able to see into the soul of things with an unclouded vision. Unswerving as is his faith in law, it only strengthens his faith in the goodness of God, it fills him with hope instead of depressing him. "Will not man one day," he asks, "open his eyes and see how dear he is to the soul of Nature,—how near it is to him? Will he not see through all he miscalls accident, that law prevails for ever and ever?" "When he perceives the law, he ceases to despond. Whilst he sees it, every thought and act is raised, and becomes an act of religion."

As Emerson's mysticism springs from keenness of vision, from a power to pierce through the mask of nature to the inner meaning of the universe, so is his religion, in its loftiest ascent, the noble product of a keen sense of beauty, which, like Wordsworth, Carlyle, Shelley, he possesses in a remarkable degree. What a noble tribute does Wordsworth pay to loveliness in his "Lines on a Highland Girl"! In *Sartor Resartus*, how does the bosom of Teufelsdröckh heave and swell under the power of Blumine; and Carlyle's impassioned homage to the beauty of the Princess de Lamballe is one of the most glowing pages in his *History of the French Revolution*. A divine discontent with all earthly beauty inspires Shelley's lines headed "The Question." Emerson calls a beautiful woman a practical poet who tames her savage mate, and plants tenderness, hope, and eloquence in all whom she approaches. He regards the refining influence of graceful and cultivated women as one of those elements of civilized life which contribute in a notable degree to the moral progress of the race. There is no monkish austerity in this saint. Beauty sends a thrill through his bosom which he is not ashamed to express. His "Ode to Beauty" could only have been written by one whose heart was pierced by the shaft of beauty. But he stands on a higher plane than Wordsworth, Shelley, and Carlyle in this, that with him the love of beauty is transformed into a spiritual passion, not occasionally, but as a constant affection of the pure mind. The love of beauty, aided by the moral sentiment, enables him to realize vividly the loveliness of virtue. The contemplation of a masterpiece of art, he says, produces a state of mind which may be called religious. In Greek architecture he sees an image of the beauty of temperance. And in him the sense of beauty attains a still higher elevation, reaching the loftiest form to which it can ascend. By union with the sense of the Infinite, it is exalted into a longing for the beauty of God, as a dew-drop touched by sunshine becomes a proclaimer of the glory of the sun. To Emerson all finite beauty is a promise and a hint of the uncontained beauty of the Supreme Being. Lovely forms, he says, do not point to "any relations of friendship or love known and described in society," but "to relations of transcendent delicacy and sweetness," to what "roses and violets hint

, and foreshow." Then is personal beauty truly charming when it "suggests gleams and visions, and not earthly satisfactions." These sentences read like an exposition of Shelley's "Hymn to Intellectual Beauty." The influence of Plato on both Shelley and Emerson is marked. Plato in the *Symposium* leads the mind step by step up to the thought of the Infinite Beauty. Shelley breaks forth into a strain of impassioned utterance. Emerson presents that great idea to our minds in suggestions and affirmations which show that he lives and moves in the divine atmosphere of that thought. He does not approach Shelley in the power of poetic expression. But to him belongs the far higher gift of a steady faith in the Divine Beauty that rules his entire being.

In some of the intellectual characteristics we have noticed, in Emerson's pervading sense of the Infinite, in his tendency to see things in their entirety, in his faith in the reality of the Unseen, we have the source of the fascination which the religious thought of the East has for him. The appreciative references to it which fill his pages show the breadth of his mind, his keen eye for truth in whatever garb it may be presented, and his power to draw inspiration from all sources. He concludes his inspiring essay on "Immortality" with a fable from the *Katha-Upanishad*. In naming his productions he has in two instances borrowed words from the East,—the poem "Brahma," and the essay on "The Over-soul," in which he perhaps reaches the climax of his power both as a writer and as a spiritual teacher. "Over-soul" is really the translation of a Sanskrit word, and the English language is indebted to Emerson for having enriched its vocabulary with a word of deep spiritual meaning. In this choice of names we have an indication of the reason of the attraction which ancient Hindu thought has for him. The thought of the One in the many, the thought of the Infinite revealed in the finite, which broods over his mind like

"a master o'er a slave,
A presence which is not to be put by,"

is expressed with greater power and beauty in the sacred books of ancient India than anywhere else. "In all nations," says

Emerson, "there are minds which incline to dwell in the conception of the fundamental Unity. The raptures of prayer and ecstasy of devotion lose all Being in one Being. This tendency finds its highest expression in the religious writings of the East, and chiefly in the Indian Scriptures, in the Vedas, the Bhagavad Gita, and the Vishnu Purana. These writings contain little else than this idea, and they rise to pure and sublime strains in celebrating it." Of his poem "Brahma," which is the expansion of a line of the *Katha-Upanishad* reproduced in the *Bhagavad Gita*, Professor Lanman says: "The doctrine of the absolute unity finds perhaps its most striking expression in Sanskrit in the *Katha-Upanishad*; but nowhere, neither in Sanskrit nor in English, has it been presented with more vigor, truthfulness, and beauty of form than by Emerson in his famous lines paraphrasing the Sanskrit passage."

The thought of a Unity underlying all variety colors all his ideas. Speaking of works of art, he says, "What astonished and fascinated me in the first work astonished me in the second work also: that excellence of all things is one." The ultimate fact which we reach on every topic is, he says, "the resolution of all into the ever-blessed One." His language occasionally shows that tendency to merge the many altogether in the One, which is the basis of pantheism, and which so strongly characterizes the religious literature of ancient India. "The act of seeing and the thing seen," he says, "the seer and the spectacle, the subject and the object are one. We see the world piece by piece as the sun, the moon, the animal, the tree; but the whole, of which these are the shining parts, is the soul." These sentences remind us of the following passage of the *Chhandogya-Upanishad*: "Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite. Where one sees something else, hears something else, understands something else, that is the finite. The Infinite is immortal, the finite is mortal."

In reading Emerson, we feel that at times the thought of the Infinite rushes on like a sweeping tide and carries everything before it. But in order to interpret such utterances rightly we must take them together with others which supplement and qualify them; and we must bear in mind that they are the

expressions of a flowing current of thought or spiritual emotion, not rigid statements of a creed or dogma. Beautiful expressions of intense religious emotion become prolific sources of error when the only key to their right interpretation—the glow of imagination or spiritual fervor which inspired them—is lost, and they are applied literally and stiffened into articles of faith. Hence the apotheosis of man and the doctrine of Incarnation. Hence too the pantheistic doctrine of the absolute unity of man and God. “The religions of the world,” says Emerson, “are the ejaculations of a few imaginative men.” No, they are far more. But the ejaculations play a very important part in them. And too often, while they are remembered, the feelings from which they sprang are lost. Men are thus led astray from the truth. The careful reader of Emerson can have little excuse for such misinterpretation of his teachings. If he sometimes seems to lose his balance, he soon recovers it. He keeps his thoughts in a perpetual flow, never allowing them to harden into a particular form; and he freely expresses every thought as it arises, without caring for consistency. With all his admiration for the mystic, he condemns him because he “nails a symbol to one sense” and “takes an accidental and individual symbol for an universal one.” “The universe is the externization of the soul,” he says. “The soul feels that the grass grows and the stone falls by a law inferior to and dependent upon its nature.” Again: “The world is the perennial miracle which the soul worketh.” But we recover our breath when we read: “The mind does not create what it perceives, any more than the eye creates the rose.” His most serious utterances on the relation of the human soul to God clearly assert the fundamental tenet of spiritual theism,—the union, not the unity, of the human soul and the Infinite Spirit: “Let man, then, learn the revelation of all nature and all thought to his heart; this namely, that the Highest dwells with him.” “The soul gives itself, alone, original, and pure, to the Lonely, Original, and Pure, who on that condition gladly inhabits, leads, and speaks through it.” Perhaps the most explicit statement in all Emerson’s writings on the nature of the relationship of the human soul to the Infinite Mind is the following: “Man begins to hear a voice that fills the heavens and the earth, saying that God is

within him. . . . I find this amazing revelation of my immediate relation to God, a solution of all the doubts that oppressed me. I recognize the distinction of the outer and the inner self; the double consciousness that within this erring, passionate, mortal self sits a supreme, calm, immortal mind, whose powers I do not know; but it is stronger than I; it is wiser than I; it never approved me in any wrong; I seek counsel of it in my doubts; I repair to it in my dangers; I pray to it in my undertakings. It seems to me the face which the Creator uncovers to his child." Here he beautifully unfolds a well-known thought of Hindu theology,—a thought allegorically expressed by the soul and the Over-soul being likened to two birds dwelling together on one tree.

Passages like the above clearly show that Emerson's denial of the personality of God means an affirmation of the divine infinitude, not a denial of consciousness or intelligence as an attribute of the Supreme Being. To him, as to many others, the idea of personality is associated with that of limitation. "We cannot say," he declares, "God is self-conscious or not self-conscious, for the moment we cast our eye on that dread nature, it soars infinitely out of all definition and dazzles all inquest." He understands personality to mean finiteness. Nay, he even associates that idea, as we see from a passage in his essay on "Immortality," with the lower impulses and selfish instincts of human nature. But the essential meaning of personality is mind, thought, consciousness; and this he affirms of the Supreme Being in the clearest manner. What can be meant by "seeking counsel" of an unconscious being in one's doubts? In his essay on "Self-reliance" he gives us this advice: "In your metaphysics you have denied personality to the Deity, yet when the devout motions of the soul come, yield to them heart and life, though they should clothe God with shape and color." And he yields heart and life to his own devout motions, which bring with them a clear revelation of the divine mind. Nay, with him faith in the Supreme Intelligence is an abiding conviction not affected by the tides of the inner life. "We lie," he says, "in the lap of immense intelligence, which makes us receivers of its truth and organs of its activity." He teaches us to seek intellectual inspiration from

the Infinite Mind. He hears the comforting voice of God when bowed by bereavement. There can, in fact, be no clearer affirmation of the sacred right of communion with the Supreme Mind which belongs to every human soul than we have in the teachings of Emerson. And it is in communion that he, like Plato and the seers of ancient India, has a revelation of the glorious truth of immortality. Every man, he says, parts from the contemplation of the universal and eternal beauty "with the feeling that it rather belongs to ages than to mortal life." This is the experience that inspires the utterance of the Hindu sage: "By knowing Him alone does one pass beyond death." "What," Emerson writes to Carlyle, "have we to do with old age? Our existence looks to me more than ever initial. We have come to see the ground and look up materials and tools." When sorrow casts a gloom around his path he hears the divine voice:

"Hearts are dust, hearts' loves remain;
Heart's love will meet thee again."

After Emerson's earthly career had come to an end, James Freeman Clarke began an address on his life with these words: "The saying of the liturgy is true and wise, that in the midst of life we are in death. But it is still more true that in the midst of death we are in life." An address on such a life could not have been more appropriately begun. What a wealth of faith belonged to him who could say with unquestionable sincerity, "We are all great, all rich, in God"!

In Emerson's capacious nature there is room for the expansion and alertness of the West, as well as the concentration and serenity of the East. While he has a pervading consciousness of the Infinite as the supreme reality, he also recognizes the reality of the individual soul. He has in a large measure the polarity which he attributes to Plato. "A man is a centre for nature," he says. "If there were any magnet that would point to the countries and houses where are the persons who are intrinsically rich and powerful, I would sell all and buy it, and put myself on the road to-day." He speaks most impressively of the value of human endeavor, of the need of using aright the opportunities of the passing hour, of the supreme importance of training the will. To the

seeker of spiritual enlightenment his advice is, "Work and live, work and live." "Sufficient unto the day are the duties thereof," he says. "A man is relieved and gay when he has put his heart into his work and done his best; but what he has said or done otherwise shall give him no peace." "Do your work and you shall reinforce yourself." These are precepts which we in the East should inscribe on the tablets of our hearts. His ideal is the absolute harmony of work and worship, attained through perfect obedience to the divine will. Speaking of self-reliance, he says, "Let us not rove; let us sit at home with the cause." On the first page of his essay on "Self-reliance," we have the following beautiful sentence: "A man should learn to detect and watch that gleam of light which flashes across his mind from within, more than the lustre of the firmament of bards and sages." This inwardness, this attitude of listening for the accents of the soul, is of the East. "You are," he says, "preparing with eagerness to go and render a service to which your talent and your taste invite you, the love of men and the hope of fame. Has it not occurred to you that you have no right to go, unless you are equally willing to be prevented from going?" This, like Milton's line,

"They also serve who only stand and wait,"

is the very essence of the noblest ethical teaching of the *Bhagavad Gita*. For whatever the practice of the East may have been, the precept "work is worship" could not be more impressively inculcated than it has been in the *Gita*. With these devout spirits duty is but a form of communion. It must be acknowledged, however, that at times Emerson yields to optimism of the Oriental type and underestimates the need of human effort. He tells Carlyle that the truth can very well spare him and have itself spoken by another without leaving it or him the worse. Speaking of reformers he says: "Many a reformer perishes in his removal of rubbish, and that makes the offensiveness of the class. . . . They expend all their energy on some accidental evil, and lose their sanity and power of benefit. It is of little moment that one or two, or twenty, errors of our social system be corrected, but of much that the man be in his senses." Such language is disheartening. A man may well be forgiven a little flurry when

his neighbor's house is on fire. But such an attitude on his part is due, in some measure at least, to the insincerity and vanity he sees in many of those who assail existing institutions. And some of the most notable acts of his life are impressive object-lessons on the duty of courageous and active resistance to wrong. How noble and inspiring is the remonstrance addressed by him to the President of the United States when the Cherokees were about to be expelled from the state of Georgia! And, when Lovejoy was killed by a pro-slavery mob, we are told by eye-witnesses that Emerson's reference to him in a lecture as one who had fallen a martyr for the rights of free speech made a cold shudder "run through the audience at the calm braving of the current opinion." Great events powerfully affect great minds. The French Revolution made Edmund Burke lose his balance. The conflict with slavery enabled Emerson to gain the balance which he sometimes lacked. Dr. Garnett says that what rescues Emerson's optimism from moral indifference of the Oriental type is the fact that "his writings are full of the loftiest lessons of renunciation." But renunciation could nowhere be more impressively inculcated or practised than it has been in the East. It is righteous indignation and insistence on the value of human effort that deliver Emerson from moral languor. His faith in the greatness of man's destiny, his lofty ideals, and his sincerity inspire him with a passion for moral and spiritual freedom which nothing can subdue. To his own ideal he clings with unswerving fidelity. When he "rests in perfect humility," when he "burns with pure love," Calvin or Swedenborg has nothing to teach him. He feels that before the immense possibilities of the human race and of every individual soul, the greatest men the world has known shrink into nothing. He laments that even a Jesus should be "confounded with virtue and the possible of man." This prophet has a stern independence, though he speaks in gentle accents and his bearing is meek. In this union of meekness and courage, of freedom and reverence, of an eager acceptance of the heritage of the past and a conviction that greater things belong to the future, of faith in an all-pervading Deity and a sense of the reality of human life and the responsibility of man, we have a most striking example of the harmonious union of the modern spirit with the noblest teachings of ancient times.

In India the influence of Emerson has been deeply felt by many of those who have received Western education. It would be well if his influence extended to larger numbers. But the loftier the aims of the teacher, the smaller the band of disciples; and many, it must be admitted, are repelled by the peculiarities of Emerson's style. At a time when Western ideas have such a fascination for us, we need the aid of such teachers in discriminating between what is wholesome and what is hurtful in them. He is one of those wise men who, while they have amply participated in the intellectual activity of their day, have resisted and rebuked its vices and follies, and who have contributed in a large measure to its noblest moral and spiritual tendencies. Amidst the perplexities created by the conflict of the past and the present, of the East and the West, he is a safe guide; and amidst the depressing influences of life he is an unfailing source of strength and inspiration.

The invaluable service that Emerson renders to us is that he recalls us from the vanities of life to its abiding realities. His power as a spiritual teacher lies mainly in the fact that every word he utters comes from his inmost heart, and he is himself loyal to the high ideal he sets before others. He awakened noble intellectual aspirations in others by his pen and voice; and he was himself gifted with a powerful intellect and a deeply thoughtful mind which were consecrated to study and high thinking. He said that love is the affirmative of affirmatives, and no man had a more tender heart than he. He was full of boundless hope for the future of the human race and of every individual soul. He was guided and inspired by unfaltering faith in the divine goodness and beauty; he was cheered by steady hope; and his was a love which, while it flowed freely forth on all sides, was in the intimate relationships of life tremulous with emotion tender as woman's.

Carlyle would often send across the Atlantic to his illustrious friend the brief but significant query, "Watchman, what sayest thou?" Next to seeking counsel of God, we cannot do better than turn to such a watchman, and ask him in all seriousness, "What sayest thou?"

*THE ETHICS OF JESUS AND THE MODERN MIND*¹

DANIEL EVANS

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Many times during the past half-century the question raised by Strauss, "Are we still Christian?" has been asked by other persons. The vast changes in thought which have taken place within this period have led to this. The difference between the ancient and modern thought-worlds are numerous, far-reaching, and now acutely felt. We live in a universe infinite in extent, eternal in duration, dynamic in all its elements, law-abiding in all its forces and areas, developing through an immanent process of evolution by resident forces, and moving on to a far-off divine event when the purposes of God will be realized in a perfected humanity.

Our fathers, on the other hand, lived in a world recent in the date of its origin, small in extent, and made by fiat; its laws statutes to be set aside at the pleasure of its maker; its nature deranged by the sin of man; the historic process degenerative; and its end catastrophic.

It is these differences in world-view which have made many persons ask the question, "Are we still Christian?" Have we not broken connection with the past, and even with the Christ who cherished the ancient world-view? Has there not come about a discontinuity in thought? Does not this break in thought involve also a discontinuity in faith? Can the spiritual content of the old world-view be separated from its framework of thought? Can the soul of faith survive the passing of this corruptible body of thought? To these crucial questions, some give negative answers, and confess that they can no longer call themselves Christians; they no longer consider themselves as maintaining the continuity of thought with the Christ of history.

¹ Address at the opening of the academic year at Andover Theological Seminary and Harvard Divinity School, September 29, 1911.

Others, however, answer in the affirmative. They admit that they no longer hold to the ancient world of the church and of the Bible, but they still maintain vital continuity with all the profound things of the Christian faith. When they think of the nature of the ultimate reality in which the universe and humanity are grounded, from which they both come and to which they move; when they reason concerning the purpose of the ultimate reality for the universe and humanity; and when, still further, they consider the moral character of this ultimate reality, then they find themselves thinking the thoughts of Jesus after him. They interpret the nature of this reality in the terms of personality, its character in the terms of Christlikeness, its purposes in the terms of the divine kingdom. They are conscious of their fellowship of thought with the master in these supreme matters of life. In all that concerns the inner and intensive meaning and worth of the world and man and God they trace the continuity. However much they may differ in their thought with respect to the outer or extensive meaning of these realities through their knowledge of the researches of science, the vast human material of historic study, and the deep ponderings and comprehensive views of philosophy, nevertheless they only come to the true secret of things when their thoughts concerning the heart of reality are the truths of the mind of Jesus. Discontinuity concerning the framework of the world there must be, but continuity with respect to the ultimate realities there can be and there is.

There is, however, another group of men who are not so ready to give either a positive or negative reply to these questions. Their minds are in suspense; they are not so certain in their doubts as the one group, nor so sure in their faith as the other. They are not an inconsiderable number in our day; they are found inside as well as outside the churches, and their condition creates a serious situation, and one to the help of which the Christian thinker must come.

In view of this crisis in matters of faith we are urged by some men to abandon the ground of faith and go over entirely to the field of conduct, and to invite to meet with us there all sorts and conditions of minds, irrespective of their faith in, or interpre-

tation of, the ultimate realities of life. It is claimed that this procedure would not only be the strategic thing to do, but the right thing, since the Christian religion moves wholly in the region of the ethical.

This invitation ignores, I fear, very important matters. It is not quite fair to the men whose difficulties are with matters of faith to ask them to forget the same and go over to the region of practical interests. These very interests have no great value, if the foundations of faith are insecure. Nor does Christianity move wholly in the region of the ethical. It is primarily a faith, and its ethics grows out of its faith. Then, too, it ignores the fact that there is at present scarcely any more agreement in matters of Christian ethics than in matters of the Christian faith. The question, "Are we still Christian?" is now raised concerning the ethics of Jesus no less than the faith of Jesus. Yesterday men outside as well as those inside the churches were in practical agreement on Christian ethics as giving us the great regulative principles for the guidance of our life. Even Mill, while he thought Christian morality somewhat defective because of its negative character, yet maintained that in the Golden Rule we have a principle which is adequate for all practical purposes of conduct. And while Matthew Arnold criticised the doctrine of the Incarnation of Christ, he highly commended as a practical rule of life the Imitation of Christ.

The situation, however, in these matters has greatly changed in recent years. The Christian moral ideal itself is now called in question. Next to the question concerning the faith of Jesus, the most crucial question now raised with respect to the Christian religion is that which asks whether or not we have broken with the moral ideal, not only of the churches of our own faith and order, or of the historic church, or of the apostles, but also with the moral ideal of Jesus himself.

The question is asked, Is it possible to live according to the ethical demands of Jesus? Can these demands be realized in our modern world? Would not the sincere and earnest effort to practise them involve our whole social structure in ruins? Would it not bring about the end of our civilization? Indeed

the question is raised whether we ought to live in accordance with these teachings. If they contradict our experience, if they would involve such destructive consequences, if they would necessitate our abandonment of the very world we have been hard at work building up, ought we to try to put them into effect?

These questions are raised by ethical students, who take into consideration the evolution of morals and the nature of morality, by publicists who labor for the highest national welfare, by social workers whose sympathies are deep and wide and whose consciences are quick to social demands, and no less by New Testament scholars who have returned to the sources of the Christian moral ideal and studied it historically rather than confessionally. These questions are not only live questions; they are the life-question of the Christian religion. They find expression in popular periodicals as well as in technical journals and scholarly books. This situation is particularly true of Germany, to a lesser degree it exists in England, and it will soon be acute with us.

There must be an attempt to hold the Christian moral ideal in the full light of the ethical thought of our own day and generation, and there must be an inner unity of mind, if we would live at peace and have power. We are persuaded that the kind of allegiance Jesus demands is a loyalty based on the conviction that his fundamental moral claims are reasonable and just. If it were necessary, it would be better to differ from him conscientiously than to agree with him conventionally.

Let us then in the first place observe where the apparent, if not real, break comes between the modern mind and the ethical demands of Jesus. It is primarily in the different attitudes taken towards the world and the worth of the present life. The following contrasts are set forth and emphasized.

The first contrast concerns the necessity and importance of the economic conditions of our earthly life. These have their justification in their nature and in the part they play in the advancing civilization of the world. The richer, fuller life of culture is largely conditioned by these economic values. Wealth therefore has its place, and foresight is a virtue.

Now when we go into the gospels, and read there the teach-

ings of Jesus concerning these matters, we cannot but note the contrast. We learn that we are not to lay up treasures upon the earth; we are to take no thought for the morrow; the chief emphasis falls upon the dangers of wealth; the struggle for existence and all that it involves is not recognized. It is maintained by some that life in our world is impossible on these terms.

Again, we have a high appreciation of the heritage of civilization. We take keen interest in science, in its pursuit of knowledge, and in its pushing further into the confines of the unknown. We delight in the beautiful, and find deep joy in the ministry of art. We gird up our loins and light our lamps for the strenuous task of philosophic interpretation of the meaning of our world. We know the strength of the bonds of friendship, and feel the inspiration of another's confidence, and share in the common joys of life.

Now when we read the gospels, we find to our delight that there is some appreciation of these high values of culture on the part of Jesus. He stands near to us in his appreciation of the beauty of the flowers of the field, in his keen interest in the processes of growth, in his poetic productions in the form of parables, and in his friendly intercourse with human beings. And yet the surprise comes that there is no full recognition of these ends of life as parts and factors in the kingdom, and that no ethical instructions are given the disciples concerning them. They appear to play no important part in Jesus' thought, nor to have any essential place in the kingdom.

Still further. We are believers in the positive life. We love the heroic, and we are aggressive. We want to express ourselves, to realize the possibilities of our nature, and to prove true to our individualities. Self-realization is the end we set before ourselves. We want to be something. We have little sympathy with the desire to be nothing. And we go in for the strenuous thing. We desire to test our physical prowess and moral capacity. We like the task that counts for something in the life of the world and in the progress of civilization. The morality that appeals to us is the morality of masters, the morality of power, control, progress.

Now when we read the ethical demands of the gospels, we find considerable emphasis on the negative and the passive, self-denial, renunciation, non-resistance, turning the other cheek, giving the other garment also: these are the strange notes we hear. We have here apparently the morality of the "weak brother." Nietzsche calls it the morality of slaves.

Then, too, we have a growing social consciousness and conscience. Our social interest in men is not merely sympathetic, it is also righteous. We are interested in them not only as victims of our social order, or of the tyranny of the strong, but also interested in them as men who have a right to be treated with respect, and who deserve that the causes of the wrongs they suffer be remedied. The least of the children of men have a right to participate in the blessings of civilization. The fruits of culture are not for the few. And we are concerned more and more with the social causes of human misery. We must try to catch the thieves who waylay the man who travels from Jerusalem to Jericho, as well as take care of the victim of their wrongs, that we have to do today. We demand and work for radical social changes. Ours is a democratic morality, touched with the spirit of revolution.

In the noble sympathy of the gospels, so pure in its source and so genuine in its expression and so broad in its reach, there is full agreement between the ethics of Jesus and the modern conscience. It is, however, at the points of the social causes of wrongs that the difference arises. The personal rather than the social is the distinctive note of the ethical teaching of Jesus, and personal sympathy is emphasized rather than social wrongs. And the brotherhood contemplated is one selected out of the world rather than a world-redemption itself.

Once more, we are optimistic in our outlook upon the world. We find resident forces at work in the historic processes that bid us hope and be of good cheer. We are believers in progress. The idea of revolution has taken possession of our minds. It is our regulative idea. The past is interpreted by it; and the future is confidently awaited, and is expected to follow the same laws. This is the mood in which men now do their work in the world.

That there is an optimism in the gospels is undoubted, but it

concerns the kingdom of God, the transcendent good, rather than the world. The outlook on this world is pessimistic enough. It is in the bondage of sin. It is in the power of the devil. The earth-forces are evil. There are no latent sources, nor resources, in them for their recovery and for the victory of the good. The only hope for the world is beyond the world. It is in the apocalyptic, catastrophic coming of the kingdom. The mood is eschatological.

This non-worldly, transcendent, ethical teaching of Jesus is explained in various ways.

There is, first of all, the "*zeitgeschichtliche*," or historical, explanation. Jesus belonged to another civilization than ours. He lived in a pre-capitalistic age; he passed his days in a small town; he lived as a member of a subject race, in a corner of the world, into which, however, with the soldiers and traders came something of the spirit of the great outside world. Corresponding to this historical situation in which Jesus lived, his gospel was idyllic. It was beautiful, and adapted to its day and its place. It was the gospel of the poor. Its ethical directions contemplate life under such conditions. Not one of them is out of place in such circumstances. They are feasible, they are obligatory, indeed they were realized by the disciples. Were our conditions the same today, they would have the same relevancy; and they have relevancy just in so far as they are similar, as in our personal relations in small circles.

Our civilization, however, is very different. We live in a capitalistic era and our modern states are world-powers; the struggle for existence on the part of men is intense; the necessity for great and strong states, ultimately based on force, is inevitable; the existence of these states requires equipment for possible, and indeed inevitable, wars. For such states, and for citizenship in them, and for economic success, the ethical demands of Jesus have no force, his ethical teaching no relevancy. This is the position maintained by Friedrich Naumann, and this is the explanation he gives for the character of Jesus' ethics, and for the necessity he is under to have recourse to another ethical standard for his life in the modern state.

Another explanation offered is in the terms of the eschato-

logical expectation of Jesus. The reason that Jesus gave such ethical directions concerning laying up treasures in heaven rather than on earth, carelessness concerning the morrow, non-resistance toward wrong-doers, and even love for our enemy, was that he expected the end of the world to come shortly. When one expects the end to come soon, he can fulfil all these requirements. This we find in the conduct of persons who time and again throughout the whole course of history have expected the speedy end of the world. So also in the case of the early Christians, instructed by St. Paul, and no less in the case of the disciples instructed by Jesus. His demands were to get ready for the end. This was the great positive requirement. The negative requirements were in view of the same event. The positive and the negative ethical conduct was the expression of the disposition engendered by this hope.

This is an explanation of the ethical demands of Jesus in the terms of an "eschatological interim ethics," set forth by Johannes Weiss in 1900 in *Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes*, later reaffirmed in his New Testament commentary, also by Ehrhard in *Der Grundcharakter der Ethik Jesu*, and more recently by Schweitzer in his work, *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*. This is the position held by many of the younger German theologians, by modernists like Loisy and Tyrrell, and by many others in England. The eschatological interpretation of the teaching of Jesus has had some influence on scholars, who, however, while conceding that some ethical demands and directions of Jesus may be explained in this way, yet hold that the fundamental ethical teaching of Jesus is not determined by this idea. Nor is the eschatological idea true to the facts when it is made the regnant idea in the mind of Jesus. This is the position held notably by the New Testament scholar Dobschütz, and by the theologian and moralist Herrmann.

The third explanation is given in the terms of the fundamental philosophy of Jesus' life and teaching, in the terms of the religion of redemption. At this point we shall only suggest the line of thought, and shall return to it later. This explanation is based on Jesus' estimate of the ultimate values of life. Here is the fundamental contrast of an immanent-world ethics, and of a

transcendent ethics. The question is, In what are we to find our highest good? in the things of earth or in the things of heaven? in the values of culture or in the values of religion? in the relativities of life or in the absolutes? in things and human beings or in God? In which of these series are we to find our deepest and most enduring satisfaction? In which of them are we to come to the fullest realization of our powers and possibilities? For Jesus the ultimate values of life were the great values; in these men were to find their enduring satisfaction and highest realization. His ethics, therefore, is fundamentally transcendent: this character of his ethics cannot be ignored, nor must it be minimized in the interest of any easy solution of our problem of keeping continuity with the moral ideal of Jesus.

Let us observe now the various historic attitudes taken toward these contrasts between the ethical demands of Jesus and the demands of life in the world.

There is first the apostolic. The first followers of Jesus naturally took the same attitude as their master. For them these contrasts did not really exist. They did not create for them a problem. Like their master, they expected the speedy end of the world. Their ethics was of men awaiting the great change. The great values were those pertaining to the kingdom of God about to be established. The things of earth paled in the splendor of the heavenly light of the eternal world. Their citizenship was not on the earth but in heaven; they were subjects of no temporal order, but only of the eternal realm. Their conduct therefore was determined by this hope. Even the closest relation of life, the marriage of two human beings, might well be renounced in view of the situation.

The problem of life here in the world began, however, to make its appearance in consequence of the deferred coming of the Lord. The economic necessity of work, of earning a livelihood, of having means to help the destitute Christians, made itself felt, and Paul demanded that men should work.

The sub-apostolic church was forced to recognize these contrasts in the teaching of Jesus and the necessities of life in the world. The long-deferred consummation, and the gradual fading

of the hope of the Lord's coming at all, created the problem of taking some new attitude towards the world. They were face to face with new situations. They had to live in the world; they had to earn their living; they had to relate themselves to the various callings and tasks of life; they had to take some part in the general social life of the world. Serious ethical questions began to be discussed: how far could Christians, in loyalty still to their religious convictions, lay up treasures on the earth, support the state based on force, take up service in the army, avail themselves of the comforts and luxuries? And, still further, came the question, How participate in the life of the world for its transformation? Here arises in all earnestness the problem with which the church and Christians have been confronted ever since, and before which we find ourselves today.

The attitude of the church in the middle ages, which is still that maintained by the Roman Catholic church, was one of compromise. It held to the non-worldly, transcendent ethics of the gospels and of the early church. The true and higher Christian life centred all its thought and interest on the eternal world and its values. The negative attitude was taken towards the world. Separation from it was necessary. The ideal of the perfect life was the monkish. The priests and nuns were the genuine Christians. They lived on a higher plane than others. They were the persons loyal to the strict ethical demands of Jesus. They were his uncompromising followers. However, all could not be priests and nuns; the common mass of people had still to live in the world, do their day's work, earn their living, build their homes, hold society together, and maintain the church itself, and make for a Christian civilization. But this life was regarded as on a lower level; it involved compromise with the world: it necessitated either the abandonment or the deferred fulfilment of the non-worldly ethical demands of Jesus. Thus two standards of morality were not only recognized by the church, but taught and established by it. On the whole, this is still the position maintained by the Catholic church and its ethical teachers.

In the Protestant attitude a break was made with this double standard of morality. It could not tolerate the outer and inner

division involved in this compromise-ethics. There was not only the recognition of the necessity and legitimacy of the vocations of life, but their justification and inculcation. The common man and woman at their tasks in the home or field or store or public office were as highly appreciated as the cloistered monk and nun. Their contribution to the church and the life of the world was more valuable. The service of God was not simply and solely in worship, but also in work, not only in the church, but in the home and society.

Not only the relations of the earthly life, but also the organizations and institutions, were fully recognized and highly appreciated. The state had its functions to fulfil, and society its life to develop and enrich, and civilization its place in relation to the kingdom of God.

. It is true that much of Catholicism came over into Protestantism in matters both of dogma and of morals. The recognition of these "earth-tasks" was somewhat defective: Luther and Calvin grounded their justification more on the Old Testament than on the teachings of Jesus, and where the teaching of Jesus was followed, it was taken more as a precept than as a principle; the problem involved in keeping continuity with Christ was not clearly seen nor deeply felt; and their thought of life in the world and its tasks wavered between a pessimistic and optimistic conception; indeed both were under the influence of the Roman Catholic depreciation of the world.

These contradictions are clearly manifest in the movements which have continued these principles and influences. Thus in Pietism we find the non-worldly attitude taken towards life and the cultural values of civilization. Individual piety and separation from the world are its characteristic notes. And even in Puritanism, while there is a true recognition of the state and its great tasks, and a noble insistence upon social righteousness, yet the negative attitude is strong, and the danger imminent that Puritanism become puritanic.

The more positive side of the Reformation, its better appreciation of the goods of life, came to expression in the thought of Schleiermacher, who found in the state and culture the ethically indispensable elements in the good that God wills for his children,

and of Rothe, who regarded the state rather than the church as at once the nobler and larger factor and sphere for the realization of the will of God.

In the present situation relative to this problem there is, first of all, the attitude which frankly, though sadly, confesses the fact of a break with Jesus and the necessity for it, and the acceptance of another ethics than the Christian, relative to all the worldly tasks of life. These tasks have their own ethical necessities and justification and therefore have a right to make their moral demands upon us. Morality is not only grounded in human nature, but it is conditioned for its growth, and has sanction, only as it represents the actual stage which it has reached in its development. Since the world has entered upon its capitalistic era the ethics adapted to it and demanded by it is not one growing out of and suited to a pre-capitalistic era. In all matters therefore that concern the struggle for existence, the economic situation, the building of a great state, we must not look to Christ for direction, but rather to the ethics which belongs to our civilization. This is the position of Naumann, who is significant not from a scholarly point of view, but from the popular, since he has a large influence and expresses pretty accurately the mind of the average man engaged in public life. He says very frankly: "We do not question Jesus when things are concerned which belong in the region of economic and state construction. . . . I vote for the German navy, not because I am a Christian, but because I am a citizen, and because I have learned to renounce looking for fundamental questions of state in the Sermon on the Mount."

On the other hand, we find men who take literally the ethical demands of Jesus in all their sharp non-worldly transcendent meaning. The ethical directions of Jesus, whether spoken to one person or to a group, whether as incidental or fundamental, are taken for infallible guidance for our lives in our infinitely more complex situations. Poverty is accepted, non-resistance is practised, oaths are abjured, even family ties are renounced, and the world with all its fruits of culture is condemned. The great, world-famous representative of this attitude was Tolstoi.

It is not without meaning that, as Naumann comes out of lib-

eral Protestantism, so Tolstoi came out of Greek Catholicism; the one out of a vigorous nation of the west, and the other out of a variously mixed nation of the east. Tolstoi was in revolt against a church and state which press hard on new manifestations of life and efforts at freedom. In this sense his ethics is that of revolt, and yet the hold of the traditional and the authoritative is still strong upon him. He would be free from the dogmatic moral prescriptions of his state and church only to be bound by the ethical prescriptions of Jesus. By his new obedience he would involve the whole state structure and social fabric in ruins: he is a religious and ethical anarchist, the counterpart of the philosophical anarchists who come largely from the same country, and from like situations elsewhere.

The significant and worthful thing, however, in Tolstoi is that he has been able to free himself from the entangling alliances of state and church, and to return from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries into the first century, and find and face the historic Jesus. He certainly moved in the right direction when he entered the gospels. He found it better to break with modern life than to break with Jesus. He would solve our problem by ignoring and abandoning one of the elements which create it.

Neither in the one nor in the other of these attitudes have others been able to find the solution of our problem. They do not feel compelled, with Naumann, to break with Jesus in their life in this world; nor on the other hand, with Tolstoi, to break with the moral situations of modern life and the ethical demands made upon them therein. These men are ready to make many concessions, but they do not feel compelled to make any compromise on the fundamental principles of life which Jesus announces. They allow that these several contrasts, if not so sharp as represented, are nevertheless very real; that the eschatological idea does shape and color some of the ethical demands of Jesus, though it does not explain nor vitiate this ethical ideal; that we cannot imitate the example of Jesus in our complex world in matters of detail, though we can in the greater matters of his spirit in all our relations; that we cannot go to him for ethical instructions on our manifold new tasks, nor should we think to find such for our situation, and yet that we must go to

him still for the fundamental principles of moral life. Differences there are between the men who represent this third attitude, but they are more incidental than fundamental. The two most influential theologians in Germany at present, Herrmann and Troeltsch, illustrate these differences and agreements. The former narrows the sphere of the ethical more than the latter; it covers a smaller area, and the vocations and cultural values of life and civilization are more negatively estimated. Troeltsch recognizes more than Herrmann the moral necessities of life in the world, appreciates more highly cultural values, and finds them more deeply grounded. In short, his ethics is more immanent than Herrmann's. Greater than their differences, however, are their agreements in holding that in the ethics of Jesus we find the deepest principles of life, and that, as a matter of faith, we can cherish the conviction that these principles will be finally realized in the life of man. In this third attitude, with these differences and agreements, here more and there less, are to be classed the greater names of German theology.

Let us now consider the lines of thought which promise a solution of our problem.

It is of fundamental importance that we recognize that the Christian religion is the religion not of law but of the spirit, and that the ethical characteristic of this religion of the spirit is its demand for, and creation of, an autonomous moral life.

The religion of law was overcome in principle by Jesus. He ushered in the religion of the spirit. This religion is not burdened, as was the Jewish religion, with manifold ethical precepts for the guidance of conduct down to the minutest matters of dietetics and hygiene. Nor is it bound to a given stage of social development by fixing its institutions and customs, as in Islam. Some incidental instructions, particular precepts for the guidance of certain persons in given situations, are found in the Christian religion with its ethical teaching, it is true, but these are not its distinctive features, and they are certainly not its fundamental principles. Even the Golden Rule is not a rule, but rather a spirit, and even the law of love is not so much a law as an inner,

pure, and permanent disposition. And the followers whom Jesus sought were not like soldiers, whose duty it is:

“Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs but to do and die.”

He sought for convinced followers, men whose minds no less than their hearts were in his service. He did not demand imitators of his outward life, but followers of his own free, autonomous spirit. He did not make himself a substitute conscience for men. They were to judge for themselves what was the right. It is true that he quickened and illuminated the consciences of men, and made men free from sin, and from moral and religious confusions of righteousness; and consequently men's judgment of what was right was truer and keener and quicker and saner than before they came under his influence. This indeed came about as a result of their experience of redemption, wrought in their souls by his life and death. He won them for God, for the ultimate things and values and realities of life, and this was at once the condition and the cause of their new conscience.

What Jesus sought, therefore, to accomplish for men, and what he consequently demanded of men, was that their conscience might be illumined and emancipated. They must be able and free to judge for themselves, under his ethical leadership, the great matters of life, as occasions arose and new situations demanded. He did not set himself up as the great casuist of perplexed consciences, but rather as the creator of autonomous consciences. He did in the realm of ethics what he did in the region of church polity: he left men free for their tasks. As in the one case he created spiritual life, which produced the church, but left to the occasion and to the men the kind of church to be organized, and the method of its administration; so also in the other case he created the conscience which was free to determine for itself the right conduct in the given situations of life. As we have learned that worldliness does not consist in the things we seek and use, but in the spirit in which we use them and the purpose to which we put them, so also must we learn that it is the spirit of our life that determines the moral character of our

conduct. There is no real morality that is not autonomous. There is no real free conscience that is not able to determine its course in the world. Jesus did not increase the ethical precepts and principles of life; he reduced them practically to one, the principle or spirit of love. And even this one great moral principle of personal conduct he derived from the new life in the soul in its relation to the ultimate reality of the universe, the Moral God.

The first great moral unification which Jesus created was that of the inner life: the unity of the disposition, the heart united to do its moral tasks, the will master of its impulses and passions and powers, quick to do the behests of duty, and moving out from the centre of its inner life in all directions.

And Jesus set this moral personality, with its autonomous morality, growing out of its new divine life, in the midst of the greater human realities of life. Moral personalities are the great ethical realities. Human beings are the highest moral values of life. Persons, not things, are the ends of conduct. Things find their highest uses in relation to men. They get their value through their social ministry. The economic necessities are necessities because men need them for their life here in the world. The state is founded because human beings have social needs which grow out of their social nature. Cultural values are produced by men, and highly appreciated for their services in the enrichment of life. The institutions of society are established for their social worth and utility. It is man who is the great creator of cultural values. And he is the object of their existence. And he is at the same time the standard by which they are judged. Man is not made for the Sabbath but the Sabbath is made for man, and in like manner the industrial régime, the state, the cultural values, and the whole human world are made for man.

Now it is into right relation with these moral personalities that Jesus sets a man, and contemplates placing each and all. The redeemed man looks out upon the world, and all that he does is done from the inner disposition of love. This leads him to recover the personality of others, to have an enthusiasm for all sorts and conditions of men, to cherish an unconquerable faith

in them, to devote himself to them, and to make any sacrifice to recover them to God, to establish relations of brotherhood, and to make love supreme in their conduct.

It is this new interest in men that determines conduct toward them. This conduct varies with changing conditions: new social situations create new duties, but the disposition of love and the final purpose of conduct in the creation of a moral fellowship remain dominant and regulative through all these changes. They determine the thing to be done in any given situation and at any historic moment in the progress of civilization.

Then, too, we must observe that Jesus' moral demands bring men face to face with the ultimate moral reality of the universe. His morality makes its transcendent demands because the fundamental facts of life necessitate and justify them. Men are set in a moral order that is more ultimate than their desires and their consciences. Their lives are grounded in the eternal reality. They derive their being therefrom; they come with endowments from its wealth; they are placed under an authority that is beyond their caprice; they are called to co-operate in a purpose that expresses the will of the eternal as the goal of all men; they are at once the factors through which and the sphere in which this ultimate moral reality finds expression and realization. In brief, they are the children of God, in and through whom the purposes of the heavenly Father are to be fulfilled.

It is this profound religious conviction that is the deepest thing in the life of Jesus, and the most fundamental truth in his thought. It is life in God, and with God, and for God, and out from God, that we find in all its glory and wonder in the life of Jesus. It is this reality of his religion that gives its deepest principle to his ethics, and makes it distinctively religious and fundamentally transcendent. It places man at the centre of moral reality. All that he does, he does in God and out from God. He no longer stands at the circumference of life, moving towards the centre; but rather at the centre of life moving out towards the circumference. If in his religion he goes through nature and man to God, in his moral life he goes from God to the world and man. This is the dialectic of the Christian moral movement.

And since the God with whom he stands in right personal rela-

tion of love in the Christian religion is the reality in whom all beings find their lives, and from whom they derive their nature, and by whom they are placed in the world and set in social relations, the moral ideal binds a man to the whole of life. It is not an isolated, solitary, individualistic God with whom he has to do, but the God of love, who cherishes a supreme purpose and good for the world, who takes interest in every human being and rules in the affairs of nations, and makes all things new.

If we are thus placed in right relation with God, this relation involves a proper attitude towards the world and man. Whatever interests, therefore, we believe to be divine, whatever the moral situations in which we find ourselves and which we recognize as providential, whatever social good we see is necessary for the progress of the race, these become for us the moral task of life.

This therefore makes Christian ethics transcendent in its supreme good, ultimate in its sources, fundamental in its bases, authoritative in its claims, contemporary in its demands, and progressive in its character.

Now our estimate of the worth of given cultural values, and our attitude towards them, must be determined by our recognition of these fundamental moral realities of the universe: the greatness of our own personalities, the reverent and loving attitude towards all other personalities, and our highest weal in right relations with God. By their service or disservice to these realities are the things of the world to be judged.

This involves the spirit of detachment in our relation to all these things. We must maintain our freedom in our relation to them. Not things but the man must be in the saddle. Man must ever be the master. He must be able to live with these things or without them. He must know, as the great Apostle did, how to abound and how to be abased, and in the one condition as in the other enjoy contentment of soul. He must see the necessity for the attitude demanded by the master: the readiness to renounce all these values if the moral situation demands it. He must respond to the heroic appeal: to count the interests of God of greater value, and their right to his life of renunciation. In times of national crises we recognize

the truth of this position, but there is no time without its crisis for the moral life, and certainly our age demands this spirit of detachment and this spirit of heroism. For, as Professor James once said, our greatest fear is the fear of poverty. And Kipling gave wise counsel to young men when he said: "Fear the man who has no love of money. He is the dangerous man in a mammonistic age." Not only Jesus but every great soul has appealed to men to cherish the spirit of detachment from the lesser values of life.

And it involves the recognition of all these values, the lowest and the highest of them, as subordinate ends, and in their measure means to the one great divine end of the kingdom of God. They have their own ethical value: this must be recognized; their worth must not be disparaged; their place in life must not be scorned. And yet they gain their greater value, and have their deeper significance, in relation to the supreme end for which all things exist: the final purpose of God. When the lesser values clash with the higher,—when the good is the enemy of the better,—then they must be renounced. The kingdom of God has the right of way in a man's life, in society, in history. When the interests of the kingdom demand it, sacrifice of everything,—wealth, position, domestic ties, even life itself, must be made. The servants of the kingdom in every age and land are cross-bearers.

We observe, once more, that the modern mind has sore need of all the rigor of the transcendent demands that Christian ethics makes.

The grave defect of our age is that, in its ambition for the possession of wealth and its passion for power, it pays little or no attention to the means it uses, nor to the methods it employs. The ethics of the natural process, if the word ethics may be allowed here, is taken over into the human world. The use of power in the securing of ends is a characteristic, not only of our subjugation of nature, but also in our subjugation of men. Not only is the resort to force the last resort of men; it is also the first. The will to power exercises force on its way to gain its end. It is characteristic of our industrial régime, our military system, our social tyranny, and the recrudescence of sav-

agery in lawless outbreaks. A morality that is deeper grounded than the natural process and that is better established than human laws is required for the restraint of men from wrong, and for the achievement of the freedom of mastery in the right.

And a greater good than these goods is required for the satisfaction of life. There is a struggle for the possession of things, which when got do not satisfy. Not in things, nor even in the higher values of culture, nor even in our human relationships, can we find the permanent satisfaction of our lives. Never were more men in possession of wealth than now, never were so many men persons of privilege in having the advantages of a liberal education, and never were our human relationships larger than at present. And yet there is a strange dissatisfaction in the lives of men and women in our day. There are abundant outer resources for pleasure, meagre inner resources of happiness. The psalmist's words are strangely and sadly true of our day: "The Lord gave them their requests, but sent leanness into their soul." There is a poverty of the inner life, which is very different from the poverty of spirit. The age is not rich towards God, though it has abundance of things. And its enduring satisfaction can only come from its ethical wealth, and its peace be found by living at the centre of reality with God.

Finally, it is in Christian ethics that we are to find an adequate dynamic. The higher the ideal, the greater must the dynamic be. If the ideal of our age is not so high as the Christian, yet, even for the realization of its own ideal, the age needs a greater dynamic than its own provides. It is not able to realize its own immanent, this-world ethics. It cannot get men to live for its interests, to devote themselves to its causes, to sacrifice all for its earthly kingdom. It confesses that the forces of economic necessity, human passion, and selfishness are too much for it. And the very forces it has developed, the Frankenstein it has built, it has not the ability to direct. The demand is for moral power to control economic and political forces and to raise men to a higher moral level. For the realization of these lesser ends, to say nothing of the Supreme End, there must be some resource for men of today deeper and stronger than economic

necessities, higher and wiser than human wills, and more permanent than the passing generations. Christian ethics brings with it the power adequate for the realization not only of the lesser ends, but also of the one supreme end, the kingdom of God. Thus in the deep matters of faith and in the fundamental principles of the moral life, we trace the continuity between ourselves and Jesus, our Master.

*THE CRITICAL PROBLEM OF THEOLOGY TODAY:
THE PROBLEM OF METHOD*

HERBERT ALDEN YOUTZ

AUBURN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

I

Systematic Theology used to be the acknowledged Queen of the Sciences, exacting allegiance and tribute in every district of human thought. By one of those cataclysmic upheavals of thought that now and then disturb society, the situation has been radically altered. The queen has been dethroned. Surveying this wrecked glory and these emblems of departed power, the faithful speak of a rebellion; the philosopher thinks of it as a revolution; the man of science calls it evolution.

Traditionalist, philosopher, or scientist, we all know that the present situation is enigmatical. So far as systematic theology is concerned, "there hath passed away a glory from the earth." What is the significance of the changing order? There are differing degrees and kinds of glory. Has theology passed its zenith with the glory that has failed? Or is the present situation but a temporary eclipse? Are we to mount higher in the scale of glory when we emerge from the shadow cast by the ascendant star of science?

More concretely said, the coming of an age of science, with its new way of regarding the world, its new methods of explanation, its new spirit of independence and power, its new ideals of life, has disturbed the old order. The upheaval has been profound, and the presuppositions upon which traditional theology built its fortresses are today largely discredited or under suspicion. The result is seen and felt in far-reaching confusion in the realm of religious explanation, and in the universal effort at adjustment. Since theology and religion reciprocally influence each other, the result has been a wave of uncertainty or depression in the field of practical religion. The appeal of the Christian ministry for young men of ambition has waned; the authority of the pulpit

has suffered; the hold of the church upon society has weakened, —with the result of a vacillating moral and religious consciousness. Robust ethics and conquering ideals are achieved in the atmosphere of confidence and conviction. An age of hesitation and confusion in the things of the spirit does not best minister to moral fibre and world-defying, world-conquering confidence. This general estimate of the present situation as having its roots, partly at least, in the confusion of religious explanation, will serve as a practical apology for offering an analytical discussion of the state of Systematic Theology.

If there were space for it, the situation might be made much clearer by an historical review of the rise, rule, and decline of systematic theology, with a study of the causes for the decline. We may safely start, however, with the assumption that the fortunes of theology are at low-ebb tide today, and with the other assumption, which I think the whole history justifies, namely, that the weakness of the situation, the cause of the decline, lies in the inadequate conception of the task and method of theology which controls the makers of theology. If we can set ourselves right here, gaining a somewhat definite and tenable conception of our task, we shall be prepared for fruitful work in theology. For fallacious conceptions and, above all, confused conceptions of our task are current in theological circles today. The confusion of the theologian is reflected in some form in the whole Christian church.

In speaking of art and artists, John Ruskin observes that "failure is less frequently attributable to either insufficiency of means or impatience of labor, than to a confused understanding of the thing actually to be done."¹ A confused understanding of the thing to be done! That is the key to the present Babel of opinions. What are we trying to do? What is our task, and what are its limitations; and what the best method of approaching our task? Sabatier says, "To the thinking man a discord between methods is a graver matter than an opposition between doctrines."² The insight of that pregnant sentence ought to be

¹ Introduction to the Seven Lamps of Architecture.

² The opening sentence of his book, *The Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit*.

the possession of every theological thinker. The discord between theologies today, the discord between science and theology, between traditional theology and modern theology, the discord of the church trying to find its strength, of the individual trying to recover his faith,—what is it but the discord of method, the discord of confused conceptions of what we are trying to do? It may be that the theological battle will continue; but even so let us stop the petty guerilla warfare about petty things and fight in the open for our deepest insights, out of which are the issues of life.

The seriousness of the discord of method lies in the fact that the debate is not carried on at the point of fundamental disagreement.³ The real difference between the disputants may be the irreconcilable differences of clashing philosophies and of fundamental conceptions of method. The opposing champions may be controlled by presuppositions which are mutually antagonistic and which do not appear in the debate. Neither party suspects the nature of the disagreement, nor the place of control. Most doctrinal debates are of this sort, and the present struggle exhibits this blindness to the real issue. Sharp rapier-thrusts and brilliant defences are futile to settle such disputes, even though one party to the encounter may give way. For the issue is between fundamentals, and all parties engaged must see the issues involved and the fundamental point of disagreement; else the crossing of swords is useless, wasteful, and bombastic. To be sure, seeing the issue is not necessarily healing the breach. But it is much to know just where and why the conflict is, even though we agree to disagree. Concrete problems must be subordinated to a study of principles. The debate then becomes rational rather than verbal. Some of the showiest debates in the history of theology have been insoluble in the terms of their formulation; but they belonged in the Theory of Knowledge, where the value of the discordant methods could have been rationally determined,

³In an analytical discussion of "The Old Theology and the New," in the *Harvard Theological Review*, January, 1911, which has appeared since this article was prepared, Professor William Adams Brown makes a similar emphasis. "All turns here on the term 'method.' The new theology is not a matter of date, but of principles."

and the true issue seen. A change of venue should have been ordered, a new tribunal. For only a better analysis of the problem of knowledge could have cleared the rational atmosphere.

The true theological issue today—the real ground of confusion—is in the matter of rational method. Recent literature is recognizing this fact, and it is a hopeful sign of the times. A significant example of this is a symposium, in a recent theological journal, by three leading theological professors, dealing with the theme, “The Task and Method of Systematic Theology.”⁴ Such essays will help constructive thinkers to clarify their own visions of truth and to formulate their convictions.

II

The greatest sense of discord today in the theological field is that expressed in the distinction between the traditional orthodox wing of the church on the one hand, and the modern orthodox wing on the other. By these terms are meant the older and the newer movements within the field of Christian interpretation. The main battle is in process here, and the chief confusion arises somewhere on the line where these two movements collide. It is not sufficient to brush this distinction lightly aside with the assumption that it is only a phase of the perennial clash between the conservative and the radical forces of thought. This is not wholly true; moreover, it is not specific enough. There is something distinctive about the present situation. What is the real principle of discord between traditional theology and modern theology,⁵—these terms being used to designate the general type of theological formulation which we have inherited from the past and the general type of protest and reconstruction current today?

⁴ American Journal of Theology, April, 1910. The contributors to the symposium were Professor Benjamin B. Warfield of Princeton Seminary, Professor Wm. Adams Brown of Union Seminary, and Professor Gerald Birney Smith of the University of Chicago.

⁵ Faithful critics have pointed out that this use of the words “modern” and “traditional” to designate the contrasted types of theological method is ambiguous. But any words are open to like criticism; and the carefully restricted definition here given to the terms ought to render them innocuous, and fairly adequate.

The comprehensive answer is that it is a fundamental "discord between methods," and not an "opposition between doctrines." More specifically said, it is the discord between the static conception of life and the world which has prevailed until far into the nineteenth century, and an evolutionary or growing conception of life and the world which holds our minds today and pervades every field of our thinking. The units of the older world of thought were conceived in rigid and fixed terms. The units of our modern thinking are elastic, growing things. The older philosophic ideal was Being; the modern philosophic ideal is Becoming.⁶ The older scientific ideal was unchangeable essence; the modern scientific ideal is development as the essential nature of things. The older conception of method moved in terms of absolutes; the modern conception of method deals with relative standards.

This abstract statement of a fundamental discord of method finds concrete exemplification in every line of inquiry. For the technical student of thought it is doubtless sufficient to say that the difference that we have characterized is the difference which the discovery of the evolutionary conception and its application to life has wrought. Darwin⁷ is the father of this discord. Profoundly interpreted, evolution is indeed the key to our problem; but not evolution as popularly conceived, nor evolution as an hypothesis of natural science, nor, least of all, as a philosophical dogma. Evolution as a statement of that whole radical transformation of our method of thinking which marks the emergence of modern thought is indeed the key to our total problem. But the term is likely to be only a verbal explanation, or to offer only a shallow interpretation. It is necessary therefore to characterize the far-reaching implications of the evolutionary method as a new insight into meaning, a new and pregnant principle with which thought operates in every realm.

⁶ This relativity is not the "absolute relativity" of the Hegelian "becoming is the truth of being." It is not a metaphysical doctrine at all, but the recognition that we know phenomena as process. Our explanations must take account of the omnipresent fact of finite development, whatever our conception of the absolute.

⁷ See, for example, Henry Jones, *Idealism as a Practical Creed*, pp. 24 f.

The key to the true understanding of the modern world of thought is in the hand of the man who has mastered the meaning of law, process, growth. In the field of natural science, the biological method has yielded immense fruit. The law of life is growth. Everything that lives, grows. In the field of organic life, the application of the principle is fairly clear. We study a plant or a tree in terms of its law of development. Likewise with animal life, we are concerned with the laws of growth. This is perfectly clear when applied to the individual. But natural science has carried with fruitfulness the application of the principle of growth to the groups of individuals. Our classifications into groups and species express not fixity, but development.

In the inorganic world, science is controlled by similar ideals. Geology discovers that the world itself has developed and is developing. Astronomy affirms not only a moving world, but age-long, advancing processes everywhere. This is a growing universe. The old rigidity and finality are dispelled.

But the real significance of the newer insight is not seen until the method is applied to the study of man. Man's world is a growing thing; and man himself, studied as an individual or in groups or as a genus, expresses development and not fixity. Anthropology, psychology, sociology, all deal with elastic, moving facts, not with static facts. And thus this principle of insight is brought to a man's moral world, his religious world, his rational world, and under the scrutiny of this newer method it is all seen as a moving, advancing process. Religion, whether in the race or in the individual, grows from the zero point to its best estate by a progressive process. The moral life awakens and grows from more to more. And even rationality, intelligence, thought, is everywhere an advancing fact, not a constant quantity. The effort to fix this complex, moving fact by a name, as "human nature," is delusive. We conceal the movement thus under a mental conception that seems to form a fixed point in the flux. The older, abstract units of thought about man, such as "moral agent," "responsibility," "freedom," "religion," are all seen to have fluent rather than fixed meanings in their practical application. None of these things are constant quantities, but growing. We must learn to think not only a man's objective

world, but also his subjective world,—his units of thought and the thinker himself,—as moving, growing facts, expressing a process proceeding by inviolable laws.

All of this is indeed bewildering and confusing for the lay mind, especially when viewed on the background of the old, secure, and fixed units of thought. The fountains of the great deep are broken up, and chaos seems to threaten. But the real significance for theology of this changed method is likely to be misapprehended. It is a shallow view which assumes that the real trouble with the evolutionary principle in theology is that it makes creation always a process as against the fiat-conception of Genesis. That science affirms our world and all worlds to have been evolved, while the Bible says that God created them; or that science affirms the evolution of man, while Genesis declares that God placed him ready-made in a ready-made world, this is only the fringe of the problem and really does not touch its implications. It is the thorough-going antithesis of the modern sense of the relativity of meanings to the older sense of the absoluteness of meanings which makes the situation acute. Neither party can clearly comprehend the other. It is an "irrepressible conflict" between two irreconcilable orders of thought; and to debate about doctrines across the dividing line without comprehending the underlying principle of disharmony, can only result in words, bad blood, confusion, and distrust. Confident, positive, constructive work in theology can proceed only upon a clear grasp of the situation and a deliberate adoption of the principle which actually underlies our own world of thought. Thus only can we find a real point of contact between our theology and the thinking of the people. In the present twilight-stage of the great debate many preachers and theologians simply share the confusion of their hearers, and get on by the amphibious method of breathing both atmospheres. The result is an anaemic theology, by reason of the imperfect adjustment to the old or the new. At best it is a *modus vivendi*, and theology must eventually either die or adjust itself to its environment.

Concrete illustrations of this discord between methods are familiar to all who touch the field of theology. They occur at every stage and phase of the work. The traditional theology,

formulated in the spirit of a static interpretation, protests against change. Her formulations are canonized and sacred. Modern theology says that the very life and efficiency of theology is in adjustment to the changing demands of life and of thought. Traditional theology conceives the Bible as a final message to the world. Modern theology regards the Bible as the faithful record of a growing and endless message. Traditional theology conceives the Bible as "inerrant" or "infallible," and reluctantly admits the function of criticism. Modern theology conceives the Bible as the richest of many sources of practical guidance, and welcomes all the light of research. Traditional theology regards revelation as a constant quantity, an *absolutum*, either coextensive with the Bible or contained therein. The business of exegete and expositor is to discover and construe this absolute content. Modern theology conceives revelation simply as what is actually revealed of God, and testifies to the supreme revealing power of the Biblical record. Again, in the matter of truth or doctrine traditional theology regards the Bible as the "documented revelation of God to man," and the task of theology is "the ascertainment, formulation, and systematization of the truth thus communicated." Modern theology, on the other hand, seeks no such absolute *quantum* which it can formulate and systematize. It gladly finds its material in the whole spiritual realm, so richly illuminated by the Bible, and offers it for religious guidance. And the truths with which it deals—its explanations—must not be identified with fixed doctrines, but must be studied in their roots and in all the stages of their growth. Traditional theology regards Jesus as the oracle whose recorded word is the touchstone of theology. Hence the proof-text method prevails. Modern theology regards Jesus as personality, the spirit of truth, whose spirit—whose outlook on the spiritual—is indeed the test of all theology. But texts must be subordinated to the spirit that speaks through them. Literalism gives place to true spiritualism. In a word, traditional theology moves in a world of absolute conceptions, searching an absolute Bible for an absolute revelation. And its ideal is an absolutely valid and permanent theology. Modern theology conceives its task in utterly different spirit. Theology is an ever-growing science searching

for all records of God's ways with men, all revelations of the Holy Spirit in experience and history. And it seeks so to interpret this revelation for every age and every man that it shall come with the freshness and force of God's word. Christianity, the gospel, Christ, are constant quantities of the traditional theology to be brought as saving facts to that other constant fact, the sinner. Christianity, the gospel, Christ, the sinner, these are all facts for modern theology; but they are facts which grow and expand and vary in endless adjustment to the wondrous growing spirit of men in every age and at every stage of development.

We may further draw out the essential contrast of spirit and method in terms of the following antitheses.

The traditional method starts with a body of truth accepted as absolute, and proceeds deductively. The modern method starts with experience and history, and proceeds inductively. Apriorism is the key to traditionalism. Empiricism is the key to the modern method. According to the traditional method the Bible, or some revelation contained in the Bible, constitutes an unchanging standard of theological truth. For the modern method the Bible, and its teaching so far as we can apprehend it, are not finalities, but registers of human experience and conviction. For traditional theology, revelation has to do with statements. For modern theology, revelation has to do with insight, meanings. Traditional method assumes the possibility of eternal patterns for conduct,—moral finalities, ever valid. Modern method affirms eternal principles and ideals of conduct which yield guidance through interpretation rather than by mechanical application. The modern method regards traditional theology as "standpatism" in religion. The latter regards modern method as "insurgency." The traditional method calls the moderns lawless, and disloyal to the true standards, while the latter profess to be moved by a great moral awakening. For they scornfully decline to take advantage of "half-fare permits to the clergy" in theological thinking. The scientific spirit has pointed out the essential dishonesty of claiming rational exemptions or privileges for theologians. No marvel or miracle must be made to do service for integrity in thinking. The scientific conception

of inviolable law has tended to moralize and tone up modern theological method.

Traditional theology has held aloof from the other sciences and has grudgingly conceded their advance, feeling that many scientific discoveries were inimical to religion. Consistent with its presupposition of a unique, absolute standard of truth, traditional theology has felt obliged to defend her dogmas, and has only reluctantly yielded at certain points where scientific criticism has compelled it. Volumes upon volumes are written whose burden is this: "Even though we have been routed from our ancient stronghold, scientific method cannot reach this new citadel of faith. Here is a reserved district where criticism cannot enter!" Thus miracles are a strong bulwark of traditional theology, for the reason that they are inexplicable. Modern method, on the other hand, has joined hands with every scientific spirit and has been eager for light from every quarter. For the modern method has essayed to put theology upon a common basis with every other true science, in that it shall be empirical, inductive, and fearlessly face the truth. It says that history, experience, and reason will sufficiently sift and protect religious truth. Let us know the facts, and they will be our best revelation of truth! It only asks for a proper limitation of its field, and for tests of truth appropriate to its subject-matter.

Thus, while traditional method is occupied largely with defences and with justifying the old standards, modern method is studying how to make real to men of today the vital message of Christianity. Consistency and system is the central aim of the one; reality and effectiveness is the aim of the other.

To the traditional method, a divine revelation is like Melchizedek, without pedigree or descent: to the modern method, revelation is like a well-born child, rich in ancestry and potential of unborn truth. For the one, discontinuity is the mark of divine revelation: for the other, continuity is a test of truth. It follows that traditional method commonly insists upon the distinction between the natural and the supernatural order,—the secular and the religious. The modern method in theology either obliterates this distinction or gives the terms new significance.

The security and certainty of the traditional method is in the

assumption of a fixed standard to which every teaching is brought to be measured. The security and certainty of the modern method lies in the absence of any such arbitrary standards, since the soul can be trusted to discover and obey the laws of its own being. Even religious truths lie open to our understanding. Freedom of thought is the test of modern orthodoxy. Therefore the method of authority which is the ruling ideal of traditional theology cannot be retained entire or in part by one who frankly concedes the truth of the modern ideal. The incompatibility is complete at this point. It is about the ideal of authority that the traditional movement is rallying its forces, and it is here that the modern movement is leading the fiercest attacks. There is no compromise possible. It is a war to the death.

In a final word, the modern method in theology squarely faces the evolutionary method of regarding life and the world, and thus puts itself squarely on a footing with all other true sciences. In so doing it disregards the old-time demand for absolute standards or absolute proofs. In place of the older, fixed standards it trusts the veracity of the mind's nature in the form of rational principles of insight; and in place of absolute proofs it submits its formulations to the verification of experience. In this spirit it essays to minister to the human heart in the whole range of its need in terms of the law of its life and its growth.

And now when the issue is squarely seen and felt between the modern method and the traditional, together with its epochal significance for theology, many a thoughtful and reverent student gasps out this inquiry: "But if there are no absolute standards of truth, no absolute proofs,—no infallibles or *absoluta* in our approach to the Bible and Christianity,—how can we be absolutely certain of the line between the true and the false in religious explanation?" The question wrings the soul of the teacher who knows sympathetically the mind of his pupil. It is sufficient here to say that the inquiry really begs the question. The "absolute certainty," in the sense meant, has disappeared, with the other absolutes of the older method. With all other true sciences we fall back upon the tests of intelligence and the verification of experience. Independent "proofs" we have none. Are we "absolutely certain" of our conclusions in chemistry or in ethics? The

question is academic. Practically, we can affirm no such infallible standard. But the seeking heart finds its confident way to God, and the seeking understanding finds its confident way to truth, without this external compulsion. "For certainty in concrete things is a matter of life rather than of speculation."⁸

In view of the instinctive protest that arises here from those who feel that this is dismissing the whole matter of truth with an airy wave of the hand, or at least making it a purely subjective and relative matter, we would earnestly point out that this apprehension arises from false inference as to the consequences of method. The earth is as real and solid since we have discovered that it whirls in space and is among the smallest of an infinite universe of worlds, as it was when people regarded it as "fixed" and flat and lonely. Neither does the atomic theory, nor the theory of electrons, undermine our confidence in the stability of things. Movement does not affect the essential stability of things,—but only interprets that stability. So in religious explanation, we need only to note the actual stability of the realities involved and adjust our preconceived conceptions to the newer insight.

Those who feel that subjectivity and uncertainty await those who apply the evolutionary insight to religious problems suffer needless alarm. This is to misunderstand the place and method of application of the modern principle of relativity. There are not only abiding historical facts but there are abiding ideals and principles of intelligence which constitute the fixities of our human knowing. Jesus Christ abides forever, the same in his character and spirit and outlook on the spiritual. Religious experience and rational principles of truth,—these are inalienable possessions, even though we face the self-evident fact that both religion and rationality are growing quantities. We manage our religious problems in terms of these abiding meanings. Christ, experience, the moral reason, are precious possessions by which we can always determine our religious latitude and longitude, and direct our thinking toward the right goal.

Moreover, the tacit assumption of the protest that we must

⁸ Borden P. Bowne, *Essence of Religion*, p. 65. This was always a fundamental principle with this master thinker; and it is, indeed, an illuminating insight of much modern philosophy.

have "external standards" means the demand for some past, fixed standards to which we can look. This means distrust of our actual guiding standards today. What is this but distrust of the guidance of the Holy Spirit today, in our worship of the past? What is it but the denial of the living Christ of present experience, in our worship of the figure of history, nineteen hundred years away? This is the real heresy of religion!

"Thrice ingrate he whose only look
Is backward,—focussed on a Book,—
Neglectful what the Presence saith,
Though He be near as blood and breath."

There is spiritual rebuke in the insight of the newer method, rich insights into the possibilities of faith, as we cast ourselves on the truth and face the fact that God worketh hitherto, and worketh still, in his own way. The modern preacher who masters the modern meanings of life and the world has his unique and responsible opportunity to bring to men the consciousness of a living God co-working with men today. The preacher's method of interpretation becomes his instrument to save men.

And in any case we cannot restore the Ptolemaic conception of the human world as static. Our world of mind and morals and religion "does move,"—though it is controlled by laws as faithful and abiding as God himself! Our security, like that of all legitimate explanation, rests upon the assumption that this is an "honest world." Theology assumes the veracity of the religious world, though it cannot "prove" its right to its assumption.

III

Turning now from the consideration of this fundamental discord, which we regard as the real crux of the present confusion and ferment, we call attention to some more general issues which involve confusion.

Any really consistent and fruitful thinking is controlled by a view of the world which involves certain presuppositions, a certain large view of the meaning of life, and a corresponding ideal of philosophic method. Thus the great philosophies fall into

distinct types according to these presuppositions of method upon which they rest. For freedom in philosophic thinking can only mean freedom to be absolutely faithful to controlling principles. "Freedom of thought," in the sense of lawless or unprincipled thinking, is unreason. Now it follows that certain types of philosophic method, proceeding from presuppositions which are inimical to religion itself, are valueless or confusing when applied to religious problems. For example, an avowed atheistic philosophy of life could not consistently expound religion based upon theism. There are many present-day currents of thought which are implicitly materialistic, atheistic, or thoroughly agnostic of religious values. When a man controlled by such a philosophy enters the field of theology, whether as exegete, expositor, or systematic formulator of theology, his findings have a qualified value. They must always be estimated upon the background of the theorist's implicit assumptions. Christianity is not consistent with any and all philosophies, and the failure to discern this truth has produced a great number of bizarre and valueless volumes of so-called "scientific" treatment of the Bible and of Christianity. If thinking is to be consequent, it must be consistent; and there is no such thing as a disinterested or colorless attitude in philosophy. The thinker is always committed to something, and his thinking will have this element of relativity. Even philosophy must give an account of itself, for if it is not watched, it will make the worse appear the better reason. So in the matter of theological method in general, we earnestly insist that the work of exegetes and theologians shall be examined in their fundamental, controlling principles and not in their surface-utterances. Some very keen and able men are disqualified for the work under consideration. To see this clearly will be to eliminate some of the confusion from theology.

We can do no more here than point out some of the currents of thought which neutralize the value of religious explanation when they are in control, for the reason that they carry assumptions which undermine the values to which religion is committed.

1. First of all there is a false naturalism that sometimes busies itself with religious problems. Naturalism is the type of philosophy, based upon the analogy of the method of natural science,

which explains all things in terms of genesis and process. It "functions" so easily with the social consciousness of today that it is capable of easy perversion. It might be characterized as the anatomical study of personal and social phenomena. This naturalistic study of phenomena in terms of beginnings and processes does bring us a great insight. But the danger is in a false naturalism which says, in effect, that explanation in terms of process is the full account of things. Anatomy is the last word. This attitude is familiar to students in the field of religion, but it is a barren attitude, for it stops short of those meanings and values of religion which give it worth and warmth and power. The anatomy of religion it is useful to know; but it is the flesh and blood and spirit of living religion which ultimately commend it to men. Theorists of this sort are writing books upon religion today which are hailed as "scientific"; and they are indeed scientific in the sense that they are modelled after the methods of natural science. They are unscientific in the sense that they have not correlated their method to their task, nor adopted tests of truth that bring them into first-hand contact with their data. They always deal with a corpse, and their keen dissection never discovers the actual life that commands religion. Naturalism describes the body of religion, but overlooks its living soul.⁹

2. Then there is a current form of abstract idealism in philosophy which perpetuates the myopic vision of the old rationalism and treats all problems in a transcendental spirit. Many of the religious fads of our day are examples of this type of treatment. Caring more for the articulations of abstract speculation than for the articulations of life, explanations of this type often deal in airy but pretentious styles of philosophic architecture which appeal to the pride of the half-educated. The weakness of this type of philosophy is that the demands of life and experience are overlooked in the abstract and vague effort to reach some supposed logical demand. Moral distinctions are levelled, and the moral reason is stultified. The thread of reality is snapped when religion commits itself to these abstractions; and the

⁹ The fault to be criticised in this type of thinking is not that it is not true, but that it does not exhaust the meanings and function of explanation, nor even touch our fundamental religious questionings.

earnestness and concrete devotion to actual life which characterize religion at its best are thus lost. Explanations offered in this spirit are likely to be insensible to the values of human life, and thus of life's supreme distinction,—religion!

3. There is a curious blending of the method of naturalism and the method of abstract idealism in a popular exegetical or historical movement widely current today. It is a method often rather unjustly identified with the Ritschlian method in theology. This is the attempt to "explain" a doctrine or a man or a movement by a process of analysis which ultimately brings the object sought to the vanishing point. Under the guise of pursuing an "historical method" it makes abstract idealism its directive principle, and by a process of refinement, of casting out everything that can be "accounted for" by the laws of development, it essays to reach a sediment, an "irreducible minimum" of truth with which it can operate. We are familiar with the attempt to find in this way the "real Christ" and the "essence of Christianity." The result is likely to be a vacuous or vaporous thing without form, comeliness, or function. Explainers of this type offer us as the ghostly residuum of their reduction an "essential Christ" or an "essential Gospel," which neither informs nor inspires. In the task of discriminating essentials from non-essentials, theological analysis must understand the limitations of method as instrumental and not as tyrannical.

4. Again, there is a movement of thought that expresses an overdone principle of empiricism. Pragmatism expresses the psychological emphasis of the age. But an excessive pragmatism, which renounces all ideal values and makes the test of truth to be merely the demands of the hour, is likely to overlook all the forces that stand above actual life and command it. Thought itself becomes an invertebrate, mollusious thing when it thus repeats the old positivism¹⁰ and makes the actual order the measure of truth. The old rationalistic trust in the logical reason was excessive; but the excessive pragmatic reaction ignores a great guiding principle of the mind's nature, namely, its active power to control life from the point of view of its own

¹⁰ This seems to be the pervasive weakness of Professor Gerald Birney Smith's otherwise admirable discussion in the Symposium cited above (note 3).

ideal; its power to look ahead and forecast the truth in terms of principles that abide through changing doctrines. Mind is dynamic and creative; not merely a passive reflection of logical relations. An excessive empiricism is supine before the problem of life. It does not adequately function with the fact that religion is a conquering power to overcome the world. A true pragmatism must and does adjust itself to this prime fact of religious life.

Thus we might attempt to pick out the philosophic currents and cross-currents which go to make up the mental world of a given age, and we might profitably attempt to distinguish currents from the tidal movements in which all men seem to think together. We make here this partial analysis not in the interest of a thorough-going criticism or condemnation; we only point out that *a philosophic method which is sceptical or agnostic at its roots, or in its fundamental principles, must inevitably repeat its scepticisms in its formulated account of life and religion.* So far to transcend differences of method as justly to estimate them all in their limitations as well as in their fruitfulness, is the real goal of philosophic insight. Only as a theologian measurably attains to this power of rowing against currents can he be other than the helpless victim of a prevailing current or "Zeitgeist." It becomes profitable unto all things rational for a theological student thus to understand the rationale of the movements of thought that control him, and thus to be able discriminately to assess the value of his own logic and his own conclusions. Only thus can he transcend the confusion, the scepticism, the helpless uncertainty of the theological atmosphere of his age, by understanding these things in their causes.

IV

A brief sketch of some of the more important positive constructive principles must complete our essay toward theological method.

First,—theology and religion must not be treated as identical terms. Religion is the great human fact that expresses the

soul's life illuminated and controlled by the vision of the divine. Theology is the mind's interpretation of this prime fact of life. Theology thus becomes instrumental and secondary to religion.

Secondly,—as a human fact, religion is not a constant quantity in any save a conceptual sense. It is a growing fact, responsive to the whole complex, growing life of a man. Theology, the intellectual interpretation of religion, must not only take account of this incessant movement of the human spirit in its response to its vision of God, but itself, as our thought about religion, is subject to the laws of thought. This inevitably means that there will be change, growth, development, in our interpretation of religion. Theology cannot be a constant quantity to be handed out to succeeding generations of thinkers; but in a living race or a living man it outgrows all arbitrary standards.

Thirdly,—the historical study of doctrine thus becomes a first principle of theological method. Every Christian doctrine must be interpreted in the light of its history. The real meaning of the doctrine must have regard not only for its origin but for its development and goal. Jesus exemplified this principle in his demand for "fulfilment" of inherited truths.

We must recognize that the ruling conceptions of any age—its science, its philosophy, and its whole outlook upon life—are inevitably reflected in its thinking and shape its doctrinal interpretations. As these conceptions grow or change from age to age with the growth of society, we must learn to discriminate between the abiding truth of a doctrine and its form in any age. Thus the great creeds and symbols of the church become landmarks, monuments, rich revelations of truth to guide us. But a creed or a doctrinal statement cannot permanently become a fixed standard. It is a witness to a spiritual reality; not the living reality itself.

On the other hand, this principle of relativity has some vital consequences for the shaping of an authoritative theology for today. Our accepted conceptions of the world must find sympathetic understanding in the terms of our theological thought. For our own "ruling conceptions" must be the vehicles of the spiritual message to us. Anachronisms may not be untrue,

but they are inadequate to produce conviction. Thus such conceptions as law, development, immanence, socialism, and the like must be the Spirit's instruments to us. Hence the theologian must know the "social consciousness" of his own times as well as of past ages.

Fourthly,—this principle of growth and development must be applied to the Biblical record precisely as to any other record of human experience. The scholar has the same rights of investigation and criticism in the Biblical record as in any other. We may not canonize any standard as an *absolutum* of truth. Thus considered, the Bible, with its precious record of God's life manifested in the experiences of men and nations and its record of God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, becomes our richest source of knowledge of the Christian religion, and our most fruitful source of directive principles for the guidance of life and thought. Considered thus, the Bible is not less essential to the work of a theologian, though it serves a somewhat different function. It becomes not so much an object of study as a means of study. For each Biblical writer is no longer a lonely oracle of revelation, but a fellow-student of the divine revelation. Nowhere are the respective angles of approach of the traditional and the modern student more radically contrasted than here. The inspiration of this latter view of the Bible, once apprehended, will be an immense incentive to vital thinking and vital religion.

Fifthly,—the contention for an "infallible rule of faith" which characterized the traditional demand for a directive standard in theology we must metamorphose into the forms of verification or tests of truth recognized by modern thinking. The synthesis of experience, history, and reason forms the tribunal where our certainties are tested. Thus theology takes its place among the sciences. It is no truer than they; but it is as true, and the theologian's passion for truth is met and satisfied in the same way. Truth lies in the maintaining of balance in the application of our tests of truth. An over-emphasis upon experience results in mysticism; an over-emphasis upon history results in a false naturalism; an over-emphasis upon reason results in rationalism. Each expresses an excess.

If an age of overgrown rationalism neglected to supplement the guidance of reason by an appeal to experience, it would seem that the excessive empiricism of our day needs to see the abiding truth of rationalism. History and experience must not be studied as merely inarticulate, successive phases of the flow of life. Reason expresses the fact that intelligence brings its own nature to the problem, and that nature is constructive and normative in its knowledge rather than passively reflective. The principle of continuity is rational as well as temporal; logical as well as successive. Thus the phases of history and experience are to be studied in their relation to the logical as well as the practical demands of life. Theology is controlled by rational necessities as well as empirical. Theology must be understood in its rational unfolding as well as in its historical. There is a true apriorism that must guide all wholesome empiricism. A theology which commands assent in any age must "function" with the logical reason as well as with practical needs.

Sixthly,—one consequence of a better analysis of religion is the disentanglement of essentials from non-essentials. This brings the clearer insight that the august fact of religion moves in the realm of moral relations. On the one hand, this insight is reflected in a modern effort to eliminate metaphysical considerations from theology. On the other hand, it is manifest in a wholesome discrimination against formalism, legalism, and traditional superstitions. The essential quality of religion is always moral. The secret of the Lord is ever with the righteous.

This becomes a controlling principle of modern theology, so that we may justly speak of the moralizing of theology as the supreme task of the reconstruction. Religion is pre-eminently a matter of ethics and not of etiquette. Theological construction must be controlled by moral earnestness and moral insight. The characteristic emphasis of modern theology is the application of the moral test to all doctrinal formulations. Spiritual authority involves moral consistency.

Seventhly,—Christian theology interprets the type of spiritual life and experience which Jesus Christ created and of which he is the supreme revelation and standard. Christian theology, therefore, is the type of religious interpretation which always

comes back to the spirit of Jesus Christ for its final test.¹¹ It stands or falls with the test of the spiritual ideal which he incarnated in his character and conduct. And we must come back again and again to the concrete historical Jesus and his gospel to measure and test the spirit of the living Christ whose guidance within us is our supreme wisdom.

Eighthly,—to summarize our point of view, the task of Christian theology is to learn the Christian gospel of the spiritual life in the fullest and clearest way in which it has been revealed—in Jesus Christ, and in all experience and history as the context of Jesus and his gospel—and then to find the vehicle for the expression of thought which shall commend that message to living men today.

This involves the sympathetic study of the consciousness of our own time. For a vital and true theology must so translate the Christian truth into the living thought of today that it will grip men's convictions, persuade their reason, and compel their affections. The best theology is that which, while conveying the spiritual message of Jesus Christ, sympathetically interprets what is true in all great historic forms of doctrine, and translates this truth into a language that shall command the moral reason of the men who live today and judge them and win them. For the practical aim of Christian theology is to bring to living men Jesus' sense of a living message from the Living God.

¹¹ This language will seem too indefinite to some readers. We desire here only to make Jesus Christ the supreme test and principle of Christian theology, without entering the field of christological theory. The acceptance of this canon of criticism is consistent with a great variety of conceptions of Jesus and his work.

CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION¹

W. W. FENN

In present theological conditions, one who is called upon to discourse concerning "natural religion as it is commonly called and understood by divines and learned men" finds himself embarrassed at the outset by the difficulty of defining his subject in accordance with the requirement, since the term is variously understood by "divines and learned men." In a recent issue of the *Harvard Theological Review* Professor Knight of Tufts College described three specific uses of the correlative terms "nature" and "supernatural," each of which, moreover, comprises many subordinate varieties. The late Dr. C. C. Everett, to whom, by the way, Professor Knight does not refer, defined the natural as "the universe considered as a composite whole," the world of cause and effect, one might say, in which the laws of Haeckel's "Substance" prevail, or the *natura naturata* of Spinoza, and the supernatural as the non-composite unity, Spinoza's *natura naturans*, which manifests itself in and through the natural. If this use be accepted, and with it Dr. Everett's definition of religion corresponding to the stage in the development of the discussion where the terms first appear, namely, as "feeling towards the supernatural," it is difficult to find any meaning for the term natural religion save as it may denote religion awakened by contemplation of nature. Otherwise, it becomes a contradiction in terms, the adjective cancelling the noun or vice versa. In substantial agreement with these definitions is the habit of regarding the supernatural as covering the realm of free personality, both human and divine, while the world of things, in which law uniformly and inexorably rules, is styled nature. Here too, since religion resides in personality and, at least among those who employ this terminology, involves a relation to personality, natural religion becomes meaningless.

¹The Dudleian Lecture, delivered in Emerson Hall, Harvard University, May 10, 1911.

Again, and perhaps more commonly, natural religion designates a religion in harmony with the nature of man—its doctrines capable of unification with his knowledge, its experiences interpreting and fulfilling all other experiences of his life. Those who accept this terminology usually identify the supernatural with the irrational and the miraculous, and regard any other than natural religion as mere superstition and ignorance which should be hounded off the face of the earth. From this point of view, it is quite immaterial how religious ideas were derived: they may have been imparted by revelation, which in this case is held, as by Toland, to denote merely the way in which the ideas were communicated, or they may have sprung up within man himself. In either case, the point is that they are capable of appropriation into the unity of thought and experience and for this reason belong under the category of natural religion. According to this definition, therefore, all religion worthy of the name is natural, as according to the former it is supernatural.

Without pursuing the analysis farther, let us assume arbitrarily, and for the purposes of the discussion, that natural religion means, what undoubtedly the founder of this lectureship understood it to mean, such knowledge of God, his existence and nature, as may be obtained by man through the exercise of his normal and rational powers directed to the study of the human and the material world. From the middle of the seventeenth to the middle of the nineteenth century, and particularly in the eighteenth, there was quite extraordinary interest in this subject, especially among the English, to whose common sense the facts of organic adaptation made convincing appeal. The literary output was remarkable—we need only mention such outstanding examples as Newton, Ray, Boyle, Derham, Wollaston, Butler, wielding a hiltless sword, Lord Brougham, Hume, Paley, Stewart, and the Bridgewater Treatises, to suggest how voluminous it was. Among divines and learned men of Dudley's time, then, it was commonly believed that the study of nature yielded results which furnished a firm and unassailable basis for revealed religion. Thus the organ of natural religion is reason, while that of revealed religion is faith, by which truths are received which the reason could not of itself have discovered although they may

be capable of appropriation by it. In the words of Culverwell, "As the unity of a Godhead is demonstrable and clear to the eye of reason, so the trinity of persons, that is, three glorious relations in one God, is as certain to an eye of faith. It is as certain to this eye of faith that Christ is truly God as it was visible to an eye both of sense and reason that he is truly man. Faith spies out the resurrection of the body as reason sees the immortality of the soul." With this understanding of the term, therefore, we have to inquire how it stands today with natural religion. Is it possible for us, using its historical materials and methods, to arrive at its conclusions, particularly with respect to the existence of God?

Robert Browning's poem "Caliban on Setebos" has for a subtitle "Natural Theology on the Island," indicating that the author included within the purpose of his poem a criticism of the methods of natural theologians by showing their fallacy when employed by so brutal a creature as Caliban. It is indeed an effective satire, so effective that we must turn for an answer from Browning to Browning, from the author of Caliban to the author of Saul, where precisely the same method of argument is used but with entire approval. Caliban cruelly and wantonly pinches off the legs of passing crabs, David's heart goes out in love and pity towards the stricken king, and each argues from himself to God. But if the method is valid in the case of David, the fault with Caliban's reasoning was not in its method but in its premises. If a base line is poorly selected, the untrustworthy results which follow do not invalidate the mathematical principles employed.

In further reply to Browning's criticism, it might be fairly urged that he has represented only in part the method he impugns, in that he has considered but one of the two principal lines of argument commonly adopted, each of which supplements the other. If the argument from man would lead to caprice or wilfulness, that from nature proves order and stability. In its more cogent forms, that is, the argument for natural religion reasons from the order and adaptations of nature to ordering intelligence and from the moral attributes of man to the benevolence of God. It is undoubtedly true that at various periods in the

history of the argument one of these methods has been emphasized sometimes to the exclusion of the other, nevertheless the foremost advocates of natural religion have perceived that both are necessary for convincing proof.

It is worth observing, moreover, that in its early years the Christian church came very near surrendering both forms on account of certain tendencies of thought which were happily pronounced heretical. If Marcion, for instance, had determined the course of Christian thinking, the argument from nature would have been put out of commission, since he and his followers distinguished between the God of revelation and the God of creation, deeming the latter, who was identified with the God of the Jews and hence of the Old Testament, an inferior being, a demiurge, very like Setebos, and consequently denied the possibility of inference from the world to the true God. The reason for this view, as for Manicheism, is all too evident in the character of the world with its mingled weal and woe, sunshine and tempest, smiling fields and destructive torrents, a haunting sense of which, as we shall hereafter see, has always chilled the ardor of advocates of natural religion and must ever weaken the demonstrative force of the argument. But the church was so tenacious of its claim to antiquity through the Old Testament and its prophecies that it refused to renounce the God of the ancient covenant and Marcion was disowned. Thus the world was saved to God, and the argument from nature occurring often in the Old Testament remained intact. "The invisible things of Him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even His everlasting power and divinity." Notwithstanding the evil in the world, the various explanations offered for which cannot here be reviewed, it was stoutly maintained that the world was God's world nevertheless, furnishing in its majesty and beauty ample evidence of a divine creator and sustainer.

Again, the attempts to deny the real humanity of Jesus menaced the second form of the argument because proceeding from a view of man which would have been destructive. This habit of thought was akin to the one just mentioned in that both associated the world and the flesh with the devil. Hence it was supposed that

the celestial Christ could not really have taken to himself sinful flesh, and all flesh was deemed sinful, but must have appeared in its likeness alone. Accordingly, it was not the natural but only the spiritual man in whom the divine image could be discerned and from whom one could argue up to God. But the church was nobly determined to maintain the humanity of Christ no less than his divinity, and in so doing committed itself to a corresponding view of humanity. Undoubtedly the Augustinian theology, deeply influenced by Augustine's earlier Manicheism, served practically to discredit an argument which, however, still remained theoretically possible. Thus, notwithstanding difficulties, the church held to a position which kept open the way of natural religion.

Plainly, however, such knowledge of God as could be derived from the works of nature had not availed to lead men to acknowledge and serve him, and in consequence the image of God in man had become hopelessly obscured. Accordingly it was held that God had made a special and additional revelation of himself in order to make more sufficient and efficient the general revelation which had proved inadequate. And thus natural religion came to be deemed rudimentary and needless. What need of the candle of the Lord in the reason of man when his sun is shining in full splendor in the sky of faith? Why turn to the beggarly rudiments of the world when in Christ is God's consummate revelation? Thus it happened, naturally enough, that, although natural religion continued to be theoretically possible, it was practically ignored. "When that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away." When gods arrive the half-gods go. So long as revelation stood secure, scant attention was paid to the dimmer, more uncertain, and less effective revelation in nature and humanity. Thus the matter stood through centuries of Christian teaching until the Renaissance and the Reformation.

The rise of Humanism brought, as has often been remarked, a rediscovery both of nature and of man, and was accompanied by a discrediting of the authority of the church as custodian of revelation. The Protestant Reformation was a direct attack upon the historic church, although the reality of revelation was

stoutly defended, but inevitably the shifting of the seat of authority tended to weaken the sense of authority and Christianity itself fell under suspicion and into uncertainty. Naturally, therefore, there came a return to natural religion, and the two arguments from nature and from man came to the front. Very rapidly we must trace the fortunes of these two arguments, beginning with that from nature.

This argument had been revived earlier by Raymond de Sebonde, a Spanish physician, professor of theology and medicine at Toulouse, who in 1486 published his *Theologia Naturalis*, on account of which he has sometimes been called the father of natural religion. The author's preface is highly significant. It affirms that the treatise relies upon no authority, not even that of the Bible, for its aim is to confirm that which is put forth in the sacred Scriptures and to lay the foundations upon which we may be able to build that which is contained in them. Thus, so far as we are concerned, the teaching precedes both Old Testament and New. God has given us two books, that of the universal order of things and that of the Bible. The former was first given from the beginning of the world, for every creature is but a letter traced by the hand of God, so that of a great multitude of creatures, like a great number of letters, this book is composed, in which man finds himself and is, as it were, the capital and principal letter. The second book of the sacred Scriptures was afterwards given to man and this in the failure of the other, in which (so blind was he!) he saw nothing. Hence the first is known to all the world and not the second, for one must be a clerk to be able to read. Besides, the book of nature cannot be falsified, effaced, or falsely interpreted, neither can heretics pervert it, and in it can be no heresy, quite unlike the book of the Bible. Both have proceeded from the same Master. God has given us the creatures as he has given us the Scriptures. Hence they agree well with one another and do not contradict each other.

This suggests a much more modern treatment than the book really contains, for the author goes on to say that no one is able to read in this great book of nature unless he is first purged of his original sin and illuminated by grace—both of which apparently

depend upon the agency of the church. Nevertheless, here in the first half of the fifteenth century is a truly remarkable utterance concerning natural religion which is a fit introduction to the literature that was to follow.

Starting from the physical world as it is in our knowledge, subsequent arguments for natural religion may be roughly grouped under the categories of Cause and Design—from the world as effect to God as creative cause, and from the order and adaptations of the world to Intelligence as controlling and co-ordinating all. In Hume's *Dialogue concerning Natural Religion*, these arguments are subjected to rigorous examination. The dialogue form which Hume adopted was peculiarly suitable to the circumstances in which he wrote, for it enabled him to state objections without committing himself to them, and so successfully was it employed that there is still uncertainty with which person in the debate he identifies himself—Philo or Cleanthes. For our purposes, however, the question is of no importance, since the arguments stand or fall by their own weight and not by his authority. With reference to the argument from order to Intelligence there is an objection advanced by Hume, more thoroughly developed by Romanes, which is staggering. Within the limits of our experience and observation do order and adaptation invariably prove active intelligence? That can hardly be maintained in face of animal instincts, for the beaver constructs its dam and the bee its comb in a way marvellously adapted to the end sought, but can we say that intelligent recognition of that end and direction of activity towards it have achieved the result? Can intelligence be predicated of the beaver and the bee? It may be pleaded indeed that there is a sort of unconscious intelligence resident within the animal or the insect because of its participation in the universal world-intelligence which works through it, but such an answer presupposes the very thing which is to be proved. If, then, our own experience does not entitle us to affirm that order and adaptation invariably proceed from intelligence, with what plausibility can it be argued that similar facts on the cosmic scale point demonstratively to Intelligence as creative and guiding power? The analogy breaks down and the argument collapses, and this even without reference to the theory of evolution which has affected

disastrously the argument as employed by believers in special creation. In fact, the principal effect of the acceptance of the theory of evolution has been to shift the argument from adaptation to order, and accordingly to find in the imposing system of natural laws, including those of evolution, evidence of determining intelligence—an argument which, notwithstanding the severe criticism to which it has been subjected, still holds the field and is the most persuasive form in which the ancient reasoning from the world to God can now be presented.

With regard to the causal argument it is needless to repeat the familiar criticisms. Even if the causal idea be held valid beyond the realm of experience, it would warrant us in arguing only to a cause sufficient to produce the given effects and not to a cause surpassing them. But remembering Hume's own notion of cause, it is impossible to believe that he intended to have either of his imaginary disputants taken as representative of his own opinions. Much has been made of the point that the causal idea obliges us to choose between an uncaused first cause and an infinite regress, but is not the one alternative as inconceivable as the other? Certainly no argument can be pronounced demonstrative which at its conclusion offers us two alternatives both equally inconceivable.

Finally, there is the objection that neither argument, nor both combined, would justify the attributing of benevolence to the creating and directing cause. The formal conclusion of Hume's argument seems to be that we are warranted in affirming intelligence but not goodness from the facts of the world. This has been the outcome of many another investigation before and since. The facts of evil in the world are too numerous and appalling to be blinked. Nor has the doctrine of evolution done so much to help matters as many seem to suppose. Rather, it has deepened the problem by teaching that suffering is not merely incidental but is, so to speak, inherent within the nature of things and essential to the progress of which so much is magnificently and amusingly said. What if a good end has been attained in man,—still the result is but partial and along a single path; the suffering of animals has not abated since man appeared save as he has grown merciful, and the tender mercies of mankind are

often cruel to the animal world; and, what is more, we are by no means prepared to accept uncritically on behalf of God a plea which we often despise in the case of man, that the end justifies the means. Hence, as many urge, of whom McTaggart may be mentioned as a single representative, in view of the facts of evil God cannot be regarded as omnipotent or even as supremely powerful and also good: if we reason from the facts of the world to a creative intelligence, the same facts constrain us to deny his goodness or his power. In the words of our own honorably remembered Professor Cooke, "I do not believe, however, in any sense that nature proves the goodness of God. . . . So prominent indeed is the evil in nature, and so insidiously and mysteriously does it pervade the whole system, that an argument to prove the malignity of God could be made to appear quite as plausible as the arguments which are frequently urged to prove his pure benevolence." It may be indeed that the presence of evil in the world is not incompatible with goodness, provided goodness can be otherwise established, but if natural religion appeals to the world, to the world it must go and abide by its verdict—Not proven.

But it is frequently pleaded that all this proceeds in forgetfulness of the fact that man also is part of nature and that in his advancing worth appears the end towards which nature has all along been striving. That is to say, many present-day champions of natural religion insist that its line must be drawn to include man as the interpretation of nature. This is indeed true but irrelevant to the present issue, for, let us repeat, the development has not been along a single line or even along many lines converging in man. And it is absurd to argue that the goodness in man justifies the evil in the world.

This particular use, however, of the theoretical incorporation of man into nature in an effort to make good the defects of an argument from the purely physical world is comparatively recent, and a word must be said about a much earlier form taken by the second of the principal lines of argument for natural religion—that from the nature of man to God. It is a form which flourished in the period of the Deists in England. The great conflict between Protestantism and Romanism, a conflict waged not in

the world of ideas alone but unhappily also on the battlefields of earth, with men and not ideas alone as combatants bent on one another's destruction, was still fresh in memory, and the wrangling sects of Protestantism were perpetuating the strife. Naturally there was great longing for peace, and how could it be attained better than by emphasizing the points of agreement among warring parties, which indeed were far more numerous and significant than those on which they differed, and if these agreements could be established upon some other authority than that of the Bible, with its almost limitless possibilities of interpretation and misinterpretation, so much the better. Hence we find Lord Herbert of Cherbury announcing five truths of natural religion which, as he believed, were innate in man and consequently were in need of no external support. The five points were: there is one highest divine being; this being is to be worshipped; the most important part of his worship consists in virtue and piety; blasphemy and crime must be atoned for by repentance; punishment and reward follow after this life. These ideas Herbert believed to be implicit in the nature of man in such a way that, whenever an appropriate occasion arose, they mounted into his consciousness with unimpeachable authority. But were not these the essentials of religion upon which not only all Christians but also all men, just because they were men, were agreed, and did they not offer a certain and sufficient basis of unity and ground of peace? The attempt was at least stimulating, and attention was directed to the mind of man in the hope of discovering there as a universal possession, if not these particular points of Lord Herbert, at any rate certain *notitiae communes* constituting natural religion. Into the history of these various attempts we cannot go. They were made both by those who accepted and by those who denied revelation. Mention must be made, however, of a form of the undertaking which is of especial interest to us gathered here to-night in Emerson Hall. The argument seemed to have received its quietus when Locke denied innate ideas, although Lord Herbert himself seems to have put it in a form which would have permitted his followers to reply that they meant not exactly ideas but rather tendencies to action of such a sort that these ideas were their legitimate and

necessary intellectual formulations. But this form also was threatened when Kant affirmed the reality of these tendencies as mental forms but denied them validity outside the world of experience. Yet it was soon asked, Why this denial which virtually throws us into scepticism? If the integration of man with nature be acknowledged, shall we not find the unity of both in one all-embracing life of God whereof each is manifestation? If this be so, then man and nature are of one tissue and structure and the forms of human thinking are also the forms of nature's activity. Then man is the clearer revelation of that which, or of Him who, is the very inmost being of man and nature both. What is latent in nature is patent in man. This was the creative idea of Emerson and of the New England Transcendentalists. Accordingly, by them, the basis of religion was found in the human soul as bearer of God himself within which were found certain intuitions—the idea of God, the sentiment of duty, the assurance of immortality—which as inalienable possessions of humanity were therefore unquestionable disclosures of God. How illogical and silly to seek a revelation from without, while God was thus perpetually and universally revealing himself within! Here was natural religion; and what more was needed, if indeed more had been given?

But intuitions are dubious things, and knowledge of earlier races and of contemporary peoples in early stages of development by no means serves to confirm the optimistic confidence of Parker, for example, that the farther back one goes the clearer and purer become these intuitions. In fact, is it not more likely that these supposed intuitions are actual inculcations for which centuries of Christian thinking and training are responsible? The argument which once seemed irrefragable soon lost cogency.

Meanwhile, however, there had developed a metaphysical form of the argument much more profound and promising. The question was not so much whether our detailed knowledge of the world or of man indicates God as whether our knowledge as such, in form, that is, rather than content, does not necessarily imply God. The world of sense is discontinuous, that of our knowledge is unified: does reality correspond to sense or to

knowledge? If to the latter, then it also is unified and structural, and consciousness furnishes the only form we know for the organization of reality into unity. Is not God, therefore, necessarily implied in our knowledge? The inquiry involved one of the paradoxes which rejoice a metaphysical mind. The content of our knowledge may lead us to doubt or even deny the existence of God but the structure of the denial involves the affirmation of that which is denied. We cannot guarantee the value of our denial save by a tacit affirmation of that which is openly denied. Into this form of the argument it would be superfluous to enter further, for here at Harvard all its phases are perfectly familiar, as well as all the criticisms of it. Suffice it to say that thus theism becomes part of the general epistemological problem. To accept the validity of knowledge in its detailed contents and deny the structure of our knowledge would seem absurd. And if, acknowledging that the trustworthiness of knowledge in concrete detail is not susceptible of logical demonstration, we nevertheless accept it by a sort of ontological good faith, it is hard to see why a similar procedure is not equally warranted with reference to the structural implications of knowledge.

It is remarkable, however, that the course of natural religion, which started among the common ways of men with a simplicity which promised universal comprehension and acceptance, should have led us to these heights of speculation whither only the more reflective philosophers dare climb and in whose rarefied atmosphere only the stout-hearted can dwell. It seems to have fetched a wide compass around to that earlier view of Varro as represented by Augustine which appears to have identified natural religion with an esoteric cult of the philosophers. Surely this is not the sort of natural religion contemplated by the founder of this lectureship, which was to serve as the solid foundation upon which in the succeeding years of a student's life was to be raised the imposing structure of good old-fashioned New England Congregationalism. Can such a natural religion as this ever become universal?

Here, then, it becomes necessary to draw the distinction between theology and religion, and to confess that so far we have been speaking of natural theology and not of natural religion. That

the two ideas have been confused throughout the process we have been hastily sketching is the only excuse for not making the differentiation earlier. But in a book written a generation ago by J. R. Seeley, and properly entitled *Natural Religion*, the distinction was made, and it was shown with almost prophetic insight and power that there already existed a natural religion of a kind hitherto unrecognized which was destined to increase in depth and richness. In truth, Seeley's book, now almost forgotten, seems to me one of the most significant contributions ever made to the literature of the subject, which should have marked a turning-point in thought concerning natural religion quite as noteworthy as that which his *Ecce Homo* made in the popular appreciation of Jesus. For the tendency which he was keen enough to detect has gone on apace, until it has become the most important factor in the religious world of today. The Christian church bewails its diminishing influence, which indeed is a palpable fact, but it has been slow to recognize that outside its borders there has been growing a religious life which it has inspired only indirectly, if at all, and which it by no means nourishes or directs. This extra-confessional and extra-ecclesiastical religious life seeks no alliance with any church, nor would it find itself at home there, but it cherishes a love of truth so pure and ardent that even the most precious traditional beliefs are willingly relinquished in obedience to its august demands, a devotion to goodness which stops at no expenditure of time or treasure or effort that it may give greater happiness and worth to other lives, a love of beauty which demands a city and a country beautiful, and is resolved that even the humblest shall be surrounded by the ennobling influences of art and music and educated into aesthetic appreciation. The point to be insisted upon, then, is the actual presence in the world today of a genuine, although unconventional, religious life wholly independent of ancient forms however tender and sacred as well as of historic tradition however uplifting. It concerns itself not a whit with the arguments we have been rehearsing, finding indeed ominous intimations in the word, as if we had been rehearsing arguments long since dead and buried. It knows not the language of Canaan or even of Jerusalem, still less of Nicaea and Geneva, for its speech smacks

wholesomely of the soil and the twentieth century, nor has it the faintest interest in the endeavor to translate its utterances into the hieratic dialect of formal religion. Yet as the modern man confronts the world of nature and of man, he makes direct and immediate response in natural religion. No worshipper ever felt more deeply the majesty and wonder of his God than the student of science feels, in reasonable awe, the sublime order of the universe. Those who only accept at second hand the conclusions of scientific scholars seldom know in their own experience the sobering and fructifying sense of mystery which often descends upon a reflecting master in the realms of science. He knows full well that the mystery of the world has not been dispelled, rather has it been deepened by enlarging knowledge. True, a man of science may refuse to allow himself to dwell upon the mystery he can but feel, lest it should seduce him from his appointed task, but the mystery is there, he feels it, and sometimes the analytic mind of the scholar yields to the appreciative mind of the man—more often, I fancy, than is generally supposed. The sense of mystery always has accompanied religion, and whoever faces today the world of nature thoughtfully is filled with awe. In addition, religion has inspired a feeling of confidence because of assurance that God was on the side of his worshipper, yet no devotee ever offered his prayer with half the confidence that a modern engineer constructs a bridge. This ordered world can be trusted not to deny itself or betray one who puts intelligent confidence in it. Schleiermacher and Calvin, each in his own way, emphasized the feeling of dependence as essential to religion until there was need to bring to the front again the dignity and worth of the individual man, but neither Calvin nor Schleiermacher nor any of their followers in piety ever felt more strongly the sense of dependence than does the man who today acknowledges the absolute sovereignty of natural laws, and Channing never taught more convincingly the worth of man than does he who, recognizing his dependence, is assured, nevertheless, that to him is given through knowledge of laws ability to control the forces of nature to serve his purposes. Whether or no the universe is animated by a purpose which directs its course towards the highest ends, it is at least amenable

to the ideals of man and may be guided by him towards their realization. No investigator has the least fear that his researches will unlock a force fatal to the highest life of man. On the contrary, he is confident that the unmeasured resources of the universe may all be utilized for human well-being. In this perfect trust and confidence is there not something corresponding to the trust which the old-time worshipper reposed in his God? The order of the universe may not lend itself as of old to the argument of natural theology, but it does far more, it inspires natural religion in the breast of man. Furthermore, the remarkable fact is that the evil of the world, which as we have seen always menaced natural theology, does not seem to impair this natural religion. One who knows nature at first hand is fully and keenly aware of her awful tragedies, nevertheless it is precisely he who often finds in nature a pure delight, rising at times to a sense of companionship which is the very acme of spiritual joy. Natural religion, then, solves in experience the problem which natural theology has so far failed to solve in thought. Thus increasing knowledge of nature has given to the modern man the religious feelings towards nature which the worshipper has cherished towards his God. There are the same feelings of awe, trust, spiritual companionship, only they seem not to be directed towards the same object.

The same fact appears even more markedly in the world of man whence natural theology sought to draw its second great argument. If love of man is of the essence of religion, it surely is not lacking nowadays among those who would not call themselves religious, and who certainly are not religious if judged by conventional ecclesiastical standards. The church honors men like St. Francis of Assisi and the holy martyrs who surrendered all their goods and even life itself in obedience to the command of Christ, but in our own time not once nor twice have we seen young men, and old men too for that matter, turning their backs upon comfort and ease and devoting time, energy, and life to the welfare of their fellows, not in obedience to Christ, but at the bidding of their own sympathetic friendliness. The world may pronounce such men fanatics, fools, and crack-brained enthusiasts, yet in their "fanaticism" is exhibited a spirit which now is

stirring mightily in the souls of men and which is thoroughly religious in character. All about us, thronging the ways of men, are those who never talk about loving their fellows, who in fact would shrink from the pompous phrase, but whose hearts abound in friendliness and good will. They are not blind to the wickedness of men but find in it their supreme incentive to self-sacrificing service. They do not call themselves religious, and if religion is indicated by church attendance and by formal profession, they are not religious, but in reality they are men of natural religion.

Natural Theology has heretofore busied itself chiefly with the world of nature and of man, seeking thence to derive arguments for the existence of God. With the possible exception of the argument based on the general system of laws which interprets the prevailing order of things and the metaphysical argument which endeavors to unfold the implications of knowledge, these attempts must be pronounced logically unsuccessful as they have proved practically insufficient. Meanwhile, however, there has sprung up a natural religion, nourished in good part by the very influences which have been subverting the old-time natural theology, which is genuinely religious in feeling and will-attitude. Not that there may not be higher and purer forms of religion than this which has been described, for there may be deeper appreciation of the object by which these religious feelings are awakened and to which they are responsive. Thus is revealed the function of natural theology, which is so to interpret and correlate this natural religion as to carry it over into the world of thought. Such questions as the following, then, will be raised by natural theology. What must be the real nature of a world towards which, notwithstanding its abundant appearances of irrationality and inhumanity, those who know it most thoroughly have grown to entertain such sentiments of awe approaching reverence, of trustful confidence, and even of sympathetic comradeship, sentiments which have deepened instead of diminishing with more intimate knowledge? What is the meaning of the feeling with which man, as part of this mysterious universe, regards himself and his fellows, of his ideals which far outrun his actual, and his hopes which promise indefinitely more than eye hath seen or ear

heard for the ever-greatening future of humanity? The answer to such inquiries rests with natural theology, an answer for which the metaphysical investigation into the implications of knowledge furnishes precedent and method and indeed offers the most satisfactory suggestion. Let it be added also that Christianity, which has been changing in recent years with almost incredible rapidity, has so far universalized its distinctive concepts that it is in a fair way to become in its new form at once an interpretation and a fulfilment of this natural religion.

THE IDEA OF A MODERN ORTHODOXY

DOUGLAS C. MACINTOSH

YALE UNIVERSITY

Systematic theology is, and of right ought to be, primarily practical. In the first place, true religion is both one of the ends of an ideal human life and, in the long run, an indispensable means to the morality which is most essential to human welfare, inner and outer. In the second place, theology is necessary as an instrument for the proper control of the development and expression of religion—a special case of the function of ideas in the control of life. It follows, therefore, that a sound theology is a human necessity. The purpose of the theologian, whatever else it may or must include, must be to find those religious truths which are essential to the vitality and efficiency of the best type of human religion.

That this has really been the aim of theologians in the great formative periods of the history of Christian doctrine may readily be shown. The prevailing impression with regard to orthodoxy and excluded heresies is that the distinction between them is arbitrary and external. This is indeed to the modern mind true in large measure of the distinction between the old orthodoxy and heresy; but in their own day this distinction was neither arbitrary nor external. Then it was organically related to the most pressing of problems; it was supremely vital, for the issues involved were nothing short of spiritual life and death.

Examine, for instance, the theology of that pillar of Greek Christian orthodoxy, Athanasius. The religious interest of the day centred in the question of immortality. Athanasius, as the spokesman of orthodoxy, was supremely concerned to conserve the assurance of a blessed immortality. Man, as such, according to the presuppositions of the Greek mind, was essentially corruptible and mortal. Only the divine was incorruptible, immortal. For corruptible, mortal human nature to put on incorruption and

immortality, it must become partaker of the divine nature throughout; it must participate in the very substance of the eternally perfect God himself. If, then, Christianity was to be a veritable gospel to the Greek mind, it was essential to maintain that in Christ humanity was permeated through and through with the very being and essence of God. This is the key to the Nicene formulation, with its insistent repetition, "the only-begotten Son of God, begotten of the Father before all worlds, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten not made, consubstantial with the Father." As Athanasius explains, "Mankind is perfected in Him and restored, as it was made at the beginning, nay, with greater grace. For, on rising from the dead, we shall no longer fear death, but shall ever reign in Christ in the heavens. And this has been done, since the own Word of God Himself, who is from the Father, has put on the flesh and become man. For if, being a creature, he had become man, man had remained just what he was, not joined to God. . . . For man had not been deified if joined to a creature, or unless the Son were very God; nor had man been brought into the Father's presence, unless he had been His natural and true Word who had put on the body. . . . Therefore the union was of this kind, that He might unite what is in man by nature to him who is in the nature of the Godhead, and his salvation and deification might be sure." (*Orationes contra Arianos*, ii, 67, 70.) The one fatal defect of practically all the heresies rejected by the orthodox Greek Christians was their failure to conserve in thought the one supremely important religious value—the gospel of eternal life.

It was not otherwise with the theological thought of Western Christendom in its earlier formative period. Here the *Cur Deus Homo* is perhaps our most striking example. Anselm's object in this epoch-making treatise was to show, not by means of the substance-philosophy of the Greeks, but by means of those juridical ideas which were vital in the experience of his contemporaries, that it was impossible for man "to enjoy a happy immortality . . . unless God became man, and unless all things were to take place which we hold with regard to Christ." From the point of view of the Western mediaeval mind with its Romanized conceptions, it was indispensable for the complete satisfaction of

God's honor in view of man's infinite sin, that there be either the suffering of finite man for an infinitely long period or the suffering of an infinite being, God as well as man, for a finite period. Thus the only alternative to everlasting damnation for every sinner was to be found in the reality of the vicarious, penal suffering of him who was God and man in one person. Here again the decisive consideration leading to the selection of the belief in "God in Christ" as orthodox, in opposition to all deviating positions as heretical, was the interest in the conservation of indispensable religious values. If there was to be blessedness, eternal life, for man, the substitutionary punishment of the God-man seemed indispensable; and so long as the older presuppositions existed, all deviations from this position were inevitably dreaded by Protestant and Catholic alike as damnable heresies.

But this suggests a special reason why theological construction is important in the present situation. The old orthodoxies were true hypothetically. That is, if salvation, blessedness, eternal life, is possible only on the conditions presupposed by ancient or mediaeval thought, then the central elements of those orthodoxies must be maintained, for Christian faith must hold that salvation is possible. But the fact is that the older presuppositions are not those of the modern mind. We no longer adhere to the metaphysical presuppositions of the ancient Greek church, nor to the external legalism of the mediaeval churches, Roman and Protestant. Advances in scientific knowledge have caused changes in the views, not simply of the technical philosopher, but of the average man of today. Changes in human interests and activities also, partly caused by new knowledge, partly otherwise, have produced their characteristic changes in thought, so that religion is in a radically altered situation in the modern world. It is no longer necessary for us to believe the old orthodoxies upon the old grounds; and so the question arises, Is it necessary to believe them at all, and if so, why? The former orthodoxies were good, but they seem to have grown stale. They successfully met situations which no longer exist.

What is obviously suggested by these facts is the idea of a modern orthodoxy, a formulation of the doctrines necessary and effective for the conservation of the faith which will meet the

vital religious needs of the modern man.¹ This does not mean a return to traditionalism and the appeal to an external authority. That is no longer possible for the emancipated intellect. If we accept Professor William Adams Brown's recent definition of the new theology, in his article entitled "The Old Theology and the New,"² as "the theology whose method is determined by the results of modern scientific movement, both on the objective side in the acceptance of development as the law of the physical universe, and on the subjective side by the recognition of the contribution which the mind itself makes to the content of its own knowledge," we are fast approaching a state of affairs where all must be new theologians. The autonomy of the thinking subject must be as fully respected in theology as in mathematics and physics.

But neither does the idea of a modern orthodoxy imply the setting up of a new traditionalism which shall bind the minds and consciences of future Christians to those formulations which express our independent convictions. Never again must there be placed about the neck of religion the millstone of dogmas enforced by external authority. Although there is still need of a greater confidence in the dependableness of the spirit of man at its best, freedom in religion is being rapidly realized, and will undoubtedly be a permanent achievement of humanity. Henceforth the great religious problem is not freedom but truth.

Not a reversion, then, to traditionalism and the orthodoxy of the past, just because it was the orthodoxy of that day, nor yet the establishing of a new traditionalism for the future, is what is meant by a modern orthodoxy, but, with frank acceptance of the modern situation and the liberal concession to others of the freedom we demand for ourselves, we mean the intelligent conservation, by means of theological construction, of the religious values which are vital today. Professor Brown, in the article referred to, says that the questions at issue between the various

¹ It will be readily understood that what is here suggested is something very different in idea from the "modern orthodox" movement in Germany, as represented by such writers as Theodor Kaftan, Seeberg, Stange, Dunkmann, and Grützmacher. That is essentially an attempt to convince the modern mind of the truth of the ancient and mediaeval orthodoxy.

² Harvard Theological Review, January, 1911.

representatives of the new theology are only differences of detail, and that, as compared with the issues which separate the new theology from the old, they are secondary and may be overlooked. The ties that bind together the various types of new theology are, as Professor Brown asserts, primarily intellectual. And it is this fact, as it seems to me, that constitutes at once the strength and the weakness of the newer movement as a whole. Because of the greater intellectual defensibility of the new, it will undoubtedly succeed in displacing the old. But will it minister to the needs of the modern man better than, or as well as, the older orthodoxy ministered to the demands of the religious spirit of its own day? This is the crucial question. Deeper even than the line of cleavage between the old theology and the new is the dividing line between the modern theology which is conservative of vital Christian faith and that whose only asset is its liberalism. There is a closer and more vital bond of union between Christians who, whether of the old theological persuasion or the new, are supremely interested in the christianization of the world, than there is between those whose sole bond of sympathy is antagonism to traditionalism in religious belief. The new theology, viewed in the large, is full of heresies; besides much that is sound and vital, it contains much that is destructive not simply of the orthodoxy of the past—that is a comparatively light matter and even in some respects a cause for congratulation—but it contains also much that is incompatible with a *modern* orthodoxy, a theology which shall conserve the genuine and essential religious values of the present.

If we attempt to apply this idea of a free but discriminating modern orthodoxy, the preliminary question arises, What are the essential religious interests of today? In brief, man is still in need of religious peace combined with moral power. Perhaps the modern emphasis is upon the need of power, whereas the former insistence was upon the necessity of peace; but religious assurance is still indispensable, not only as an end in itself, but as a means to the highest degree of spiritual power. While continuing, then, to emphasize the ideas that strengthen the sense of responsibility and the demand for spiritual power, we need to achieve anew in the modern world the Christocentric faith that

the supreme power in the universe has been revealed to us in the character of Jesus Christ and in his attitude toward men. To conserve in the serious worker for individual and social regeneration a joyous confidence in the saving love of God, in so far as this can be done by a system of thought, is the task for which a modern orthodoxy is demanded.

How, then, is this ethico-religious faith to be conserved in the life of the modern man? Not by a simple return to the standards of the past, for, while much can be learned from a discriminating study of the way in which doctrine ministered to life in the past, it must be remembered that what was heretical and injurious to faith, when taught in connection with certain presuppositions formerly held, has in some instances come to be integrated into the very essentials of vital Christian faith. As an example one has only to cite the ancient heresy of patripassianism reappearing in the vital Christian doctrine that human sin causes suffering to God the Father, who, because of his love, is the great vicarious Sin-bearer for the salvation of the world. Moreover, on the other hand, much of the old orthodoxy is, in the modern situation, not so much heretical as irrelevant; it is not a live hypothesis. What is needed today is that the minister as theologian shall take account of the ways in which the interests of present-day Christian faith are being threatened by various tendencies of contemporary thought, and that he learn how these modern heresies may be eliminated from the new theology.

The chief heresies of the new theology may be grouped, I believe, into two main classes, the ultra-monistic heresies and the ultra-pluralistic heresies. The heresies of an ultra-monistic point of view were typically and somewhat sensationally set forth by R. J. Campbell in his much-discussed book, *The New Theology*. Some rationalistic monists deviate still further from the essentials of an ethico-religious faith in the direction of an all-engulfing Brahministic pantheism, while others do not go so far; but any view which merges man in a deterministic Absolute so as to threaten his responsible freedom; any view which tends to explain away moral evil as merely negative, as entirely due to mere immaturity, the absence of being, or to mere ignorance, the absence of knowing; or to explain it as a necessary means to good,

and therefore itself in reality good—any such view is plainly too inimical to moral values to have place in the faith of Christianity as the truly ethical religion, and is therefore to be rejected as a dangerous and destructive heresy. And indeed it is not simply as not moral enough that ultra-monism is to be rejected; it is defective religiously as well. If from the absolute point of view the validity of the distinction between moral good and evil is overcome, what we as moral beings must call moral evil is to be taken as a revelation of God, as well as what we must call moral good. All reality, as having its place in a rational and orderly system, is regarded as equally divine; or, if any degrees of revelation are recognized, the criterion of the divine is held to be intellectual power and clearness of ideas, rather than that highest good, the good will. What warrant then is there that our highest human values, including morality, will be conserved by a God or Absolute of whom morality cannot be predicated?

Ultra-monistic heresies, then, are objectionable primarily on the moral grounds that they depotentiate man and belie morality, and ultimately on religious grounds as well, as giving no satisfying view of God. Ultra-pluralistic heresies, on the other hand, are to be rejected primarily on the religious grounds that they depotentiate God and tend to make religion impossible or futile. A thorough-going pluralism which holds that reality is and always has been composed of a collection of absolutely independent individuals, is so irreligious as to be practically atheistic, and in the case of McTaggart of the University of Cambridge the atheism is explicitly avowed. But it makes little difference religiously whether or not the pluralist asserts that one of the non-interacting individuals is God; this isolated pluralistic God cannot act on the lives of other individuals, nor, according to thorough-going statements of the theory, upon the world or anything but the contents of his own inner life. Whether there is such a God or not, it is to man as if there were none; such a God can do nothing for him

A less extreme but still objectionable pluralism is that which has gained considerable currency through the philosophical writings of the late Professor William James and some others. This theory does not deny the possibility of God's acting upon

or within the life of man, but it restricts the divine presence and activity to those comparatively rare and more or less highly abnormal experiences that seem to be limited, practically, to people of highly emotional and "mystical" temperament,³ and which it is now the fashion to interpret as due to the emergence above the threshold of consciousness of activities originating in a supposedly more or less psychical subconscious department of life. A recent noteworthy development of this theory is to be found in Professor Sanday's *Christologies Ancient and Modern*, where he uses this conception of the relation of God to man in his interpretation of the real divinity and real humanity of Christ. The religious weakness of this view is partially admitted by Professor James when he says, "That the God with whom, starting from the hither side of our own extra-marginal self, we come at its remoter margin into commerce should be the absolute world-ruler, is of course a very considerable over-belief."⁴ But more than that, such a God—not to dwell upon the acknowledged possibility that it may be gods, rather than God—such a God is necessarily absent from much and indeed by far the most of what is of greatest value in human life and experience. What is qualitatively most like our ideal of the divine has, for the most part, nothing whatever to do with the real God. The true, the beautiful, and the good in human life would become the only worthy object of human worship, and God himself be almost negligible. In no comprehensive sense could he be said to be Saviour of the world. In all but a comparatively small fraction of his life, man would be necessarily irreligious, if indeed any one could be really religious at first hand,—except one who happened to have a consciousness with what Professor James calls a "leaky margin," or unusual openness of the "subliminal door," one who is at least liable to have trances and various sorts of sensory and motor automatisms. Is that faith completely

³ When the mystic interprets all reality from the point of view gained within the mystical experience in its more extreme forms, the result is an extreme monism in which the individuality of man is merged in that of God; when he interprets life and reality from the ordinary non-mystical point of view of common sense while attaching religious value to the mystical experience alone, a somewhat too pluralistic world-view is the result.

⁴ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 518.

Christian which is satisfied to say that it is not in God, but in occasional subconscious touch with him, that we live and move and have our being? One may be forgiven, surely, for refusing to believe, as a recent writer has put it—rather too strongly perhaps, but still strikingly—“that the feet of the supernatural deliberately choose to tread the slime of the subliminal . . . while avoiding the sunlit hills of full rational consciousness.”⁶

It would seem then that the modern theologian is between Scylla and Charybdis. How may he avoid both of these opposite dangers,—on the one hand that of being ensnared by the devil of ultra-pluralism, and on the other hand that of being engulfed in the deep sea of ultra-monism? Or, positively, how is he to conserve for the modern mind the essentials of a vital ethico-religious faith? Truly, it is no insignificant service that is demanded of the constructive theologian of today. He must do for himself and for his generation what Athanasius and Anselm and others like them did for their earlier days; he must find or frame an orthodoxy for the times. Is there any theologian or any school of theologians whose members are successfully addressing themselves to this task?

It may not be invidious, perhaps, to express the opinion that among all the various schools and tendencies of modern theological thought, the Ritschlian theology is most deserving of attention in this regard. It has serious shortcomings, indeed, but it starts well and is doubtless upon the right track. It is pre-eminently a Christocentric theology. It finds its normative revelation of God in the person and work of Christ as the founder of the kingdom of God among men; Christianity is the religion of the Christ-like God. All that is involved in this Christocentric principle must have place in one's theology, as belonging to the essentials of Christian faith; all that contradicts it, as, for example, certain features of extreme monism and extreme pluralism, must be rejected as heretical; all that is neutral may be left as irrelevant or at least comparatively unimportant. Theology, it is maintained, must be religious, and not speculative; ethical, and not mystical; evangelically Christian, and not syncretistic.

⁶ F. M. Davenport, *Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals*, p. 280.

In these propositions lie the strength of Ritschlianism, and at the same time its weakness. On the one hand they guarantee that no content will be admitted into the theology which would destroy its vital essence, namely, faith in the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has revealed himself for our moral redemption. This vital content would be imperilled if the results of metaphysical speculation, or of suggestion in mystical experience, or of the comparative study of religions were uncritically admitted to a place in our theology. But on the other hand the content of a permanently Christocentric theology might be further developed by the fructifying influence of the speculations of the philosopher, the suggestions and inner assurances of the mystic, and the discoveries of the student of other religions. And, what is more important still, to tell the Christian thinker that he must not use the content of his Christian faith as an hypothesis in metaphysical speculation, nor seek to reassure himself of the truth of his faith in the immediacy of religious feeling, nor submit his religion to the test of the survival of the fittest in competition with the great faiths of the world, is to imperil Christian certainty, and thus in the end to endanger the content of our faith itself; for it encourages the doubt that perhaps the Christocentric faith is not capable of meeting these varied tests of thought and feeling and action. Surely our Christian faith is made of sterner stuff than this timidity of the Ritschlians would suggest.

The fact is, Ritschlianism has the primary qualifications for being the orthodoxy of the modern man, but it greatly needs to be supplemented. One of the criticisms commonly directed against it is that its judgments are subjective evaluations with no sufficient guarantee of their objective validity, as, for example, in the case of the divinity of Christ, where it is claimed that the Ritschlian doctrine may be interpreted as meaning that if Christ is felt to have divine value for our experience, he is divine; if not, he is not divine. It is commonly held that greater explicitness is desirable with reference to the divinity of Christ, perhaps largely because of the central place which that doctrine has had in the orthodoxy of the past. It is claimed that an "ethical" divinity is not enough; in other words, it is not enough to say that the moral quality of Jesus' life is good enough to be called

divine, nor even to say that he was the man who did the divine work of bringing salvation to the human race. There must be predicated, it is declared, an essential or metaphysical divinity, such as has always been held among the orthodox Christians. But according to the idea of a modern orthodoxy, if an essential divinity of Christ is to be asserted, it must be because the genuine religious needs of the time demand it, not because it has been believed in the past. That there is in reality a present religious need for the doctrine of the essential divinity of Christ is best shown by turning from christology to theology proper. The other side of the doctrine of the "ethical" divinity of Christ is the Christocentric doctrine of God; or, in other words, if Christ is like God, then God is like Christ. But if we are entitled to say that God is like Christ, we must and may go farther. If God is really like Christ, he must, like Christ, be actually doing what the Christ-like spirit everywhere must do; that is, he must be not simply providing for humanity in an external way, but working for the salvation, the moral redemption, of humanity as effectively as it is possible for God to do. Now if this means anything at all, if God is not merely a good-natured being who wishes us well, but can do nothing for us, it means that the saving effect of Christ's work in human history is, in the full sense of the word, God's doing. Thus we conclude that God is not merely *like* Christ; God was *in* Christ, reconciling the world to himself, and thereby redeeming, regenerating, and progressively perfecting the sons of men. But if God was in Christ, by parity of reasoning we must conclude that God was and is in the Christ-like everywhere; and here we come upon the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit, or the christianized form of the doctrine of the immanence of God, as opposed to the distinctionless immanence of pantheism and its monistic relatives. And this doctrine of degrees of the actual immanence of God, varying according to the measure of likeness to the spirit of Christ, while it is the needed supplement to Ritschlianism and thus fills out the outline of a modern orthodoxy, at the same time leads one over naturally and necessarily into the field of metaphysics. These essential principles of modern orthodoxy have a right to be taken as working hypotheses in metaphysics and elaborated and tested in the

light of all relevant knowledge. And in the end this will doubtless mean at least as valuable a service of religion to philosophy as of philosophy to religion, for it is high time for metaphysics to recognize that the question of monism and pluralism is first of all a religious question and only secondly and secondarily a question of philosophy.

This task of finding, elaborating, and defending a modern orthodoxy is not an affair of the professional theologian alone; it is the business of the minister, and indeed of the whole religious community. The theologian doubtless has as much to learn from his brethren in the active ministry as he has to teach any of them, just as the true minister can always learn as much from his people as they have to learn from him. It is a case of the mutual service of reflection and experience. The theologian and the minister as a student of theology must study systems of thought, but even more imperative is the need to study religious life, to interrogate persistently and with due discrimination the human heart in its necessities and in its assurances, for in the end, when the transition to a modern position has become general, it is the Christian consciousness at its deepest and best that must pass final judgment as to what shall constitute the orthodoxy of the modern man.

*THE NATURE OF PRAYER*¹

MARY WHITON CALKINS

WELLESLEY COLLEGE

Prayer is the intercourse of the human spirit with a reality, or being, realized as greater-than-human and either conceived or treated as personal. This definition, it will be observed, leaves open the question whether the object of religion is always reflectively known to be personal; yet it regards prayer, the characteristic religious experience, as a personal and personifying consciousness, the worshipper's awareness of superhuman reality in vital connection with him, the worshipper. As William James has said, "The religious phenomenon, studied as an inner fact, and apart from ecclesiastical or theological complications has shown itself to consist, everywhere and at all its stages, in the consciousness which individuals have of an intercourse between themselves and higher powers with which they feel themselves to be related."² Or, to quote Jevons, "rites and ceremonies, sacrifices and altars exist" for the sake of "the prayer in which man's soul rises or seeks to rise to God."³

This paper considers the nature of prayer thus conceived as the expression of intercourse with God—or with the gods. Such a conception, it must be reiterated, does not involve an intellectualist view of religion and does not suppose that the worshipper has of necessity framed a metaphysical idea of God as personal being. It is the curious error of many contemporary writers to suppose that one cannot be conscious of a being as self, or person, without having formed such a speculative conception of the

¹ This paper, substantially as here presented, constituted the second of a series of four lectures, on the Psychology of Public Worship, delivered in July, 1910, at the Harvard Summer School of Theology.

² *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 465.

³ F. B. Jevons, *An Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion*, 1908, p. 149.

self. Thus, Ames⁴ believes that he has refuted the spiritistic view of religion when he has proved that the child or the savage cannot attain the conception of "the closely articulated and unified self." The truth is that one may have a predominantly emotional or volitional consciousness of oneself and of other self, human and divine. The records of primitive religious rites and the expressions of developed religious experience alike confirm the belief that such a personal consciousness, however fragmentary and confused, is involved in prayer.

The teaching of this paper stands, therefore, in complete opposition to the view that a God is merely a "central object" of attention⁵ and to all the theories which identify religion with magic, sacrament with charm, and prayer with incantation or impersonal ejaculation. It may well be true that magic antedates religion, and it is certain that prayers may be combined with incantation⁶ but the historically later experience is not necessarily identical with that on which it follows; and prayer and incantation, though directed to the same object, are utterly diverse in nature,—in Leuba's words, "they combine but never fuse." The difference between magic and religion may be insisted on with the greater vigor since it is taught by scholars who differ widely in their views of the relation between the two. Frazer, who believes that religion arises later than magic through a tardy recognition of the inherent falsehood and barrenness of magic, naturally asserts "a fundamental . . . opposition of principle between magic and religion."⁷ But Lang and Leuba and Jevons, who reject this intellectualist account of the origin of religion, hold with equal vigor the belief that the difference between prayer and charm or incantation is "essential, fundamental, as little to be ignored as it is possible to bridge."⁸ The dis-

⁴ *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, 1910, p. 972, etc. Cf. Irving King, "The Differentiation of the Religious Consciousness" in *Psychological Review*, Monograph Supplement, 1905, pp. 2, 20, etc.

⁵ Ames, *op. cit.*, pp. 97 ff., 106, 120, 172 ff., 311.

⁶ See J. H. Leuba, *The Psychological Origin and the Nature of Religion*, pp. 65 ff.; and M. Jastrow, as cited below, p. 492, and footnote.

⁷ *The Golden Bough*, second edition, p. xvi. Cf. F. B. Jevons, who quotes these words, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

⁸ F. B. Jevons, *An Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion*, 1908, p. 71. Cf. p. 104.

inction may be briefly formulated in the following statements:—An incantation is conceived as coercing the divine power for human ends, in a mechanical, non-personal fashion.⁹ For example, an incantation or the wearing of an amulet is supposed mysteriously and, as it were, mechanically, irrationally, without intervening conscious process, to influence the superhuman, controlling powers. Prayer, on the other hand, even though directed to the same end as that of the magical incantation, is the address of spirit to spirit; a personal attitude by which the divine self is conceived to be affected in essentially the way in which one person is affected by another.

The confusion of prayer with incantation seems to be closely connected, as effect or cause, with the very prevalent misconception which identifies prayer with petition. From this point of view prayer is synonymous with request or supplication, a begging, beseeching, besieging, demanding attitude of human self to superhuman power. This conception falsifies the history of religion and unduly narrows the meaning of prayer, which, as communion with God, may take on any form of personal intercourse. Unquestionably this has been the teaching of the church. "To speak boldly," says Clement of Alexandria, "prayer is conversation and intercourse with God."¹⁰ "Prayer," says St. Thomas, "is the ascent of the soul to God."¹¹ Sabatier repeats almost the words of Clement when he describes prayer as "intercourse with God, . . . intimate commerce, . . . interior dialogue."¹² And the outcome of that most penetrating study of personal religion, William James's *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, is a similar definition of prayer as "every kind of inward communion or conversation with the power recognized as divine."¹³

Thanksgiving and penitence, as well as petition, are forms of

⁹ See Leuba, *op. cit.*, pp. 12 ff., 49 ff.; Tiele, *Elements of the Science of Religion*, vol. ii, pp. 16, 135 ff.; Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie*, *Mythus und Religion*, 2ter Teil, pp. 182 ff.

¹⁰ *Stromata*, vii, 242 d.

¹¹ *Summa theologiae*, *secunda secundae*, *quaest. lxxxiii*, art. i, 2.

¹² *Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion*, pp. 24–26, quoted by James, as cited below, pp. 464–465.

¹³ *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902, p. 464; cf. p. 477, note 2.

intercourse with God "common in the most primitive faiths." We may, therefore, profitably widen and deepen our conception of prayer if we bring together illustrations of its different forms from different stages of the religious experience. Fundamental to all is the prayer which expresses not petition, nor penitence, nor thanksgiving, but the mere sense of fellowship. A seemingly perfect example are the prayers, quoted by Tylor, addressed by the Samoyed woman on the steppes of Asia to the sun: "When thou risest, I too rise from my bed; when thou sinkest down, I too get me to rest."¹⁴ I know of nothing to compare with this except the naïveté, sophisticated to be sure in comparison with this utter simplicity, of what may be named the narrative portions of St. Augustine's *Confessions*. Like the Samoyed woman, St. Augustine is, as it were, assured of God's interest, of his companionship, and talks to him as simply as to a sympathetic human hearer.

Next to these, and still at a far remove from prayers of petition, one may group the prayers of reverent contemplation, of adoration, prayers in which the emphasis falls, not on human need, or weakness, or satisfaction, but on the divine completeness and greatness, the prayers in which, to use Everett's fine phrase, the feelings of the worshipper centre in God. An example of such prayer is found in the opening lines of a Babylonian hymn to the Sun God:

O Shamash! out of the horizon of heaven thou issuest forth,
 The bolt of the bright heavens thou openest,
 The door of heaven thou dost open.
 O Shamash! over the world thou dost raise thy head;
 O Shamash! with the glory of heaven thou coverest the world.¹⁵

Countless illustrations of these prayers of confidence and adoration may be found in the Hebrew scriptures and in the writings

¹⁴ E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. ii, pp. 291-292. Cf. D. G. Brinton, *Religions of Primitive People*, 1897: "The earliest hymns and prayers do not, as a rule, contain definite requests but are general invitations to the gods to be present."

¹⁵ Quoted and translated from Sir H. C. Rawlinson, *The Cuneiform Inscriptions of Western Asia*, 20(2) K 3343, by M. Jastrow, *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, 1898, p. 301. Like all these hymns to Shamash, this hymn passes into an incantation,—in Jastrow's words (p. 293, etc.), a probable "concession made to the persistent belief in the efficacy of certain formulas."

of Christian saints of all ages. "Thou art the same and thy years have no change," says the psalmist. "Thou hast made us for thyself," is the prayer of Augustine, "and our hearts are restless till they rest in thee." And Thomas à Kempis, a thousand years later, prays: "Thou brightness of eternal glory, thou comfort of the pilgrim soul, with thee is my tongue without voice and my very silence speaketh unto thee. Come, oh come; for without thee I shall have no joyful day or hour; for thou art our joy, and without thee my table is empty." Taken together these prayers of fellowship and of adoration may be contrasted with those more egoistic prayers in which the stress falls not on divine greatness or strength but on human need or gratification.

Prayers of thanksgiving, however superficially related to these prayers of adoration, yet differ from them in requiring a less exclusive absorption in God, in starting from the sense of human satisfaction, human delight, which is then attributed to God as cause: "O that men would praise the Lord," cries the psalmist, "for his goodness and for his wonderful works to the children of men." Prayers of thanksgiving belong to very primitive peoples; and in sacrifice one often finds concrete expression of gratitude. Such sacrifices, exemplified by first-fruits, ceremonials, and burnt offerings, are most often accompanied by verbal expressions. "Even the savage," Jevons asserts, "who simply says 'Here, Tari, I have brought you something to eat' is expressing thanks, albeit in savage fashion."¹⁶

Equally egoistic in their emphasis are the prayers of penitence, the acknowledgments of sin. For in these the worshipper's keenest consciousness is of his weakness, his guilt, his unworthiness. "O my God, my sins are many, great are my transgressions," is the confession of the sinner in one of the penitential psalms of the Babylonians.¹⁷ "I acknowledge my transgression and my sin is ever before me," says a Hebrew psalmist. Yet always, mingled with the consciousness of his own sin, the penitent has the vivid consciousness of God, else this were no religious experience, and the consciousness of intercourse with God, else it were no prayer. In penitential prayer I am conscious of my

¹⁶ Jevons, *op. cit.*, p. 183; cf. pp. 186-187.

¹⁷ Jastrow, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

weakness, my failure, my sin, not as a merely individual experience, and not simply as a contravention of human law, an attack on society, a wrong to my fellow-men, but in its relation to God. I am conscious of my weakness as contrasted with his strength, of my sin as opposition to his will. And I cry, in the acuteness of this personal contact of sinning soul with divine self, "Against thee, thee only, have I sinned."

Penitential prayers are clearly allied to one of the forms of petition,—prayer for forgiveness. Sacrificial offerings for sin are the concrete manifestations of this yearning for pardon. Even the effort to bribe the god is in essence a prayer for pardon, even though it evidences a cleft between religion and morality. So the savage who says, "Here is a bit of the pig, good Hiero, take it and say nothing of it," expresses at the least his sense of the power of the god to deliver him from the consequence of wrong-doing.

But one need not turn to the Hebrew and Christian scriptures only for illustration of prayers for forgiveness quite devoid of the flavor of bribery and of intrigue. Here, for example, is an Aztec prayer: "O merciful Lord, let this chastisement with which thou hast visited us give us freedom from evil and follies."¹⁸ The following is quoted by Tylor from the *Rig-Veda*: "Through want of strength, thou strong and bright god, have I gone wrong; have mercy, almighty, have mercy."¹⁹ A Babylonian psalm, cited by Jastrow, contains a passionate confession of sin:

I seek for help, but no one takes my hand;
 I weep, but no one approaches me.
 I call aloud, but no one hears me.
 Full of woe, I grovel in the dust without looking up;
 To my merciful god I turn speaking with sighs.

 To the known or unknown god do I speak with sighs,
 To the known or unknown goddess do I speak with sighs.
 O lord, look upon me, accept my lament;
 O goddess, look upon me, accept my lament.

One can compare with this no other than the familiar words of the Hebrew psalms: "Out of the depths have I cried unto thee:

¹⁸ Brinton, op. cit., p. 106; quoted from Sahagun, *Hist. de Nueva España*, lib. v.

¹⁹ *Rig-Veda*, vii, 89, 3; quoted by Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. ii, p. 374.

O Lord, hear my voice. . . . Have mercy upon me, O God, according to thy lovingkindness, according to the multitude of thy tender mercies blot out my transgression."

Of a second and ethically even higher type of petitionary prayer are the prayers for moral strength. In the petition, quoted by Brinton, of a Sioux Indian the prayer to be kept from sin is combined with a petition of the material sort. "O my grandfather, the Earth," the Indian prays, "I ask that thou givest me a long life and strength of body. When I go to war, let me capture many horses and kill many enemies. But in peace, let not anger enter my heart."²⁰ Tylor quotes an Aztec prayer for a newly made ruler: "Make him, Lord, as your true image, and permit him not to be proud and haughty in your throne and court."²¹ The psalms abound in such petitions: "Unto thee lift I up mine eyes, O thou that dwellest in the heavens. Behold as the eyes of servants look unto the hand of their masters and as the eyes of a maiden unto the hand of her mistress, so our eyes wait upon the Lord our God, until that he have mercy upon us."

We come finally to the petitions for material good. Unquestionably, prayers of this sort are most frequent, not merely among primitive peoples, but throughout the ages of prayer. These are the prayers for food, for raiment, for success in war and in love, and for length of life. Thus, the prayer of the Nootka Indian, "Let me live, not be sick, find the enemy, not fear him, find him asleep and kill a great many of him," closely resembles the petition of the Hebrew psalmist: "Let his days be few, . . . let his children be continually vagabonds and beg; let the extortioner catch all that he hath. . . . Let there be none to extend mercy unto him. . . . Let this be the reward of mine adversaries from the Lord. . . . But do thou for me, O God, the Lord, for thy name's sake." And that of the Gold Coast negro, "Give me rue and yams, gold and agries, . . . slaves, riches, and health," could be matched by many prayers offered in Christian churches.

Now these are the prayers which are characterized, by those who

²⁰ Brinton, *op. cit.*, p. 106; quoted from Clark, *Indian Sign Language*, p. 309.

²¹ Tylor, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 373; quoted from Sahagun.

oppose the practice of prayer, as irrational or even immoral. Petition, it is said, unless it is an essentially futile, ejaculatory exercise, a device for relieving emotion by the aimless expressing of it, must involve belief in the possibility of obtaining its end. And this requires the assumption that the eternal purposes can be altered for the caprice or the wish of the individual. How can I rationally pray for favorable weather, for riches, for personal success? Either the satisfaction of my wish is already inevitable, or I must believe that I can deflect the divine purpose. In full agreement with this protest, I hold that prayers for concrete and individual good are inconsistent alike with the deterministic hypothesis underlying all natural science, with any absolutist philosophy, and with the form of theism which conceives of God's purposes as eternal. Such prayers are, in fact, irrational forms of the essentially reasonable expression of the consciousness of our dependence on God and of his interest in our concerns.

But this unqualified acknowledgment of the crude and unjustified demand for material and selfish good involves no searching criticism of prayer as such. For, as we have found, historical investigation and psychological analysis unite in the demonstration that prayer is more than petition. Prayers of fellowship and adoration and petitions for spiritual goods, obviously assume no reversal of God's purpose, no opposition to the common good in the interest of any one person. And even petition for individual and material good is rational and morally justifiable if it be fused with the conscious submission of human to divine will. A prayer of the Khonds, a tribe of Northern India, reads: "O Lord, we know not what is good for us. Thou knowest it. For it we pray."²² This recalls the prayer of Fénelon, "Lord, I know not what I ought to ask of thee; thou only knowest what I need. . . . Behold my needs which I know not myself. . . . Smite or heal; depress me or raise me up; I adore all thy purposes without knowing them; I am silent. . . . I yield myself to thee. I would have no other desire than to accomplish thy will. Teach me to pray. Pray thyself in me."²³ So Socrates "prayed simply for things good, because the gods knew best what is good;"²⁴

²² Brinton, *op. cit.*, p. 105; cf. Jevons, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

²³ Fénelon.

²⁴ *Memorabilia*, i, § 2.

and St. Paul says that "we know not what we should pray for as we ought, but the spirit itself maketh intercession for us." Frederick Robertson has said, "That prayer which does not succeed in moderating our wish, in changing the passionate desire into still submission, the anxious, tumultuous expectation into silent surrender, is no true prayer, and proves that we have not the spirit of true prayer. That life is most holy in which there is least of petition and desire, and most of waiting upon God; that in which petition most often passes into thanksgiving." In prayer like this, petition itself has become acceptance. I do not merely surrender my will, I identify my will with God's, if I pray, "Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight."

Petitions of this sort, the free expression to God, our heavenly Father, of those wishes and desires which we know that he knows and which yet we pour out before him in the great personal instinct of complete intercourse, petitions in which the passion of desire is fused with loyal adoption of God's purpose and with full submission to his will, most clearly show the essential meaning of answers to prayer. The term is usually taken to designate the instances in which prayer for material good is followed by the happening of the event prayed for. And discussions of the answers to prayer, on the one hand, heap up instances of material health and wealth and prosperity following on specific petitions, and, on the other hand, insist that the rational order of the universe cannot be conceived as broken to meet individual need, and that these alleged "answers" are one and all coincidences. With the whole weary controversy we have no concern. For it utterly mistakes the nature of God's answer to prayer. Answer to prayer is, essentially, the recognition of the human by the divine self, the reaction of the divine on the human, the response of God's love to human love and trust. In a word, God's answer to prayer is God's consciousness of the human self as turning to God. The conviction that prayer is, in this sense, answered is indeed an inherent factor in prayer. In the words of James, "The intercourse is realized as mutual. . . . The conviction that something is genuinely transacted is the very core of living religion."²⁵

²⁵ *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 466, note 2; cf. p. 477, note 2.

The relation thus conceived between man and God is, it must be insisted, harmonizable with theistic religion—and, I may add, with personalistic philosophy of every type, pluralist or absolutist. For, granting the existence of divine and human selves, the analogy of human experience shows the possibility—nay, the necessity—of the reciprocal relation of spirit to spirit. Not, then, through any acceptance of a special revelation, but through the recognition of the inevitableness of the relation of intercourse between spirits, Tennyson cries,—

“Speak to him, thou, for he hears, and spirit with spirit can meet;
Closer is he than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.”

Up to this point, prayer has been discussed as relation of the single worshipper to God. But it is evident that this analysis of prayer is in no way opposed to the prevalent teaching that prayer and sacrament and religious rite are social in their origin. Thus Jevons asserts that “public worship has been from the beginning the condition without which private worship could not begin and without which private worship cannot continue”;²⁶ and more recently E. S. Ames argues that “these ceremonials are social and therefore have the massive and corporate value of the entire community consciousness.”²⁷ Not only, indeed, the primitive but the developed religious consciousness may be truly “social.” For in spite of the unassailable privacy of the relation between me, the worshipper, and God, there may yet be fused with my awareness of this individual relation the consciousness of other selves related, as I am related, to God. Of course, this feeling—the experience of sympathy or sharing—implies the recognition of a common God. Such an experience finds expression in the well-known prayer of Robert Louis Stevenson: “We beseech thee, Lord, to behold us with favor, folk of many families gathered together in the peace of this roof, weak men and women subsisting under the covert of thy patience.” This is the expression of feeling which one could not have toward one’s own particular guardian spirit, or *daimon*; the feeling, on the other hand, of a family to a household or patriarchal god; of the

²⁶ An Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion, p. 176.

²⁷ The Psychology of Religious Experience, p. 72, note 2.

members of a tribe to a tribal god; in a word, of the members of a community to the community god. It is a feeling widening indeed with every enlarging conception of God until at last it becomes a consciousness "of the union of the world of all spirits,"²⁸ and incarnates itself in the universal prayer to Our Father.

This consciousness of other selves in common relation to God is the essential mark of public worship. It may appear in various stages and grades of intensity and clearness,—as an emotional consciousness of myself affected by these other selves in common relation to God, or as a developed and reflective consciousness, a realization of myself as member of a social organization, of a church or religious community. "O God"—we pray in these moments when we are profoundly conscious of ourselves and of all mankind in universal relation to the divine self—"O God, who art and wast and art to come, before whose face the generations rise and pass away; age after age the living seek thee, and find that of thy faithfulness there is no end. Our fathers in their pilgrimage walked by thy guidance and rested on thy compassion; still to their children be thou the cloud by day, the fire by night. O thou Sole Source of peace and righteousness, join us in one communion with thy prophets and saints who have trusted in thee."²⁹

Such a reflective consciousness of the network of human relations may, it is true, conceivably crowd out the God-consciousness from which it sprang—and we have then ecclesiasticism and institutionalism without religion, husk without kernel. At the other extreme, the worshipper may be utterly inattentive to his fellow, primarily conscious only of his individual relation to God, yet even here he is affected in spite of himself by the emotion and the loyalty expressed in common rites, and even by the bare presence of his fellow-worshippers. The justification of public worship is, indeed, primarily this admitted contagiousness of emotion, this suggestibility of the individual through the social group.

But neither the vividness of the experience of public worship nor the possibility, or even probability, that purely social rites

²⁸ James, *op. cit.*, p. 231, note.

²⁹ James Martineau.

antedated prayers to a God, treated as personal, justify the conclusion of Ames and King and other contemporary writers, that religion is a purely social experience, "the consciousness of the highest social values, the social attitude of solidarity."³⁰ Such a conclusion unduly obliterates the widely recognized distinction between the merely social and the religious experience, and is with difficulty reconciled, even by its advocates, with the records of primitive religions.³¹ Let it be granted that the community-meal preceded and grew into the tribal sacrifice, and that the prayer resembles the earlier incantation. Yet neither form of words nor feast becomes religious until it involves "the very movement itself of the soul putting itself in a personal relation of contact with the mysterious power of which it feels the presence."

³⁰ Ames, *op. cit.*, pp. 144, 168.

³¹ Cf. Ames, *op. cit.*, p. 134: "Prayer appears to justify the belief in supernatural beings." Cf. Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie, Mythos und Religion*, 3ter Teil, for the explicit distinction between the primitive social and moral consciousness and primitive religion. Wundt says, for example: "Die Keime des Sittlichen [liegen] zunächst ausserhalb des Gebiets religiöser Betätigung (p. 690). . . . Die [Wurzel] der Religion ist die . . . Idee des Uebersinnlichen; die der Sittlichkeit liegt zunächst in den sinnlichen Affekten (p. 751)."

G. McC. S. 301,

45633

Princeton University Library



32101 076387131

